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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
1. The Problem of the Dissertation 
After nearly two thousand years of Christian theology 
the problem of man is still very much a live issue. The 
continuing struggle with this problem is reflected in the 
writings of Nicolas Alexandrovich Berdyaev.1 In particular, 
no recent Christian thinker of importance has given such 
clear and emphatic expression to the idea of man's creativi-
ty as has this Russian Christian philosopher-theologian. 
This emphasis in his writings is rather unusual in that it 
came during a period of theological discussion when the dom-
inant theological viewpoint gave emphasis to man as the 
creature and there was much discussion of man's Kreaturlich-
keit. 
The purpose of this study is to explore Berdyaev's 
concept of human creativity--first in a comprehensive, expo-
sitory manner and then in a more intensive, evaluative ap-
proach. 
1 . Berdyaev's name is found with several variant spellings 
(e.g.t the Library of Congress uses the spelling Ber-
diaev}. The spelling used in this study is the one 
generally used by the publishers of Berdyaev's works 
in the English . 
l 
2 
(1) The study will first explore the theological sig-
nificance of Berdyaevts idea of human creativity and seek to 
determine its relation to a Christian doctrine of salvation. 
The idea of human creativity lies at the very center of 
Berdyaev's thinking but nowhere has he given a developed 
treatment of it. He announced it often in his writings but 
he was usually soon carried away by other matters which 
pressed in for his attention. 
The theme of human creativity was first announced in 
his book The Meaning of the Creative Act. 1 This is the book 
by which he first became known in western Europe. But writ-
ing of this work much later in his autobiography he said: 
"My misfortune is that, owing partly to the distraction pro-
vided by other themes and problems and partly to my unsys-
tematic manner of thinking, I was never able to work out the 
principal thesis of this work."2 On the dust-cover of The 
Meaning of the Creative Act is the statement that there was 
1. Trans. Donald A. Lowrie (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 
1955). Cited hereafter as Creative Act. This book was 
finished by Berdyaev in 1914 and was published in Mos-
cow in 19lb. It was the last book he was able to pub-
lish in Russia before his exile. The German translation, 
Der Sinn des Schaffens, appeared in 1927• The English 
translation, however, did not appear until 1955, well 
after the author's death and after the appearance in 
1952 of the English translation of his last written 
book, The Realm of Spirit and the Realm of Caesar. 
2. Nicolas Berdyaev, Dream and Reality, trans. Katharine 
Lampert (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1950), pp. 210-211. 
Cited hereafter as Dream. 
discovered among the papers of Berdyaev, after his death, 
the outline for a projected new book on creativity. 
3 
(2) On the basis of this comprehensive exposition of 
Berdyaev's idea of human creativity, the second purpose of 
the study is to identify the major theological presupposi-
tions which undergird the idea and to evaluate these presup-
positions. 
2. Definitions 
The term "human creativity," as used here,refers to Ber-
dyaev's concept, the meaning of which constitutes an impor-
tant part of the problem of the dissertation. 
"Salvation," as used in the statement of the problem, 
means the proper relationship of man to God and the benefits 
accruing to man from this relationship. 
3· Limitations 
This study is of a theological nature and its chief con-
cern is with the theological meaning of the problem. It 
shall consider matters of a philosophical or psychological 
nature only as they appear in the writings and thought of 
Berdyaev and only with the purpose of clarifying some theo-
logical aspect of Berdyaev's thought. 
No attempt will be made to trace the development of 
Berdyaev's thought. However, in the effort to understand and 
to express his thought about man as a creator, the signifi-
cant sources of and influences upon his thinking will be 
noted . 
4 
There is no concern for what may be called the cultural 
aspects of human creativity, the so-called "creative arts" 
(e . g . , science , art, music}. Though there is some relation-
ship between these and Berdyaev's concept of human creativi-
ty , they occupy only a peripheral place in his thought and 
have no direct importance for a theological study. 
4. Previous Research in the Field 
One of the earliest doctoral studies of Berdyaev is 
that by Kennedy in a St . Louis University dissertation . 1 
This work has its limitations, both because of Berdyaev's 
productivity after its date and because of the narrow pur-
poses which characterize the study. 
The problem of time and history in Berdyaev's thought 
has been treated in a dissertation by Williams at Boston 
University2 and in a Drew University dissertation by 
1 . Paul Vincent Kennedy , "A Philosophical Appraisal of the 
Modernist Gnosticism ~ of Nicolas Berdyaev" (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation , St . Louis University , 1936) . The 
purpose of this study is succinctly stated in its Ab-
stract: "The aim of this thesis is to demonstrate that 
Berdyaevts doctrine is really a revival of Gnosticism 
on a Modernist basis ; that the appearance of profun-
dity in his writings is delusive; and that his accept-
ance as a rel igious leader would be dangerous and ill-
judged. " 
2 . Bert Charles Williams , "Berdyaev's Philosophy of Histo-
ry" (unpublished Ph . D. dissertation, Boston University , 
1949) . 
5 
Slaatte . 1 
The problem of freedom and time has occupied the dis-
sertations by Phillips at Bryn Mawr College2 and by Cherbon-
nier at Columbia Univers1ty . 3 Both are concerned with the 
tension between time and freedom in the person, but Phillips 
develops this with special reference to Kant's treatment of 
the subject-object problem while Cherbonnier, whose study 
includes Bergson and Heidegger as well as Berdyaev, is con-
cerned with Berdyaev's interpretation of the experienced 
datum of freedom as encompassing both the temporal and the 
eternal . A treatment devoted to the specific problem of free-
dom in Berdyaev's philosophy is to be found in a disserta-
tion by Cayard . 4 
Berdyaev's metaphysics is studied in a Tulane Universi-
ty dissertation by Dye5 while the specific problem of the 
1 . Howard A. Slaatte , "Time and Its End in the Existential-
ism of Nicolas Berdyaev " (unpublished Ph. D. disserta-
tion, Drew University , 1955). 
2 . Rilla May Phillips , "Time , Fr eedom and Self-Consciousness 
in the Philosophies of Karl Jaspers and Nicolas Ber-
dyaev11 (unpublished Ph . D. dissertation, Bryn Mawr 
College, 1961) . 
3 • Edmond LaBeaume Cherbonnier , "Freedom and T~e: A Study 
in Some Recent Contributions to the Problem" (unpub-
lished Ph. D. dissertation , Columbia Universit y , 1951) . 
4 . William Wallace Cayard , "Berdyaev ' s Philosophy of Free-
dom" (unpublished Ph . D. dissertat i on, University of 
Southern California , 1957) . 
5· James Wayne Dye, "Unity i n Duali ty : An Examination of the 
Metaphysics of Nicolas Berdyaev" (unpublished Ph. D. 
disser tation , Tulane University , 1959) . 
6 
antitheses, dualities, polarities, and antinomies of Ber-
dyaev's metaphysics is dealt with in a dissertation by Dren-
nen.1 The particular metaphysical problem of evil, freedom 
and the Ungrund in Berdyaev is the concern of a dissertation 
by Tsambassis. 2 
A study in the area of comparative literature by Shel-
don at Indiana University is an attempt to clarify the rela-
tionships between Berdyaev and some of his literary and phil-
osophical predecessors.; A particular value of this study is 
that it represents an important step in the establishment 
of a definitive bibliography of Berdyaev's writings. 
A work which most closely approaches the area of the 
present investigation is the Yale dissertation by Kirkland.4 
This study in ethics is a consideration of Paul, Luther and 
Berdyaev against the background of the interest in the rela-
tion between creativity and morality found in Nietzsche, 
1. Donald A. Drennen, "The Oppositionist Character of Nico-
las Berdyaev's Philosophy" (unpublished Ph.D. disserta-
tion, Fordham University, 1958). 
2. Alexander Nicolas Tsambassis, "Evil and The 'Abyssmal 
Nature' of God in the Thought of Brightman, Berdyaev, 
and Tillich" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, North-
western University, 1957). 
;. James Gail Sheldon, "The Orientation of Nicolas Berdyaev: 
His Relation to Jacob Boehme, Fyodor Dostoyevsky, Frie-
drich Nietzsche, and Henrik Ibsen" (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, Indiana University, 1954). 
4• William Kirkland, "Creative Morality and Christian Eth-
ics" {unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 
1954). 
7 
Bergson and L.A. Reid. 
The investigation of previous research reveals that no 
doctoral dissertation has been written which has been devot-
ed to the specific theme of human creativity in the thought 
of Berdyaev. It also reveals the need for more theological 
confrontation with Berdyaev--the studies cited above are 
predominantly philosophical in nature. 
5· The Method of the Dissertation 
Because the idea of human creativity cuts through much 
of what Berdyaev has written, a consideration of the entire 
range of his thought is required. All of his philosophico-
theological writings in English translation have been sur-
veyed for possible relevance. Despite the very moderate 
interest which American theologians have shown in Berdyaev, 
it is fortunate that every book from his mature and most 
productive period has appeared in English translation. The 
specific books most relevant to this study, listed in the 
chronological order of their writing and with the date of 
their first English publication, are: The eaning of the 
Creative Act (1955), Freedom and the Spirit (1935), The Des-
tiny of Man (1937), Solitude and Society (1938), Spirit and 
Reality (1939), Slavery and Freedom (1944), The Beginning 
and the End (1952), and The Divine and the Human (1949). 
There are also significant insights to be gleaned from his 
essay on Dostoevsky (1934) and from his autobiography 
8 
Dream and Reality (1951). 
Following a brief presentation of biographical materi-
al, this study approaches the comprehensive exposition of 
the theological meaning of Berdyaev's teaching on human 
creativity by engaging his thought at its most inclusive and 
determinative point--his dualism of spirit and nature (Chap-
ter III). Concerned mainly with the meaning of Berdyaev's 
dualism, this chapter also considers the reasons for his 
predication of a dualism, the philosophical background for 
the formulation of his thought at this point, his conception 
of the relationship which exists between the two terms of 
his dualism (symbolism), and his understanding of the pro-
cess which creates the dualism (objectification). 
From this point the study, which continues to be philo-
sophically oriented, narrows its concern to an investigation 
of the content and meaning which Berdyaev gives to the word 
"spirit" (Chapter IV). The approach to an understanding of 
"spirit" is made by a study of its three main expressions--
personality, freedom and creativeness . Theological meanings 
begin to assert themselves throughout this chapte~ so that 
it ends with the conclusion that the main theological con-
cern of Berdyaev's teaching on human creativity is that 
human creativity involves the problem of a particular under-
standing of man's relationship to God. 
fhe study which follows then becomes primarily of a 
9 
theological nature. Chapter V explores the two terms of the 
creative relationship, God and man, and also shows the mean-
ing of Christ for this relationship. The treatment of the 
first phase of the problem of this dissertation, the theo-
logical meaning of human creativity in Berdyaev's thought, 
concludes in Chapter VI with an identification of the marks 
of the creative experience of God and its communal or cosmW 
consequences. 
The second phase of the problem, to identify the major 
theological presuppositions which undergird Berdyaev 1s 
teaching of human creativity and to evaluate these presup-
positions, is presented in Chapter VII. In order to under-
stand more clearly these theological features of Berdyaev's 
thought, the attempt is made to show them within the con-
text of contemporary theology by comparing and contrasting 
them with the thought of two present-day theologians, L. 
Harold DeWolf and Paul Tillich. Then Berdyaev 1s theological 
thought is evaluated in two ways. The first part of the 
evaluation consists of a test of the internal consistency 
of Berdyaev 1s thought as it is expressed in these major 
theological presuppositions . The second part of the evalu-
ation seeks to determine the adequacy of Berdyaev 1s theo-
logical thought to interpret the meaning of Christian 
experience. 
CHAPTER II 
A BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE "REBELLIOUS PROPHET 11 1 
Nicolas Alexandrovich Berdyaev was born March 6, 1874 
in Kiev , Russia. His family was of the aristocracy with a 
long, honorable military tradition. There was one other 
child in the family, a brother Serge, fifteen years the 
senior of Nicolas. 
In his childhood Berdyaev did not know a normal f~ly 
life nor was he exposed to traditional Orthodox training. 
His parents delegated the care of the child to a family 
nurse. In his autobiography he acknowledges that he never 
felt that he ''belonged'' to his parents; he never was able to 
appreciate blood ties, family life,or even resemblances be-
tween members of a family.2 As a child he never was required 
to do anything nor could he recall ever being punished. 
Sickness was a constant part of family life--the elder bro-
ther was both physically and emotionally ill--and 
1. Taken from the title of Donald A. Lowrie's biography, 
Rebellious Pro het: A Life of Nicolai Berd aev (New 
York: Harper and Bros., 19 0 • This is the best avail-
able source for a life of Berdyaev. 
2. Berdyaev, Dream, pp. 1-2. Though classified as an auto-
biography, this work is a statement of a spiritual pil-
grimage with only secondary interest in events and 
chronology. 
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throughout life Berdyaev lived in constant fear of sickness 
as was symbolized by the woolen scarf which he usually wore 
to protect his neck from drafts. 1 
A nervous tic,which plagued him from early childhood, no 
doubt left its mark upon the personality of Berdyaev, inten-
sifying his sense of peculiarity and encouraging the crea-
tion of an inner world of his own. 
Almost without warning the head would be thrown back, 
the fine face distorted with a tortured grimace, and 
from the twisted, wide-open mouth the tongue ould 
be thrust out. In a few seconds the spasm would pass 
and the face return to its normal state.2 
Berdyaev the child can be described as one who lacked 
family discipline, who manifested an inability to adapt him-
self to the ideas or wishes of others, who failed to relate 
himself to other boys of his age, and who was given to fits 
of anger. The totality of these factors produced "his con-
sciousness of spiritual apartness. The more the world 
pressed in upon him, the more he strove against it."3 
It was hoped that Berdyaev would continue the military 
tradition of his family, and at the age of ten he was en-
rolled in the Cadet Corps in his hometown of Kiev. There his 
scholastic record was undistinguished and, furthermore, he 
proved unable to adapt himself to the military discipline 
1. Lowrie, pp. 22-23. 2. Ibid., P• 23. 
3• Ibid., p. 26. See Berdyaev, Dream, pp. 37-38: "I atched 
~e formation of a subjective world which gradually 
evolved in me and which I opposed to the objective 
world around me." 
- -------- ----- ----------------------------, 
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of the school . At the end of six years of such training, he 
withdrew and began an intensive three year period of study 
which enabled him to pass the entrance examination for the 
University of Kiev . It should be observed that before leav-
ing military school he had already read Hegel, Schopenhauer, 
Kant , Tolstoy, and Dostoievsky . 
In 1894, at the age of twenty, he embarked upon his 
university career . He had intended to study natural science, 
but at that time Marxism was just beginning to make its way 
in intellectual circles in Russia and Berdyaev came under 
the influence of revolutionary theory . He became an active 
leader in the underground activities of the Social Democra-
tic Party , as the N~xists were called . In 1898, upon his 
third arrest fo r student revolutionary activities, he was 
expelled from the university . This ended his formal educa-
tion. While at the university , besides immersing himself in 
the writings of Marx, he very likely also read nietzsche . 
Two years later , in 1900 , the charges against Berdyaev were 
formally considered and he was sentenced to three years of 
exile in Vologda to the north . 
While he was in Vologda he took special delight in the 
works of Ibsen . It was here that Berdyaev began his own writ-
ing career . The title of his first book was Subjectivism 
and Individualism in Social Philosophy . The title itself is 
indicative of the movement froo Marxism to idealism which 
--------------~~~~~--~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-~~~~~~-
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was occurring in Berdyaev's thinking. 
He says that it was ethical considerations which carr~ 
him into the Marxist fold.l Although he held to the economic 
and political views of Marxism, he rejected dialectical ma-
terialism as a philosophical basis for these views. He con-
sidered himself an unorthodox, critical and free-thinking 
Marxist.2 His unorthodoxy, mainly his strong idealist ten-
dency, was the cause for tension between Berdyaev and some 
of his co-exiles during his stay at Vologda. 
He left Vologda late in 1902 and was permitted to live 
out the rest of his sentence in southern Russia. At this 
time he made the friendship of Serge Bulgakov, a young 
marxist professor of economics who later became a prominent 
Orthodox priest and theologian. In 1903 he went to Germany 
and studied for a semester at the University of Heidelberg 
under the neo-Kantian Windelband, while all the time contin-
uing his activity in revolutionary movements. 
Upon his return to Kiev in 1904,Berdyaev met and, after 
a s 1ft courtship, married Lydia Yudifovna Trusheff without 
the benefit of a formal marriage ceremony.3 After the mar-
1. Berdyaev, Dream, P• 115. 2. Ibid., P• 117. 
3· Lowrie, P• 73• This is consistent with Berdyaev's view 
that ulove is by its very nature J.awless and defies the 
law: lawful or legal love is love that has died. • • • 
The so-called institution of marriage is, in fact, a 
piece of shamelessness, exposing as it does to society 
that which should remain hidden and scrupulously guard-
ed against the eyes of strangers" (Dream, p. 71). 
--------------------------
riage he moved to St. Petersburg, then the capital of Russi~ 
There he found himself immersed in the atmosphere of the 
early twentieth century Russian renaissance which Berdyaev 
remembered for its ecstatic creative experiences, new pro-
blems and challenges, the awakening of original philosoph-
ical thought, profound spiritual uneasiness,and religious 
search1ng.1 
During his residency in the capital he associated with 
such men as Bulgakov, Andre Byeli , N.O. Lossky, and S.L. 
Frank--men who,like Berdyae~were moving toward idealism. 
Berdyaev shared in the work of two publications, The New Way 
and guestions of Life, and took the initiative in founding 
a religious-philosophical society whose activities centered 
in the reading of papers and intense discussion. Concerning 
the period of his stay in St. Petersburg he wrote that he 
"had not yet fully discovered or clearly defined the ruling 
motive of my life and thought"; however, "some hidden pro-
- -
cess [was) going on within me as yet not susceptible of 
expression, but pointing towards a deeper appreciation of 
the religious element.n2 He became increasingly aware of un-
wholesome elements in the atmosphere of St. Petersburg and 
in 1907 he left the city. 
After a brief time in Paris , Berdyaev settled in Moscow 
l. Berdyaev, Dream, P• 141. 2. Ibid., p. 162. 
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where he was to live until he went into final exile in 1922. 
It was the Moscow period, he said, which "coincided with a 
serious attempt on my part to study, and to relate my think-
ing to, the theological tradition of the Orthodox Church.nl 
But despite the intensification of his religious quest, he 
became increasingly antagonistic to the organized Orthodox 
Church. Especially troubled by the tendency of the Church to 
yield itself as a tool of political oppression, he acknow-
ledged that "I was increasingly made aware of the terrible 
stumbling-block provided by historical Christianity.n2 It 
as during this Moscow period that he had contacts with 
spokesmen of various religious sects and mystical groups 
outside the Orthodox Church,and from them he gained a great 
interest in the writings of the German mystics--Jacob Boehme, 
John Tauler and Meister Eckhart in particular. 
In 1912 Berdyaev went to spend a year in Italy. His 
visit there gave him a new comprehension of the Renaissance 
and brought a new wholeness to his life. "The disparate 
pieces of earlier thinking suddenly fell into an integral 
pattern, and in a movement of inspiration amounting to ec-
stasy he began to write.n3 The result of this writing, which 
1. Ibid., p. 165. Lowrie observes that the summer of 1907 
--siw Berdyaev well along toward a definite Christian 
experience and that he had then begun to read the 
church fathers (p. 99). 
2 . Ibid., P• 202. 3· Lowrie, P• 134· 
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was finished the following year in Moscow, was the book The 
Meaning of the Creative Act, a book which "signaled his de-
parture toward a position all his own."l 
Berdyaev welcomed the downfall of the tsar with the 
outbreak of the Russian revolution in 1917; he looked upon 
the revolution as inevitable and deserved,but he did not 
share the easy optimism of the revolutionary group so far as 
the long-range results of the revolution were concerned. 2 
He saw the revolution to be the result primarily of the 
failure of historical Christianity and the failure of Chris-
tians to do their duty. "Communism was for me from the very 
start a challenge and a reminder of an unfulfilled Christian 
duty. Christians ought to have embodied the truth of commun-
ism: had they done so, its falsehood would never have won 
the day.n3 
Over one million Russians fled Russia at the time of 
the revolution. The activities of these emigres centered in 
Berlin and Paris. Berdyaev, however, continued to live in 
Moscow during the first five years of the revolution. In 
1920 he was elected to the professorship of philosophy at 
the University of Moscow, and for a year he gave lectures in 
which he openly criticized Marxism. He was arrested by the 
1. Ibid., P• 137• 
3• Ibid., P• 229. 
2. Berdyaev, Dream, p. 222. 
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Soviet police near the end of his year of teaching at the 
university; and he was again arrested in 1922 on similar 
ideological grounds. This time he was sentenced to exile out-
side of Russia. It was during t his period of revolutionary 
turmoil that he wrote The Meaning of History and Dostoievsk~ 
ith a group of some seventy-five other exiles, Berdy~ 
traveled to Berlin. He was cordially received by the German 
authorities but experienced his first clash with the Russian 
emigres. Since he had remained in Moscow during the revolu-
tion, and still held to much of the Marxist social and eco-
nomic views, he was eyed with suspicion. Assisted by the 
American YMCA, he founded the Religious-Philosophical Acade-
my and engaged in other intellectual activity. But finally, 
due to economic distress resulting from the collapse of Ger-
man currency in 1923, Berdyaev moved to Paris in 1924• 
The last third of Berdyaev's life, spent in Paris, was 
his most active and productive . He continued the work of the 
Religious-Philosophical Academy which he transferred to 
Paris. In 1926 he founded~· (The Way), a religious and 
philosoPhical journal,which he edited until the outbreak of 
the second world war . He was made editor-in-chief of the 
YMCA Press, the largest publisher of Russian books outside 
the Soviet Union, and held this position until his death. 
Berdyaev wrote that "there has never been anything 
which caused me greater torment than my relationships with 
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other people and my railure in this respect."1 This trouble 
which plagued Berdyaev, and which certainly is a great part 
of the tragedy in his lire, is indicated in Lowrie's biogra-
phy in the titles of two of the chapters which deal with 
Berdyaev's life in Paris--"In and Out of Organizations" and 
"Broken Friendships." He had been active in the Russian Stu-
dent Christian Movement but later left it when he was con-
sidered a heretic by the more orthodox. He had had close 
contact with the Orthodox Theological Institute and had 
given occasional lectures there, but he ended his relations 
with the I nstitute by writing a hasty article against it in 
defense of one of its faculty members. The broken friend-
ships in the Paris period of Berdyaev's life are likely due 
to his trait of "personalizing opinion; if one broke with 
his neighbor's ideas, he broke with the neighbor as we11.n2 
His short temper and sudden bursts of anger only intensified 
his difficulty in maintaining friendships in the face of 
disagreements. He was essentially a lonely figure throughout 
his life, a fact which he regretfully noted in several of 
his writings. 
Berdyaev took an active interest in the ecumenical 
movement. Soon after his arrival in Paris he took the initi-
ative in arranging for interconfessional conversations 
1. Berdyaev, Dream, p. 28. 2. Lowrie, p. 203. 
between Orthodox, Roman Catholic and Protestant Christians . 
Participating were such men as Serge Bulgakov , Jacques Mari-
tain and Marc Boegner . Other men with whom Berdyaev associ-
' ated in Paris were Father Laberthonniere, Gabriel Marcel, 
/ Etienne Gilson, Emmanuel Meunier, and G. P. Fedotoff. One of 
his last important lecture series was given in 1946 at the 
Ecumenical Institute in Bessey, Switzerland. 
The books which Berdyaev considered most important for 
his thought are: The Meaning of the Creative Act and The 
Meaning of History, both produced in the pre-Paris period; 
and Freedom and the Spirit , The Destiny of Man, Solitude and 
Society , Spirit and Reality, Slavery and Freedom, The Begin-
ning and the End, The Fate of Man in the Modern World, and 
The Russian Idea--all produced during his Paris years . 1 His 
final manuscript was The Realm of Spirit and the Rea~ of 
Caesar. In speaking of the unsystematic nature of his books, 
he said that when he writes his thought flows so rapidly 
that he hardly has time to write it down-- "often I am forced 
to leave ords unfinished so as to keep up with the rapid 
course of my thinking . I never think much about the form it 
takes . "2 In addition to this , it is reported that Berdyaev 
1 . According to Lowrie , PP • 232-233 · 
2. Berdyaev , Dream, p . 219 . 
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would hand his manuscripts to the printer unedited. 1 
The invasion and fall of France caused Berdyaev intense 
suffering. He fled to south-west France only to have the 
area occupied by German troops shortly after his arrival. He 
returned three months later to his home outside Paris at 
Clamart. He never stopped writing during the war, and when 
it finished he continued on with his production. He died 
suddenly at his writing table on March 24, 1948. 
1. Lowrie, P• 189. 
CHAPTER III 
BERDYAEV' S DUALISM OF SPIRIT AND NATURE 
The selection of a starting-point for the exposition 
of the key concepts necessary for an understanding of Ber-
dyaev's thought is an arbitrary matter. It is impossible~ 
however, to go far in any direction without a clear under-
standing of his dualistic interpretation of the world which 
is experienced by man. This is a basic intuition and may be 
considered the starting-point from which Berdyaev proceeds 
to develop his thought. 
1. The Demands for a Dualistic View 
Berdyaev's dualism is predicated on three main cons1d-
erationss {1) man's awareness of his situation in the world, 
(2) the ethical-religious demand, (3) the philosophical 
demand. 
A. The Demand of Man's Situation 1n the World 
Existential philosophy has focused attention upon man's 
position in the world. In the book in wh1~ he first an-
nounced his theme of human creativity, The Meaning of the 
Creative Act, Berdyaev begins with the assertion that the 
world is the prison-house of the human soul. 
21 
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The human spirit is in prison. Prison is what I 
call this world, the given world of necessity. "This 
~rld" is not the cosmos; it is a non-cosmic condi-
tion of divisions and enmity, the atomization and 
falling apart of the living monads of the cosmic 
hierarchy. And the true way is that of spiritual lib-
eration from 11 the world," the liberation of man's 
spirit from its bondage to necessity. The true way 
is not a movement to right or left in the plane of 
"the world," but rather movement upward and downward 
on lines of the ultra-worldly, movement in spirit 
and not in "the world."l 
Again, speaking of this "world" by which man is confronted, 
~ 
the opening statement of his The Beginning and the End 
reads s 
:Man finds himself' in the world, or has been thrown 
into it, and as he stands facing the world he is con-
fronted by it as by a problem which demands to be 
solved. His continued existence depends upon the 
world, and he perishes in the world and by the action 
of the world. The world nourishes man, and it des-
troys him. The world environment into which he is 
cast in mysterious fashion from some source or other, 
everla~tingly threatens man and arouses him to con-
flict. 
These statements are autobiographical. They reveal the 
fundamental consciousness which Berdyaev had of' the world in 
which he lived and the basic posture of his lite in such a 
world. The world is restrictive, not unified, hostile to 
man's best interests, a 11 f'lat-land~ 1n which the third dimen-
sion of' depth 1s missing.~ But there is here also the hint 
1. :P. 11. 
2. Nicolas Berdyaev, The Beginning and the End, trans. R.M. 
French (New Yorks Harper and Bros., 1952), P• ;. Cited 
hereafter as Beginning. 
;. Berdyaev's autobiography, Dream and Reality, 1s so titled 
--·-----------------------------------------
that man is not necessarily helpless in the face of all 
this; he is not only threatened by the world, but it also 
comes to him as the challenge to a task. 
23 
This intuitive dualism must be the universal accompa-
n~ent of man's fullest consciousness of himself. "Man's 
highest consciousness £! himself ![ not explicable Bz !S! 
world£! nature !B£ remains ~mystery!£ that world.nl 
Man's self-consciousness reveals to him that which distin-
guishes him rrom the rest of the world. The methods of sci-
once, adequate in the study of nature, are not able to 
exhaust man's being; in fact, science cannot study that 
which is primary in man, and so a science of man is impos-
sible. Man's knowledge of himself as a part of the world 
of nature is a secondary feature in man's self-conscious-
ness because •man is first given for htmselt, and exper1 
ences himself as man, as a spiritual ract outside nature, 
outside this world. Man is prior to, and deeper than, his 
psychological and biological aspects.•2 Man knows binwelt, 
in his essence, to be a break in the world of nature. He 
cannot be contained nor exhausted within nature. Th fact 
that man is and the tact of his self-consciousness •otter a 
~ 
powerful and indeed the only rerutation to the appar nt truth 
•since it is, in the end, no more than a description of 
a fundamental conflict with this world and an evocation 
of the image of another one• (Dream, P• ;07). 
1. Creative Act, P• 61. 2. ~· 
that the world of nature is the only and final world.nl 
Man's existence, a break in the natural world, "proves 
that nature cannot be self-sufficient but rests upon a 
supernatural reality.n2 
This awareness of a dualism means that man is more 
complex than materialism would suspect. He belongs to two 
worlds, not two worlds existing objectively side by side, 
but to the two worlds of his experience. 
I aware of my self as a point of intersection 
of two worlds; while ~this'' world, the world of my 
actual living, is known to me as unauthentic, un-
true, devoid alike of primacy and ultimacy, there 
is "another world" more authentic and more true, 
to which my de pest self belongs.3 
B. The Ethical-religious Demand 
His awareness of man's position in the world as pred 
!eating a dualism is seen by Berdyaev to be not only his 
own basic intuition, and not only the universal accompani-
ment of man's deep self-consciousness, but also something 
which is demanded by religious and ethical considerations. 
Dualism is the starting-point or the basic intuition 
of all r 11g1ons and religious experience. 
1. ~., PP• 61-62. 
2. Nicolas Berdyaev, The Destiny of Man, trans Natalie 
Duddington <4th ed.; London: Geoffrey Bles, 1954), 
P• 46. Cited hereafter as Destinz. 
3• Dream, P• 20. 
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In the depths of every true religion and every 
fienuine mystic there is the thirst for overcoming 
the world" as a lower order of being, for victory 
over "the world," and hence we have asceticism as 
a way to this conquest and this victory. ithout 
this ascetic mDment, that is the conquest of lower 
nature for the sake of the higher, conquest of 
this world !or the sake of anothe1 world, religious 
and mystical life is unthinkable. 
The true religious life is equivalent to the mystical life 
in the sense that it transcends the mpirical world. The 
religious life has the specific purpose of enabling men 
"to pass beyond the limits of the objective world 112 which 
exercises a depressing influence upon the human spirit. 
Berdyaev understands Christianity to call tor his 
dualistic interpretation of the world. Christianity ac-
knowledg s "the !allen state of this world and, therefor , 
~ 
that to pass through dualism is unavoidable" while the 
-
eschatological element in Christianity "makes all forms ot 
onism impossible within the confines or this objectivized 
world.n3 Christianity's teaching of the Kingdom of God, 
which is not equivalent to the pr sent state of the world 
but whose power is manifested in the world, is seen to ply 
a dualistic phase in human destiny. 
Berdyaev states that the awakening of the religious 
1. Creative Act, P• 160. 
2. Nicolas Berdyaev, Solitude and Societ,, trans. George 
Reavey (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1938 , P• 47• Cited 
hereafter as Solitude. 
3• Beginning, PP• 20-21. 
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life for him was a strongly ethical matter. Bound up with 
his religious impulse from the very beginning was "a bitter 
feeling of discontent with and dissent from the world with 
its evil and corruption.ttl The evil of the "world" forms a 
- . 
basic problem for him and against it must be asserted the 
mDral realm, which is true reality. 0 The drudgery, ugliness 
and injustices" of life are what impel man to 0 seek refuge 
-in another world, the world of metaphysical or mystic con-
templation, the world of ideas or the City of God.n2 
c. The Philosophical Demand 
Berdyaev also sees the nature of the philosophical 
quest as 1mplying a dualism. Philosophy "starts by doUbting 
-the reality of the perceptible world, ot the world ot ob-
jects and things."~ As a philosopher, Berdyaev claims to 
-have "always denied that the things which the world pre-
sents to us are stable and final reality.n4 
The nature of Philosophy, then, is to transcend the 
empirically-given world. Since it perceives the world as 
1. Dream, P• 174• "Dualism and an ethical lin• of approach 
ar always associated with one another" (Beginning, p. 
20). 
2. Solitude, P• 22. ~· ~., P• W,.. 
4• Nicolas Berdyaev, Slavery and Freedom, trans. R.M. 
French (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1944), P• 7• 
Cited hereatter as Slavery. 
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value or as meaning rather than as mere fact (as science 
does), philosophy has as its aim "to investigate beyond the 
~ 
l~ts or the empirical universe, and thus to penetrate in-
to the intelligible universe, into the transcendental 
world.nl In transcending the objective world, philosophy 
"grapples with its underlying reality in the anxious hope 
~r probing the meaning or life and of personal destiny.n2 
~ 
It is Berdyaev's opinion that "our love or metaphysics 1s 
. 
engendered by our discontent with the world around us and 
our disgust at the empirical lite.n3 Dualism, then, though 
it is not the ultimate ontological truth, is "the fundruDen-
tal truth underlying philosophy. 114 
2. The Background tor Berdyaev's Dualism 
Berdyaev's dualism can only be understood in the light 
or two great dualistic systems in the history of philosophy, 
the dualisms of Plato and Kant. He is proud to claim both 
as part of his philosophical heritage. The reason tor the 
importanc of Plato and Kant lies in the tact that they 
represent stages in human self-consciousness when pbiloso 
phy arises out of dualistic thought which mak s the dis-
tinction between the world of sense and the world of ideas, 
the world of phenomena and the world of noumena 5 
1. Solitude, P• 7• 
3• ~., P• 7• 
5• Beginning, P• 7• 
2. Ibid., PP• 19-20. 
4• ~·~ P• 48. 
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A. Plato 
The "feeling'' of' Berdyaev's dualism is more Platonic 
than anything else. This is to be expected; he was raised 
in the Eastern Orthodox Church which is deeply steeped in 
the Platonic tradition. 
Aristotle describes Plato's dualism of Ideas and sen-
suous things as the joint product ot the Heraclitean doc-
trine of' th constant flux of things and of the Socr tic 
stress on detinition.l Wh n Plato learned through Socrates 
of' conceptions which, when once rightly defined, nev r 
Change he believed that their counterparts must not be 
found in the changing, sensuous world but that there must 
be other existences (which he named Ideas) which were the 
objects ot conceptual cognition. 
indelband observes that Plato's doctrine of Ideas 
meets metaphysical, epistemological and ethical needs. The 
Idea is "firstly the abiding Being in the change or phenom-
na; secondly, the object of knowledge in the change of 
opinions; thirdly, the true end in the change of des1res.n2 
But above all, Plato's immaterialism is not primarily an 
attempt to explain phenomena; rather, it "springs from the 
ethical need for a knowledge that is raised above all ideas 
1. Metaphysics i. 6. 
2. Wi1helm Windelband, A History of Philosophy, trans. 
James H. Tufts, (2d ed. rev.; New York: The Macmillan 
Co., 1901), P• 109• 
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gained by sense-perception.nl 
The Ideas are essentially different from the corporeal 
world. The world perceived by the senses is not the true 
world. True reality is incorporeal. The Platonic dualism, 
then. consists of the lower realm of natural process and 
change which is perceived by the sense, and the higher 
realm of Ideas which thought knows--the world which is im-
material, eternal, unchangeable. Plato is hailed by Ber-
dyaev as "the great founder" of the tendency of the human 
-
spirit "towards the art of passing beyond the limit of the 
given w~rld.n2 
B. Kant 
Though Berdyaev manifests Plato's mystical passion for 
the realm of the eternal and also his low estimate of the 
sense-world, he is most heavily indebted to Kant so far as 
the statement of his own dualism is concerned. He confesses 
"a special affinity with the dualism of Kant"; and stat s 
that "Kant's dualism was not a defect; it is quite the 
great;st merit of his ph1losophy.n4 He openly acknowledges: 
•uy attempt to set forth my own metaphysics of treedom will 
be derived from Kant . er5 
1 . Ibid., P• 117, The strong ethical note in Berdyaev's 
~alism has been noted. 
2. Creative Act, PP• ;1-;2. 
4. Beginning, P• 9· 
;. Slavery, P• 12. 
5 • Ibid. , p. 8. 
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Kant, in his critique of reason, brought to expression 
the important doctrine in his thought which involves the 
distinction between phenomenon and noumenon, between appear-
ance and the "thing-in-itself" (Ding-an-sich). Kant main-
tained that the categories are forms whereby the understand-
ing gives form and relationship to the perception of the 
senses, and that these forms have no contents in themsel~es 
apart from sensuous perception . Therefore the only object 
of human understanding is the appearance, the phenomenon, 
that which is given in sense experience. So far as man's 
ability to know his world is concerned, there is no dual-
istic distinction to be drawn . 
The pure concepts of the understanding never admit 
of a transcendental, but only of an empirical use, 
and • • • the principles of the pure understanding 
can only be referred, as general conditions of a 
possible experience , to ~bjects of the senses, never 
to things by themselves . 
This contrasts wi th Plato' s distinction between phenomenal 
and noumenal objects of knowledge , between that which the 
senses know and that which thought knows . "A real division 
of objects into phenomena and noumena, and of the world into 
a sensible and intelligible world • • is 1nadmissible.n2 
But Kant was not satisfied with just a phenomenal 
world. As Windelband points out, if reality is resolved 
1 . Immanuel Kant, Kant Selections, ed. Theodore M. Greene 
(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1929), P• 150. 
2. Ibid ., P• 154• 
-----------------------~·----------
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into phenomena, then nothing is real except what appears to 
a sensuously receptive being;and the world becomes just a 
shadow in the thought without its own cause or ground.1 
Accordingly, it was Kant's conclusion that noumena must be 
affirmed as a necessity for thought although they cannot be 
the objects of knowledge. "The concept of a noumenon is • • 
~ 
• merely limitative, and intended to keep the claims of sen-
sibility within proper bounds";2 that is, the noumenon 
. 
serves a negative function, not adding anything positive to 
sense perception. It is this function of limiting the sphere 
of sensibility that makes the noumenon indispensable, else 
what was given in the senses would be considered the whole 
of reality. 
It was in Kant's ethical theory that the positive sig-
nificance of the noumenon was shown.3 In order for morality 
to be possible, freedom must be real--freedom which is the 
self-determination of the rational will. A free act is an 
act not conditioned by others according to the category of 
causality, but rather it is a self-determined act which may 
be the initial cause of an endless series of acts. Pure un-
derstanding can know nothing of freedom which is an excep-
tion to the law of cause and effect and Which is necessary 
for the moral life. Freedom must then be a noumenal realit~ 
1. Pp. 547-548. 2. Kant Selections, P• 1~ 
3· See Windelband, P• 554· 
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and the reality of things-in-themselves as supersensuous is 
regarded as a moral postulate. Freedom is the object of 
faith (as are immortality and God). 
Though in different form, the over-all conclusion of 
Kant's two "critiques" is the dualism of Plato with its two 
worlds of the sensuous and the supersensuous, of the pheno-
mena and the th1ngs-in-themselves. 1 Phenomena make up the 
realm of necessity which is controlled by knowledge. The 
things-in-themselves constitute the realm of freedom which 
is controlled by faith. It is, in effect, a dualism of na-
ture and morality, of the sensuous world and the moral world. 
3• Berdyaev's Dualism 
As has already been noted, Berdyaev expressed great 
appreciation of Kant's dualistic conclusions . He saw e~al 
truth in Kant's distinction between the order of nature and 
the order of freedom.2 He approved Kant ' s dualism of two 
worlds and his recognition that the antinomies involved in 
that dualism are unavoidable . 3 Concerning those deter.mining 
ideas which have characterized "the whole extent of my phil-
osophical journey," he felt a special closeness to the dual-
ism of Kant with 
his distinction between the realm of freedom and the 
realm of nature, with his doctrine of freedom as of 
1 . Ibid . , P • 555 • 
3• Ibid . , P• 85 • 
2 . Beginning, P• 9· 
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a character which is apprehended by the mind, with 
the Kantian doctrine of the will, with his view of 
the world of phenomena as distinct from the real 
world which he not ve,q happily called 11 the world of 
things in themselves. 
The hint of his basic criticism of Kant is already con-
tained in these approving words. A statement of Berdyaev's 
dualism could best begin by observing how he would correct 
Kant at this point. The main burden of this criticism is 
that Kant did not deal adequately with the noumenal world, 
that he made the mistake of opposing the phenomenal world 
to the object-in-itself which was empty of both experience 
and knowledge.2 In doing this, Kant "obscured the path of 
knowledge of the authentic world of existence" which is dis-
tinguished from the world of phenomena as can be seen in the 
fact that "the category of spirit is almost entirely lacking 
in his phiiosophy."3 Kant saw the thing-in-itself as an 
objectively-existing thing (though not an object for know-
ledge) which guaranteed the independence of the object per-
ceived from the knowing mind . For Berdyaev, on the other 
hand, the thing-in-itself (if it may still be called that) 
is not an object, not a thing, not in the non-ego,but is 
rather a subject. Though Kant did not draw the fullest con-
clusions from his distinction of the sphere ~f nature and 
the sphere of freedom, yet "after Kant it was possible to 
1 . Slavery, P • 12. 
3 · Slavery, P• 12. 
2. Solitude, p. 27. 
-----------------------------------------------------------
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see metaphysical reality only in the ego.nl .Phenomena, in 
Berdyaev's dualism, are not grounded in unknown objects or 
things-in-themselves conceived of as true reality, but are 
grounded in the subject or ego, the real noumenal world, 
which gives phenomena their existence. It is in the expla-
nation of the two worlds that Berdyaev differs with Kant. 
Because of his failure to identify the noumenal world 
with the subject or ego, Kant failed to become the founder 
of modern existentialism, although he almost achieved it.2 
In his thought the possibility of personalist and existen-
tial philosophy is revealed, for "the order of freedom is 
indeed Existenz,u3 and it leads "to the discovery of the 
active subject."4 
Having observed that Berdyaev's dualism is demanded by 
his consciousness of man's situation in the world, and is 
predicated also by ethical-religious and philosophical con-
siderations, and having pointed out the Platonic and Kantian 
background for this distin~ion which he makes in man's 
experience of reality, the study now proceeds to point out 
the specific meaning of this distinction in his dualism. 
Some allusion to this has already been made in the foregoing 
1. Beginning, p. 23 . This possibility was developed in Ger-
man idealism by Fichte and Hegel, but in a way which 
Berdyaev thought obscured the individual ego. 
2 . Solitude, P• 46. 
4• Solitude, P• 27. 
:;. Beginning, p. 9• 
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discussion. 
A. Noumena 
True to the historically-developed meaning of this 
term, the question of the noumenon is also for Berdyaev the 
question: "What is reality? What is that which is primary 
and from which all else arises?" The answer which most fre-
quently occurs in his writings is the term "spirit. 111 "Spir-
it11 signifies the depth dimension of man's being,which does 
not submit to the law of causality which Kant held applies 
to all phenomena. The traditional categories of "substance" 
and "essence" are not applicable to spirit, for spirit 
11belongs to another order of reality and to a different 
scheme of things"2 than that to which static concepts apply. 
The only categories (if such they be) which are suitable to 
apply to spirit are those of a dynamic nature. Spirit is the 
metaphysical term for what man experiences in himself as 
freedom,3 as creative energy,4 as noumenal pass1on,5 as 
1. See, for example, Nicolas Berdyaev, Freedom and the Spir-
it, trans. Oliver Fielding Clarke (London: Geoffrey 
Bles, 1935), chap. 1. Cited hereafter as Freedom. See 
also Beginning, PP• 62-63. 
2. Freedom, P• 8. 
3• The phrase "spirit is freedom" appears again and again. 
See Beginning, PP• 16, 59, 62; Freedom, PP• 7, 129. 
4• See Beginning, pp. 59, 62-63, 176. 
5• Ibid., P• 69. 
concrete or primary life,1 as existence,2 as inner unity.3 
Terms such as these are used interchangeably as the nature 
of the discussion would require. They are practically syn-
onymous, and yet each contains a descriptive shading which 
helps to complete the vivid picture which Berdyaev has in 
mind. Each term denotes the noumenal world, true reality. 
Other terms or phrases used by Berdyaev for the noumenal 
world or the realm of the spirit are subject,4 the Ego,5 the 
individual,6 the realm of what is human and personal,? the 
world of reason or mean1ng,8 the cosmos.9 
This picture of what Berdyaev understands by the nou-
menon clearly indicates the basis for the existential and 
personalist character of his philosophy. Reality is discov-
ered in man's fullest awareness of himself as a person; and 
man as a person is he who exists, who has the courage to be 
1. Ibid., PP• 17, 69, 235; see also Freedom, PP• 7, 9· 
2. See Beginning, PP• 17, 45· See also Nicolas Berdyaev, 
The Fate of Man in the Modern World, trans. Donald A. 
Lowrie (New York: Morehouse Publishing Co., 1935), p. 
4. Cited hereafter as Fate of Man. 
3· See Nicolas Berdyaev, The Realm of S irit and the Realm 
of Caesar, trans. Donald A. Lowrie Ne York: Harper 
and Bros., 1952), p. 31. Cited hereafter as Realm of 
Spirit. 
4· See Beginning, P• 176; Slavery, P• 141. 
5 · See Solitude, P• 32· 6. See Beginning, P• 122. 
7 · See Fate of Man, P• 4. 8. See Realm of Spirit, P• 31. 
9 · See Beginning, P• 59· 
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and to dwell within his own authentic world as distinguished 
from the phenomenal world.l The idea of spirit is predomin-
ant here, and Berdyaev is indebted to German idealism with 
its idea that spirit is the ego returning to itself. "To be 
in the spirit is to be in oneself";2 that is, in order to 
approach reality Berdyaev follows Socrates in accepting the 
Delphic precept, 11Know thyself." IT man's senses can give no 
knowledge of what is real, then man must cease looking out-
side himself for reality and seek it within himself. Spirit 
is Berdyaev's characteristic word for describing the new di-
mension which man finds introspectively. 
B. Phenomena 
IT 11spirit" best expresses Berdyaev's understanding of 
noumenon, then it could be assumed that the antithesis of 
spirit best expresses his understanding of phenomenon. The 
word he uses most frequently in an antithetical relation-
ship to spirit is unature . " The first chapter of his work, 
~ 
Freedom and the Spirit , bears the title "Spirit and Nature . " 
"The antithesis between spirit and nature must be considered 
as primary.u3 
But what does Berdyaev mean by "nature"? The word na-
ture as Berdyaev uses it refers to the world revealed by 
1 . Solitude, P• 44. 2. Freedom, P• 117. 
3. Ibid . , p. 7. 
·---- -·~~-----------------------------------------------------------
sense experience alone . Such a world is devoid o~ spirit and 
is deprived o~ any deep meaning . l This is the world which is 
open to scienti~ic observation, the world with hich materi-
alism, naturalism and positivism are exclusively concerned . 2 
This second term of Berdyaev's dualism does not actual-
ly indicate a second metaphysical reality hich exists apart 
from spirit. A dualism involving concepts of substance such 
as spirit and body or spirit and material is not his con-
cern Nature as the antithesis o~ spirit is the expression 
of an existential dialectic, and as such "it is but the ex-
pres ion of a moment which symbolizes the life o~ the spir-
it n? It represents the particular direction and tendency 
of spirit to find primary reality in the object rather than 
in the subject .4 The world created by God , with spirit as 
primary reality, is subjected to the process of naturaliza-
tion which eans that the divine and the spiritual are 
banished from it For example , man comes to be studied as an 
exclusiv ly natural being s a 'psycho-physical onad . •5 
. 
This is the empiricall y given orld m1 take ly ccepted as 
reality it elf en this naively reali tic vi w of the 
l . Ibid , p 6 2. Beginning, pp 87-88 
? Freedom, p 62 
4 . The n e o~ this particul r tendency of spirit 1 
ti~ication . " On this , see below, pp 45-52 
obje~ 
5· Freedom, P • 28 
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world is assumed, then "the centre of gravity of life, and, 
. 
most serious of all, that of the religious life, is shifted 
into the hard, material, world."l 
. 
The world that is constructed from only sense experi-
ence is not self-sufficient because it does not in itself 
possess either significance or orientation. It is the realm 
of the object or thing,2 of solid and inert substance or 
matter,3 of necessity and compulsion.4 It is a "degraded am 
spellbound world--a world of phenomena rather than one of 
existences."5 This objectified and materialized world is 
denied the status of reality for ethical reasons because it 
is indifferent to personal values and is therefore anti-
personal and anti-human.6 Berdyaev is even able to say, with 
manichaean overtones, that "'the world' is evil, it is with-
out God and not created by Him11 7; and as such it must be 
overcome. Since the phenomenal world is devoid of spirit, 
and necessity or causality rules, it is a fallen world, a 
1. Ibid., P• 45• 
2. Ibid., p. 7; see also Beginning, P• 176. 
3• See Solitude, P• 61; Freedom, P• 6; Dream, P• 287. 
4· See Freedom, pp. 7, 129. See also Nicolas Berdyaev, The Divine and the Human, trans. R.M. French (London: ~G~e~o~f~fr~e~y~B~lre~s~,~l~9~4~9T), P• 128. Cited hereafter as 
Divine. 
5· Solitude, P• 44• 6. Fate of Man, P• 4• 
7• Creative Act, P• 16. 
world separated from its ontological roots.l 
Two observations can be made on Berdyaev's dualism of 
noumenon and phenomenon. (l) It is not an ontological dual-
ism. The reality of spirit does not confront the reality of 
nature or matter. Spirit is not an object or static sub-
stance that exists alongside the objects of "the world." 
Since spirit comprises all of reality, spirit cannot be 
opposed to the body or to matter as though they were a real-
ity of the same order. Spirit belongs to an entirely diffez-
ent scheme of things. Thus the traditional division of natu-
ral and supernatural is not involved here; in fact, such a 
division is rejected. 2 (2) Instead of being a metaphysical 
dualism consisting of the relation of subject to object, 
this is rather a distinction which arises within the spirit-
ual or religious experience itself. It involves a "distinc-
tion in the comprehension of reality itselfl3 which is af-
firmed in the realm of the spirit. 11The distinction between 
-
appearance and the thing-in-itself lies not in the relation 
between subject and object but in the actual things-in-them-
selves, in a qualitative condition of that which is called 
being.n4 This dualism involves "two conditions of the world, 
1. Ibid., p. 143· See also Nicolas Berdyaev, Spirit and 
Reality, trans. George Heavey (London: Geoffrey Bles, 
1939), p. 73• Cited hereafter as Spirit. 
2. See Freedom, PP• 23-24• 3• Ibid., P• 7• 
4. Beginning, P• 17. 
corresponding to two different structures and ways of know-
ing."1 Reality is spirit, but for spirit to be aware of a 
form of reality which is non-spirit and objectively present 
to the senses is the reflection of a condition of the spiri~ 
This is spirit divided against itself, denying that spirit 
is primarily real. This is an inner dialectic of the spirit 
in which the thesis, "spirit," is confronted by its anti-
thesis, "nature," which represents the self-alienation of 
-
spirit. Such a dialectic expresses for Berdyaev the funda-
mental and contradictory nature of man's existence. Man must 
struggle to preserve his own personal existence,but at the 
same time his life expresses the tendency to establish ob-
jective orders of reality to which he subjects himself and 
in which he loses the depth of his being. 
4• The True Relationship between the Two Realms--
Symbolism 
Berdyaev's indebtedness to Kant in the statement of his 
dualism is obvious. He felt, however, that Kant's two worlds 
were too much separated from each other and each shut in 
upon itself. Although Kant had maintained the doctrine of 
causality through freedom, "he left unexplained in what 
manner the intelligible cause, that is to say noumenal free-
dom, is able to break in upon the causal sequence of 
1 . Realm of Spirit, P• 31. 
appearances. 111 
With the rejection of the idea that the phenomenal 
world of sense is unreal and illusory (if this were the 
case, no problem of a relationship would exist), Berdyaev 
holds that the proper conception of the relationship be-
tween the noumenal world of spirit and the phenomenal world 
presented by the senses is a symbolism 
which admits the possibility of the transfusion of 
divine energy into this world, which binds together 
and unites two worlds , and recognizes that the Di-
vine Being can only give symbolic expression to 
Itself while it remains inexhaustible and mysteri-
ous.2 
Symbolism accomplishes two things: it gives expression 
to and safeguards the infinite depth and mystery of the di-
vine world by maintaining its distinction from the natural 
world (hence Berdyaev's symbolism is a rejection of ontolog-
ical monism), and yet at the same time it asserts the close 
alliance of the divine world with the natural world {there-
by rejecting a static ontological dualism) . This is all 
possible because a symbol , by its very nature , does not 
subject the infinite to the finite but rather renders the 
finite transparent and permits the infinite to be seen 
through the finite. In this manner the symbol " is a link, 
. 
a bond of union with, and the sign of , another world which 
1 . Beginning, P• 156. 
2. Freedom , P• 62 . See the entire chap . 2, 11 Symbol, Myth and 
Dogma." 
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really exists.nl Berdyaev calls his position a "realist 
-
symbolism" which holds that 11 the outward form of the world 
-is neither a phenomenon devoid of reality nor a subjective 
illusion, but rather a symbolic incarnation of spiritual 
realities.n2 
The visible world is a symbol of the invisible world--
the Platonic tenor of this is unmistakable. Berdyaev ~ound 
the Platonic tradition, which permeated the patristic lit-
erature of the East, to be more favorable to the philosophy 
of spirit than the Aristotelian tradition because it held 
that "the earth is only the symbol of the heavenly and 
spiritual."' This is the mark of a "really profound Chris-
tianity," that it "always sees in material objects the sym-
bols of the spirit~al world.n4 
~ 
Berdyaev's conception o.f the relationship between the 
two realms does not involve a transcendent break between 
them,which would leave them in isolation from each other. 
Berdyaev's dualism is the expression of a dialectic move-
ment5 which means interaction and tension, a condition not 
intended to remain eternally such but which can be super-
seded. "It points to a conflict and it is a summons to 
creativ; action.n6 There are no frontiers that cannot be 
1. ~., P• 55· 2. Ibid. 
-
3· ll:>id., P• 50. 4· ll>id., P• 36. 
5· BeginniEfi, P• 143· 6. ~., p. 149· 
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crossed, and "a break-through of noumena and phenomena is 
possible, of the invisible world into the visible, of the 
world of freedom into the world of necessity."l This noume-
nal freedom functions in the phenomenal world as a creative 
power. 
But this noumenal freedom, the sign of the spiritual 
or divine world, 11breaks through into this world, the light 
of it shines through only in that which really exists , in 
living beings and in their ex1stence. 112 Man, then, holds 
. 
the key to this break-through. This is the case because man 
in his complexity is both spiritual and natural.? He is not 
merely a phenomenon but also a noumenon, for, as a creatively 
active and free being,he is spirit.4 The human creative act, 
as that which links the noumenal and phenomenal worlds, is 
" 
way out beyond the confines of the phenomenal world, it 
is ecstasy, an experience of transcendence.n5 And in the 
human creative act, which is of the spirit and penetrates 
the life of nature, "what is of God in li.fe is revealed.u6 
The right attitude toward the natural world of the 
senses, then, is that it is the symbol of the spirit. But 
the natural world may be "mistaken for the reality itself 
1. ~., P• 66. 
3· Freedom, P• 27. 
5• Ibid., P• 177• 
2. Ibid., P• 155· 
4. Beginning, P• 156. 
6. ~., p. 155· 
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and can become hardened and materialized.ul In this case 
. 
the natural world may be conceived as a reality existing 
alongside the realm of the spirit (a false dualism) or as 
visible and objective spirit (a false monism).2 
The mistaking of the symbol for the reality involves 
what Berdyaev calls "objectification." This is a non-spir-
-itual, non-creative process whose meaning must now be ex-
plored. 
5• Objectification 
Spirit is reality, yet Berdyaev sees spirit as con-
fronted by objective manifestations or 11 objects 11 which 
claim to be real and which restrict the freedom of the 
spirit. It would seem that if spirit is opposed and re-
stricted by something that is alien to spirit, then 11spirit" 
' does not adequately express what is primarily real. But for 
Berdyaev, primary reality is spirit and only spirit. 
The answer to this seeming contradiction is to be 
found in Berdyaev's concept of "objectification. " This is 
the philosophical expression and explanation of what he has 
said is at the very heart of his world outlook, that is, 
the sense of uprootedness and alienation which he felt in 
the world.; It is a "symbolical description of the fallen 
1 . Freedom, P• 45 · 
, . Dream, P• ,; . 
- -·--------------------------------------, 
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state of a world in which man finds himself subservient to 
necessity and disunion!'l 
Objectification is primarily an anti-spiritual tendency 
operative within spirit itself. Spirit as reality is subjec-
tive and existential, known by intuition and not given in 
sense experience. The symbolic dimension here is inwardness. 
But for the person as spirit to believe that the sense 
experiences themsel ves convey reality, to invest the pheno~ 
enal natural order with a metaphysical character,is to 
objectify reality and to separate the subject from reality, 
whose symbolic dimension then becomes outwardness and exte~ 
nality. A clear example of this is naive realism, according 
to which viewpoint reality is immediately given by the em-
pirical senses. 
Berdyaev sees the tendency to objectification as a 
built-in feature of the reason or the process of thinking.2 
Phenomena, which exist only in the sense experience of the 
subject, are turned into objects; that is, "that which the 
subject alienates from itself begins to appear to it as an 
1. Ibid., P• 288. For a thorough consideration of the mean-
ing of "objectification" in Berdyaev's thought see 
Roman Rossler, Das Weltbild Nikolai Berd a ews: Exis-
tenz und Ob activation Gottingen: Vandenhoeck und 
Ruprecht, 195 • The thesis of this book, based on a 
thorough studyof Berdyaev's writings, is that objec-
tification is the basic concept underlying Berdyaev's 
philosophy. 
2. Beginning, PP• 59, 118. 
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objective reality. 111 But the seat of this tendency lies at 
a deeper level than that of thought and reason. It is the 
result of a "certain condition of the subject" and more par-
ticularly of the will--»the object depends above all upon 
the will of the subject.rr2 Again, it is said to depend on a 
"certain state or orientation of the spirit."3 
In objectification, therefore, the spirit as subjective 
reality in some mysterious manner establishes "objects" 
which it conceives to be ontologically real. Spirit thereby 
abdicates its metaphysical primacy and submits itself to the 
pseudo-real object. Or, as Berdyaev puts it, "the world of 
appearances acquires a grandiose empirical reality which 
exercises compulsion and force upon us.n4 In terms of Ber-
dyaev's basic dualistic scheme, the freedom of the spirit 
(noumena) passes over into the necessity of nature (phenom-
ena). 
This passing of the center of gravity from subject to 
object brings definite consequences not only epistemologi-
cally but, more important still , metaphysically . 5 This is 
the case because objectification is a process taking place 
in reality itself, in spiri t; the subject which introduces 
it is not only the epistemological subject but also 
1 . Ibid . , P • 118 . 2 . Ibid . , p . bO . 
3· Dream, P• 286 . 4- Beginning, P• 57 . 
5 · Ibid., P• 78 . 
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metaphysical reality, that which exists and is primary life. 
Berdyaev's main critique of objectification is that it 
fails to reveal primary reality and knowledge--it breaks up 
reality into the realms of subject and object, and substi-
tutes knowledge of phenomena for the knowledge of noumena.l 
This means the destruction of true existence and true know-
ledge.2 Since reality is no longer of the subject--the sub-
ject having become non-existential and outside of reality--
an impersonal or depersonalized world arises which actually 
is the "non-existential and ontic materialization of the 
subject himself."3 This condition effects the isolation of 
. 
the subject and is an obstacle to communion between indi-
vidual spirits because "the object is ••• the chief obsta-
cle in the way of the subject's emergence from his inner 
existence and of his communion with the Other Self.n4 For 
Berdyaev this means that objectivity really means subjec-
tivity when subjectivity is understood in the undesirable 
sense as the subject restricted to himself. 
One significant thing about the tendency to objectifi-
cation whereby the spirit is alienated from itself is the 
fact that it proves that the subjective spirit is an active 
agent. "Man's creative activity is even manifest in the 
1. Dream, P• 97• 
3• Solitude, P• 42• 
2. Ibid., P• 288. 
4. Ibid., P• 71. 
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process of objectification . "1 The implication is plain that 
man, by the exercise of this same creative power, can also 
deliver himself from bondage to this alien world which he 
has established . 
From the theological point of view, objectification is 
the Fall . Man becomes estranged from God through his self-
estrangement . The objectified world is a fallen world, and 
Berdyaev even suggests that his views on objectification 
could be summarized under the heading: "an epistemology of 
original sin . n2 
Ber dyaev acknowledges a close similarity between his 
c oncept of objectification and what Bergson speaks of as 
"fabrication. "3 In Bubar ' s terminology , the It (or Essein) 
ls the outcome of the objectifying process .4 Berdyaev is 
particularly influenced in the formulation of this concept 
by the German mystic Jacob Boehme and by German idealism 
(particularly Schopenhauer) . 
He considers Boehme ' s teaching that the fall of man is 
the result of "evil imaginati on" t o be "the most profound 
of all thought on this subjec t .n5 Boehme says that both 
Luci:f'er and Adam lost "the oil of the meekness of the divine 
essentiality," that is , their divine nature, because of the 
1 . Solitude, P • 34; see also s;eirit , p . 50 . 
2 . Dream, P• 288 . 3 · Beginning, P • 123 . 
4 · Solitude, P• 79 • 5· Beginning , P• 144. 
"imagination" by which they expressed their "pride" and 
"false lust. 111 
50 
In Boehme's thought the divine creation of the world 
is the expression of the Eternal Will in accordance with the 
Divine Imagination. The "Imagination" is a concept bearing 
some similarity to Plato's world of Ideas, "in which the 
ideas of angels and souls have been seen from Eternity in a 
Divine type and resemblance, yet not then as creatures, but 
in resemblance, as when a man beholds his face in a glass .n2 
The creation is the actualization of this Imagination by the 
divine Will. 
In the creation a countless number of particular wills 
or selves arise with the freedom to express themselves each 
after its own character. Yet, still before the Fall , there 
is no strife or confusion, and everything exists in "temper-
ature," which is Boehme's term to indicate a condition of 
perfect concord and unity.? 
Adam, in his original state in which he centered his 
own will in the divine Will and his imagination upon God, 
1. Jacob Boehme, The Signature of All Things, ed. Ernest 
Rhys (London: J.M. Dent and Sons, l9l2), PP• 56-57 · 
2. Jacob Boehme , source unidentified, quoted in Hans L. Mar-
tensen, Jacob Boehme, trans. T. Rhys Evans and ed. 
Stephen Hobhouse (New York: Harper and Bros., 1949), 
p. 112. The following brief exposition of Boehme 's 
thought is based upon this work, one of the best avail-
able in English. 
?• Martensen, P• 116. 
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lived with a clear understanding of all things divine, human 
and natural. For him the sense-world was illuminated by and 
united to the spiritual world. Phenomena were not granted a 
false independence. But the will and imagination of the cre&-
ture function with a capacity similar to that of God. Adam, 
overcome by false lust, by an act of his own will turned h~ 
imagination away from God and set it upon the world of the 
senses. In thus breaking communion with God, he came under 
the power of a world of his own imagination which did not 
correspond to the world of the Divine Imagination. The 
fallen world was marked by the dissolution of "temperature" 
with a consequent materialization and objectificat1on.1 
Boehme's "imagination" with its irrational will or 
freedom of choice receives further development with Schopen-
hauer. Berdyaev felt himself attracted to "Schopenhauer's 
distinction of will and 'representation,' to his doctrine 
of the objectivization of the will in the natural world, 
which creates an unreal world.n2 In a key passage which re-
veals his metaphysical position, Schopenhauer writes: 
Phenomenal existence is idea and nothing more. All 
idea~ of whatever kind it may be, all object, is 
phenomenal existence, but the will alone is a thing 
in itself. As such, it is throughout not idea, but 
toto genere different from it; it is that of which 
all idea, all object, is the phenomenal appearance, 
the visibility, the objectification. It is the in-
most nature, the kernel, of every particular thing, 
l. Ibid., PP• l43-J.44. 2. Slavery, p. 12. 
--------------------------------------~--- - --
52 
and also of the whole. It appears in every blind 
force of nature and also in the preconsidered ac-
tion of man; and the great difference between these 
two is merely in the degree of the manifestition~ 
not in the nature of what manifests itself. 
Berdyaev felt that the significant thing here was the cri-
tical approach to the problem of objectification with its 
recognition of the part played by the knowing subject, for 
such a "critical awareness of the subject's participation 
in the objective processes • • • meant the subject's de-
li verance from the external tyranny of the objective warld.11 2 
6. Resulting Features of Berdyaev's Thought 
Against the background of Berdyaev's dualism some fea-
tures of his thought can be best understood. They are: his 
personalism, his existentialism and his intuitionism. 
A. Personalism 
Berdyaev maintains that spirit is reality. But he is 
hardly an Hegelian. When he describes God as a "concrete 
personality" and man as a "concrete personality," and in-
-
sists that "only a personalist doctrine of the world~ for 
which every being is personal and original, can give mean-
ing to creativity,"3 he identifies his philosophy as person-
alism. Spirit as reality is personal, concrete, unique, and 
1. Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as ill and Idea, trans. 
R.B. Haldane and J. Kemp (lith ed.; London: K. Paul~ 
Trench, Trubner and Co., 1896), I, Bk. II, 142-143· 
2 . Solitude, P • 36. 3· Creative Act, P• 135· 
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plural. He confesses a "mono-pluralism:' which means that he 
accepts "the revelation in One God of a permanent cosmic 
plurality, a multitude of eternal individualities."l He ad-
dresses himself to the problem of reconciling the doctrine 
of "the unity of the Divine Personality with the plurality 
of human personal1t1es"2 and feels that only Christianity 
possesses the key to the solution. 
But for Berdyaev the word "personal" is not restricted 
to the human world. "All existence is personal, in however 
elementary a form."3 In speaking of the realm of nature, 
which is the objectified world, Berdyaev says that he does 
"not here understand animals, etc., nor plants, nor miner-
als, nor stars, forests and seas, which all have an inner 
existence and belong to the existential and not the objec-
tivized scheme of things."4 Even stones and trees are held 
to react in an elementary way to the action of other for-
ces.5 This indicates a panpsychism; or, if that term would 
appear too psychologistic to Berdyaev, perhaps the term pan-
spiritism would be more appropriate . Berdyaev in earlier 
years spoke of reality as "the organic hierarchy of living 
beings,"6 but later he apparently gave up the "hierarchy" 
1. Ibid., P• 18. 
3 · Destiny, P• 192. 
5· Divine, P• 3· 
2. Solitude, P• 133· 
4. Slavery, P• 94· 
6. Creative Act, p. 70. 
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idea because it carried too much o£ the idea of a collective 
whole or unity, to which personality is subordinate . l The 
word "communion" came to have application not only to the 
human world but also to the animal, vegetable and mineral 
worlds . 2 Berdyaev points out that the mystical-type of phi-
losophy has always maintained that nature is something 
alive, a living organism; it looks beyond nature as mecha-
nistically interpreted and sees organism. 3 
B. Existentialism 
Berdyaev de£ines existentialist philosophy as "the 
knowledge of reality through human existence and its con-
crete manifestations,"4 adding that man in knowing himself' 
penetrates into mysteries not revealed through his knowledge 
o£ other people . John E. Smith mentions that "the concern 
for the nature and dest i ny of the individual self"5 1s com-
mon to existential philosophy since existentialists "iden-
tify existence with the individual ' s own immediate experi-
ence of himself and his situati on as a free being in the 
world. n6 
1. Slavery, PP • 40-41 . 
3 · Creative Act, P• 70 . 
2 . Solitude, P• 84 . 
4· Dream, p . x . 
5 · "Existential Philosophy," A Handbook of Christian Theo-
- !£sl, ed. Marvin Halverson and Arthur A. Cohen (Living 
Age Books; New Yor k: Meridian Books, Inc . , 1958), p . 
120 . 
6. Ibi d ., PP • 122- 123 . 
55 
Personalist philosophy and existential philosophy have 
points of similarity . Berdyaev's dualism of spirit and na-
ture, which is that of the personal and the impersonal, can 
also be called the dualism of existence and its objectifi-
cation . Spirit is personal and is more than a mere knowing 
self. It is, as Smith observes as a feature of existential-
ism, "a hoping, fearing, believing, willing, concerned self, 
aware of its need to find a purpose, a plan and a destiny 
in life . "1 This is what Berdyaev means when he says that 
philosophy must be concerned with "the concrete living enti-
ty and entities,"2 that 
the real subject-matter of philosophy ought to be, 
not being in general, but that to which and to whom 
being belongs, that is, the existent , that which 
exists . A CQncrete philosophy is an existential 
philosophy . ? 
Berdyaev's personalism, with its strong emphasis on the 
subjective approach to truth and reality , is therefore also 
existentialist . However , he would have it understood that he 
reached his opinions before the "fashionable terminology" of 
existentialism became established, so that his existential-
ism does not result from his merely co~tting himself to 
an already-fashioned system and tradition; and yet at the 
same time he feels that he has the support of what he con-
siders to be the very best of philosophical thought up to 
1 . P . 123 . 2 . Beginning, p . 98 . 
3• Ibid., P• 95 • 
his time.1 He states his claim to be considered an existen-
tial philosopher in this way: 
I am an existentialist because I believe in the 
priority of the subject over the object, in the 
identity of the knowing subject and the existing 
subject ••• because I see the life of man and of 
the world torn by contraries, which must be faced 
and maintained in their tension, and which no intel-
lectual system of a closed and complete totality, 
no immanentism or optimism can resolve. I have al-
ways desired that philosophy should not be about 
something or somebody but should be that very some-
thing or somebody, in other words, that it should 
be the revelation of the ori~inal nature and char-
acter of the subject itself. 
Both his personalism and his existentialism can only be un-
derstood in the light of his dualism. 
C. Intuitionism 
Berdyaev's dualism involves two ways of knowing. The 
phenomenal world of nature is what is present to the exter-
nal senses. It is the empirical world, ir empirical be un-
derstood in its positivist form. But this way of knowing 
does not lead to reality. 
The world of spirit, which is reality, is know by spi-
ritual experience or intuition. Though Berdyaev follows Kant 
in holding that sense, reason and concepts are applicable 
only to the world of appearances, he breaks company with 
Kant regarding the knowledge of the noumenon. Knowledge of 
of what is real is a case of "either-or." 
1. See Dream, PP• 93, 102. 2. Ibid., P• 93· 
57 
Either being is known and unriddled from the side of 
the object, taking the world as the starting-point, 
or it is known and unriddled from the side of the 
ego, that is from man. This ought to form the basis 
of distinction between different tendencies in 
philosophy. 
There is the objective approach and the subjective ap-
proach to reality. Kant in his Critique of Pure Reason is 
accepted as having shown the inadequacy and hopelessness of 
the objective approach, but Berdyaev feels that Kant dealt 
inadequately with the subjective approach. Kant, though he 
denied intuition in metaphysical apprehension, is understood 
to have inadvertently recognized intuition of the noumenal 
world as the world of freedom. A kind of knowledge not open 
to the Kantian criticism is "implied by Kant himself. He 
~ 
does not explain why knowledge of the world of appearances 
is true scientific knowledge while at the same time it has 
nothing to do with true reality."2 Kant was willing to re-
duce spiritual experience or intuition to practical ethical 
postulates, but he "would not acknowledge outright that non-
conceptual, spiritual, existential apprehension of a noumen-
on is a possibility."? 
Not willing to admit that the truly real world of 
things-in-themselves is unknowable while the unreal world 
of appearances can be known, Berdyaev defends the validity 
1. Beginning, P• 5· 2. Ibid., P• l4. 
3• Ibid. What Berdyaev is saying is that Kant knew more than 
he was willing to admit. 
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of knowledge without external sensations. This knowledge is 
expressible only in symbols, not in concepts. 1 Such know-
ledge, called intuition by Berdyaev, transcends the episte~ 
ological subject-object type of relationship which is the 
result of objectification.2 It is a "sympathetic living-into 
the world, entering into the essence of the world, and hence 
it presupposes oecumenicity (sobornost)--being and acting 
together.n3 
A similarity to Martin Bubar's 11 I-Thou" and "I-It'' to 
describe man's two primary attitudes and relations is evi-
dent here in Berdyaev. "I-~, the primary word of relation 
and togetherness, is characterized by mutuality, directness, 
presentness, intensity, and ineffability"4 and is therefore 
very close to what Berdyaev means by intuition or spiritual 
experience. "I-It, the primary word of experiencing and 
using, takes place within a man and not between him and the 
world 11 5 and therefore remains self-centered and unable to 
achieve mutuality. The "I-It 11 closely resembles Berdyaev 1 s 
"objectification," and Bubar's distinction now under consid-
. 
eration supports Berdyaev's contention that objectiv1ty,as 
1. Divine, P• 16. 2. Creative Act, P• 53· 
3· Ibid., P• 35· 
4. Maurice s. Friedman, "'I-Thou' and 'I-It' , 11 A Handbook 
of Christian Theology, P• 174• 
5· Ibid . 
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it is commonly understood,is subjectiveness, while subjec-
tivity,properly understood,alone can give true knowledge. 
Furthermore, intuitive knowledge is always personal and 
unique as contrasted with perception through the senses and 
the consequent construction of rational concepts which yield 
knowledge that is always of a general and common nature. 1 
One may even say that intuitive knowledge is irrational, as 
Berdyaev does, but in the use of this term his purpose is 
not to negate reason; rather, his purpose is to limdt the 
application of rational concepts in knowledge and to show 
that what is personal cannot be exhausted in nor comprehend-
ed by reason.2 Intuition is not only intellectual in nature 
but also emotional and volitional, thus giving emphasis to 
the activity of the person who does the knowing. Intuition 
"is the activity, the intense effort of the spirit as a 
whole."3 
1. Beginning, p. 121. Berdyaev seems to over-stress the idea 
that sense-perception partakes of the "common" which 
excludes anything unique and individual. There is also 
an irrational aspect to sense experience, for the in-
tellect never completely orders all of one's empirical 
data. 
2. Ibid., P• 122. 3• Ibid., P• 68. 
CHAPTER IV 
SPIRIT AS PERSONALITY, FREEDOM AND CREATIVENESS 
1. Introduction 
In the preceding chapter the nature of Berdyaev's dual-
ism was set forth and examined. The purpose of this chapter 
is to determine what meaning and content he gives to the 
word "spirit," the primary term of his dualism, which for 
him is alone metaphysically real and apart from which there 
is no human creativity. 
Berdyaev's association of rational and conceptual 
thought with the tendency to objectify has, as its corol-
lary, the denial of a rational or conceptual definition of 
spirit. But it is possible to indicate the attributes of 
spirit which are infallible manifestations of the presence 
of the spirit. "Among these attributes are freedom, meaning, 
creativity, integrity, love, value, an orientation towards 
the highest Divine world and union with it.nl 
This chapter proceeds on the assumption that the attri-
butes of the spirit can best be comprehended in three terms 
which Berdyaev often uses--they are (1) personality, (2) 
1. Spirit, P• 33• 
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freedom, and (3) creativeness.1 These three terms are close-
ly related to each other, and in turn they are so closely 
identified with spirit that, for all practical purposes, 
they are synonymous with spirit . Berdyaev's use of words 
suggests an interchangeability between personality, freedom 
and creativeness, on the one hand, and spirit, on the other 
hand. Such statements as: "personality is spirit,n2 "spirit 
is liberty,"3 and "spirit is creative becoming,n4 chosen 
-from among numerous similar expressions, make this clear. 
There can be creativity only if there is a dimension 
of reality (i.e . , spirit) distinguished from the objective 
realm of space and time . The existence of this dimension is 
assured because spirit is understood to express itself in 
personality, in freedom and in creativeness . 
2 . Spirit as Personality 
A. Introduction 
In view of the anthropocentric nature of Berdyaev's 
philosophy, the concept of personality plays a major role . 
As he himself says, "our conception of man must be founded 
1 . These three words often occur closely grouped together . 
See Slavery, P • 9 ; Dream, P• 50 . 
2 . Slavery, P• 51. 3 • Freedom, P• 2. 
4. Ibid . , p . 4 • It becomes obvious that Berdyaev is here 
involved in a conceptual interpretation of spirit de-
spite his contention (see Spirit , p. 33) that spirit 
does not yield itself to such an interpretation. 
upon the conception of personality."l His philosophy is a 
~ 
personalist philosophy because it holds that ultimate real-
ity is personal. Throughout his writings he exhibits an 
existential-type thirst for the knowledge of self in view 
of the human need to understand one's self, to discover 
one's own image and ultimate destiny. The problem of the hu-
man person, central to all of Berdyaev's thought, is seen 
by him as a problem that has disturbed all the great Russian 
thinkers; and he feels that Russian thought has a contribu-
tion to make that may not be forthcoming from the West, 
which for him is characterized by its individualism.2 
B. Personality and Berdyaev's Dualism 
i. Personality and the Noumenon 
It has been shown that Berdyaev's dualism, much indebt-
ed to Kant's distinction between noumenon and phenomenon, ~ 
a dualism of spirit and nature. The realm of nature is re-
vealed by sense experience whereas the realm of the spirit 
is revealed by spiritual experience or intuition. 
Personality is identified with the spiritual realm. 
"Personality is spiritual and presupposes the existence of 
1. Destiny, P• 54· 
2. Nicolas Berdyaev, Toward a New EpOCh, trans. Oliver 
Fielding Clarke (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1949), p. 57· 
Cited hereafter as New EpOch. Berdyaev is thinking 
primarily of Russian thought of the pre-Communist era. 
a spiritual world."l Therefore whatever can be said about 
spirit can also be said about personality. For example, 
spirit expresses itself as freedom; and Berdyaev states that 
"the existence of personality presupposes freedom. The mys-
tery of freedom is the mystery of personality."2 And again, 
in accordance with the outline of this chapter, spirit ex-
presses itself as creativeness; and with this may be com-
pared Berdyaev 1 s words that "personality is not a substance 
but an act, a creative act •••• Personality is activity."? 
Because personality is a spiritual category it is not 
an object among other objects;but it is always a subject, 
the "I" among other subjects, the 11 Thous," and it has its 
roots in the symbolically inward scheme of existence in con-
trast to that which is outside and exterior.4 One is a per-
sonality not by virtue of being a part of nature but by 
being spiritual. 
Personality as spiritual and subjective is also the 
"absolute existential centre . "5 This means that it has its 
o n unique and underived existence, being an epiphenomenon 
to nothing. Spirit as personality is "the existent, that 
which exists and possesses true existence." 6 An important 
property attaching to personality as an existential center 
1. Destiny, P• 55· 
3• Ibid., P• 24• 
5• ~., P• 26 
2. Slavery, P• 27. 
4. Ibid., PP• 22, 26. 
6. Beginning, P• 103. 
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is the capacity to experience joy and suf~ering . l 
Personality, as spirit, is not subjected to the law of 
cause-and-effect which characterizes the natural realm. It 
cannot be reduced to, nor explained by, sense experience. 
There is nothing in the world which can be compared with 
personality or placed on a level with it . When unique and 
unrepeatable personality comes upon the scene, "the world 
process is broken into and compelled to change its course, 
in spite of the fact that outwardly there is no sign of 
this . n2 Personality, then, is a revolutionary element, the 
exception, a break-through or rupture in this natural world. 
"The existence of personality presupposes interruption; it 
. 
is inexplicable by any sort of uninterruption; it is inex-
plicable by any sort of uninterrupted continuity . n3 
The existence of the noumenon for Kant was the matter 
of a moral postulate. The existence of spirit is more than 
a postulate for Berdyaev , but the strong Kantian association 
of the noumenal reality with the moral realm is clearly evi-
dent . This is seen as a necessity for a personalist philoso-
phy. 
The supreme value of personality, the supreme truth 
of personalism cannot be demonstrated as a proposi-
tion of objective ontology, it is affirmed by the 
moral will which assumes that value is a choice on 
1 . Solitude, p . 124; see also Slavery, p . 27 . 
2. Slavery , p . 21 3· Ibid. 
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the part of freedom. The supremacy of freedom orer 
being is the supremacy of ethics over ontology. 
To deny the value or reality of personality is to deny free-
dom, and to deny freedom is to deny personality. But in ei-
ther case, the end result is to deny the moral life. "Per-
sonality involves moral self-determination:' and by virtue 
of its rooting in spirit it is also an axiological concept 
or category.2 
ii. Origin and Nature of Personality 
The relationship of personality to the positive side of 
Berdyaev's dualism has been shown. A more particular treat-
ment of his understanding of the origin and nature of per-
sonality will further show personality as an attribute of 
spirit . 
a. Origin 
The problem of the mysterious origin of the personali~ 
(or soul) has never received a definitive dogmatic solution 
in the Christian Church . For Berdyaev , however, the pre-
existence of souls is "an absolute metaphysical truth. ":; 
The reason for his insistence upon this can be seen in the 
light of the basic lines of his thought . Either a natural 
1 . Beginning , P • 137· 
2 . Dream, P • 155 · See also Solitude , p . 122; Destiny, p . 55; 
Slavery, P• 23 . 
3• Creative Act, P • 129 . 
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or a spiritual view of the soul is possible. From the natu-
ral point of view, the soul is a product of the generic 
process and is created at the moment of conception;l it is 
born of a father and mother;2 it is conceived in biological 
or psychological or sociological terms.3 In rejecting this 
view of the origin of the soul, Berdyaev sees the pre-exis-
tence of the soul as the only alternative.4 He feels akin 
to Origen at this point, stating that Origen's idea about 
the pre-existence of the soul is more acceptable than the 
two other views which have received more general acceptance, 
either (1) that the soul is created at the moment of con-
ception (called creationism), or (2) the view that the soul 
comes into being in the process of birth by way of heredi-
tary transmission (called traducianism) . 5 Because the soul 
or personality is spirit , Berdyaev is concerned to stress 
its eternal and divine status , together with its implied 
independence of the world process . 6 
1 . Destiny, p . 61. 
3 • Destiny, P • 55 · 
2 . Beginning, p . 136 . 
4. ~., p . 61 . 
5 • Beginning, p . 241 . Origen ' s idea, of course, roots fur-
ther back in Plato's doctrine of the soul in which 
Berdyaev says there is "an eternal element of truth" 
(Freedom, p . 326) . 
6. Creati ve Act , p . 129 . When it is remembered that Berdyaev 
holds, as a general feature of his thought, that every 
event in the natural realm reflects an occurrence in 
the spiritual realm, t he rejection of creationism does 
not seem to be dictated by the demands of logic. The 
creation of the soul at the moment of conception 
Berdyaev, in the use of the word "pre-existence," does 
not show interest in a mere "before" and "after" time refer-
ence. Writing at a time when the independent existence of 
personality or soul was not a popular idea, he seems to 
point his argument toward the primary status of personality 
as an expression of spirit . 
Personality is the result of creation on the part of 
God and not of birth on the part of man. "Personality is 
created in God before all worlds.n1 Berdyaev usually speaks 
of personality as the creation of God and created ~ God, 
but he can also say that "it emanates from God.n2 The sub-
ject of God as creator will be treated in the next chapter, 
but there is here already the suggestion that God's crea-
tivity is not a process exterior to ~elf, that the per-
son created by God is not separated from God by virtue of 
having been created although he is in some manner to be 
distinguished from God. 
b . Nature 
Personality is a unique entity and can thus only be 
{creationism) could be interpreted to mean that the 
conception of the fetus reflects the independent ori-
gin of the soul in the realm of the spirit . But this 
apparently presents too close a correlation between 
the origin of the soul and physical processes, between 
eternity and time . At this point Berdyaev's thought 
exhibits a quality which has made him liacle to the 
charge of manichaeanism. 
1 . Creati ve Act, P • l42. 2 . Slavery, P• 36. 
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defined in terms of itself.1 However, it can best be des-
cribed with reference to its dynamic quality. 11 The subject 
is not a substance, a naturalistic category, but an act.u2 
In other words, that a personality exists is not known by 
what it is but by what it does. Personality is not static 
but by its very nature it is acting, changing, self-develop-
ing; it is "the union of our acts and their potentialltl.es.11 3 
But personality is not merely defined by a series of 
acts, one succeeding another. In the midst of change, per-
sonality is able to preserve its basic identity. Its very 
existence is a strange reconciliation of change and innova-
tion with constancy and self-preservation; and in the light 
of this alliance Berdyaev gives a fundamental guidepost for 
the definition of personality: "In defining the human per-
sonality, stress should be laid on its fundamental consis-
tenoy and on the persistence of its identi ty despite many 
outward changes and the acquisition of many new character-
istics. n4 In a definition which he describes as "antinanian," 
he says that the ego is "an immutable essence in the process 
of mutation."5 
1 . Solitude, P• 67. 2 . Spirit, P• 11. 
3· Solitude, p. 122 . This idea is acknowledged by Berdyaev 
as coming from Max Scheler . 
4• Ibid . , P• J.46 . 
5· Ibid., P• 66 . Berdyaev has not completely freed himself, 
--at least verbally , from the idea of substance . 
Personality is not only the unchanging in a state of 
change; it is also unity in the manifold. It is not merely 
the sum of its parts but it is also an integral whole, and 
Berdyaev mentions approvingly w. Stern's view that the 
essential quality of the personality is its unitas mult1-
plex.1 
Personality is able to preserve its unity through the 
activity of spirit. "The unity of personality is created by 
the spirit."2 The personality, which for Berdyaev is the 
-
"entire image of man," i.e., man in his full humanity, pos-
-
sesses unity when it can be said that "the spiritual prin-
ciple has the mastery over all the powers of man's soul and 
body.n3 But this mastery is not to be understood as the spi-
rit's crushing, destroying,or in any way doing violence to 
soul and body . This cannot be the case because "spirit is 
not a constituent part of human nature; it is, rather, the 
highest qualitative value . ~ Spirit is an entirely different 
reality than are the soul and the body . 
Personality, then, is a tri-unity which results hen 
spirit "communicates form" to the soul and body . What the 
word "form" means for Berdyaev may be seen by referring to 
several passages where the word occurs . It is stated that 
all creative power is connected with the bestowal of form, 
1 . Ibid ., P • 124. 
3. Ibid . 
2 . Slavery, P• 31. 
4. Divine, p . 128 . 
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which in turn is to be clearly differentiated from objecti-
fication because it does not mean alienation from the spi-
ritual realm nor subjugation to determinism. 1 Again, al-
though creativeness does not recognize "matter," it can have 
no content in itself without form,and this form is always 
finite.2 For example, in speaking of beauty, and in parti-
cular the beauty of the human face, Berdyaev says that this 
beauty must have form and cannot be beautiful without form; 
and yet "from behind that form aspiration towards the infi-
nite life must shine out, without that the beauty will be a 
dead thing."3 
It appears that when the spirit, in unifying personal-
ity, communicates "form" to the soul and to the body, the 
soul and the body as finite entities then function as sym-
bols of the spirit. They are not considered as objective 
realities in themselves but rather assume a kind of trans-
parency so that through them may shine the infinity of the 
spiritual life. The soul and the body, so far as their per-
ceived form is concerned, are not illusory but neither do 
they exist in themselves; rather, they are epiphenomenon of 
the spirit. An illustration of this idea is seen in what 
Berdyaev has to say about the human face. 
1. Beginning, P• 183. 
3• Divine, P• 143· 
2. Ibid., P• 181. 
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The face of man is the summit of the cosmic process, 
the greatest of its offspring, but it cannot be the 
offspring of cosmic forces only, it presupposes the 
action of a spiritual force, which raises it above 
the sphere of the forces of nature. The face of man 
is the most amazing thing in the life of the world; 
another world shines out through it. It is the en-
trance of personality into the world process, with 
its uniqueness, its singleness, its unrepeatability. 
Through the face we apprehend, not the bodily life 
of a man, but the life of his soul. And we know the 
life of his soul better than his bodily life. The 
form of the body belongs to the spirit-soul. Here is 
personality in its entirety.l 
The foregoing discussion shows Berdyaev holding the 
view that man is a unitary being, an integral whole. This 
means that the analysis of man into separate ultimate ele-
ments such as body and mind or the traditional distinction 
of body and soul is rejected. Such a dualism of soul and 
body is "absolutely false and out of date. Such a dualism 
does not exist."2 
iii. Personality and the Impersonal 
Now that it has been shown that personality is a cate-
gory of the spirit in accordance with Berdyaev's understand-
ing of spirit, a brief treatment must be given to show the 
relation of personality to that which is the antithesis of 
spirit, which in this case can best be described as the 
impersonal. The thing, the materialized world, the world of 
natural phenomena are all to be considered impersonal from 
the point of view of the personal. The impersonal is the 
1. Slavery, P• 31. 2. Ibid. 
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result of personality's estrangement from its true nature 
and content so that that which is properly a quality of its 
own subjective existence is exteriorized and assumes the 
role of an objective realit~which in turn threatens the 
primary place of personality in the world. This is objec-
tification, and "objectivization is impersonality" because 
it means "the ejection of man into the world of determin-
ism."l Berdyaev is deeply concerned over the transfer of the 
existential center from the person to society so that soci-
ety lays claim to being a reality which is greater and more 
primary than personalit~which is then held to be a part of 
society.2 Personality is one's emancipation from dependence 
upon society and from all determination from without because 
personality means self-determination which arises out of 
freedom.3 That in man which is determined by society is 
called one's "superficial ego 11 as distinguished from the 
"profound ego" which is personality in man. It is possible 
that 11 the completely socialized and civilized man may be 
entirely 1mpersonal,n4 which means complete s avery to soci-
ety. 
Another form of the personal-impersonal antithesis is 
the oft-repeated distinction which Berdyaev draws between 
the personality and the individual. In a clear expression 
1. Ibid. , p. 27 • 
3• ~., PP• 26-27. 
2. Ibid., pp. 102ff. 
4• Ibid., P• 26. 
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on the matter he says: 
The individual is a category of naturalism, biology 
and sociology. The individual is indivisible in re-
lation to some whole; he is an atom. He not only can 
be a member of a species or community, as well as of 
the cosmos as a whole, but he is invariably thought 
of as part of a whole, and outside that whole he 
cannot be called an individual •••• The individual 
is closely linked with the material world, he is 
brought to birth by the generic process.l 
In contrast to this, personality is not a naturalist 
category but a spiritual category. It is never the part of 
some greater whole. Also, "personalism does not mean, as 
individualism does, an egocentric isolation."2 The spiritual 
task of man, therefore, is to transform his individualism 
into a personalism, to cease being a part of anything, to 
become self-determining; or, within the framework of the 
present study, to be a creator. Individuality is a natural-
istic and biological category, while personality is a reli-
gious and spiritual category.3 
1. ~., P• 35• 2. ~., P• 36. 
3• Berdyaev, in making a strong distinction between person-
ality and individuality, seema to be seeking to avoid 
a misunderstanding of his thought at this point. In 
his emphasis upon the person and upon rreedom, and in 
his strong protest against the primacy of society and 
the state, his position does run the danger of being 
interpreted as mere individualism and self-assertion 
(as in some cases it has been so interpreted by his 
critics). 
He does not always help his own cause at this point 
because of a lack of verbal consistency. At one place 
he will observe that 11 it is very important to establish 
the difference between personality and the individual" 
(Slavery, p. 35). This is a characteristic aspect of 
his general thought. However, he will also say: "The 
------· --------------------------------~-------
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iv. Personality and Eschatology 
Personality's confrontation with a world environment 
which is alienated from personality, which is impersonal,and 
which is unable to fulfill the transcendent aspirations of 
personality, is, in Berdyaev's view, the fundamental con-
flict in human life, the fundamental presupposition of re-
ligion and the basic theme in personalist philosophy. In the 
light of his view of personality, what must be the outcome 
of this conflict between personality and the impersonal ob-
jective world's efforts to bring personality into harmony 
with itself? For Berdyaev, personality's existence in the 
midst of the conditions of the natural world must eventuate 
in an eschatology. 
The world and world harmony must be brought to an 
end for the very reason that the theme of personality 
is insoluble within the confines of the world and 
history, and because the world harmony in this aeon 
of the world is a mockery of the tragic fate of man.l 
This triumph of personality, which will mean the fullest 
true creative act is personal, that is to say, indi-
vidual, but it is not, in any sense of the word, the 
result of individualism in itself" (New EEoch, P• 81). 
The meaning of the word "individual" in the second 
quotation cannot be the same as the meaning it has in 
the first quotation. Berdyaev apparently is able to use 
the term approvingly in the sense of "self-identity," 
but then it does not connote self-assertion, absorption 
with one's self and isolation from the life of the 
world. In the second quotation, "individualism" (as 
distinguished from "individual") is used to indicate 
that which is the antithesis of personality. 
1. Beginning, P• 137• 
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possible expression of personality's true nature, will also 
mean the "annihilation" of the objective world.l The materi-
aliaed world will give way to the realm of the spirit. This 
will be the end of the false world and the full expression 
of a world which is already existentially present in the 
experience of human personality. 
c. Personality as the Universal-Particular 
For Berdyaev, personality is both that which is onto-
logically real and that which is unique. But this does not 
mean that reality is a meaningless pluralism much like a 
sand-pile,where the relation of one grain of sand to another 
grain of sand is more or less accidental because no inner 
principle is at work. As Berdyaev observes, "philosophy does 
not ••• concern itself with disjointed things which stand 
to each other in the same kind of external relation as the 
facts of nature.n2 Such a world would be a world of complete 
chaos, in the throes of a complete relativism 
The problem of the relationship of what is universally 
real with that which is individually unique is the philo-
sophical problem of the One and the Many, most often re 
ferred to by Berdyaev as the problem of the universal and 
the particular. It also finds expression in his idea con-
cerning the macrocosm and the microcosm. 
1. Solitude, P• 12,. 2. Dream, P• 89. 
or personality and only personality can it be said that 
it "is the universal in an individual ly unrepeatable form. 
It is a union of the universal-infinite and the individual-
particular."1 Concerning this aspect of personality Berdyaev 
writes: 
ersonality realizes its existence and its destiny in 
the contradictions and the combinations of the finite 
and the infinite, of the relative and the absolute, 
of the one and the many, of freedom and necessity, 
of the inward and the outward. There is no unity and 
identity of the inward and the outward, of the sub-
jective and the objective, but a tragic lack of cor-
respondence, and a conflict. But unity and universal-
ity are attained not in infinite objectivity but in 
infinite subje~tivity, in subjectivity which tran 
scends itself. 
It is in this tension that Berdyaev views the existence of 
personality as universal-particular. But this can best be 
seen against the background of the traditional controversy 
between the "realists" and the "nominalists." 
Platonic realism holds that the ideas are real essences 
or universals which exist in and of themselves apart from 
any particular things, ante ~· The universals are reality 
while things have a derived reality. Though Berdyaev is 
sympathetic to significant elements in Plato's philosophy, 
he rejects this basic Platonic concept . 11 I am, both intel-
~ 
lectually and emotionally , opposed to realist conceptualism 
and do not believe in any general ideas or universals re~ 
senting not particular and individual images but a supposed 
1 . Slavery, P• 22. 2. ~., P• 59• 
essence of things.nl The rejection of Platonism at this 
point means that "there is no wholeness, no totality, no 
universality of any kind outside personality.n2 
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The chief reason for Berdyaev's disavowal of the 
realism of concepts is that this realism, in acknowledging 
the primacy of the general over the individual and in sub-
jecting the human mind to generalities, is a source of 
man's slavery or alienation . Furthermore, the Christian 
conception of God is not that of Plato's idea of the good 
nor of Aristotle's concept of the pure act,but or the God 
who became man and with whom man has personal relations. 
The Christian faith demands the rejection of Platonic 
realism. ? 
Nominalism, in rejecting Platonic realism, holds that 
universals are not the essences of things but merely con-
cepts in the mind or names for similar qualities and rela-
tions observed in particular things . Universals or the Pla-
tonic ideas have no ontological standing; only the particu-
lar things are themselves real . Universals are post ~· 
But Berdyaev also rejects the nominalist position: "I can-
not identify myself with the nominalist position, because 
it appears to undermine the idea of the human person, and 
fails to recognize the eternal image of man . "4 
1. Dream, P• 289 . 
;. Dream, P• 289 . 
2 . Slavery, P• 42• 
4· Ibid . 
Berdyaev finds that neither realism nor nominalism is 
acceptable. The universal is not the common nor the abstrac~ 
and it is not the product of abstracting thought. No solu-
tion ot the problem of the relation of the universal to the 
particular is to be found by either ultimately denying one 
of the two terms or by opposing one to the other. This re-
jection of an opposition means that personality is not the 
part of which the universal is the whole. When personality 
{the particular) is held to be a part of the "classless 
society" {a universal or general category), then the partic-
ular person disappears, whether it be in the "classless 
society" of Marx or the "Republic" of Plato. Berdyaev's own 
-
view is similar to Aristotelian realism: ~The universal • • 
• is not independent being, it is to be found in single 
beings, in rebus, according to the old terminology. 111 This 
means that the personality is the universal. Berdyaev does 
not wish to deny any reality to universals nor does he wish 
to restrict philosophy to the particular. It is his desire 
"to find a universal in the particular, to understand the 
abstract concretely, instead of understanding the concrete 
abstractly.n2 It is only existential personalism which can 
-
succeed in relating the universal and the particular for, 
"according to existential personalism, the universal exists, 
1. Slavery, P• ;8. 
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but it exists as a qualification of personality."l 
Instead of suppressing the particular-individual, as 
does the common or abstract idea with resulting self-aliena-
tion, the universal "raises it to the fullness of existential 
content.u2 Again Berdyaev tells us that "the universal is 
not the co~n; it is not abstract, but concrete, i.e. it 
is plenitude."3 The universal does not exist apart from 
personality, and it also becomes apparent that personality 
does not exist apart from the universal. The universal is 
revealed in personality and known to personality,not as 
something presented from without or as an abstract idea, but 
"as lived and experienced in the subject and in proportion 
to the subject's awareness."4 "The universal is an essay, 
an attempt, on the part of the subject, not a reality in 
the object. 0 5 The universal, as leading to fullness of 
existential content in the person, is expressed in "the 
qualitative character of personality."6 Again, "the univer-
sal is concrete and is within actual existence as that which 
gives it qualitative value and fulfilment.n7 This reveals 
-
the existential nature of the universal and means that the 
fullest expression and content of personality does not lead 
1. Beginning, p. 121. 2. Ibid., P• 119. 
3· S1aver;y:, P• ,a. 4· Dream, P• a9. 
5· Slavery, P• ,a. 6. Beginning, P• 129· 
7· Ibid., P• 119 • 
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to isolation and estrangement through self-assertion~ as is 
the case with mere individualism which is devoid of spirit-
ual content; rather, the more fully that personality is ex-
perienced and expressed, the greater is its universal con-
tent and the greater is its participation in or relatedness 
to the whole of reality. 
Because the universal is found in what is personal, 
the spiritual experience of a person is the key to the 
philosophical quest. Thus Berdyaev can say that "every par-
ticular philosophical insight, ••• contains for me a 
whole universe of truth.nl In this regard, Berdyaev's idea 
of personality as a microcosm is very closely related to 
the idea of personality as the universal. "Personality is a 
microcosm, a complete universe. It is personality alone 
that can bring together a universal content and be a poten-
tial universe in an individual form.a2 It is the universal 
. 
content in personality that constitutes personality a micro-
cosm. And, as was the case with personality as the universal, 
so "the understanding of human personality as a microcosm 
is set in antithesis to the organic-hierarchical interpre-
tation of h~, which transforms man into a subordinate part 
of a whole."; 
To understand what Berdyaev means by "microcosm" it 
1. Dream, P• 89. 2. Slaverz, P• 21. 
;. ~., P• 22 
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must be determined what he means by the word cosmos, a word 
he often uses. In the history of philosophy the word "cos-
mos" has come to mean the world or universe as perfectly 
arranged and ordered. Such a conception of tba world was 
reached in Greek philosophy by the t~e of Plato,who wrote 
that "there is in the universe a cause of no mean power, 
which orders and arranges";l and by Aristotle,who wrote 
that "nature is everywhere the cause of order.n2 Brightman 
considers the terms world, order, cosmos, and whole as syn-
onymous.3 The word "cosmos" conveys the basic conviction 
. 
that the world is ordered by an intelligent principle of 
divine justice or harmony. The antithesis of cosmos is dis-
order, chaos, the absence of relatedness. 
Berdyaev's understanding of "cosmos" must be seen 
against the background of his fundamental distinction be-
tween spirit and nature. He is concerned to show that his 
designation of nature as the realm lacking ontological 
being and quality does not deny the idea of a cosmos nor 
does it separate man from the life of the universe. 
The cosmos, the divine world, and the divine nature 
are only rev aled in spiritual experience and in 
spiritual life. In fact it is only in the spirit 
that man encounters the cosmns, and man is not sep 
arated from it but, rather, united to it thereby.~ 
1. Philebus ;o. 2. Physics 252a. 12. 
;. ]ligar s. Brightman, Nature and Values (New York: Abing-
don-Cokesbury Press, 1945), P• 85. 
4. Freedom, P• 41. 
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The cosmos, then, is the spiritual realm, the divine cre-
ation as it centers in the divine nature,which constitutes 
it a cosmos. "In the spiritual world the cosmos dwells in 
man as man dwells in God.nl 
In the phenomenal world there is no cosmos and there 
is no God. The cosmos is in personality and God is in per-
sonality; therefore "through man there is a way out into 
another world.n2 Berdyaev is thus able to say that "man is 
a microcosmos and a microtheos. tt3 111tficrocosmos '' here means 
that man's experience gives ~valid insight into the nature 
of reality. It presupposes a correspondence or correlation 
of the whole personality with the whole of reality. Like-
wise, "m1crotheos" signifies that man's e~perience gives 
valid insight into the divine nature. 
The significance of Berdyaev's concept of the human 
personality as a microcosm, so far as the problem of this 
dissertation is concerned, is two-fold. (1) If man were not 
a microcosm, there would be no assurance that his experi-
ences gave any genuine clues to the nature of reality. Hu-
man nature would be a cul-de-sac,and the question of a real-
ity transcending sense-experience would not even arise. Th 
microcosmic nature of human personality is a fundamental 
tenet with Berdyaev. 
1. Ibid., P• 199• 
3• ~., P• 172. 
2. Beginning, P• 40. 
Man is a small universe--that is the basic truth for 
kii'Owiiig-man, and the basi'C"""'t'ruth ihich precedes the 
very possibility of knowing. The universe may enter 
into man, be assimilated by him, be attained and 
known by h~ only because in man there is the whole 
component of the universe, all its qualities and 
forces--because man is not a fractional part of the 
universe but an entire small universe himself. 
There is included here not only the idea that man is capable 
of knowing reality, but also the further suggestion that 
something cannot be real and meaningful for man but at the 
same time beyond human experience. 
The key point at issue here is that the "comprehension 
of the mystery of the world in human existence is a possi-
bility only because man is a microcosm and a microtheos.rr2 
This is the "prerequisite of all philosophy. 11 3 Man is capa-
ble of knowing and understanding only by virtue of his being 
a microcosm. "Man penetrates into the meaning of the uni-
verse as into a larger man, into a mac-anthropos."4 which 
eans that man "attains a knowledge of the cosmos by the 
same means that he attains self-knowledge.n5 
l. Creative Act, P• 59· 2. BeginniBg, P• 4o. 
,. Creative Act, P• 58. 4· Ibid., P• 59· 
5· Freedom, p. 199• It appears that Berdyaev, in his 1dea 
of the microcosmic nature of personality as well as in 
his general intuitive approach to truth, makes some 
use of the Platonic theory of knowledge as reminis 
cence. According to this theory of education, teaching 
consists not in ~parting knowledge but in eliciting 
from the student what he already knows unconsciously. 
Berdyaev indicates that, in some mysterious way, the 
truth about the world and about God are to be found 
within the depths of one's own being. 
(2) The microcosmic idea not only guarantees man's 
knowledge o£ God's universe,but it also supports the cre-
ative role o£ man in relation to this universe. "Man the 
microcosm is able to express himself dynamically in the 
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macrocosm, he has the power to create being, to change cul-
ture into being.nl The cosmic nature of human personality 
is the assurance that human creativity has existential and 
cosmic significance. Just as in knowing the universe man is 
able to penetrate into the meaning of the universe by virtue 
of his microcosmic nature, for "all meaning is revealed 
-
within the Ego, within man; and it is commensurable with 
the Ego,"2 so, in relation to the human creative act, 11 the 
universe enters into man, submitting to his creative effort, 
as into a small universe."3 
The degree to which man is able to realize his micro-
cosmic nature is the degree to which he has achieved per-
sonality. The cosmos is not given objectively but is en-
countered only in the spirit. Only in the man who has 
achieved spirituality is to be found the cosmos and all di 
vine creation. The overcoming of man's estrangement from the 
divine world means that he recovers an inner life, a true 
subjectivity, and "it is only to the man who himself pos-
-
sesses an inner life that the inner life of the cosmos is 
revealed as a spiritual reality."4 
1. Creative Act, P• 126. 
3· Creative Act, P• 59· 
2. Solitude, P• 32. 
4· Freedom, p. 199· 
D. Personality--A Goal and a Task 
i . Introduction 
It has been noted that personality is, by definition, 
the unchanging in change, unity in the manifold. The iden-
tity of personality is not altered nor obscured by change, 
which is its process of self-realization. "The personality 
~ 
is eternal, identical and unique; but for all that, it is 
permanently in a process of creative change because it has 
need of time to realize its potentialities to the full.nl 
. 
Personality is not a static category; it develops and is 
enriched. Berdyaev sees it as man's goal, the accomplish-
ment of which is life's supreme task . 
Personality is not in any case a ready made datum, 
it is the posing of a question, it is the ideal of a 
man. Perfectly accomplished unity and wholeness of 
personality is the ideal of man . Personality is self-
constructive . Not a single man can say of himself 
that he is completely a person . Personalit! is an 
axiological category, a category of value . 
Thus it is clear that, f or Berdyaev , personality in its 
fullest xpression and reality remains man ' s quest . It is 
man's "ideal"; it is what man knows he ought to be . 
Man lives in a state of tension so far as personality 
is concerned . Berdyaev proceeds to indicate a paradox at 
this point in the existence of personality because, While 
personality "must construct itself, enrich itself, fill 
itself with universal content , achieve unity in wholeness 
1 . Solitude , P• 146. 2. Slavery, p. 23 . 
------------ --- ----------------------
86 
in the whole content of its life," at the same time "there 
must originally exist that subject which is called upon to 
construct itself."l 
There exists a verbal inconsistency at this point when 
Berdyaev speaks of the originally-existing subject and of 
that which is the goal or ideal of this subject: the same 
word "personality" is sometimes used in both cases. But 
most characteristically the word "ego" is used to denote 
the originally-existing subject while "personality" indi-
cates the progress and the goal of this subject as it seeks 
its own fulfillment. 
I am an Ego before I am a personality. The Ego is 
primary and undifferentiated; it does not postulate 
a doctrine of the personality. The Ego is postulated 
ab initio; the personality is propounded. The Ego's 
purpose is to realize its personality.n2 
ii. Transcendence and Suprapersonal Values 
Because personality represents what man ••ought to be'' 
in comparison to the incomplete nature of what man ''is,'' a 
problem appears . How can man, in his weakness and sin, a 
picture of imperfection, yet at the same time be aware of a 
higher calling to be the person he '' ought to be"? How can 
man speak or, let alone imagine, an existence which far ex-
ceeds what he has actually achieved? 
This image of personalit~which is the goal of develop 
i ng personalit~ is indicative of suprapersonal values and 
1 . Ibid . 2. Solitude, p. 121. 
qualities. Without this suprapersonal level or realm of 
reality, personality would have no existence or meaning. 
"The existence of personality presupposes the existence of 
suprapersonal values. There is no human personality if 
there is no existence which stands higher than it, if there 
is no higher world to which it ought to rise.n1 "Personal-
ity cannot ascend, cannot realize itself, and realise the 
rullness or its life, unless suprapersonal values exist."2 
The experience of personality as it develops in the 
light of its ideal image is that or rising or ascending 
toward that which it recognizes as its own supreme value, 
and that or transcending its own immediate being. "Person-
ality is empty ••• unless by means or creative acts it 
moves outwards and upwards beyond its own confines, unless 
it triumph3 over itself and in so doing realizes itself.n3 
-
"Man's stature and signiricance is in proportion to that in 
him which breaks through to infinity.n4 
ith an emphasis that is strongly characteristic of 
Berdyaev's whole structure of thought, he cautions that the 
relationship between the developing personality and the su~ 
prapersonal values (wherein is grounded the ideal of per-
sonality) is not to be understood as personality sUbordi-
nating itself or being subordinated to any whole as one of 
1. Slaveri, P• 37• 
3· Beginnigg, P• 130. 
2. Ibid., P• 39• 
4• Dream, P• 45· 
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its parts, or to the highest being or to its highest 11 other" 
as a slave to its master. Personality is not crushed nor 
dominated. Transcendence is the dynamic immanent experience 
of the self,which it experiences as freedom because it is 
released from its narrow confines, and its meeting with that 
which excels it is of a free, personal cbaracter.l Con-
fronted by suprapersonal values (which for personality 
means primarily a vision of what it "ought to be''), person-
ality experiences neither alienation nor suppression,but 
rather the realization of entering into its own inheritance, 
of knowing what it means "to be oneself.n2 
iii. From Ego to Personality 
a. Stages in the Development of the Ego 
Berdyaev conveniently lists the stages in the dialec-
tical development of the ego as follows: 
Firstly, the undifferentiated unity of the Ego with 
the universe; secondly, the dualist opposition of the 
Ego and the non-Ego; thirdly and finally, the 
achievement of the concrete union of every Ego with 
the Thou, a union which preserves plurality in a 
transfigured form. ~ 
1. See Slavery, PP• 29-30. Contrary to the monad or Leibniz, 
Berdyaev's personality is a monad that does have exis-
tential ''windows" by which it transcends itself. 
2. Destiny, P• 134· 
3• Solitude, p. 66. These three stages are comparable to 
the three stages in the development of the "spirit" 
which Berdyaev mentions in Destiny, p. 39• 
The first stage is what Berdyaev elsewhere calls "the 
original paradisaical wholeness, pre-conscious wholeness.nl 
Tillich has a similar thing in mind when he speaks about "a 
kind of dreaming innocence, a stage of infancy before con-
test and decision" which is the state of being hidden in the 
unity of the ground of the divine life prior to the process 
of self-actualization.2 
The second stage Berdyaev elsewhere calls the stage of 
"division, reflection, valuation, freedom of choice."; This 
~ 
is the level of consciousness and of' self-consciousness 
where the Ego, in distinguishing itself from its environ-
ment, exists in a state of' estrangement from and tension 
with the rest of being. 
The third stage is called by Berdyaev that of "super-
conscious wholeness and completeness that comes after free 
dom, rerlection and valuation.n4 It is at this stage that 
~ 
the ego, recovering from its self-centeredness and aliena-
tion, becomes personality 
b. Love's Supreme Role 
In the effort of' the ego to escape the solitude and 
1. The Destiny of Man, P• ;9. 
2. Paul Tillich, Systematic TheoloS), Vol. I (Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 1951 , PP• 259-260. 
;. Destiny, P• ;9. 4· Ibid. 
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alienation o£ the second stage o£ its development and to 
achieve the wholeness and completeness o£ personality, the 
creative role o£ love is the sine qua .!!2.!!• 11 The personality 
and love are intimately related, £or ~ trans£orma ~ 
~ into ~ personality . Only love can ef£ect that complete 
£usion with another being which transcends solitude."1 IJ:>ve 
is so essential to the life of personality that without 
love there is "no self-fulfilment, no overcoming o£ isola-
tion, no communion,"2 and therefore no personality. Love 
postulates the personality. 
Because personality requires love, and love means the 
overcoming of isolation, the antithesis between ego and non-
ego must be resolved. The world of objectified nature must 
come to an end. As Berdyaev puts it, "I only acquire being~ 
reality, and personality when everything about me has ceased 
to be external, strange, impenetrable, or li£eless~ and 
when the kingdom of love is realized . "; In the light of pre-
vious discussion, then, it is love which makes personality 
a microcosm, a particular which is at the same time a uni-
versal. "The universality o£ personality which absorbs into 
itself the object world which crushes everything, is not an 
egocentric affirmation of self, but a throwing open in love.~ 
The intimate relationship that exists between love and 
1 . Solitude, P• 89. 
3· Freedom~ p. 268 . 
2. Ibid., P• J.47 • 
4. Slavery, p 44• 
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personality clearly indicates that the existence of per-
sonality presupposes a communion of personalities. "Per-
sonalism cannot but have some sort of community in view," 1 
remarks Berdyaev, who is concerned to show that personalism 
understands personality in a manner quite different from the 
egocentric self-containment of egoism. "Egocentrism is .f'atal 
to the development of the personality," he says, because 
"the free development of the personality precludes self-
-interest, and must be based entirely on its aspiration to 
commune with the Thou and the We .n2 
The ego, which is a potential personality, becomes one 
in reality by communion with the Thou in the We. In fact, 
"it is this communion of personalities longing to be re-
flected in one another which confirms the personality."~ 
~ 
The place of love in the development of communion, 
which is both the condition for the development of person-
ality as well as the result of its development, is not dif-
ficult to se • The solution to the whole problem of communi-
cation between one personality and another lies in love, for 
love "is the means by which the Ego emerges from its self-
sufficiency in quest of another Ego.n4 A real communion • 
• can only occur when the Ego identifies itself with the 
Thou, as in the case of love and friendship.n5 When Berdyaev 
1. ~., P• 42. 
?• 1.2.!!!•, P• 85. 
5• ~., P• 87. 
2. Solitude, p 126. 
4• Ibid., P• 84. 
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says that "the intuition of another Ego's spiritual life is 
equivalent to communion with it,trl he has simply enlarged 
-
upon the meaning or love as he understands it. 
E. A Religious Interpretation 
In this discussion of the meaning of personality in the 
thought of Berdyaev, the meaning of spirit for him has also 
been elaborated. But this philosophical interpretation or 
personality has deep theological meaning for him and, in 
line with the interests of this study, this meaning must be 
shown. 
For Berdyaev, Christianity is the religion which most 
adequately asserts the place and significance or personal-
ity. He speaks or the "Christian affirmation of the pre-
eminence of the personal and the singular."2 Christianity, 
in affirming that every human personality has an intrinsic 
value and that all men are equal before God, also affirms 
that every man must be given every opportunity to aohiev 
the personality whioh he has in his power to become.' To 
Berdya v 1s way of thinking, the man who is most a person is 
also most spiritual and Christian. And the syste of thought 
which gives most place to the person is most spiritual and 
Christian. 
1. Ibid., P• 89 • 
-
,. Solitude, P• 129. 
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Religiously speaking, personality cannot be defined 
apart from God. As already observed, personality is not the 
epiphenomenon of nature nor the offspring of the space-time 
world, but the creation of God. Personality is pre-existent; 
that is, it is rooted in the divine life. 
The pathway of development for the ego from embryonic 
personality to full personality in this world inevitably 
passes through the stage of division and alienation,when 
the non-ego is objectified and therefore restricts and en-
slaves the go. This egocentric self-containment of the 
self is its fall and its sin.l 
The deliverance of the self from its self-containment, 
which is its sin, means the process of achieving personality. 
The self is open to "suprapersonal values," by which term 
thi study understands Berdyaev to be attempting to say some-
thing basic and meaningful about God in human experience. 
The self can and must transcend itself to achieve personal-
ity, and this transcendence is a religious task which comes 
as a moral imperative for Berdyaev. "Personality must come 
out of itself, must transcend itself--this is the task set 
to it by God.n2 Furthermore, personality cannot transcend 
itself if God does not exist for it. "Personality cannot 
1. See Slavery, p. 268. See also Nicolas Berdyaev, Truth and 
Revelation, trans R. M. French (New York: Harper and 
Bros., 1953), P• 119. Cited hereafter as Truth. 
2. Destinz, P• 57• 
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ascend, cannot realize itself, and realize the fullness of 
its life ••• unless there is a divine level of life."1 In 
transcending itself to achieve its greatest expression, per-
sonality finds itself in communion with other personalities, 
the "I" meets the "Thou" and this interpenetration is possi-
. 
ble and is consummated only in the Holy Spirit, that is, in 
God.2 Then the kingdom of God or the kingdom of love is 
realized.; 
It was observed that Berdyaev saw personality as devel-
oping in the light of its image or ideal, indicating the 
openness of personality to suprapersonal values. The most 
significant point in his doctrine of personality, from the 
religious perspective, is to be found here. For Berdyaev, 
this ideal or image of human personality is not merely a 
human imag~but it is also the image of God. He uses the 
phrase "the image of God" in virtual synonymity with the 
. 
phrase "the image of human personality~Man "bears within 
~ . 
himself the image which is both the image of man and the 
image of God and is the image of man 1n so far as the image 
of God is actualized.n4 This personality of man, which is 
the disclosure within man of the image of God, is the result 
of human creativity.5 The word "God" does not mean a rea1m 
1. Slavery, P• 39· 2. Solitude, p 141 
; . Ereedom, P• 268; Solitude, P• 145• 
4• Slavery, P• 45· 5· Truth, P• 73• 
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of being over and against man's existence. Rather, human 
personality is "the bearer of the divine principle in 
lifef1 and the presence of the divine element within per-
sonality does not in any way violate what is human but, on 
the contrary, supports and affirms it.2 
Because the ideal of human personality, that which 
personality nought to be,'' is revealed as the image of God, 
the emphasis is also given that the task of achieving its 
image comes to personality as a divine imperative. Person-
ality's "image" exists in a somewhat Platonic manner within 
God before its expression in this world. "Personality is 
God's idea of man, and man's eternal destiny is indissolubly 
linked with this unique and divine thing. Its image remains 
in God and not here below in the world, in natural substan-
tiality.n3 This "idea" remains in God as the ideal or goal 
. 
of human personality. "Personality is the divine idea, God's 
design.n4 It is the divine purpose concerning any particu-
lar individual, so that "to be oneself means to realize 
God's idea of one's self. That is the essence of personal-
ity as the highest value."5 
1. Destiny, P• 134· 2. Freedom, P• 16. 
3• Ibid., PP• 277-278• 4• Ibid., P• 16. 
5
• De!!~n~lm~~e1~~-G~,~i~e~~;a~; !~~a;:~~y"~;f~m~a 
the identity of ideal Man with the human idea of God. 
This means that man's consciousness of a distinction 
between himself and God is the result of an incomplete 
3· Spirit as Freedom 
A. The Place of Freedom in Berdyaev's Thought 
i. A Basic Theme 
Perhaps the word most frequently used by Berdyaev to 
denote the manifestation of spirit is the word "freedom." 
Spinka has called him the "captive of freedom."l In his 
spiritual autobiography, written near the end of his life, 
Berdyaev wrote: "I set out by placing freedom, personality 
and creatorship at the basis of my whole outlook; but, in 
due course, my concern for freedom becrune more intense. 112 
This does not mean that his themes of personality and 
creativity assumed less importanc~ but that , in view or 
Berdyaev•s tendency to write in response to some exterior 
challenge and stimulus, he found "freedom" to be the greater 
concern in situations to which he addressed himself . 
Berdyaev saw that, if monism and pantheism were to be 
avoided as interpretations of man ' s place in the world, 
spiritual development rather than the inherent accom 
paniment of being a created human being. 
This idea or human personality as the image of God 
is related to Berdyaev •s basic philosophical and theo-
logical doctrine of divine-humanity which is discussed 
in chap . 5 of this study, PP • 203-218 . Berdyaev•s 
teaching on the "image of God" is critically appraised 
in chap . 7 , pp . ~ • 
1 . The full title of Mat t hew Spinka's helpful book on Ber-
dyaev is Nicolas Berdyaev: Captive of Freedom (Phila-
delphia: Westminster Press , l950) . 
2. Dream, P • 50. 
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there must be freedom for man. Without this freedom it 
would be impossible to speak of man's dignity and worth. 
This freedom, rather than the traditional "being," was con-
. 
sidered by him to be at the basis of his philosophy. The 
voluntaristic character of his thinking is thereby revealed. 
"Freedom, unconditional and uncompromising freedom, has 
been the fountain-head and prime mover of all my thinking .ul 
ii. Christianity a Religion of Freedom 
For Berdyaev, Christianity is the religion of freedom 
par excellence. "Christianity is the religion of freedom 
and in its essence and content recognizes it in all its 
forms."2 The dawn of Christianity meant a new advance for 
freedom. "Christianity was the first to reveal conclusively 
the freedom of the creative subject which had been ignored 
by the pre-Christian world."' ithout a leading place being 
-given in Christianity to the idea of freedom, the creation 
of the world, the fall and redemption of man, the phenomenon 
of faith (in fact, the whole world process) become meaning-
less and incomprehensible.4 Christianity, viewed as the 
1. ~., P• 158. 
2. Nicolas Berdyaev, Dostoevsky, trans Donald Attwater 
(New York: Meridian Books, 1957), p. 71. 
,. Nicolas Berdyaev, The Meanin~ of History, trans. George 
Reavey (London: Geoffrey B es, 1936}, p. 111. Cited 
hereafter as History. 
4• Freedom, P• 119. 
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or philosopher has done," and in particular reference to 
the present discussion he adds that "in this fundamental 
intuition of liberty I found Dostoievsky as it were on his 
own special ground ."l 
It was Dostoievsky's portrayal of freedom as a deep 
spiritual problem of man that attracted Berdyaev. The high-
point of this portrayal is to be found in Dostoievsky's 
masterful story, "The Legend of the Grand Inquisition," in 
the novel The Brothers Karamazov. Here freedom is portrayed 
as a burden for man who readily accepts servitude and sur-
renders his free, spiritual life for a life of mere exist-
ence. The figure of the Grand Inquisitor is the Antichrist, 
be it the Church or communism, a type of humanitarian pity 
which relieves man of his burden of freedom in exchange for 
authority and compulsion. In this legend, Christianity is 
conceived as utter freedom of a spiritual sort,and any com-
pulsion, be it by God or by man, is to be refused. God wants 
a free man, and man must be prepared to shoulder the burden 
of freedom. The moral of the legend may be stated thus: 
tragic freedom is better than compulsory happiness. 
Berdyaev's basic conviction that freedom is the funda 
mental element in the religious life he found best reflected 
in Dostoievsky. Berdyaev saw him arriving at the "existence 
of God through a consideration of the freedom of the human 
1. Dostoievsky, P• 7• 
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spirit: those of his characters who denythis freedom deny 
God, and inversely.ttl Dostoievsky understood well the move-
ment of the soul in modern man which Berdyaev also saw, 
namely that "it is from the depths of an unfathomable free-
dom that the soul comes to Christ and to God.n2 
But Berdyaev was not satisfied just to assert and de-
fend this freedom. Because man is a microcosm whose spirit-
ual experience reflects the whole of reality, the element 
of freedom in man's experience reflects a freedom which 
must be interpreted cosmically. This leads to a baffling 
portion of his thought indicated by his word Ungrund. The 
influence of the German mystic Jacob Boehme will be shown 
in this concept. 
iv. Freedom as an Attribute of Spirit 
This present chapter is based on two assumptions: (1) 
that no understanding of Berdyaev's thought on human crea-
tivity can be reached without knowing what he means by 
"spirit"; and (2) that a study of three words frequently 
used by Berdyaev--personality, freedom and creativeness--
is the best way to discover what he means by "spirit" and 
ultimately to discover what he means by human creativity. 
Freedom is an attribute of the spirit. The title of 
one of Berdyaev's significant books is Freedom and the 
1 . DostoieVsky, P• 87. 2 . Freedom, P• 322. 
101 
Spirit . "Freedom has its foundations 
• • • in the spirit . nl 
"Freedom is the eternal basis of the human spirit--the spir-
it is freedom. "2 Man is free in direct proportion to the 
degree of his spirituality . "Freedom is attained • • • 
through inwardness, whereby no part of man's nature is ex-
ternal to him. "3 
As the study has already shown, it is impossible to 
understand personality as an attribute of spirit without 
the existence of personality's freedom. Personality defined 
as act presupposes the freedom to act . The transcendence of 
personality beyond the space-time world to unite itself ith 
suprapersonal values means freedom. The ability of personal-
ity to escape self-centeredness and to achieve communion in 
love means freedom, for "freedom is the eternal basis for 
human intercourse: to be true communion it must be free . u4 
This gives some indication of the integrated nature of Ber-
dyaev's thought . 
B. Primordial Freedom 
Berdyaev's ideas on freedom may be considered radica~ 
in the sense that for him freedom is the basic ingredient 
of existence His thought is an ontology of freedom. Free-
dom not only precedes man ' s earthly existence and supports 
1 . Ibid., P• 117. 
3· Dream, PP• 149-150• 
2 . Fate of Man, P • 37 · 
4. Fate of Man, P• 37 • 
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it, but it is also the key in thinking about man's nature 
and destiny. Berdyaev's freedom is "the mysterious source 
. 
of life, the basic and original experience, the abyss which 
is deeper than being itself and by which being is deter-
mined."1 "Freedom appeared to me as the initial, primary 
reality, as the.!. priori of existence."2 
i. Critique of the Traditional View of Freedom 
For a moral and religious interpretation of existence, 
some place must be given to freedom. But the problem is: 
What is the source of man's freedom? 
Berdyaev finds the traditional, rational answer to the 
question inadequate. His understanding of this position may 
be briefly stated: man was created by God in his own image 
and endowed by God with freedom (this freedom to be under-
stood as freedom of the will, man's capacity to choose). 
Man's misuse of the divine gift of freedom resulted in the 
Fall with its accompanying sin and evil. 
The critique of this traditional view is summed-up in 
the following points. (1) It tends to consider the will as 
some abstract power apart from the person, whereas a person 
expresses his freedom by the efforts of his whole conscious 
being.; This means that freedom has its foundations in the 
1. Freedom, P• 126. 2. Dream, p. 48. 
;. Freedom, p. 118. 
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spirit and not in the will. (2) This freedom of the will 
does not liberate man but keeps him in fear; it humiliates 
man instead of exalting him because it means that man can 
only accept or reject what is given to him from without.1 
Freedom thus understood is not creative because~ instead of 
being active in its own nature, it is reactive. It is inter-
ested only in establishing man's responsibility and the pos-
sible grounds for punishment, and for this reason freedom of 
the will is a "purely normative conception that has been 
specially worked out for legal purposes. 112 (3) The tradi-
tional theological conception of freedom does not save the 
Creator from being responsible for sin and evil. It has no 
value so far as the construction of a theodicy is concerned. 
In this view "freedom itself is created by God and penetra-
ble to Him down to its very depths. u3 Freedom, the fatal 
endowment which dooms man, is given by God and so in the 
last resort is determined by God.4 Ultimately, Berdyaev 
sees this to mean that God cannot experience what might be 
called "cosmic surprises" since the very principle of 
1. Destiny~ P• So. 2. Ibid., PP• 43-44• 
3• ~·~ P• 24. 
4· Ibid. This study has not found in Berdyaev's writings 
--a:Qy justification for his contention that freedom is 
determined by God by virtue of the fact that it is 
given by God to man. Such an idea seems to rest upon 
a thoroughly immanentist view of God's relation to 
man. 
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newness, namely freedom, in having its source in God never 
achieves complete independence from God so as to have its 
own private history. "In expecting an answer to His call 
from man whom He endowed with freedom, God is expecting an 
answer from Himself. He knows the answer beforehand and is 
only playing with Himself. ul 
Berdyaev sees the traditional idea of freedom to ter-
minate logically in the doctrines of foreordination and pre-
destination, but "Calvin's horrible doctrine has the great 
merit of being a reductio ~ absurdum"2 of the over-ration-
alization of a profound mystery. Luther and st. Augustine 
also deny genuine freedom to man.3 
ii. Berdyaev 1 s Reformulation of the Problem 
Because of his deep dissatisfaction with the tradition-
al, biblical view of man's freedom, Berdyaev proceeded to 
formulate an idea of what freedom meant to him,which would 
give expression to the deep mystery which cannot be ration-
alized. He saw the problem existing as a dilemma: the diffi-
culty of reconciling the idea of human freedom with the idea 
of God's existence, and the difficulty of recognizing free-
dom if God does not exist and man is just a part of nature. 
The paradoxical solution of the problem is that 
freedom, without which creativeness and the moral 
life are impossible, comes neither from God nor from 
1. Ibid. 
3 • Freedom, PP• 207-208. 
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the created nature. In other words, freedom is 
uncreated and at the same time it is not divine . 111 
Passing from positive, rational theology to negative , 
mystical theology , he believed he could give expression in 
myths and symbols to the deep mystery of life which rational 
thought could not penetrate or capture . 11The limit to ration-
al thought is set by a mystery and not by a taboo . 112 
Porret correctly observes of Berdyaev that, in his de-
velopment of his idea of freedom, "Boehme lui aide a expri-
mer la metaphysique de la liberte . 11 3 Jacob Boehme, the Ger-
man mystic , developed in his theosophic teachings an original 
form of mysticism. His greatest influence upon Berdyaev was 
the concept of the Ungrund , the dark , primal , irrational, 
fathomless origin of all that exists . 
In eternity, i . e ., in the Ungrund out of nature, 
there is nothing but a stillness without being; 
there is nothing either that can give anything; it 
is an eternal rest which has no parallel, a ground-
lessness without beginning and end . Nor is there 
anything in which there were a4possibility •• • • It has no essential principle . 
The Ungrund is eternity beyond nature and the creatures 
of nature . It is the coincidentia oppositorum which precedes 
1 . Destiny, P• 34· 2 . ~. , P • 25 . 
en Russia: 
de la 
4• Jacob Boehme, Menschwerdung , II , 1 , 8 as quoted in Jacob 
Boehme , The Way to Christ , trans . John Joseph Stoudt 
(New York : Harper and Bros ., 1947) , p . xxvi . 
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all the antitheses and ambiguities of existence . It is the 
basis of existence as distinguished from existence itself . 
As potency of being, it can neither be thought of as some-
thing that is,nor as something that is not. The same specu-
lative notion appears as Schopenhauer's "will," Nietzsche's 
"will to power," Freud's "unconscious," and Tillich's ''being-
itself." 
. 
Although the significance of Boehme's thought at this 
point for Berdyaev's doctrine of God will be shown later, 
it should be mentioned that in his doctrine of Ungrund 
Boehme is describing the process of the eternal self-gener-
ation of God , 
How from the dark ground of Being within h~ the 
urgent impulse ("Drang"), or will, which has only 
itself for its object, attains self-revelation in 
the divine wisdom, and how that which has th~s 
become revealed forms itself into the world . 
In the nature of God, but deeper than God, lies this 
dark, primordial abyss which for Boehme is pure , naked will . 
This mystical, voluntaristic feature of his thought appealed 
to Berdyaev as he was struggling to find the meaning of life. 
On the importance of Boehme he writes : 
To me Boehme's importance for Christian philosophy 
and Christian theosophy lies in his efforts to break, 
by his vision, the powerful hold of Greco-Latin 
thought upon the Christian conscience, and in his 
penetration of the first Mystery of life which the 
thought of antiquity concealed . Christian theology 
(and not only Catholic theology) is so deeply imbued 
1 . Windelband , A History of Philosophy, P• 375 · 
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with Greek thought, Platonism, Aristotelianism, and 
Stoicism, that an attack upon this manner of think-
ing appears like an attack upon Christian revelation. 
Were not the Greek doctors of the Church disciples 
of Greek philosophy, were they not Platonists? Their 
thought retained the imprint of the limits of ~reek 
rationalism. It did not succeed in solving the prob-
lem of personality, the probl~m of freedom, the 
problem of creative dynamism. 
It is upon this basic insight of Boehme that Berdyaev 
structures his idea of primordial freedom . Some adaptation 
is to be seen. The voluntaristic nature of Boehme's Ungrund 
as primal will is preserved in Berdyaev's christening of it 
as primal freedom. Also, Boehme's Ungrund is the "dark 
nature" within the Godhead and deeper than the Trinity 
~ 
while Berdyaev appears, in some sense, to posit the Ungrund 
outside the Godhead as primal, meonic stuff--hence the 
eternal, uncreated nature of primal freedom from which the 
orld is created.2 
For Berdyaev, the Ungrund as primal freedom is "an 
-initial, irrational, and mysterious void which lies at 
the heart of the whole life of the universe . 3 This is meta-
physical language; it takes freedom out of its usual envi-
ronment of discussions on free will, free choice, psycho-
1. Nicolas Berdyaev, "Ungrund and Freedom, 11 Cross Currents , 
7(1957), 261-262. 
2. Berdyaev's thought at this point bears some comparison 
i th Plato 1 s "ReceptacleJ1 However, freedom is not a 
property of the "Receptacle." 
3· Freedom, P• 165 . 
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logical causality and declares that before anything ever 
came to exist, before creation, there was original freedom 
in which was contained the potential for all possible cos-
mic expressions and development . Primordial freedom pre-
cedes being and in that sense may be called 11non-being 11 or 
11no-thing . 11 "Freedom cannot be derived from being; freedom 
is rooted in nothing, in baselessness, in non-being, if we 
use ontological terminology . Freedom is without foundation; 
it is not determined by being nor born of it. 111 This clear-
ly speaks of freedom as the irrational principle. And yet, 
while freedom is not subject to rational categories, 11 in 
it the divine reason is alive . 112 This must be interpreted 
to mean that freedom has a positive, meaningful role to 
play in the universe. 
Berdyaev has been accused of a metaphysical dualism 
in his idea of freedom which, as eternal, exists outside 
of God. Does this mean the existence of two orders of 
being, God and freedom? His answer is that it does not . "I 
was always anxious to emphasize that the idea of ' groundless 
freedom' does not imply a kind of ontological dualism."? 
He regards dualisms and monisms as rationali~ations, and 
since his Ungrund was not a rational concept but the sym-
bolism of a mystery, it could not be part of a dualism. 
1 . Slavery, P• 76 . 
3• Dream, P • 179• 
2 . Creative Act, PP • ~6-147 • 
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This part of Berdyaev ' s teaching is perhaps the part 
which seems the strangest to many . Why does he hold such an 
idea of freedom? Several reasons can be suggested why Ber-
dyaev felt it necessary to express freedom as he has . (1) 
It best describes the relationship between God and man as 
experienced in this world . 1 The nature of religious or 
spiritual experience is understood to be a genuinely dra-
matic event in which man brings something to God which did 
not originally come from God in the first place, and reve~ 
something to God that God had not previously known . If it 
is held that man's freedom has the same source as his life, 
t hat is, God , the conclusion is inevitable that when man 
separates himself from God he also loses his freedom . 
Therefore man ' s return to God cannot be a free return. Ber-
dyaev argues that if this idea is logically carried out , 
we reach a monophysit e position in which the freedom 
of God is recognized while that of man is denied . 
Man receives a certain kind of fr eedom from God , but 
he does not possess that which leads him to God . The 
free response that man has to make to the divine 
call becomes impossible , God responds to Himself . 
The tragedy in which two beings participate is trans-
formed into a tragedy which involves action on the 
part of one being alone . With such a conception of 
freedom the original phenomeno~ of the religious 
life becomes incomprehensible . 
The Ungrund , then , might be called the ucosmic guaran-
tee" of man's free relation to God . Human freedom must be 
not only freedom in God but f r eedom in relation to God (as 
1. Ibid., p . 288 . 2 . Fr eedom, p . 136 . 
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well as to the world and to certain aspects of man's own 
nature) . Man must be free to accept the Truth which makes 
him free; or, as Berdyaev puts it, ".freedom in the accept-
ance o.f Truth cannot be won .from Truth itsel.f, .for it is 
prior to it."1 Freedom in the acceptance o.f God must be 
a.f.firmed, and "it is upon this very deep .foundation that 
.freedom as a principle o.f being prior to all organized and 
perfected life rests . 112 
Man's knowledge o.f this primal freedom is not by con-
cepts because it is "a living reality to be known dynami-
cally through the exercise and the experience of it . 113 
"Man .feels within himself this irrational and un.fathomable 
.freedom in the very .fibre o.f his being, and it is closely 
bound up with his potential energies . 114 This means that 
.freedom is closely related to the "depth" in man, to what 
is noumenal as distinct from what is phenomenal . 
(2) This idea o.f .freedom gives Berdyaev what he .feels 
is the cornerstone .for the construction of a theodicy . 
The only serious argument in favor o.f atheism is 
the dif.ficulty of reconciling an almighty and benev-
olent Deity with the evil and su.ffering in the world 
and in human existence . All theological doctrines 
hich deal with this problem appeared to me as 
intolerable rationalizations . Theodicy reaches down 
to the mystery of .freedom, which is not susceptible 
to any rationalization, and which cannot be expressed 
in terms o.f easy-going deductive logic. The issues 
1 . ~- , p. 127 . 
3· Dream, P • 52. 
2 . Ibid . , p . 128. 
4. Freedom, p . 126. 
lll 
involved in this problem have led me to the recog-
nition of uncreated or uncaused freedom, which is 
tantamount to the recognition of an irreducible 
mystery, admitiing of intuitive description but not 
of definition . 
Freedom,as the irrational mystery revealed in human 
existence and independent of Divine creation and deter~­
nation,conceals within i t self the possibilities ~f evil as 
well as of good,although it itself is neither good nor 
evil . As pure potentiality or possibility, it precedes and 
is the ground of all positive , rational expressions of be-
ing and may itself therefore be called "non-being. " The 
source of evil , then, is not in God nor in a being existing 
alongside God, but in the unfathomable abyss of non-being. 2 
This very myster~which is behind all things, which makes 
possible personal existence and freedom, 3 which constitutes 
the whole dignity of man and the world in which he 1ives , 4 
is also the origin of evi1 . 5 
(3 ) Berdyaev believed that primal freedom as he under-
stood it was necessary to his teaching of creativeness . 
The very nature of reality i s that it is process or becom-
ing, dialectical development , creativeness . Though he 
accused Hegel of betraying freedom to a necessary logical 
1. Dream, P• 178 . 2 . Freedom, P• 165 . 
3 · Beginning , p . 116 . 4- Dostoevsky, p . 86 . 
5 · S;Eirit, P • 105 ; ee also Beginning , P • 155 ; Dostoevsk:;y: , 
P • 85 . 
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process, yet he accepted Hegel's insight of the dialectic. 
"Hegel's discovery remains true , that becoming, develop-
ment, the appearance of what is new, are impossible and in-
explicable if we remain within the confines of being and 
fail to introduce non-being into our dialectic.nl 
"Beingtt for Berdyaev is the objective realm of neces-
sity and determination, the realm of cause-and-effect. The 
classical expression of "being" so understood is the inert 
substance which materialism designates as reality. With 
this is related the law of the conservation of energy, by 
which hypothesis materialism understands that the world's 
energy is fixed in quantity and cannot be increased.2 
"Being," then, lacks freedom and is empty of possibilities 
or potentialities. 
If being, shut in on itself and finished off, being 
in which no movement or change of any kind is possi-
ble be regarded as reality, then the possibility of 
creative action must inevitably be denied . There is 
no creative act whatever except the one by which 
God made the world.) 
Freedom as non-being is Berdyaev's metaphysical 
(though mystical and allegedly non-rational) explanation 
of how that which is non-existent becomes existent. "No 
. 
sort of creative newness can emanate from 'being.' It can 
take its rise from 'freedom' only.rr4 Creativeness as becom-
1. Beginning , pp . 161-162. 
3· Beginni9B, P • 167 . 
2 . Creative Act, P• 133· 
4• Ibid . , P • 167. 
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ing is the synthesis of non-being and being which exist in 
a dialectical relationship . 
This freedom cannot be expressed rationally because 
"concepts deal with and are dependent on the already exist -
ingrl and yet in this freedom 11 the divine reason is alive . 
~ 
Freedom is positive creative power rather than negative 
arbitrariness . 112 The divine Logos is present in freedom as 
creativeness since creativeness is productive of that hich 
has meaning and value . 
c . Freedom in God 
The primordial, irrational and unfathomable freedom 
is man ' s starting point,but it is not the goal of life . In 
itself there is no assurance "that man will follow the 
right path , that he will come to God , that truth will dom-
inate in his life and that freedom will in the long run be 
supreme in the world . 11 3 It has already been observed that 
~ 
primordial freedom is the source of both evil and good , al-
though it precedes that distinction . This freedom, which is 
the constituent element of every human personality by the 
very fact of that person ' s creation and existence , is not 
sufficient in itself . It is the freedom to choose the Truth 
(i . e ., God) , but it is not the freedom which Truth bestows . 
1. Dream, P • 213 . 2 . Creative Act, P• 147 • 
3• Freedom, p . 131. 
The ambiguity of primordial freedom without illumination 
by the Truth is the basic point of Berdyaev ' s criticism of 
humanism and is for him the main reason why humanism is a 
historical failure . This freedom, existing by itself, may 
turn into its opposite through a dialectic of freedom. 1 
It is apparent that Berdyaev recognizes two kinds of 
freedom and, as he remarks, "the problem of their relation 
has exercised my mind in most of my writings. 112 Berdyaev 
finds historical precedence for his two freedoms in the 
distinction made by Augustine in his struggle against Pela-
gianism, that of libertas minor and libertas major . 3 Liber-
~minor corresponds to Berdyaev's "primordial freedom . " 
-Its counterpart , libertas major, is the freedom which has 
its source in God . 11 It is the freedom which must one day 
be achieved through the triumph of the highest principles 
of life . 114 This is the highest type of freedom, but to 
affirm this divine freedo~ apart from man ' s freedom is to 
discover that the divine freedom " l eads to arbitrariness 
and constraint here truth and goodness are concerned , and 
to virtue imposed from without . 11 5 
Either type of freedom , taken by itself, is liable to 
a fatal inner dialectic . Just as human freedom, by itself , 
1. Dream, P • 52 . 
3 • Freedom , p . 125 . 
5 . Ibid ., P• 133 • 
2 . Ibid . , P • 47 • 
4· Ibid.' p 126 . 
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tends to evil and slavery, so the divine freedom,in denying 
human freedom,seeks to create freedom through necessity and 
compulsion. This tendency is clearly portrayed in Dostoiev-
sky's "The Legend of the Grand Inquisitor," which has so pro-
. . 
foundly influenced Berdyaev's thinking about freedom. The 
temptation of the Grand Inquisitor, the Antichrist, was to 
overthrow freedom and be rid of the irrational element in 
life for the sake of happiness and organized goodness. The 
Grand Inquisitor, in condemning Christ for imposing the 
tragic burden of freedom upon man, says 
We shall persuade them that they will only become 
free when they renounce their freedom to us and sub-
mit to us •••• Then we shall give them the quiet 
humble happiness of weak creatures such as they are 
by nature. Oh, we shall persuade them at last not 
to be proud, for Thou didst lift them up and there-
by taught them to be proud •••• Yes, we shall set 
them to work but in their leisure hours we shall 
make their life a child's game, with children's 
songs and innocent dance. Oh, we shall allow them 
even sin, they are weak and helpless, and they will1 love us like children because we allow them to sin. 
The Grand Inquisitor argues that individual freedom is 
incompatible with happiness. He tells Christ that had He 
accepted all the kingdoms of the earth from Satan, 
Thou wouldst have accomplished all that man seeks on 
earth--that is, some one to worship, some one to 
keep his conscience, and some means of uniting all 
in one unanimous and harmonious ant-heap, for the 
craving for universal unity is the third and last 
anguish of men . Mankind as a whole has always 
1. Fyodor Dostoievsky, The Brothers Karamazov, trans. 
Constance Garnett (New York: The Modern Library, 1929), 
PP • 317-318. 
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striven to organize a universal state . 1 
The great lesson of this Legend is that truth cannot 
compel nor use violence to make man free . The Christ of 
the Gospels rejected this way, and it is precisely for this 
that the Grand Inquisitor condemns Christ as "the worst of 
heretics . " 
The relation of the two freedoms constitutes in large 
measure the dramatic make-up of the human scene . Berdyaev 
sees freedom both as freedom to choose the truth and free-
dom as bestowed by the truth, freedom for the truth and 
freedom in the truth, freedom as the initial experience of 
man at the beginning of his existence and freedom as man's 
final end or goal . Theologically viewed, it is the freedom 
of human nature and the freedom of divine nature . Full free-
dom of the spirit,2 which is the freedom of creativeness, 
is both the freedom of man and the freedom of God . 3 Crea-
tive freedom, then, involves the question of God-manhood . 
D. Freedom as Divine-Human 
Both types of freedom are necessary and neither one 
must be violated or destroyed . Man in his creative capacity 
must have both that freedom which is in and through the 
1 . Ibid., p . 316 . 
2. Even man ' s initial freedom must be understood in Berdyaev 
as of the spirit , but it is spirit in the beginnings 
of its development and not in its mature expression. 
3· Freedom, P• 127 . 
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truth, and that primal rreedom for the free choice of that 
truth which brings rreedom. This is another way of saying 
that man, in becoming what he ''ought to be'' in the light 
or the divine (the divine corresponding to man's image or 
ideal), must not violate what he essentially is. 
Not only does each of the two rreedoms contain within 
itselr the seeds of its own destruction, being susceptible 
to an inner dialectic that tends to produce its opposite 
when it is not complemented by the other rreedom, but the 
two freedoms may be openly opposed to each other. This 
opposition "belongs to a world already divorced from its 
divine cent;e . 111 The natural man finds himselr in the middle 
of this opposition and can rind no escape; he "moves from 
the rirst kind of rreedom to the second and from the second 
to the rirst, but everywhere rreedom is poisoned from with-
in and dies . 112 
The reconciliation of human freedom and divine free-
dom is actually the traditional question of the relation 
of the human nature and the divine nature , and "only the 
Christian revelation, the religion of the God- man, can 
reconcile the two kinds of freedom . 113 Berdyaev holds that 
the human element must not be violated in this relationship, 
but that it also needs the illumination of the divine ele-
1 . Ibid ., p . 134· 
3· Ibid ., P• 135 · 
2 . Ibid . 
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ment. The completion of that which is human by that which 
is divine must be in accordance with the unique nature and 
development of the individual. This is Berdyaev's contention 
when he says: 
The primordial, undetermined and underived character 
of freedom has been expressed in the proposition 
that the "self" cannot receive the "non-self" unless 
it makes it (the ~non-self 11 ) the content of1itself~ unless it takes it up into its own freedom. 
It has already been shown that, for Berdyaev, the per-
sonality in its development as an expression of spirit 
transcends to the realm of suprapersonal values and that 
the suprapersonal element unites with personality in accord-
ance with personality's own inner laws of development. In 
the same manner human freedom, the freedom which is the 
essential condition of the existing subject, 2 though not 
proceeding from God yet ascends toward God.3 In freedom 
which is divine-human, the relation of the divine freedom 
to the human freedom is not one of constraint and necessit~ 
but of grace "which is a force acting from within freedom 
itself."4 In fact, Berdyaev is convinced that "God is truly 
present and operative only in freedom. !t5 Grace, then , is 
not some objective force acting upon man; the antithesis 
of freedom and grace is a false one, for it is revealed 
1 . Dream, PP • 47-48 . 
3 · Destiny , P • 128. 
5· Dream, p . 46 . 
2 . Solitude, p. 56. 
4 • Freedom, P• 135· 
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that ''the Christian doctrine of grace is the true doctrine 
of fr~edom. " 1 History is pictured as the complex inter-
-
action of three principles: freedom, necessity, and this 
transfiguring grace . 2 
Berdyaev holds that the problem of man's freedom is 
only solved in the coming of Christ , the God-Man of the 
Christian faith . 
It is Christianity alone which can comprehend · 
the fundamental mystery of human freedom which is 
inseparably linked with the union of the two natures 
of Christ the God-Man, a union which, ho~ever, does 
not in any way exclude their distinction. The source 
of man's freedom is in God, and that, not in God the 
Father , but in God the Son . But the Son is not only 
God but man in the absolute and spiritual sense of 
the word, that is the Eternal Man . ~ 
Christ shows that the gulf between God and man has 
been bridged without a violation of what is divine and of 
what is human . Human freedom, essentially irrational, 
ascends to the divine freedom and is thereby illuminated . 
The divine-human drama of freedom is conceived by Berdyaev 
as a dialectical relationship between two poles--the human 
pole which is irrational , dynamic , full of potential ; and 
the divine pole, the Logos , which strives for purpose , 
meaning and value in the universe . The synthesis does not 
involve the destruction of either pole, for each pole needs 
the other; and the assurance of ultimate synthesis is found 
1 . Freedom, P • 135 · 2 . History, P• 147 • 
3· Freedom, PP • 136-137 • 
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in the Ungrund which is the common ground of all being. 
The divine is experienced, not as a power supernat-
urally operating upon the human freedom, but as an immanent 
quality (i.e. , "grace") working within human freedom. This 
-illuminated freedom is thus a divine-human freedom which is 
expressive of full spirituality and is undetermined from 
without.l God through grace enables man to conquer the evil 
results of his unilluminated freedom, and man out of his 
reintegrated freedom makes a free response to God and thus 
continues the work of creation because, in beginning to 
open up to God, "he co-operates with the divine task of 
achieving a creative victory over nothingness . 112 
E. Conclusion 
For Berdyaev, freedom is not an attribute of nor an 
appendage to man, but a definition of man . Man (understood 
in terms of what he ought to be) does not have freedom; he 
is freedom . This freedom must be affirmed for its own sake , 
and not to serve some other interest . 
The real problem of freedom must be placed beyond 
all idea of reward and punishment , of salvation or 
perdition, beyond sin and redemption, beyond the 
disputes of St . Augustine with Pelagius, or of 
Luther with Erasmus, beyond all discussions of pre-
destination, which must be denied (both as a word 
and a concept) at the very beginning of our statement 
1 . The influence of Hegel's idea of spirit, that it is to 
be "in oneself , " is evident here . 
2 . Freedom, P• 209 . 
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o~ the problem. All this lies still within the 
li~ts o~ the legalistic concept of Christianity_ 
in the sphere o~ ideas of consecration and justi~i­
cation, instead o~ the idea of trans~iguration1 The true problem of ~reedom is that o~ creativity. 
It is impossible to consider Berdyaev's thought on 
creativity without examining his view of freedom as an ex-
pression of spirit. The two are inseparably linked together: 
"the problem of creativity was for me always one with the 
problem of freedom. "2 "Freedom is the inner, creative energy 
of man"3 by which he creates new life for society and for 
the world . Creativeness can be defined as '~reaking through 
~rom non-being, ~rom ~reedom, to the world of being . "4 
-This creative ~reedom confronts man as an obligation 
and a duty, as a moral imperative, as that which God requires 
o~ man . 5 This ~reedom is positive and full of meaning, and 
is not just a limiting idea. 
Freedom is not a negative and ultimate concept, 
merely indicating the boundaries which reason cannot 
pass . Freedom is positive and ~ull o~ meaning . Free-
dom is not only a denial of necessity and dete~n­
ism. Freedom is not a realm o~ chance and wil~ulnes~ 
as distinguisged from the realm o~ law- abiding and 
of necessity . 
Though freedom cannot be rationalized , yet "in it the 
divine reason is alive . "? That is , in the hole creative 
1. Realm of SJ2irit, PP • 103-104. 2. Dream, p 212 . 
3· Realm of SJ2irit, P• 105 . 4· Destini , p . 127 . 
5· Beginning, p . 216 . 6. Creative Act, p . 145 · 
7· Ibid ., pp . 146-147 . 
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process, which is grounded in freedom, the divine Logos is 
at work to achieve this positive content of purpose, meaning, 
quality and value . 
4· Spirit as Creativeness 
A. Introduction 
The third and ~inal attribute of spirit to be consid-
ered which bears testimony to the reality of spirit is cre-
ativeness. This completes the three-fold study of personal-
ity, freedom and creativeness which has been proposed as 
the most promising approach to an understanding of Berdyaev1s 
teaching on "spirit." In view of the problem of this study, 
the meaning of spirit as creativeness comes as a fitting 
climax. Along with the exposition of creativeness as a 
spiritual expression, the role of creativeness in Berdyaev~ 
view of personality and the relationship of creativeness to 
freedom must also be shown . In retrospect it will be shown 
that the foregoing considerations of personality and free-
dom as attributes of spirit are inextricably related to any 
discussion of Berdyaev ' s thoughts on creativity. 
i. Creativeness and the Spirit 
Berdyaev is insistent that creativeness is only possi 
ble within a dualism along the lines of the one he has for 
mulated . "To monistic philosophy creative newness is un-
thinkable •••• But a more important matter in principle 
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is that creative newness presupposes dualism. 111 This dual-
ism, as already seen, is one of 11 spirit 11 and"nature." 
Nature is the objective world of phenomena which Berdyaev 
designates as nbeing" while spirit is the non-objective 
world of noumena designated "non-being." 
As personality and freedom involve the spiritual realm, 
so does creativeness. 
Spirit is creative activity: every creative act 
is a spiritual act •••• The human creative act, 
always of spiritual rather than natural origin, 
postulates the material world, the plural human 
world; and emanating from spirit, it introduces in-
to the world something new and hitherto non-exist-
ent.2 
Elsewhere Berdyaev writes that human creativeness is the 
manifestation of spirituality,3 that spirit is act or cre-
ative act,4 that the man of true creative inspiration is 
the man moved by the spirit,5 that the man who passes from 
passivity to creativeness is he who passes over to spirit-
uality.6 The identity of creativeness with the spirit is 
clearly established. 
Creativeness as spirit means that creativity is not a 
quality of material substances or objects but that it is 
involved in the symbolic dimension of spirit, i.e., depth 
or inwardness. The spirit is never object but always subject; 
1 . Beginning, P• 168. 2. Spirit, pp. 56-57· 
3· Ibid . , P • 150. 4- Beginning, p. 104. 
5 · Ibid . , P• 70. 6. Slavery, P• 254• 
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hence Berdyaev's contention that "newness cannot be ex-
plained with the object as the point of departure . It is 
only when we start ~rom the subject that it becomes ex-
plicable . 111 The object, which belongs to the phenomenal 
world, remains confined to a cause-and-effect scheme o~ 
things. When Berdyaev defines spirit as creativeness or as 
act (as he uses the term, ~is equivalent to creativeness), 
he refers to that aspect of experience which is not the 
effect of any cause but is rather the initial and unique 
cause . Spirit as creativeness is a break-through into the 
otherwise closed objective realm of causal relationships. 
Just as spirit's antithesis is its objectification in 
the natural world , and the antithesis of personality and 
freedom are the impersonal world and slavery, respectively; 
so creativeness has its antithesis and this is most often 
expressed by Berdyaev as passivity, an unspiritual condition 
of man . "Every act is a creative act : a non- creative act is 
passivity . 11 2 Spirituality means to pass from passivity to 
creativeness . ? Passivity means that a person ' s existential 
center of gravity has passed from within to without , that 
one is sUbjected to external determination hich is most 
often understood by Berdyaev as social suggestion and social 
pressure . 4 The man who is a creator is understood to be the 
1. Beginning , p . 168. 
3• Ibid ., P• 254 • 
2 . Slavery , P • 24• 
4. Beginning , P• 70 . 
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man who has found the reality and the meaning of the spirit-
ual life . 
ii. Creativeness and Personality 
When Berdyaev writes that 11 the subject is not a sub-
stance, a naturalistic category: but an act, 111 and asserts 
that activity (understood as self-determi nation as distin-
guished from passivity or external determination) is the 
exclusive property of personality,2 it is evident that he 
understands personality in terms of creativity. This in 
turn means the denial of personality as a substance but 
without the negation of personality itself. 
Concrete and living personality has actually no 
resemblance to substance, for the nature of person-
ality is essentially dynamic. Personality is above 
all a spiritual energy of qualitative originality, 
a spiritual activity which is the very centre of 
creative power.? 
Personality, then, in accordance with its own true nature, 
is the very principle of creativeness . Without personality 
there would be no creativity . Rossler's observation on Ber-
dyaev's thought at this point is correct when he says that 
"der Trager und Verwirklicher von Freiheit und Schopfertum 
ist die Personlichkeit."4 
The creative nature of personality was shown in the 
1 . Spirit , P • 11 . 
3• Freedom, p . 16 . 
2 . Solitude, p . 53· 
4 . Roman Rossler, Das Weltbild Nikolai Berdjajews, p. 98. 
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discussion on personality found earlier in this chapter in 
the section entitled , "Personality- -A Goal and a Task . " 
There it was shown that Berdyaev sees personality to be in 
a process of creative change as it seeks fully to realize 
its potentialities, yet with the unique capacity to main-
tain its identity throughout its development . In the pro-
cess from ego to personality , personality transcends itself 
and its environment and rises to a union with suprapersonal 
values by means of creative acts . It is this which Berdyaev 
has in mind when he writes that "creative activity is pre-
cisely a transition from isolation and limitation . 111 In 
contrast to the disintegration of personality when it is in 
a state of passivity before the objectified world, the 
growth of personality means the harmonious integration of 
its elements of thought, sensations , volitions, emotions . 
This wholeness of life , which is spirituality, means a 
growth in creative capacity . 2 " It is an integral , not a 
divided, spirit which lies behlnd the creative act . 113 
Creativeness , then , constitutes the very life of per-
sonality . Either one cannot exist without the other . Both 
creativity and personality rise above the empirically- given 
world and both signify the entrance of energy into the 
world which is cause but not effect . 
1 . Fr eedom, P• 312 . 2 . Destiny , PP • 173-174• 
3 • Creative Act , p . 122. 
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iii. Creativeness and Freedom 
Creativeness has a very close relationship with free-
dom. The word "relationship," however, must not be taken in 
an external sense. It might better be maintained that "per-
sonality," "freedom," and "creativeness" are inner distinc-
tions which Berdyaev makes in describing man's spiritual 
experience. 
Without spiritual freedom there is no creativity. 
"Creativity is inseparable from freedom. Only he who is 
free creates. 111 Berdyaev is insistent that man's response 
to God's call to the creative life cannot be made entirely 
with what has initially come from God . 
Something must come from man also, and that some-
thing is the very essence of creativeness, which 
brings forth new realities. It is, indeed, not 
''something" but "nothing"--in other words it is 
freedom, without which there can be no creative 
activity. Freedom not determined by ~nything 
answers God's call to creative work . 
This initial freedom is designated "non-being" or 
"nothing" by Berdyaev to emphasize that it is not a quality 
. . 
of the rationalized world of "being . " Without this initial 
' freedom in man there could be no human creativity, since 
everything human would then be derived from God, who would 
be sole Creator. Only on the basis of this freedom can a 
person be considered in some sense self-determined, able to 
act in his own right . 
1 . ~· 1 P • ll.t4. 2 . Destiny, p. 128. 
----- --- -----------------------------------, 
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Just as personality is understood to transcend to the 
suprapersonal realm, so initial human freedom is seen to 
ascend toward God even though it was not given by God. Free-
dom as divine-human is fully a spiritual freedom; it is 
freedom of an integrated pers onality which is true, cre-
ative freedom. 1 
B. The World Process as Creativeness 
i . The Incompleteness of Creation 
Essential to Berdyaev's philosophy of creativeness is 
the idea that man does not live in a finished, stabilized 
world . That which God has created {the world of persons) 
possesses a dynamic quality . "Created being is continuously 
created--it knows no limits to the creative process; it is 
not a closed set of data . 112 Berdyaev observes that if cre-
ated being was inert and complete in itself, then the only 
creative act would be the one by which God made the world . 3 
The created world is a world of possibilities; it 
is not a ready-made finished static world. In it the 
creative process has to be continued and it has to 
be continued through man . • •• The creation of the 
world is not only a process hich moves from God to 
man. God demands creative newness from man; He 
a~aits the works of human freedom .4 
He is fond of saying that man now lives in the "eighth day 
of creation . 11 5 
1 . Fate of Man, PP • 38-39 · 2 . Creative Act, p . 142. 
3· Beginning, P• 159 4. Divine, p. 53 · 
5· See, for example, Divine , PP • 53, 191; Creative Act, 
P • 138 -
129 
ii. The Rejection of Naturalistic Metaphysics 
The identification of human creativity with a world 
that is incomplete and changing means for Berdyaev the re-
jection of the naturalistic world-view. 
The type of philosophy which I dislike most is 
naturalistic metaphysics, which is intent on ob-
jectifying and hypostatizing every idea and every 
process of thought and on seeing everywhere ob-
jective realities, unchangeable substances, entities 
and forms. The impact of such a philosophy is to 
freeze cold everything it touches. 
This statement indicates that by "naturalistic metaphysics" 
-Berdyaev does not understand a certain well-defined philo-
sophical system but rather that tendency within any philos-
ophy to "objectify. " Even a metaphysics of spirit which 
considers spirit to be a substance or ~ nature comparable 
to material nature is "naturalistic" within the meaning of 
Berdyaev.2 "The noumenal spiritual world discloses itself 
in creativeness, in movement , in freedom, not in congealed, 
self-enlocked, motionless being . 11 3 Berdyaev disassociates 
creativity from any metaphysical tendency to identify real-
ity with that which is presented objectively to the physical 
senses. 
iii . Reality as a Creative Process 
a . Spirit as Creative Becoming 
In his denial that reality is a completed, self-con-
1. Dream, P• 287 . 
3• Ibid . , P• 158. 
2 . Beginning, PP • 103-104. 
tained, objective realm of being,and in his insistence that 
spirit is act or creativeness, it can be seen that Berdyaev, 
in his metaphysical system,gives primary importance to the 
idea of process, of development and becoming. Spirit is not 
something achieved or substantial; rather, "spirit is crea-
tive becoming . "1 The nature of the real world is that it 
has been created and that it continues to be created. 2 
Reality is incomplete,but in the creative process it strives 
for its completeness . Berdyaev speaks of reality in its 
completeness as the "cosmos," and "the cosmos is being cre-
ated; it is not given, it is a task set . 113 
b . Creativeness and the "Existential Dialectic" 
Berdyaev's understanding of creativeness as expressing 
the nature of reality is structured upon a dialectical 
framework . Though he strongly criticized Hegel ' s antiperson-
alism, he saw great value in Hegel ' s introduction of the 
idea of non-being into the concept of being . 11He introduced 
the idea of non-being, nothingness , without which there is 
no becoming, no emergence of what is new . n4 Hegel viewed 
the universe as one Absolute Spirit which expresses itself 
by an external dialectical process . Under the dialectical 
s cheme of thesis--antithesis - -synthesis , he wrote of: 
1 . Freedom, P• 4 · 
3• ~·, P • 142• 
2 . Creative Act, p . 128. 
4. Beginning, P • 94· 
(1) the Spirit in itself, in its essence; (2) Spirit for 
itself, in its externalization; (3) the Spirit in and for 
itself, returning to itself.l 
Berdyaev's teaching of creativeness is based upon this 
same dialectical scheme of thesis--antithesis--synthesis. 
However, the terminology which he employs is different. In 
fact, Hegel's "Being" is Berdyaev's ''Non-being," while 
~ 
Hegel's "Non-being" is Berdyaev's "Being," which means a 
complete reversal of terms at this point. 2 
For Berdyaev, the primary and undifferentiated reality 
is freedom, the Ungrund which is Non-being. "Creativeness 
/ )/ ) )/ presupposes non-being, r-~ ov (and not oVK ov ) which is the 
source of the primeval, pre-cosmic, pre-existent freedom in 
man. tt3 This freedom as non-being is the "thesis" in Berdyaev's 
. 
dialectical understanding of creativeness. This is the 
1. See Windelband's exposition, A History of Philosophy, 
p. 614. 
2. For Hegel, the antithesis is the introduction of an 
irrational element into reality which is essentially 
rational; for Berdyaev, the antithesis is the intro-
duction of a rationalized element into reality which 
is essentially irrational. 
3• Destiny, p. 127. As will be indicated in the next chap-
ter, Berdyaev holds that God created the personal 
world from "nothing" or "non-being," which is identi-
' ,, ') )# fled with the Greek p.'l'J ov as distinguished from ovK ov 
"Meonic 11 nothing carries the idea of potentiality of 
being whereas the other does not. "Re nothingness 
longs to be something" (Spirit, p • . 5). "Non-being" 
as used by Berdyaev emphasizes the dynamic, non-con-
ceptual character of the basic nature of the universe. 
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starting- point of the universe . 11 The origin of development 
is not to be found in transcendent being conceived as an 
immutable standard, but in the void (Ungrund) . 111 
-This primary freedom, as it seeks to express itself, 
meets with opposition,and thus the dialectical situation 
is established . 
The acts of the creative subject meet with the oppo-
sition of the objective world, and the strength of 
freedom measures itself against the power of this 
resistance . Freedom in2this world is conflict, not a thing to be enjoyed . 
Just as Hegel in his dialectic understood that the "anti-
thesis" arises from the "thesis," so in Berdyaev the oppo-
sition to and negation of freedom arises from freedom 
itself . The appearance of the "antithesis" in Berdyaev's 
-dialectic, which is called 11being 11 and which refers to the 
- -
objectified, rationalized world, is explained in his teach-
ing on "objectification . " With obvious overtones of Fichte , 
whose influence is evident at this point , Berdyaev says that 
"the 'I' postulates the tnot I ,' and this is the opposition 
.,;hich has to be overcome . 11 3 
While Hegel understood the synthesis of Being and Non-
being by the term Becoming , Berdyaev understands the tension 
of Non-being and Being to be resolved in the synthesis which 
he termed Creativeness . While he does not openly embrace 
1 . Freedom, p . 314• 2 . Beginning, p . 170 . 
3· Ib i d . 
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Hegel ' s dialectical scheme , Berdyaev's fascination by it 
as promising a way to think of newness in the world is 
clearly evident . l 
Hegel ' s dialectic describes the life of the Absolute 
Spirit, but Berdyaev sees in his dialectic a representation 
of the individual person ' s existence in this world . Man is 
a bridge between the realm of "spirit" and the realm of 
"nature , " between "non-being" and 11being , " and "creative-
ness means breaking through from non-being, from freedom, 
to the world of being . 112 Man's life represents the tension 
-between ''being" and "non-being"; or, as Berdyaev puts it, 
"existence is ~ynon~ous with becoming . 11 3 
~ 
In actual fact a conflict goes on between spirit 
and natural necessity, a striving of personality 
with the objective world, a conflict which God in 
man ages with the ' world, ' which in its fallen 
state has lost its freedom. Real development and 
progress in the world are the result not of a regu-
larly-working and necessary process, but of creative 
acts , of the invasion4of the realm of necessity by the realm of freedom. 
This "conflict" or "striving " when expressed philosophi-
- -
cally is the antithesis of "non-being" and "being . " This 
1 . See Beginning , pp . 18-29 , 94• Perhaps Berdyaev ' s closest 
identification of his "creativeness" with Hegel's 
"becoming" is in his statement that _"creativeness pre-
supposes non-being , just as Hegel ' s !becoming ' does" 
(Destiny, p. 126) . 
2 . Des tin:y:, p .. 127. 
4· Beginning, P• 147 • 
3· Solitude, p . 40 . 
creative tension may issue in "real development and prog-
ress." 
c. Creativeness and Eschatology: the Cosmos 
The ~act o~ creative development and process is ~or 
Berdyaev evidence that the world is imper~ect, that reality 
is incomplete. "We do not live in a real world, but in a 
world where existence and non-existence are confused, and 
our spiritual awakening is an awakening to true existence.ul 
Such things as a "world order" or "world harmony" do not 
- - ... -presently exist and can only be thought o~ by being made 
part of an eschatology.2 Creativeness poses an eschatolog-
ical question, namely: "Is the conquest of this objective 
-
world a possibility, not the annihilation of what is 
'earthy,' but its liberation and transformation, its tran-
sition to a different scheme of things'l"3 Berdyaev ans ers 
this question in the affirmative . This "conquest," "libera-
-tion," "transformation, " or "transition" is now being 
- - -
accomplished by the creative process in which man partici-
pates. 
1. Freedom, p. 50. 
2 . Beginning, p . 148. "The vision of world harmony is the 
image of a world which can be grasped by the mind" 
(Ibid . ) . 
3· Ibid ., pp . 221-222. 
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Creative development does have a goal . History has 
meaning only on the condition that it end . "Unending his-
tory would be meaningless . And if within unending history 
uninterrupted progress were revealed, that is not an idea 
which our minds could accept . 11 1 "Endless progress, an end-
less process , means the triumph of death. 112 The goal is 
the transformed world, a world truly expressive of harmony 
and order . It is a world which has recovered its essential 
oneness (such unity being guaranteed by the fact that the 
Ungrund is the source of all things) after having passed 
through the experience of dualism when spirit was self-
estranged . 
Berdyaev ' s philosophical term for the goal of creative 
eschatology is cosmos . 3 This is the attainment of complete 
spirituality, as Berdyaev indicates when he says : 
The cosmos can only be conceived as a living organ-
ism. We must be able to see the spirit in nature and 
nature in the spirit , the objec tive in the subjective, 
the natural in the spiritual , and the cosmic in the 
anthropological . Cosmology has always been based on 
the inner identity of spi r i t and nature , that is to 
say , on a conception pf nature which regards it as a 
spiritual phenomenon .~ 
Again , speaking of the transformed world , he says that 11 at 
~ 
that time there will be a unity of nature and freedom, the 
thing that is true and good will be the thing that is 
1 . Ibid ., p . 229 · 2 . Ibid . 
3• This is equivalent to the "Kingdom of God" of theology . 
4· Freedom , P • 299 · 
beautiful . 111 In other words, the antithesis of ego and non-
e go, of non-being and being, is resolved . Perhaps Berdyaev's 
clearest statement on the meaning of cosmos is this, that 
human creativity is directed towards 
the increase of the creative energy of being, the 
growth of beings and their harmony in the world , to 
the production of hitherto non-existent values, new 
upsurge into truth, goodness and beauty--i . e . towards 
the production of the cosmos and of cosmic life--
towards a 2pleroma, 11 towards a super-worldly com-
pleteness . . 
Such a cosmos does not presently exist, but neither is 
it merely a matter of expectation . 11 The cosmos is being 
created; it is not given , it is a task set . 11 3 The idea of 
11cosmos 11 is an expression of Berdyaev 1 s faith that the 
world is essentially one, that the present condition of the 
world with its divisions , its loss of freedom, its anti-
thesis and contradictions can be transcended and superseded. 
Put in terms of 11 this world" and "the other world , " the cos -
- . 
mos represents the transformation of "this world" by 11 the 
other world . 11 
-11This world" is an illness of being , its captivity , 
its fallen state , a partial loss of its freedom, and 
its subjection to external necessity . 11 The other 
world'' is the health of being , its uplift , its lib-
eration , its fun:lness . 11 This world" must be overcome 
and eliminated . _ 
1 . Beginning , PP • 192-193 · 
3 • Ibid . , p . :142 . 
2 . Creative Act, p . 143 · 
4. Ibid ., P• 143 · 
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iv . Creativeness and the Divine 
Berdyaev holds that spiritual creativity, as he speaks 
of it, is always connected with the recognition of the 
existence of another world . "The creative act of the human 
spirit is always a yearning toward infinity, toward the 
transcendent . "l This flight toward infinity or the tran .. 
scendent is elsewhere spoken of as "a breaking through to 
eternity"2 or 11 an upsurge towards another kind of being, 
towards the heights . 11 3 Such language must be understood in 
the light of Berdyaev ' s basic contention that the word 
"transcendent," though signifying a very meaningful reality, 
does not refer to anything which exists in separation from 
the human spirit; rather , the transcendent is always the 
immanent .4 The creative act gives expression to this imma-
nence of the transcendent . In creativity the transcendent 
is shown to be a reality ; that is , 11 t he transcendent comes 
to birth in the creative effort which is a union with eter-
nal creativity . "5 
Creativity, then , means transcendence or "ecstasy . n6 
. 
Ecstasy is "communion ••• with the basic realities of the 
world of th~ spirit . u7 Because it is a spiritual experience, 
1 . Realm of Spirit , p . 148. 2 Dream, p . 209 . 
3· Creative Act , p . 122 . 4 · Realm of S,Eirit , P• J.48. 
5· Tr uth , P• 75 · 6. Dream, P• 209 . 
7· Realm of S,Eirit , p . 181 . 
the manifestation of a spiritual condition, creativity does 
not involve any relationship to an objectified world. 
In more deliberately religious terminology, it is evi-
dent that Berdyaev understood human creativity as both re-
quiring and implying God. "True creativeness is theurgy, 
God-activity, activity together with God. 111 Berdyaev holds 
that man's creativity is a divine process, that 
the Creator and creativeness are very intimately 
near each other, that God is in creativeness and 
creativeness is in God, that everything which takes 
place in the world and in man takes place in God; 
also, that God's energy overflows into the world . 2 
5· The Main Question: Man ' s Relation to God 
In this chapter, which sought an understanding of Ber-
dyaev's idea of spirit which to him is reality , the central 
importance of his teachings on personality and freedom to 
his idea of human creativity has been shovm . There has also 
emerged the main theological concern with Berdyaev ' s teach-
ing on human creativity--namely, that human creativity in-
volves the problem of man ' s relationship to God . 
First it was shown that the very existence and develop-
ment of personality involves the presence of a suprapersonal 
element within personality which does not lead to a denial 
or violation of personality but rather its affirmation . By 
this suprapersonal element Berdyaev means God . 
1 . Creative Act, p . 126 . 2 . Ibid. , p 301 . 
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Secondly, it was shown that man's rreedom, though it 
does not proceed rrom God, yet it ascends toward God when 
it is a truly creative rreedom. It is a divine-human rree-
dom, the synthesis or divine grace and human rreedom. 
Lastly, it was shown that human creativity is a divine 
process, a "theurgy 11 to use Berdyaev's word • 
. 
At the beginning or this chapter, Berdyaev was quoted 
as saying that the attributes or spirit are "rreedom, mean-
ing, creativity, integrity, love, value, ~orientation 
towards the highest Divine world and union with it." It can 
no be seen that the last phrase, which has been italicized 
ror purposes or recognition, stands orr by itselr and is 
the very basis ror all that precedes it . Without this orien-
tation toward and union with God (which is the experience or 
the spiritual lire) , there would be no rreedom, meaning, 
creativity, integrity, love or value . 
This conclusion, that human creativity rrom the reli-
gious point or view is primarily a question or man's proper 
relation to God, receives convincing support rrom this 
statement or Berdyaev: 
The real problem or creativeness, so rar rrom being 
formulated and solved by Christianity , has not even 
been faced in all its religious implications . It 
has only been considered as the problem of justi-
fying culture , i . e . on a secondary plane, and not 
as the question or the relation between God andman. l 
1 . Destiny , p . 151 . 
Human creativity understood as a certain relationship 
between God and man is the aspect of Berdyaev's teaching 
wnich must occupy the rest of this study, which now becomes 
openly and avowedly theological. 
CHAPTER V 
BERDYAEV'S DOCTRINES OF GOD AND MAN 
1. Introduction 
On the basis of the conclusion of the preceding chap-
ter, that Berdyaev's "human creativity" is the expression of 
a certain relationship of man to God, this chapter will con-
sider his thinking about the two terms of this relationship, 
God and man, as they relate to the problem of human creativ-
ity. It will also seek to show the meaning of Christ for 
this relationship. 
2. God 
A. The Ground for Belief in God 
Berdyaev rejects the traditional proofs of the exis-
tence of God. 
Intellectually I reject the traditional proofs, onto-
logical, teleological, or any other, for the exis-
tence of God. I am unable to think of God as a "nec-
essary being"; I disclaim altogether the categories 
of Being as applied to God and regard them as fig-
ments of abstract human reasoning. God is, he is 
existent, and I am able to think of him only as such, 
that is to say, existentially and symbolically. My 
relation to, and thinking of, God are existential and 
dramatic acts, and the wrestlings of the spirit which 
denote this relation enter into my certainty concern-
ing God. I suffer torments of religious doubt only 
when I am compelled to admit the force of traditional, 
static dogmatiim, which exasperates me and rouses 
me to protest. 
The traditional proofs of the existence of God are not only 
unable to do what the term "proof" indicates, but they are 
also unnecessary and even harmful. 2 The desire for proof 
arises out of an unspiritual condition of life in which the 
consciousness of God is absent.3 "All the proofs of the ex-
istence of God are naturalist in character and conceive of 
God as an objective reality similar to that of the natural 
world. 114 
1. Dream, pp. 67-68. It should be observed that Berdyaev re-
jects 11proofs 11 of God's existence, which apparently can 
be distinguished from "evidences" of such an existence. 
He associates "proof" with "lifeless, logical dialec-
tic" (Realm of Spirit, p . 42) , and "such a proof of 
the divine would at once identify It with those objects 
of the visible and natural world Which compel us to 
recognize their existence" (Freedom, pp. 107-108). 
There can be no guarantee of God's existence which will 
render man incapable of doubt and denial; man recog-
nizes God out of freedom with all the risks that such 
freedom involves (Realm of Spirit , p . 35) . 
2. Realm of Spirit, p. 35 · 
3· Freedom, p. 10 . Berdyaev's position at this point should 
be compared with another contemporary viewpoint which 
also rejects "proofs" in so far as they are an attempt 
to prove God's existence . But this other position, 
rather than suggesting that proofs express an aliena-
tion from God (as Berdyaev does), holds that proofs 
confirm that given reality of God in human life and 
support an already-assumed faith in God . For a presen-
tation of this view see John Baillie, Our Knowledge of 
God (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1939) , PP• 
~-258, and especially P• 240 . 
4 . Freedom, p . 10 . Berdyaev gives specific reasons for his 
rejection of the well-known arguments for the existence 
of God . (1) The ontological argument is based upon the 
How, then, does Berdyaev know that there is a God? The 
confusion of the product of thought with reality, and 
it is subject to Kant's criticism. "With clear insight 
Kant perceives the confusion between the process of 
thinking and being, and the way in which thinking ac-
cepts as objective being that which it itself produces" 
(Beginning, p. 9; see also pp. 10, 103). 
(2) The cosmological argument, which holds that 
causes presuppose causes and that finally the series of 
causes must come to an end in a cause which does not 
depend upon something else for its existence, is re-
jected with this statement: 11We reject the view, wide-
spread in theological teaching, that God is the cause 
of the world, the first cause. Now causality and causal 
relationships are completely inapplicable to the rela-
tionship between God and the world, between God and 
man. Causality is a category applicable only to the 
world of phenomena, not at all applicable to the nou-
menal world. • • • God is not the cause of the world. 
• • • God is not a force in the natural sense of the 
word, acting in space and time" (Realm of Spirit, p. 
39; see also Slavery, pp. 82-8,). (3) The teleological proof of God's existence, which 
finds in the world the suggestion of a purpose or goal 
toward which all things move, is rejected by Berdyaev 
because he does not see the world as conforming per-
fectly to purpose. 11 Few things are more alien to me 
than the feeling and conception of cosmic harmony and 
purposefulness 11 (Dream, p. 171,). The most that he will 
admit is a "partial teleology« (Beginning, p. 146) as 
against teleology as a universal principle; that is, 
God does not exercise a providential government over 
the universe as a whole (Divine, pp . B-9; Beginning, 
p. 151). A teleological view of the world would exclude 
both creativeness and eschatology. 11 It is very impor-
tant to establish the truth that there is an antithesis 
between teleology and eschatology, as there is between 
teleology and creativeness. A consistent teleological 
view of the world recognizes a definite aim to which 
everything is subordinated, but it excludes an end, it 
makes an end unnecessary. The orld ought to come to an 
end precisely because there is in the world no perfect 
conformity of purpose, in other words there is no com-
plete conformity ith the Kingdom of God 11 (Beginning, 
pp. 185-186). Though Berdyaev rejects a "consistent 
teleological" view of the present orld, still his no-
tions of human creativity and eschatology seem to be 
based upon the demands for such a teleology. He does 
one valid reason for belief in God is the disclosure of the 
divine element to man in his very own spiritual experience . 
We cannot put the question of God apart from man . 
Taken in its depth, and not superficially, the exis -
tence of man is the only witness to the existence of 
God, since man is the reflection of God's image, al-
though he so often deforms it . Man is not only a 
finite being, as modern thought would affirm; he is 
also an infinite being: he is infinity in a finitt 
form , a synthesis of the finite and the infinite. 
Man does not exist apart from the divine element really 
(and not symbolically) present in him, and this divine ele-
ment is "the one and only reason for belief in God . n2 The 
not admit that teleology can be based on less than 
perfect conformity to a certain goal or purpose . The 
question of teleology becomes the question of whether 
the world is a complete expression of order or less 
than a complete expression . Because the world is less 
than a ca.mplete expression of purpose , the teleological 
argument for God ' s existence is therefore ruled out . 
Henri Bergson, with whom Berdyaev was a contemporary 
as well as a f e l low resident of France dur ing the Rus-
sian's mature years has also rejected what he called 
a "radical finalismfr in the world without reintroducing 
it in the form of an eschatology . "We have to choose 
between the out-and-out negation of finality and the 
hypothesis which co-ordinates not only the parts of an 
organism with the organism itself , but also each living 
being with the collective whole of others" (Creative 
Evolution, trans . Arthur Mitchell New York: Henry Holt 
and Co., 1911 , P • 43) . Bergson did see a wholeness or 
unity in the world , the evidence of a telic impulse , 
without demanding complete harmony or an end or the 
world which would bring such a harmony . He saw the 
demand for a compl ete conformity of purpose in the 
world to be the over-extension of the tendency of the 
intellect to envision ends for human activity and to 
calculate the means which will bring the ends to pass 
(Ibid ., pp • 44-45) • 
1 . Realm of Spirit , p . 36 . 
2 . Begi nning , p . 234• See also Destiny , p . 82 . 
discussion in the last chapter on personality as an expres-
sion of spirit revealed that personality is the bearer of 
supernatural values and only exists by virtue of such 
values . This is only to say, as Berdyaev points out, that 
11 the existence of personality presupposes the existence of 
God; its value presupposes the supreme value--God . 11 1 Since 
the value-experience of man is spiritual experience, when 
Berdyaev says that "man's spiritual nature, ••• is the 
only proof of the existence of God, 11 2 he simply confirms 
the previous quotation . "Belief in God is only an internal 
meeting with Him in spiritual experience . 11 3 But even the 
divine element in man, as revealed in spiritual experience, 
11does not prove, but it does show, the existence of God , 
since it reveals the spiritual element in man . "4 
Inasmuch as Berdyaev finds reason for belief in God 
only in a consideration of man ' s essential nature, his view 
could be called an anthropological argument for God . In 
fact, he calls the anthropological proof of God's existence 
the strongest of all the 11proofs 11 of God's existence . 5 God 
is that which is higher than man, not as an exterior force 
acting upon man, but as that i n man which makes him truly 
man . 6 
1 . Destiny , p . 55 · 
3• Ibid ., P • 35 · 
5 · Ibid ., P• 35 · 
2 . Realm of Spirit, p . 32 . 
4. Ibid . , PP • 35-36. 
6. Ibid . , p . 40 . 
Berdyaevts anthropological basis for belief in God's 
existence is marked by a strong emphasis upon man's discon-
tent with his world environment, and in particular with its 
inability to support personal values . 
The experience of evil urges man to transcend this 
world, and, though he be overwhelmed by the mean-
inglessness of his mundane existence, his very dis-
content and refusal to accept the conditions of life 
as he finds them are Godts most universal witness . l 
The divine is not revealed in some objective world order 
but in the revolt of suffering personalities against the 
world order which threatens man's freedom,2 a freedom ne-
cessary for man's existence . 
Against this background must be considered Berdyaev's 
statement that 11human freedom creates God . 11 3 Man as a free 
being is seen to "create" God, that is, to give expression 
to God's reality, to disclose a realm of being other than 
that given to the senses , to disclose meaning and value . It 
is only in the disruptive act which breaks with the world , 
that is, in the creative act , that the living reality of 
God is shown and thereby also the reality of man . 4 
B. The Knowledge of God 
Berdyaev insists that God cannot properly be kno n 
1 . Dream, p . 293 · See also Realm of Spirit, p . 36. 
2 . Slavery, P • 88 . 3· Divine, p . 185. 
4 · See Dream, P • 290; Beginning , P • 155 · 
rationally, by the use of concepts. 11 It is impossible to 
think about God in rational terms."1 -The mystery of God's 
life '~ears no relation to what is affirmed through the me-
dium of rational concepts. 112 
What is this approach to a knowledge of God, under-
stood by the term "rationalism," which Berdyaev rejects? 
It is a process of 11hypostasization 11 which objectifies and 
erects into absolutes certain moments of the spiritual 
life . 3 It involves categories of thought which are framed 
to deal with the natural world.4 It means scientific domi-
nation over the religious life and the denial of any reali-
ty outside the jurisdiction of science.5 Such an approach 
presupposes that the basis of all being is a clear light 
comprehensible to reason and does not recognize a "mysteri-
ous abyss" to which reason must eventually succumb:6 "Ra-
tionalism, where the knowledge of God is concerned, • • • 
believes that rational concepts are capable of reflecting 
the real essence of God's Nature and of comprehending the 
Divine Being. 117 
Such a rationalism is closely linked with naturalism 
and materialism.8 It is also linked with a positivist 
1. Realm of Spirit, p . 36 . 2. Freedom, p . 64 . 
3 · Ibid .' p . 5 · 4- Ibid., pp. 23, 66. 
5· Creative Act, P• 24. 6 . Ibid., P• 130 . 
7· Freedom, pp . 64-65 . 8. Ibid ., 
-
PP • 23, 63, 66 . 
tendency. 11 The rationalist way of looking at things is sim-
ply the positivist reaction of man to the natural world. 111 
Reason , by itself, inclines unavoidably towards either 
monism or dualism. 2 And worst of all, a rationalist theism 
leads to deism and natural religion, and ultimately to 
atheism and the negation of religion.3 
When Berdyaev practically identifies rationalism with 
naturalism and with the method of natural science, it be-
comes immediately evident that this rationalism is the 
rationalism which came to dominate the latter half of the 
nineteenth century and the early twentieth century, and 
which assumed both the positivistic expression of scientif-
ic empiricism and the naturalistic or materialistic expres-
sion of the scientific view of the universe. Berdyaev must 
be seen as a participant in the many-faceted attack which 
developed in the early twentieth century against this mech-
anistic materialism. He did not attack materialism with the 
Kantian critique of knowledge nor with the idealist conten-
tion that matter is known only through mind; rather, like 
his contemporary Bergson, he sought an energizing principle 
1. Ibid • , p. 64 • 
2. Ibid., p. 73· See also Realm of Spirit, p. 38. 
3· Freedom, p. 63. 
as the basis of all being . 1 But to this must be added the 
emphasis, so basic in Berdyaev's thought, that man's most 
dependable insight into the nature of reality is to be 
found in the quality and intensity of his own private, 
higher self-consciousness . This, for Berdyaev, is the weak 
link in the chain which nineteenth century rationalism 
threw around the universe--that it could not contain nor 
give meaning to man's higher self-consciousness. "Positiv-
ism, materialism, and rationalistic naturalism identify a 
limited area of consciousness with the whole of being. Con-
sciousness having put limits to the reception of being, re-
gards itself as reflecting it in its totality . rr2 
Although he rejects the all-inclusive claims of posi-
tivism, it is seen, e . g . , in his rejection of the tradition-
al arguments for God, especially the teleological argument, 
that Berdyaev also concedes much to positivism.3 In 
1. Bergson's dates, 1859-1941, make him the elder contempo-
rary of Berdyaev (1874-1948) . Nowhere does Berdyaev a~ 
knowledge a specific indebtedness to Bergson; any per-
sonal references to Bergson are usually of a critical 
nature. Inescapable similarities in their thought can 
be mentioned--the mechanism of matter, the creative 
force of consciousness , man's freedom involving the 
entire personality , the distinction between intelli-
gence (science) and intuition (philosophy) as two ways 
of knowing. But Berdyaev considered Bergson to be too 
biological . 
2 . Freedom, p . 98 . 
3 · But does Berdyaev concede too much to positivism so 
that he is thereby forced into a more extreme dualis-
tic expression than is necessary or justified? See 
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maintaining that the Divine is unknowable so far as ration-
al knowledge is concerned, he seems to accept the conclu-
sions of positivistic thought, but with the carefully-drawn 
stipulation that such conclusions apply only to the natural, 
objective world . l 
Berdyaev's denial of a rational knowledge of God does 
not involve the denial of all religious knowledge whatsoev-
er . In fact, his denial of a rational theology is made in 
what he considers a serious attempt to establish a valid 
below, chap . 7, for the critical consideration of Ber-
dyaev' s dualism . 
1 . Berdyaev's dualism, as it expresses itself in the matter 
of the knowledge of God, bears a close resemblance to 
the thought of the American philosopher W. T. Stace as 
expressed in his book Time and Eternity (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press , 1952) . Stace , a confirmed 
naturalist who proposes to rec oncile naturalism with 
religious belief, has as his fundamental thesis the 
idea that science and religion deal with two completely 
different orders--science with the temporal order and 
religion with the eternal order . Corresponding to these 
two orders are two ways of knowing--the intellect is 
appropriate to the temporal order and the intuition is 
appropriate to the eternal order . God can only be ap-
prehended intuitively and His reality can only be at-
tested to by the use of religious symbolism. In equat-
ing revelation with intui tion , Stace follows the via 
negativa of the mystics , and holds that any theologi-
cal statement is false if it is taken literally . The 
concepts by which the intellect works are appropriate, 
in a literal sense , only for the finite , temporal or-
der . 
In these points of thought Stace and Berdyaev seem 
to have much in common , even though Berdyaev ould re-
ject the basic naturalism of Stace's philosophy . (For 
a good , critical considerati on of Stace's position , 
see David E. Roberts , "Naturalism and !ysticism, 11 
Union Seminary Quarterly Review , 8 [195~ , 25-31 . ) 
lC)l 
religious knowledge. Rational thought, when transferred 
from the realm of natural being (where he acknowledges that 
it is fully adequate and definitely af~irmed) to the reli-
gious sphere, produces a conflict between knowledge and 
~aith, and between science and religion, which can only re-
sult in a victory for science as it continues to extend its 
sway over all of life . 1 
Just as the one valid reason for belief in God is the 
divine element in man revealed intuitively in spiritual ex-
perience, so "the knowledge of God can only be given in an 
experimental and symbolic theology of the spirit, for all 
real advance in the knowledge of God always rests upon spi~ 
itual experience and its symbolic expression . "2 Such symbol-
ism, by setting forth the limits of both the spiritual and 
natural spheres and limiting the competence o~ rational 
knowledge by revealing knowledge not dependent upon ration-
al concepts, "safeguards the inalienable rights and eternal 
truths of the religious li~e ." 3 
This spiritual experience, which is man's full exis-
tence, and which is the basis for symbolism in the knowledge 
of God, is primarily an introduction to mystery which is 
"the Divine mystery inherent in the innermost depths of 
being . n4 
1 . Freedom, p . 66 . 
3· Ibid ., p . 66. 
2. Ibid ., p . 68 . 
4. Spirit, P • 124. 
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Mystery , docta ignorantia have a profound signifi-
cance . The whole meaning , importance and value of 
life are determined by the mystery behind it , by an 
infinity which cannot be rationalized but can only 
be expressed in myths and symbols . God ii the in-
finite mystery that underlies existence . 
God ' s real i ty is inextricably tied to the existence of mys -
tery . It is the presence of this mystery , and not taboo , 
which constitutes the limit of rational thought . 2 Rational 
thought betrays and destroys mystery . 3 
The special word which Berdyaev uses for this mystery 
is the word Ungrund . 
Symbolism presupposes the abyss , the "groundlessness" 
(Ungrund) of the divine life , the infinite hidden 
beyond the finite , the esoteric life of God which 
cannot be grasped by the mind of man and is4inca-pable of logical and juridical formulation . 
Berdyaev sees this mysterious abyss in Jacob Boehme's Un-
grund (from which he has borrowed both the word and much 
of its meaning) and in the Gottheit of Eckhardt . He speaks 
of it as "this primitive and depthless di vinity" which is 
11 somethin~ greater than God himselr .u 5 
Berdyaev calls such symbolic knowledge of God "apo-
phatic mystical theology 11 6 and often simply "negative 
1 . Destiny , P• 24. 2 . Ibid ., p . 25 . 
3· Dream, P • 90 . 
4. Freedom, p . 69 . This idea of the irrational or supra-
rational element behind the religious idea of God is 
seen by Berdyaev as bein~ expressed by Otto in his 
Das Hei1ige (Ibid ., p . 64) . 
5· Creative Act , p . 130 . 6. Spirit , p . 10 . 
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theology . nl Such a knowledge of God denies that God can be 
known in terms which are borrowed from the natural world . 
"It conceives God as super- being or even non-being . n2 God 
is spirit or existence,and only the symbolic language of 
spiritual experience is applicable to him. Berdyaev's con-
tention is not simply that man can experience more of God 
than he can rationally express; rather , he seems to cate-
gorically deny any capacity on the part of human reason to 
adequately and meaningfully express a knowledge of God . 
Though such theology , being "apophatic," denies the 
applicability of rational concepts to divinity , Berdyaev 
warns that it must not be confused with agnosticism. 
Apophatic theology is mystical rather than agnostic . 
It affirms another truth: the spiritual interpreta-
tion of the Divine mystery, the Unknowable , that 
hich positive concepts are unable to express . It 
further affirma that man is capable of experi encing 
the Divine , of communicating with It , of being one 
with It . 3 
The criterion of a person ' s faith in God and knowledge 
of God is God himself . Such a criterion is not to be found 
apart from God's manifestati on in the divine - human relaticn-
ship . 
In demanding an authoritati ve criterion which 111 
convince us of the existence of God and enable us 
1 . See Fre edom, pp . 67- 68 , 74; Destiny , P • 24• "Apophatic" 
means "negativ e . " 
2 . Spirit , p . 10 . See also Freedom, pp . 67 - 68 . 
3 • Spirit , P • 124. 
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to discern what is divine in the world, we are look-
ing for support not to God Himself and to divine re-
ality, but to the lower natural reality of the exter-
ior world. 1 
The correct knowledge of God, then, is given in synbols 
which have a basis in spiritual experience or existence. 
By the same token Berdyaev maintains that God must be de-
mythologized, i.e . , God must be freed of false symbols or 
myths, particularly those which have come to describe the 
traditional conception of the God-man relationship in soci-
omorphic categories of power and domination . 2 
c. God as Spirit 
If God exists,and if God cannot be known through con-
cepts which man is accustomed to use in referring to the 
world about him,but can be known only symbolically, what 
can be said about God? 
Here must be recalled Berdyaev's contention that God 
can be properly referred to only in the symbolic language 
of spiritual experience . Only the God who can be experienced 
by man can be known, and this is obviously not sense exper-
ience but man's experience of himself as a spiritual bein& 
his awareness of the fullness of his existence . Therefore 
Berdyaev can say that "only that which happens within can 
have any meaning for us . "3 This is what he calls "the final 
1 . Freedom, p . 26 . 
3 · Freedom, p . 93 · 
2 See Beginning, pp . 150-151, 153 · 
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and definitive revelation of the Spirit . nl 
In holding that a knowledge of God is given only in 
spiritual experience , the anthropocentric nature of Ber-
dyaev 1s theological views is established . Whatever is pred-
icated of God must be rooted in man ' s own existential exper-
ience . Certain things can be said about God only "because 
such conceptions are derived from the highest spiritual ex-
perience of man and not from experience of the world of 
nature and society . "2 The problem is not to rid statements 
about God of anthropomorphic elements , which would be an im-
possible task , but to establish a proper anthropomorphism. 
11 What has been wrong with anthropomorphism is not that it 
ascribed to God traits of humanity , or sympathy, or that it 
sees in Him a need for responsive l ove , but rather that it 
ascribes to Him traits of inhumanity , cruelty and love of 
power . 11 3 
Above all , for Berdyaev God is Spirit . 11 God is Spirit 
and he can operate only in Spirit and through Spirit . 114 The 
1. Beginning , p . 153 · 2 . Truth , p . 112 . 
3· Divine , p . 3· Berdyaev has exposed himself to the problan 
of how one religious statement can be more adequate 
than another when all religious statements are symbol-
ic in nature and , if taken literally , are false . Here 
he seems to introduce the notion of the chain of being 
which involves a hierarchy of degrees of reality and 
value ranging down ard from the One . The more adequate 
symbols , then , are those taken from the highest as-
pects of human existence while the less adequate are 
thos e bich are taken from the lower . 
4· Beginning , p . 152 . Ber dyaev means the same thing when he 
spirit ual life is not only the manifestation of divine real-
it~ but also provides the empirical basis for holding that 
God ' s being is spiritual and not natural . 11 God is Spirit" 
comes as close as Berdyaev can come to a non-symbolic state-
ment about God , and all other statements about God must be 
in accordance with this basic assertion . Since God is Spir-
it, God is also freedom or liberty1 because spirit is that 
which is active and self- determining . Other affirmations 
follow throughout Berdyaev 1 s writings that God is love , 2 
truth,3 creativeness,4 meaning,5 mystery . 6 These can all 
be affirmed of God because they indicate the divine presence 
in man's highest spiritual experience . Berdyaev sums up 
much of what all this means to him in the statement that 
11 God is the overcoming for my sake of the pain of aliena-
tion , he is for me the attainment of joy . 117 
writes, "God is life " (Fre edom , pp . 23 , 24) . The word 
"life" here does not have a bi ological meaning but 
carries the sense of fullness of existence , as does 
the word 11spirit . 11 
1 . See Freedom, p . 2 ; Dr eam, p . 158 . 
2 . See Beginning , p . 238 ; Truth , P• 112 . 
3· See Truth , p . 66 ; Beginning , p . 152; Realm of Spirit ~ 
P • 40 . 
4 · See Beginning , P• 238 ; Dream, p . 179 · 
5· See Realm of SEirit , P • 40 ; Freedom , P • ?6 . 
6 . See Truth , PP • 66 , 112 ; Destiny , p . 24. 
7 · Tr uth , p . 66 . 
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When Berdyaev says that God is 11 a concrete Being, a 
Person and not an abstract idea, 111 s~ch a statement must be 
weighed against the background of his understanding of God 
as Spirit. He does not mean that God is merely a larger 
edition of what the human person is . The evidence for the 
"personality" of God is seen as conveyed by the nature of 
spiritual experience itself . 
If, • •• we say that God is a person, this must be 
understood, not in the limited natural-human sense, 
but in the spiritual sense of a concrete image, with 
which personal contact is possible for us . Contact 
and relationship with God is possible, not as a rela-
tionship with the Absolute, for whom there can be 
no other, with whom there can be no relationship, 
not with the God of apophatic theology, but with a 
real, personal God who has relationship to others.2 
Whatever else God may be in himself, the divine revelation 
in spiritual experience is so intimately involved with 
human personality as to lead Berdyaev to the conclusion 
that God cannot be anything less than personal . 
D. God the Creator 
A theological study of human creativity cannot escape 
the consideration of the relationship of this human creativ-
ity to the basic theological notion that God is the Creator. 
What does the idea that God is Creator mean to Berdyaev? 
i . A Critique of the Traditional , Biblical View of Creation 
Two particular points of dissatisfaction are registered 
1 . Destiny , P • 106 . 2 . Realm of Spirit, P• 40 . 
by Berdyaev regarding the basic understanding of creation 
as it is expressed in both the biblical account and in tra-
ditional Christian theology . 
(1) The traditional, biblical view pictures creation 
as a process completed in seven days and thereby "leaves no 
room for the mystery of freedom or for creative developmen~ 
for it always regards the world as a mystery which is ful-
filled and as an order incapable of change . "l 
(2) It pictures the created world as existing outside 
of God, and this cannot be the final truth. 2 Berdyaev's 
criticism here is directed toward theism, which he appar-
ently has some trouble distinguishing from deism. ? The no-
tion of a God transcendent over his creation is the result 
of the objectification of either God or his creation,which 
is an objectification of the mystery of an inwardly spirit-
ual process in which God is immanent in his creation and 
the creation is immanent in God . As such , the notion of God 
1 . Freedom, P• 307 . See also Creative Act , p . 137 . 
2 . Creative Act, P• 132. 
3· "In the ofricial theistic consciousness there is a dan-
- gerous tendency towards a fatal deism which finally 
separates God from the world . • • • The theistic con-
cept, which recognizes only a transcendent , distant 
and external God , is an immature, childish concept, 
which gives rise to religious fear" (Creative Act, p . 
134) . This certainly is not the meaning usually associ-
ated with theism, which has become by definition a be-
lief in both the transcendence and immanence of God . 
In fact , the use of the term arose in reaction to the 
one-sided emphasis of deism on God's transcendence . 
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existing apart from his creation reflects the alienation 
and non-spiritual condition of man. 1 The tendency of theism 
to emphasize a distinction between the Creator and his ere-
ation is seen to foster a block-universe interpretation of 
creation. 110fficial theology has preferred a scientific pos-
-itivism and a mechanistic theory of nature to any form of 
cosmological gnosis. Better a godless world than one regard-
ed as divine. 11 2 Theistic thought, in objectifying the crea-
tion, is thought to relate the creation to God only super-
ficially, thus jeopardizing the very meaningfulness of the 
creation. 
The widespread explanation that God created the world 
either for his own pleasure (this is a deplorable 
notion) or in order to reveal his love to some one 
other than himself, is very nalve . It has always been 
assumed in this connection that God stands in no 
need of anything, that the world and man are in no 
way of any use to him, and that the creation of the 
world is a mere arbitrary and fortuitous event. 
Theologians are quite sure--though whence the know-
ledge is derived is not known--that the creative act 
of God signifies nothing within the interior divine 
life, and that it reveal~ no movement of any kind 
in it and no enrichment ., 
In these criticisms Berdyaev is expressing what he 
feels is the need of a doctrine of creation which will give 
1. See Beginning, P• 253; Realm of Jpirit, p. 39· 
2. Freedom, p. 289. The biblical account of creation empha-
sizes both that the world and all things in it are good 
and that they are not God nor some process in God. It 
does not appear to support Berdyaev's idea that if the 
world process is not divine it is therefore godless. 
3· Truth, p . 61. 
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expression to God's continuing creative activity in the 
world , which will intimately relate man ' s existence to the 
divine life . The indications are here that his thought is 
pointed in the direction of an organismic rather than a 
cause - and- effect interpretation of the world . 
ii . Creation as the Mystery of the Interior Life of God 
a . Berdyaev's Panentheism 
God ' s creativity is the question of his relation to or 
attitude toward the world . 1 The world which God has called 
into being is a world of concrete personal beings , creative 
centers of existence , and not objects or things . 2 The rela-
tionship which God sustains with the personal world is not 
causal nor does he act as necessity . The category of caus -
ality applies only to the phenomenal world and not to the 
noumenal world . 3 "When people speak of God as the creator 
of the world they are speaking of something immeasurably 
more mysterious than a causal relation . n4 God ' s relation to 
the world cannot be expres s ed i n spatial t erms . 
The term which des cribes the true relation of God and 
the world for Berdyaev , though the word itself very rarely 
occurs in his writings, is panentheism. 11 Panentheism is the 
1 . Freedom, P • 190 . 
2. See Slavery , p . 88 ; Spir it , p . 13. 
3 · Realm of Spirit, p . 39 · 4. Truth , P• 56. 
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most perfec t way of expressing the relation between God and 
the world ."1 This points the way to that "something immeas -
urably more mysterious than a causal relationship . " In this 
view , 11 all authentic being is rooted in God; apart from God 
nature does not exist , and there is only evil , sin , and non-
being . 112 God is called 11Being- in-itself , "3 so that every-
thing which has true being (the created world) does not ex-
ist independently of God but is itself divine and has its 
existence in God . Only sin and evil are non-divine and op-
pose the divine .4 
The meaning of panentheism, translated into the termi-
nology of creativity , is that "the creation of the world is 
an inner process of fragmentation and development in Divine 
being . 11 5 Apart from God there is no creativity. 
Berdyaev ' s interpretation of the created world is thus 
in terms of some kind of organism rather than in term3 of a 
machine where causal relations would be applicable . He has 
a vision of a unique organic whole which comprehends all of 
1 . Freedom, P • 257 • 
2 . 1£!£•, p . 238 . The use of the word "non- being" here is 
not in accordance with Berdyaev' s more characteristic 
use of it as applied to the Ungrund . Here it has the 
idea of •'unreality . • Another quotation from the same 
work helps clarify its meaning : "But outside God and 
the divine sphere there is only non- being, the realm 
of illusions and lies" (p . 168) . 
3 · Destiny , p . 18 . 4 . Freedom, P • 257 · 
5· Creative Ac t , p . 132 . 
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actual and potential reality , and outside of this whole its 
particular parts have no relevant meaning or even being . 
This "whole" is the noumenal or spiritual world, essentially 
divine in that all its life is comprehended in and bounded 
by the Deity abstractly known as the Ungrund . This "whole" 
represents a process which is at one and the same time 
"theogonic, cosmogonic and anthropogonic . nl 
b . Potentiality in God 
To conceive of the spiritual world in terms of process 
or development in the Divine life is seen by Berdyaev to 
lead to the conclusion that potentiality exists in God . 
This, in turn, involves the rejection of the theological 
idea of God as actus purus , which holds that in God there is 
no potentiality , no coming into existence of that hich has 
not previously existed . 
The Aristotelian conception of God as actus purus 
deprives God of that interior active life , and trans-
forms Him into a lifeless object . God is left with-
out power, that is to say , He is no longer the 
source of movement and l i fe . 2 
A lack of potentiality in God would make the creation 
of the world , understood as creative activity in God , unin-
telligible and impossible since "the creation of hat is oow 
i s due to potency . "3 To deny process or movement in God is 
1. Cr eative Act , p . 135 · 2 . Freedom, p . 2 . 
3 · Beginning , P • 159 · 
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considered to be a dangerous deistic tendency toward the 
separation of God from the world . l The very dramatic nature 
of religious experience itself is a denial of the limited 
and abstract rational idea that God is a self-sufficient 
and immovable being . 2 
Berdyaev's insistence upon potentiality in God, even 
to the point of making the notion of potentiality primary 
in his thinking about God since the Ungrund in its initial 
state is pure potentiality, means that the God of his 
thought is a becoming God, a God who achieves the perfection 
of his being in the perfection of the created world . 
c . God the Creator Born out of the Ungrund 
Berdyaev's thought on the dynamic nature of God is 
greatly indebted to the mystic Jacob Boehme . "Boehme's im-
mense importance lies in the fact that he introduced into 
the concept of God a dynamic principle opposed to the stat-
ic concept of Greek philosophy and medieval scholasticism--
in other words, that he saw in God an internal life. 11 3 This 
dynamic principle is the Ungrund , "a bold attempt to under-
stand the creation of the worl d through the inner life of 
the divinity."4 This Ungrund for Boehme was pure, unformed, 
1 . Creative Act , P • 134· 2 . Realm of Spirit , pp . 36-3?. 
3 · Nicolas Berdyaev, 11 Ungrund and Freedom," Cross Currents, 
7{1957) , 250 . 
4 . Ibid ., P• 253 · 
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unconscious will . 
The Ungrund, when taken over into Berdyaev 1 s thought , 
comes to symbolize that mysterious abyss which supports all 
life and existence . It is 
that dark void which precedes all positive determina-
tion of being •••• The void (the Ungrund of Boehme) 
is not evil, it is the source of every kind of life 
and every actualization of being • • • • An initial, 
irrational, and mysterious void li~s at the heart 
of the whole life of the universe . 
The Ungrund is referred to as 11 the abyss, 112 "primordial 
freedom, 11 3 and 11 non-being . 114 The important thing about it , 
1 . Freedom, p . 165 . See also Beginning , p . 105 . Berdyaev, 
in calling the Ungrund "irrational," must not be under-
stood to mean irrational in the sense of being absurd, 
ridiculous or even anti-rational . The fundamental con-
sideration at this point is his commitment to the Kant-
ian position that reason has its place only in scien-
tific knowledge , "only in the sphere of phenomena and 
not in the noumenal sphere" (Be~inning , p . 13) . Ber-
dyaev ' s thought is "irrational , not merely because he 
recognizes the limits of speculative reason or the in-
fluence of the will or the presence of unique , dynamic 
factors which defy conceptual expression . These , of 
course, are ideas present in his thought , but they can 
be acknowledged without an espousal of irrationalism. 
Berdyaev's thought is irrational in its Kantian insis -
tence that speculative reason is thoroughly non-exis-
tential and inherently incapable of producing reliable 
knowledge about God or about the universe at its deep-
est level . Since the Ungrund is not related to the 
sphere of speculative reason , perhaps the word "non-
rational" would carry more clearly this distinct ion 
which Berdyaev makes . 
2. Be~inning , p . 105 . See also Freedom, p . 126; Destiny, p . 
5· 
3· Beginning , p . 105 . See also Freedom , p . 126; Destiny, p . 
39 ; Dostoevsky , p . 85; Dream, p . 46. 
4· Beginning , p . lol . 
so far as the understanding of creation as a mystery of the 
interior life of the Divine is concerned,is that it is the 
dynamic as well as the primary principle of the universe . 
All genuine activity and dynamic expression are ultimately 
rooted in the Ungrund . 
The Ungrund , understood as the underlying mystery of 
all existence,and in particular as the source of freedom 
which is the basic, original ingredient of life, is consid-
ered to be the source of what is 11 uncreated" and "not di-
vine . "1 
But Berdyaev's basic understanding of the Ungrund it-
self is found in these terms he applies to it--the "Primary 
Godhead,"2 "Divine Nothing, 11 3 the "divine Ungrund, 114 and 
"the Absolute . 11 5 On this point he feels he is one with Ger-
man mysticism. 
The great German mystics made a distinction be-
tween God (Gott) and Divinity or Godhead (Gottheit) . 
Such for instance was the teaching of Eckhart . 
Boehme maintained the doctrine of the Ungrund which 
was at a deeper level than God Himself . The meaning 
of this distinction between God and Divinity is not 
1 . Destiny, p . 34. The terms "uncreated 11 and "not divine" 
are to be understood as applying to the cosmogenic and 
anthropogenic aspects of process itbin the Ungrund . 
Berdyaev would thus contend that the irrational free-
dom ~hich man feels within his om depths , and which 
is bound up with his creative potential, is both un-
created and not divine . 
2 . Beginning, p . 107 . 
4· Beginning, P • 107 . 
3· Destiny, pp 25, 29 . 
5· Destiny, P• 29 . 
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expressible in metaphysics or ontology . This truth 
can only expresi itself in terms of spiritual life 
and experience . 
"The truth of pantheism may be extended only to this primi-
tive and depthless divinity . 11 2 
Berdyaev holds that out of the Ungrund, the sine qua 
B£a of creative development , God the Creator is born in 
eternity . This is the theogonic aspect of process within 
the Ungrund . 11 God gives birth to himself, realizes himself 
out of the Divine Nothingness . 11 3 He says the same thing, 
but in more abstract , philosophical terminology, when he 
asserts that 11 the origin of development is not to be found 
in transcendent being conceived as an immutable standard , 
but in the void (Ungrund) which requires illumination and 
from which the light comes . n4 
The s i gni ficance of God the Creator being born out of 
the Ungrund now becomes clearer in this last quotation, 
which reveals another i nstance of Berdyaev ' s fascination 
with the Hegelian dialectic in explai ning reality . The 
1. Freedom, p . 194· Though this is an existential distinc-
tion--"spiritual life and experiencen--Berdyaev's 
statement concerning the proper mode _for expressing 
its meaning does not seem to agree with his literary 
efforts , which assume that some intelligible expression 
of the distinction can be given. 
2 . Creative Act , P• 130 . 
3· Beginning , P • 107 . See also Destiny , p . 25 . 
4. Freedom, P• 314· Italics mine . 
Ungrund is a highly dialectical concept . As thesis it is 
the dark, chaotic, abysmal, unconscious, blind, unformed, 
mysterious ground of all existence and its totally dynamic 
character explains the forward thrust of all of life. But 
this totally dynamic potentiality of being requires "illu-
mination" by form and meaning, and this "light" is not some 
extraneous addition to the Ungrund but is born out of it, 
for the thesis itself yields the antithesis in the dialec-
tical scheme. This thirst for form and meaning which arises 
as antithesis is God the Creator, the first Person of the 
Trinity, for the Creator is that in the universe which be-
stows form and meaning. 1 Berdyaev says that if the Ungrund 
itself be considered the Creator, then 11 the world proves to 
be accidental, unnecessary, insignificant, having no rela-
tion to the inner life of the Deity and therefore, in the 
1. In the Hegelian dialectic the antithesis is the negative 
moment which denies the thesis . The thesis, though the 
first and least adequate stage in development, still 
is positive in nature . 
In contrast, Berdyaev begins in negativity--the 
Ungrund, an assertion of radical voluntarism, is the 
starting place for his thought, his thesis. And the 
birth of God the Creator out of the Ungrund is the 
assertion of the antithesis as a positive moment (the 
''light'') in the process . The Ungrund as the vision of 
apophatic theology is the Godhead; upon the emergence 
of God the Creator (the personal God of kataphat1c 
theology) from the Ungrund, God the Creator is con-
fronted by the Ungrund as by "the abyss, the free 
nothingness which precedes God Q. . e. , is uncreatecil 
and is outside God @. . e ., is not divin~" (Beginn:r'ng, 
P • 107) . _ 
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last resort, meaningless . "1 
-How deeply Berdyaev is indebted to Boehme on this 
point can be seen against the background of an observation 
by Stoudt that Boehme 
saw that the idea of the Ungrund needed a dialecti-
cal counterpart- -the treasury of divine forms . And, 
unlike the world-soul of Plato's Timaeus, this King-
dom of Forms • • • exists within the Godhead . This 
is undoubtedly Boehme's greatest contribution to the 
doctrine of God, the elevation of the Kingdom of 
Forms to a place in the Divine , and making it the 
dialectical counter-image of the Unconditioned God . 2 
Berdyaev also locates the Kingdom of Forms in God the Crea-
tor . God arises out of the Ungrund and in confronting the 
Ungrund (i . e ., in the resulting tension between the thesis 
and the antithesis , between dynamics and form) , creates out 
of the meonic freedom both the world and man . 3 "The world 
and the centre of the world--man , is the creation of God 
through Wisdom, through Divine Ideas , and at the same time 
1 . Destiny, P• 29 . 
2 . Jacob Boehme, The Way t o Christ , trans . John Joseph 
Stoudt (New York: Harper and Bros ., 1947,) , p . 246 . 
Stoudt's statement concerning Boehme's 'greatest con-
tribution" apparently does not take into account the 
fact that Augustine has done this very same thing in 
his exemplarism. Very likely both Boehme and Augustine 
were influenced by Nee - platonism which interpreted the 
Platonic ideas as thoughts of God and conceived of 
them as being in Nous , the divine mind which emanates 
from the One . (see:-on Augustine's exemplarism and the 
influence of Nee- platonism, Frederick Copleston's 
A History of Philosophy [!lestminster, .Iaryland: The 
Newman Press , 195~, II , 59 - 60 , 72- 73 • ) 
3• Destiny , PP • 25- 26 . 
it is the child of meonic uncreated freedom , the child of 
fathomless non-being . "1 But this creation of the world by 
God the Creator is called 11 a secondary act , 112 the primary 
-
act being the birth of the Creator from the Ungrund . There 
are unmistakable indications here that Berdyaev's Creator-
God occupies the role of a demiurge . 
d . The Trinitarian Nature of God ' s Creativity 
To speak in terms of God the Creator or the Trinity is 
to use terminology characteristic of positive theology . Ber-
dyaev does not use "Father," "Son , " "Holy Spirit" (often 
just "Spirit 11 ) as terms to be literally applied to the be-
-ing of God in His unity; rather, these are symbolic ter~ 
by which he speaks of the rise , the flo and the perfection 
of the world process which is embraced by mystery . "Creature 
has meaning and dignity only if the creation of the orld 
be understood as the realization of the Divine Trinity with-
in the inner life of the Absolute , as a mystery of love and 
freedom . 11 3 The process of the world ' s creation is said to 
1 . Ibid . , p 29 . 
2. Ibid ., pp . 25 , 29 . To hold that the creation of man and 
the 11orld is a "secondary act" seems to dis t ract from 
the anthropocentric method of Berdyaev . fhat empirical 
basis can there be for suggesting a more primary 
creation? 
3· Ibid ., P• 29 . See alsop . 33 · 
pass through all the hypostases of the Trinity . l 
The drama of creation begins with the birth of the 
Creator God of the Trinity out of the Ungrund. At the pri-
mary level of the Godhead nothing can be thought of as ex-
ternal to God . At the secondary level of the creation of 
the world, however , the Ungrund as non-being (primarily as 
it is expressed in freedom) is said to be outside the Crea-
tor God . The Creator is pictured as working with the pri-
mal freedom to effect a transition from non-being to being -
(which is the creation of the world) . The created world it-
self is comprehended within the meaning of the Trinitarian 
God for Berdyaev. 2 God the Creator is a symbol of the 
11 light 11 which illuminates the meaninglessness of non-being, 
-
a symbol of that aspect of process which makes for form and 
meaning . Since the Platonic notion of the realm of Ideas is 
included in the symbol of God the Creator , this symbol func-
tions as the dialectical counterpart of the Ungrund . 3 
1 . Creative Act, p . 138 . 
2 . Destiny , pp . 25 , 29 . This is the point of Berdyaev 1 s 
statement : 11 We may not think of being as outside God, 
but we may thus think of non-being" (Ibid . , p . 29) . 
The context shows that b'y 11 being" he means the creat-
ed world (see alsop . 25) , by "God" he means the 
Trinitarian God , and by "non-being~ he means uncreat-
ed freedom. 
3 · In Berdyaev 1 s understanding of the distinctions in the 
Trinity it is apparent that he associates the tradi-
tional idea of the pre-existent ord or Logos with the 
Creator God rather than with Christ the Second Person . 
On his use of the words Meaning or Logos (the two 
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The Second Person in the Trinity of Berdyaev signifies 
more than just the person of Christ who is revealed as per-
feet God and perfect Man . The Second Person is the symbol 
of all creation (both man and the world) in its ultimate 
perfection, understood as reflecting back to the Creator 
the perfect images of the Ideas by which He creates . 11The 
eternal Humanity is the divine Other , the Second Person of 
the Godhead . nl The creation of the world by God is "His 
emergence from solitude 11 ;2 it involves "the attitude of God 
towards His other self 11 ; 3 it means that God "desired anoth-
er self and a reciprocal answer to His love . 114 Creation is 
apparently understood as the Creator ' s attempt to objectify 
the Ideas eternally in His mind , and the Creator has an 
"Other" to the extent that the created world embodies the 
~ 
mind of the Creator . Thus the perfection of creation is the 
perfection of the Creator ' s relationship to His "Other . " 
God's continuing creativity is seen as a movement to -
ward a fuller expression of this "eternal Humanity" as He 
words seem to be synonymous) as applying to the Cre-
ator God, see Realm of Spirit , P • 16; Freedom, P • 149· 
1 . Divine , p . 43· Words used synonymously with "Humanity" 
are "Man" and " God- Man ." These words appear to symbol-
ize th~ highest Idea in _the mind of God as He creates 
the world . 
2 . Creative Act , P• 128 . 
4· Ibid ., P• 21 . 
3· Freedom, P• 190 . 
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struggles dialectically with the primal freedom. "God the 
Creator has done everything to bring light into that free-
dom, in harmony with His great conception of creation . "l 
The goal of God's creativity is the deification of all ere-
ation, i.e., all creation should be an incarnation of God's 
mind . 
As in Jesus Christ, the God-Man, there occurred an 
individual incarnation of God in man, so similarly 
in humanity there should occur a collective incar-
nation of God . God-humanity is the continuation of 
the incarnation of God; it brings forward the prob-
lem of the incarnation of the truth and righteous-
ness of Christ in the life2of humanity, in human culture and human society . 
The incomplete perfection of creation due to primal freedom 
indicates a tension between the Creator and creation, be-
tween creation-in- Idea and creation-in-fact. Thus in the 
achievement of God-humanity there is the unfolding of a 
divine and human drama in which two movements are disclose~ 
11 the movement from God towards man , and the movement from 
~n towards God . 11 3 The Second Person of the Trinity, in the 
thought of Berdyaev , must be understood as a symbol of the 
complete immanence of the Creator in creation and of the 
1 Destiny, p . 30 The recalcitrance of freedom is the 
source of evil and suffering in the created world, 
and is the basis for Berdyaev's contention that there 
is tragedy in God . 
3· Divine, p . 111. 
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creation in the Creator . Both man together with the world 
and God the Creator represent partial truths , as do the 
thesis and antithesis of the dialectic . Man , by virtue of 
the fact that he is the creation of God (and thus possesses 
the image of God), and at the same time has roots in the 
primal freedom , is the very focal point of God's creative 
struggle . It is through man that the creation is perfected , 
that the Second Person of the Trinity is fully realized . 
And this perfection of the Trinity in the Second Person , as 
the universal realization of God- manhood , is seen as ex-
pressing the fullness and enrichment of God Himself . 11 God 
with man and the world is a greater thing than God without 
man and the world . Man and the world are an enrichment of 
the divine life . ul 
The Third Person of the Trinity is understood as the 
bond of unity between the First Per son (God the Creator) 
and the Second Person (the created world in so far as it 
embodies the creative purpos e of the Crea t or) . Only in the 
Third Person can the relations between God and man be re -
solved . 2 The Holy Spirit means the immanence of God in the 
world and in man . 3 It means 11fulness and the victory over 
1 . Ibid., p . 7 • "God has a relati on to his other , that is 
--rQ say to man and to the world , and he kno s the rela-
tion of love . The perfec t ion of God is the perfection 
of his relation" (Beginning , p . 102) . 
2 . Freedom, P • 139 · 3· Ibid., P• 48 . 
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strife and division; it is sobornost, the perfect society 
in which there is no opposition between personalities, 
hypostases, and the one Being . 11 1 The Holy Spirit is a sym-
. 
bol of the transformed and deified world and man; it is the 
synthesis, the higher stage of truth which arises out of 
the dramatic relationship of the Creator to His creation. 
It is the Kingdom of God, 11human and cosmic community in 
freedom and love . u2 
The meaning of the creation of the world in the Trini-
tarian symbolism of Berdyaev's thought is perhaps best ex-
pressed in these words which reveal both religious warmth 
and penetrating sensitivity: 
The creation of the world by God the Father is a 
moment of the deepest mystery in the relation be-
tween God the Father and God the Son . The revela-
tion of the divine mystery in the depths of the 
divine and spiritual life , of the inner passionate 
divine thirst and longing for an other self, that 
other self which may be the object of a great and 
infinite love on the part of God , and that infinite 
thirst for reciprocity and love on the part of the 
other self, determines for the deep Christian con-
sciousness the very principle of movement and pro-
cess . This inner tragedy of love felt by God for 
His other self and its longing for reciprocal love 
constitutes that very mystery of the divine life 
which is associated with the creation of the world 
and of man . 
This creation represented such an interior move-
ment and dramatic history in the divine life; it was 
the history of the divine love bet een God and His 
other self . And t hus the Second Person of the Divine 
Trinity , the Son of God and symbol of infinite love, 
is the very heart of both the divine and the world 
tragedy and destiny Herein is accomplished the 
1. Ibid . , P • 199 · 2 . Divine, P • 43 • 
union of the historical destinies of the divine and 
human lives . Without such a conception of divine 
and spiritual life it is impossible to grasp the 
origins of history or the true destiny of the world 
and of mankind . And it is based essentially upon a 
dynamic interpretation of the depths of spiritu~l 
life as a creative movement and tragic destiny . 
To summarize briefly at this point , the world process 
is the transition from non- being to being, from the dark, 
abysmal Ungrund to a fully ordered and meaningful cosmos . 
This is understood in dialectical terms . From the purely 
dynamic principle , the Ungrund , arises that which works for 
order and meaning , God the Creator . The creativity of God 
is the infusion of the dynamic potentiality of being with 
form and meaning . When non-being receives form it is no 
longer potentiality of being but actualized being . This 
growth of being is understood as a process within the God-
head and it points to the completion of this process in the 
Godhead which is the final and compl et e revelati on of God 
as Trinity . The world process , then , runs the full course 
from the pure dynamics of the Ungrund, which is a sort of 
unconscious, unrealized divinity, to the realization of the 
fully- conscious expression of divinity in the Trinity, which 
is the goal of the creation of the world . 
Berdyaev, in his doctrine of the Trinity, is abellian 
to the extent that he holds that the belief in the Trinity 
c omes from the evidence of human experience itself . God is 
1 . His tory , PP • 48-49 • 
experienced as a Trinity . 11 The inner relationships between 
the Hypostases of the Trinity are dynamic and not static 
and are revealed as concrete life. 111 But Berdyaev seems to 
-
reject the ultimate conclusion of Sabellius that the Trini-
ty is only a matter of appearance. God truly is Father-
Creator, Son and Holy Spirit since Berdyaev holds that spir-
itual experience alone reveals the true nature of reality. 
\Vherever there is life there is the mystery of the 
three Persons, which belongs both to heaven and 
earth. Wherever there is life there is the mystery 
of the three Persons, there is the distinction of 
the three Hypostases and their absolute unity. This 
mystery is reflected and symboliz~d everywhere in 
the life of man and of the world . 
Two major lines of trinitarian thought, running back 
to Augustine and Hegel respectively, appear to merge in 
Berdyaev . The Augustinian tradition is evident in his idea 
that the Trinity can be thought of on the analogy of human 
love. The creation as a mystery of the interior life of God 
is understood to be 11 the need which God feels for His other 
-
self, of one ho loves and is beloved, of the love which is 
realizable within the Trinity in Unity . 113 The three persons 
1 . Freedom, p . 192 . The question arises: Is a third person 
revealed in intense religious experience? It may be 
possible to maintain that a true relationship between 
two human persons is only possible in a third, namely 
God, but can this be applied to the God-man relation-
ship also? To speak of a third person here would actu-
ally tend .to depersonalize the relationship . 
2 . Ibid ., P• 200 . 3· Ibid ., P• 191 . 
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of the Trinity are here viewed as the Lover , the Beloved, 
and the Love between the two . Augustine also used the anal-
ogy of the Father as the Lover, the Son the Beloved, and 
the Holy Spirit the Love which is the union or communion 
of the Father and the Son . "We have three things: the lover, 
that which is loved , and love . Love itself is nothing but a 
kind of life which couples together or seeks to couple some 
two entities, the loved and the loved . 11 1 
Augustine's main thrust in trinitarian thought , how-
ever , was not along the line of this social-love analogy 
but rather on the analogy of the individual human personal-
ity , the psychological interpretation of the Trinity which 
more clearly guarantees the Divine unity . Such a view holds 
that the relationships between the three Persons of the God-
head can be best understood by examining the human mind and 
its power of knowledge . 
Here then , is a kind of image of the Trinity : the 
mind itself , its knowled e which is at once its off-
spring and self-derived 'word ," and thirdly love . 
These three are one , and one single sUbstance . The 
mind is no greater than its offspring , when its 
self-knowledge is equal to its being; nor than its 
love , when its se~f-love is equal to its knowledge 
and to its being . 
1 . Augustine , "The Trinity , " VIII , 14 in Augustine : Later 
Works, ed . and trans . John Burnaby , Vol . VIII of The 
Library of Christian Classics , ed . John Baillie , John 
T. McNeill, Henry P. Van Dusen (Philadelphia : Westmin-
ster Press , 1955) , PP • 54-55 · 
2 . Ibid ., IX , 18 (Augustine : Later Works , p . 71) . 
-··-~--------------------------------
Thus the Son of God, equal to the Father, is eternally gen-
erated as the object of the Divine self-knowledge while the 
Holy Spirit is an accompanying motion of the Divine will, 
which is Love . Such an idea seems also to be reflected in 
Bera.yaev's view that the Son is God's "other self" and the 
' Holy Spirit is the union of the two "selves" in love. 
The distinctive feature of Hegelian trinitarian thought 
is that it holds the generation of the Son to be the crea-
tion of the world . God the Father as an abstract idea 
achieves reality by becoming estranged from himself in the 
person of his Son as expressed in the existence of the con-
crete world . 1 This is the creation of the world. This oppo-
sition between God and the world, or between "self" and 
' -
"other,'' is resolved in Absolute Spirit . Here Spirit is the 
. . 
final and absolute moment in the process of the Divine self-
consciousness (or, as Augustine held, the focus of Divine 
unity). 
The reconciliation believed in as being in Christ 
has no meaning if God is not known as Trinity, if it 
is not recognized that He is but is at the same time 
the Other, the self-differentiating, the Other in 
the sense that this Other is God Himself and has po-
tentially the divine nature in it, and that the 
abolishing of this difference, of ~his otherness, 
this return, this love , is Spirit . 
1. Georg W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, 
ed. E. B. Speirs and trans. E. B. Speirs and J. Burdon 
Sanderson (London: K. Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co ., 
Ltd ., 1895), I , 30-31 . 
2. Ibid., PP • 99-100 . 
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With both Hegel and Berdyaev, the doctrine of the Trin-
ity involves the whole world process . 1 Furthermore, for both 
thinkers the goal of the creative process is the perfection 
of the relationship in the Trinity between God the Father 
and God the Son,which means the revelation of the completed 
Trinity . 
E. Summary 
Berdyaev's view of God , relevant to a study of his 
idea of human creativity , may be summarized as follows . The 
only ground for belief in God is to be found in man's own 
most profound awareness of himself . Only those things, sym-
bolical in nature , may be said about God which are quali-
ties of this deep self- awareness (or spiritual experience 
or existence) . On this basis God may be said to be spirit, 
love , freedom, truth , meaning , mystery , and creativeness 
since these are acknowledged by Berdyaev as descriptive of 
man ' s highest self- consc iousness . The anthropocentric , 
intuitive nature of Berdyaev' s theological method is ob-
vious . 
Berdyaev 1 s thinking on God ' s creativity presents some 
mystifying ideas . From an initial, unconscious void (the 
1 . Such a notion is re j ected in contemporary theology by 
.Karl Barth who writes that the Trinity is a denial of 
loneliness and an affirmation of love lithin God "even 
apart from the world" (The Doctrine of the Word of God, 
trans . G. T. Thomson ~ew York : Charles Scribner ' s 
Sons , 193~, P• 158) . 
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Ungrund) is born a principle of form and meaning , namely 
God the Creator . The creation of the world is pictured as 
God acting upon the primal freedom which 11 consents" to an 
actualization of its being . The creation of the world is 
the union of the dynamic and formal principles of the uni -
verse; and as Berdyaev describes it , this creation could 
almost be called the reflexive action of the Ungrund itself 
but for the fact that the dark, unconscious state of the 
Ungrund probably precludes any thought that it can be prop-
erly called an agent acting upon itself . 
The goal of creation is a properly- ordered universe 
variously called the cosmos or the kingdom of God . Since 
created persons possess uncreated freedom over which God 
has no control , a free response of the person to God is 
necessary to achieve this cosmos. This free relating of the 
human person to God is the essence of the spiritual life, 
which is the process of the transformation or deification 
of man . This whole creative process i s thought to take 
place within the Godhead and to involve the progressive rev-
elation of the Trini ty as it moves toward its completion . 1 
1 . For man to fall away from God , then , means an actual dis-
ruption in the life of the Trinity . The importance of 
man ' s response to God so far as the divine life is con-
cerned is thus made obvious --hence Berdyaev ' s words 
that "God longs for His ' other,' His friend ; He wants 
him to answer the call tG enter ~ the fullness of the 
divi ne life and to participate in God ' s creative work 
of conquering non- being" (Destiny , p . 25) . 
1 8 1 
In Berdyaev's thought, the cosmos or kingdom of God is 
equivalent to the final perfection of the Trinity and is 
the final moment in the fulfilled Divine self-consciousness. 
3· Man 
A. Introduction 
The purpose here will be, as in the preceding section 
on God, to give a statement of Berdyaev's views on man as 
they particularly relate to the theme of human creativity. 
i. Beyond Optimism and Pessimism 
Berdyaev does not accept an absolutely optimistic atti-
tude toward life which assumes that everything is steadi1y 
improving, nor does he accept an absolutely pessimistic at-
titude which assumes that everything is hopeless and un-
changeably bad.1 A relative pessimism, however, based on a 
reading of the empirical facts of history, is justified and 
in accordance with the Christian consciousness.2 "Christian-
-ity is not optimism, but Christian pessimism can be only 
relative, since beyond the world of unreason and meaning-
lessness, Christianity sees a meaning.n3 The Christian task 
1. See Spirit, P• 95; Freedom, P• 362. 
2. See Spirit, p. 114; Beginning, p. 209. 
3· Fate of Man, p. 17. It is from this viewpoint that Ber-
dyaev criticizes Heidegger for his extreme pessimism: 
"He looks upon man and the world exclusively from 
below, and sees nothing but the lowest part of them. 
As a man he is deeply troubled by this world of care, 
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is the overcoming of the world's meaninglessness. Such a 
task is eschatological in nature and centers in Berdyaev's 
doctrine of man as creator, for "an actively creative atti-
tude to life is superior to both -pessimism and optimism."1 
ii. A Critique of Traditional Christian Anthropology 
Berdyaev presents his doctrine of man against the 
background of his dissatisfaction with what he understands 
to be the traditional Christian view of man. "Traditional" 
- -in this context means the theological tradition which began 
with the Church Fathers and has developed along the same 
line both in formulations and emphases; and for Berdyaev, 
a son of the Russian Orthodox Church, "traditional Christi-
~ 
anity" resembles very closely Eastern Orthodoxy. 
This criticism of traditional Christian thought can be 
summed up in one main charge--its monophysitism. "There is 
a fateful tendency toward monophysitism in historic Chris-
tian1ty. It is as though the man who is redeemed from his 
sins desired that his human nature should cease to exist--
fear, death, and daily dullness. His philosophy, in 
which he has succeeded in seeing a certain bitter 
truth, albeit not the final truth, is not existential 
philosophy, and the depth of existence does not make 
itself felt in it" (Beginning, P• 117). 
1. Spirit, p. 95· Despite Berdyaev's interpretation of the 
world's condition, which makes for a relative pessim-
ism, he is basically and ultimately an optimist in 
outlook. For a strong statement of his optimism see 
his essay "On Suicide," Approach (Spring, 1962), 
PP• 6-27 • 
that only the divine nature alone should exist . "1 This mono-
~ 
physitic tendency is marked by an overwhelming sense or 
man's sinfulness . 2 It is marked by a lack of appreciation 
for any positive aspect of man's own nature and involves 
the belittlement of human nature . The traditional emphasis 
on the religious life is that 11 one should empty oneselr of 
everything human, not get rid of the bad only but make a 
general clearance of all that is human as such, in order 
that the divine may enter into man . "3 In traditional theo-
logy 
the very word "creature" acquires a deprecatory mean-
ing . The creature is insignificant, impotent, pitiful, 
helpless , it is nothing . It is as though in creating 
the world God wanted to humiliate the creature and 
demonstrate its nothingness and helplessness . All He 
requires of it is blind submission , and He cruelly 
punishes dis obedience •••• Theologians regard 
creature as low and insignificant beca~e it is 
creature and not because it is fallen .~ 
This criticism of traditional Chris t ian thought on man 
adds up to the charge that Christianity fai ls to understand 
the deep and complex problems of contemporary man and is 
thus unable to speak intelligently and effectively to his 
condition . It is necessary that Christianity continue under 
new forms the same creative spirit of the Fathers of the 
Church without adopting their answers to questions which 
1. Creative Act, p . 111 . See also Truth, P• 124. 
2. Divine , p . 110 . 3 · Truth , p . 124. 
4· Destiny , PP • 26-27 . 
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man no longer asks, for "Christianity will not be able to 
~ 
continue if it remains in a state of decadence and wedded 
to the past, if it persists in living on its capital in-
stead of looking for fresh riches."1 It is "difficult to 
~ 
heal a contemporary soul of its disease by yesterday's rem-
edies alone."2 
iii. The Need of a New Anthropology 
Berdyaev's criticism of what he understands to be the 
traditional Christian anthropology points up his contention 
that a new Christian anthropology is needed. This is an in-
escapable theme which runs throughout his writings. He 
wrote in the Introduction of his early book, The Meaning of 
the Creative Act: 
In the vital source of this book and this reli-
gious philosophy there is a quite exceptional, im-
perial feeling of man, a religious comprehension of 
the Anthropos as a divine person. Up to now, reli-
gion, mystics and philosophy have been so inhuman 
and non-human that they led,~with immanent neces-
sity, to godless positivism.~ 
On the last pages of his final work he wrote in anticipa-
tion of the "new man" who will be the embodiment of the 
ideal of this new doctrine of man: 11 The new man must be 
~ 
creative, and hence he must look toward the future, toward 
that which has never been. This is his answer to the call 
1. Freedom, P• 2)4. 2. Dostoevs!Y, p. 62. 
,. Creative Act, P• 19. 
of God . nl This will be an anthropology in which man is 
~ 
"B£ longer envisaged ~ ~ fragment of nature and the ob-
jective world, but ~~being in his ~right, situated in 
the extra-objective and extra-natural world, in the very 
core of his £!B. existence.n2 
-The need for a reformulated doctrine of man has come 
about because the psychical nature of man has undergone 
great and complex development so as to outmode the anthropol-
ogy of the Church Fathers.3 This does not mean that man has 
become progressively better; on the contrary, "the soul of 
man has not grown better, but it has developed and become 
much more complex, and to this fact a different thought co~ 
responds . u4 
Berdyaev sees the historical manifestation of this 
growing complexity of the human consciousness in the human-
istic philosophy which climaxed in Friedrich Nietzsche. 
Nietzsche is called "the most significant spiritual phenom-
enon of modern histo~y.n 5 He struggled against a false idea 
~ 
of God "so widely spread in theology , that the existence o:f 
1. Realm of Spirit, P• 170 . 
3• Divine, P• 56. 
2. Solitude, P• 31. 
4· Ibid . , p. 24· 
5· Creative Act, P• 90 . Other men are also seen as signif-
icant in forcing a new doctrine of man--Dostoyevsky, 
Kierkegaard, Solovev, and Bloy in particular (Divine, 
P • 24) • 
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God is incompatible with man's creativeness."1 But in denymg 
God, he saw man as a shame who must be overcome in the sup~ 
man, thus expressing the logical conclusion of pure human-
ism--hence Berdyaev's observation that "after Nietzsche, 
his works and his fate, humanism is for -ever overcome.tt2 
-But Nietzsche's failure had its positiye result: "Nietzsche 
is the forerunner of !. ~religious anthropology.u3 The 
failure of godless humanism meant that it is necessary to 
think also of God when one thinks of man. The new doctrine 
of man signaled in Nietzsche, 11 in its f'inal concept, in its 
Logos, must become the Christoiogy of man.n4 The dilemma, 
-
as indicated by humanism, is that man's dignity and creative-
ness are not compatible with conceptions of God which were 
then in vogue; and yet, apart from God, man is seen as a 
shame and a pain, something that must be overcome. On this 
view, then, humanism not only opposed Christianity but also 
provided Christianity with 1ts greatest opportunity. 
Man had to pass through the humanistic consciousness 
in order to arrive at the revelation about man. It 
was impossible to remain at the stage of patristic 
consciousness. Through humanism, man's activity is 
born in suffering, and it moves upward rather than 
downward. The truth of humanism is part of the 
religion of divine humanity, which predicates belief 
not only in God but in man as well.? 
1. Destiny, p. 150. See also Creative Act, P• 106. 
2. Creative Act, P• 90. 3· Ibid. 
4• Ibid., P• 91. 5• Ibid., P• ~9. 
Berdyaev feels that the issues raised by humanism can 
only be resolved by a positive answer from Christianity. 
"Humanism can only be defeated by the positive discovery of' 
the truth about man and his creative mission.ttl Christian-
ity's lack of effectiveness in the face of the modern pre-
dicament of man is a reflection of its own failure to find 
a solution to the religious problem of man, to state the 
true nature of a Christian doctrine of man which "must re-
veal the secret of man's creative calling and thus give to 
man's creative impulses a high religious meaning."2 
Berdyaev's response to what he interprets as a chal-
lenge to a new Christian anthropology is given in his doc-
trine of man as a creator. This opens up his positive faith 
and should be viewed as his own participation in and contri-
bution to the answer hich he feels must be forthcoming 
from Christianity. Berdyaev's faith in man as a creator is 
his reconstruction of the Christian doctrine of man. 
B. Christian Presuppositions for a Doctrine of Man 
Any view of man which is Christian, says Berdyaev, 
must be based upon two key ideas: (1) that man is created 
in the image and likeness of God the Creator; and (2) that 
the Son of God was God-become-man who revealed himself as 
1. Freedom, P• 233· 2. Creative Act, P• 92. 
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the God-Man. 1 These are the presuppositions for any recon-
structed doctrine of man in Christian thought. 
i. Man Created in the Image and Likeness of God 
The biblical statement that "God created man in his 
own image, in the image of God he -created h1m,"2 as inter-
preted by Berdyaev, is an important theological point in 
his doctrine of man. He does not accept this religious 
revelation about man on the authority of dogma or biblical 
record but as man's free intuition.3 It is "wholly based 
upon that higher consciousness which man has of himself, 
1. Destiny, P• 53· 
2. Gen. 1:27• Biblical quotations will be from the Revised 
Standard Version of 1946 and 1952. 
3• For Berdyaev, revelation means intuition. Revelation, 
which is divine-human in nature, is both a revelation 
of God and of man. 
Berdyaev's philosophical and theological method can 
be expressed in one word--intuition. The only verifi-
cation of the insights given by intuition is the fact 
that they seem to correspond closely to one's own ex-
istence, to the processes which go on in the depths of 
the human spirit (and in this case, particularly Ber-
dyaev's spirit). 
This basic intuitive method, when interpreted into 
terms of his attitude toward the written record of the 
Bible, means that. Berdyaev sees the value of the Bible 
to lie primarily in its function as a commentary upon 
one's own inner spiritual experiences, as an aid for 
the -verbalization of what takes place in the spirit. 
"Every event and indeed every word and action in the 
external world remain unintelligible so far as we are 
concerned if they do not reveal to us that which sperum 
and acts within, ••• There can be revealed to us 
only that which is revealed in us, for only, that which 
happens within can have any meaning for us 1 {Freedom, 
P• 93). 
which transcends the limits of the natural world . "1 It is 
not an abstract truth, then, but an empirical fact of spir-
itual experience . 
The main thrust of Berdyaev's interpretation of the 
"image of God" in man is to relate intimately man's exis-
. 
tence to the divine life . Man as the "image of God" is like 
God; or, more precisely, man as the 11 1mage of God" corre-
sponds to and gives expression to the highest Idea in the 
mind of God the Creator . 2 
The "image of God" functions as man's ideal, as the 
Humanity which is the proper goal of the forward thrust of 
man's existence . In contrast to man's inhumanity, his fall-
ing short of what he ought to be, 11God is human and demands 
humanity . Humanity is the image of God in man . 11 3 In the 
midst of inhumanity man must strive to be human , i . e . , "to 
guard the image of man, for it is the image of God . "4 Ber-
dyaev therefore does not identify God the Creator with 
1 . Creative Act, p . 62 . 
2 . Here must be recalled the discussion on "The Trinitarian 
Nature of God's Creativity , " and especially the sec-
tion on the Second Person (see above , pp . 171-173) . 
God's creation of the world , and especially of man, is 
pictured as His attempt to objectify fully and per-
fectly the eternal Ideas present in His mind . 
3 · Slavert , P • 85 . Personality, also called God's idea in 
man Destiny, P• 69), carries the same meaning as the 
word 0humanity 11 does here . 
4 · Dream, P • 302 . 
empirical man,but he does seem to be saying that God is 
present in man in what man deeply senses to be his own true 
image or ideal or goal . Thus the "image of God" indicates a 
' s~ilarity between God and man which is more than superfi-
cial, for this "image" is a primary quality of man's very 
being . Berdyaev's thought at this point appears to be in ~ 
Eastern Orthodox tradition which looks for man's deifica-
tion, and is consistent with his view of man's participation 
in the developing Trinity . 
The "image of God" in man is not a static state of man, 
nor is it a mere potential element; it is not something 
added to man ' s own nature,nor is it something lost in the 
Fall . It means that the nature of man involves a "mysterious 
1 duality , " that man has an eternal aspect which is not sub-
ject to the processes of nature . 2 Berdyaev gives a dynamic 
interpretation of the meaning of the 11 image " in man ' s ex-
' 
perience . Because man is created in the image of God, man 
is a free spiritual being capable of rising above nature 
and acting upon it . 
Either man is the image and likeness of Absolute 
Divine Being, and then he is a free spirit , the king 
and centre of nature , or else he is the image and 
likeness of our given natural world, and in this 
case man does not exist--he is only one of the pass-
ing expressions of nature . We must choose : either 
1 . Creative Act , p . 62 . 2. Freedom, P• 275 · 
man's freedom in God, or the nec~ssity of a passing 
phenomenon in the natural world . 
Man is therefore not a passive part of the cosmic process 
but an active participant, a spiritually-free being, an 
existential center , a creator . "Creative freedom, the free 
~ 
power to reveal himself in creative action, is placed with-
in man as a seal and sign of his likeness to God, as a mark 
of the Creator's image . "2 
In the last analysis, Berdyaev on this point seems to 
be stating his basic belief concerning man--that man is a 
spiritual being . The conclusion of Chapter 4 of this study 
was that "spirit" for Berdyaev indicates the dual reality 
of God and man . So, within the context of his thought, the 
idea of the "image of God" in man possesses definite Christ-
ological implications . However , though the teaching that 
man is created in the divine image is an eternal truth, it 
"has not completely revealed the truth about man or shown 
all the consequences of tne Christological doctrine; it is 
more in the spirit of the Old Testament than of the New . "3 
-It is Berdyaev's conclusion that any Christian doctrine of 
man must also involve the doctrine of the two natures of 
Christ, that Christ is both God and man . 
1 . Creative Act , pp . 87-88 . See also Destiny, p . 49· 
2 . Creative Act , P • 99 · 3 · Destiny , P • 49 · 
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ii. The Two Natures of Christ 
Berdyaev is strong in his emphasis upon the orthodox 
Christian doctrine of Christ--that Christ is both complete-
ly divine and completely human, and that these two natures 
are united in one person. "God reveals himself by his Son, 
and that Son is perfect God and perfect man, the God-man in 
whose perfection the divine and the human are made one."l 
But the Christological problem, with which the creeds 
1. Dostoevsky, p. 99· The strong Christological as well as 
trinitarian nature of Berdyaev's thought, and his use 
of traditional terminology in this regard, stand in 
contrast to his untraditional views in other matters 
(e.g., the creation, man, salvation). This seems to 
reflect a distinction made in Eastern Orthodoxy be-
tween three types of doctrinal definitions--dogma, 
theologumena and theological opinions. 
Dogmas are religious truths estabLished by divine 
revelation which express the mind of the Church as a 
whole. They possess the highest authority and are ac-
cepted by the good Orthodox Christian. The dogmas 
center in the trinitarian nature of God and the 
Incarnation, especially as these are expressed in the 
dogmatic definitions of the ecumenical councils of 
Nicaea and Chalcedon respectively. Dogmas are not 
rational definitions but point rather to a basic 
mystery; there is considerable freedom in the inter-
pretation of the dogma. 
Theologumena are statements made by venerated teach-
ers of the Church on such problems as the nature of 
the Church, the nature of man, sin, the way of sal-
vation. Though accepted, they do not have the author-
ity of dogmas. 
Lastly, some doctrinal problems (e.g., the status of 
western Christians) are open to free theological opin-
ion; at this level contradictory opinions may be held 
within the Church. 
On the meaning of "dogmau in the Eastern Orthodox 
Church see Nicolas Zernov, _Eastern Christendom (New 
York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1961) , P• 230; and Ernst 
Benz, The Eastern Orthodox Church, trans. Richard and 
Clara Winston (Anchor Books; Garden City, New York: 
Doubleday and Co., 1963), P• 51. 
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struggled, is a problem which is broader in scope than just 
that of the relation of the two natures in Christ. It is 
actually the problem of the relation between the divine and 
the human in general. 1 And the dogma of the divine-human 
nature of Christ is not acknowledged in an authoritarian 
manner but, as in the case of the dogma of man's being 
created in the image of God, it is freely accepted as an 
initial reality of the spiritual life.2 Man discovers this 
truth of the two natures of Christ in the depth of his own 
experience, in the depth of his own self-consciousness. 
Berdyaev does not feel that the Christian formulation 
of the doctrine of Christ, as expressed for example in the 
Chalcedonian Creed, has been taken to its logical conclu-
sions. Christ as the God-Man is a revelation both of God 
and of man. A doctrine of man is inseparably tied to the 
doctrine of Christ. 
In the Christian revelation the truth about man's 
a:rvrne nature Is really og~~e reverse side of the 
medal of the truth about iStTs human n~e-.-~ 
CbrlstOTogy of man Is inseparable from that of the 
Son of God: Christ's self-consciousness is insepara-
ble rrom that of man. The Christological revelation 
is also an anthropological revelation. And the task 
of humanity's religious consciousness is
3
to reveal 
the Christological consciousness of man. 
1. Divine, p. 23. 2. Freedom, P• 74• 
3• Creative Act, p. 81. Berdyaev here speaks of "Cnr1st's 
self-consciousness." But this was written before the 
days of form criticism. He later expressed skepticism 
about any certain knowledge about the historical per-
son of Jesus (Dream, P• 299). 
This "Christology of man," of which Berdyaev writes, means 
- -
a doctrine of man which is analogous to the doctrine of 
Christ. It means that the revelation of Christ's human na-
ture is at the same time a revelation of man's divine na-
ture. Such a Christology is also the elaboration of what 
Berdyaev means by Spirit. 
In Berdyaev's thought the Christological dogma of the 
two natures of Christ is closely related to the dogma of the 
trinitarian nature of God's being. Both dogmas are adequate 
symbolic expressions of the initial and absolute realities 
of the spiritual life~The line of reasoning, so far as the 
inter-relationship of these two dogmas is concerned, see~ 
to run as follows: the dogma of the two natures of Christ 
rests upon Christ's own self-consciousness and is confirmed 
in man's own deepest self-consciousness. The religious con-
sciousness of Christ and the religious consciousness of man 
are one of a kind because they share a common humanity. 
This Christology of man means that man, too, is a 11 christ," 
. 
so to speak, and through his awareness of his dual nature 
he participates with and through Christ in the Holy Trinity 
itself. 
Through the Son of Man nature participates in Divine 
nature and the human person is comprised in the 
Divine. The self-consciousness of Christ, as perfect 
God and perfect Man, lifts man to a dizzying height, 
lifts Him to the Holy Trinity. Through Christ, ~ 
1. See Freedom, pp. 74, 81; Slavery, P• 46. 
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becomes ~ participant in the nature of the Holy Trin-
~' for the second ¥Jpostasis of the Holy Trinity 
is the Absolute Man . 
iii. Summary 
The chief point in Berdyaev's interpretation of both 
the "image of God 11 and the two natures of Christ is the mys-
tery of tWD-in-one, of God-manhood, of a double movement 
from God to man and from man to God. Man has a dual nature--
he is not only human but divine, and divine not by some 
special work of grace but in essence. Man 's spiritual expe-
rience, characterized by freedom, growth of personality and 
creativeness, not only indicates the existence of God but 
shows the union of divine nature with human nature, and the 
activity of God in the world. As Berdyaev observes, "the 
idea of God is the only supra-human idea that does not de-
stroy man by reducing him to being a mere means. 112 The idea 
of God not only does not destroy man, but it is neces sary 
in thinking about man, as the humanism of Nietzsche has 
shown to Berdyaev. The idea of man in and for himself apart 
from any divine reference does not correspond to any actual 
being but is an abstraction and a fiction. 
1. Creative Act, P• 79• See also Freedom, p. 138. A fuller 
discussion of the meaning of Christ for Berdyaev is 
found below in this chapter, pp. 204-211. 
2. Dostoevsky, P• 99• 
c. Man as a Creator 
i . Introduction 
The study of his thought about man as a creator goes 
to the very heart of Berdyaev's teaching about man. He felt 
that his religious philosophy, first expressed comprehen-
sively in The Meaning of the Creative Act, was distinguished 
from the dominant trends of thought of the day by the fact 
that it was "predominantly concerned with the problem of 
man and of his creative vocation. 11 1 His view of man's ere-
-
ativity was the core of all his philosophical and religious 
thinking: "The matter of creativity and of the creative vo-
cation of man is not only a facet or one of the facets of 
my outlook, reached as a result of philosophical reasoning, 
but a source of my whole thinking and living--an initial 
inner experience and illumination. "2 This study of Berdyaev's 
doctrine of human creativity, then , not only gives the heart 
of his doctrine of man but provides the key for an under-
standing of all his thought . 
ii. The Revelation of Human Creativity in Religious Experience 
a . The Divine-Human Nature of Revelation 
Corresponding to Berdyaev ' s basic dualism of spirit 
and nature is his view of two ways of knowing . "The 
1. Dream, P • 167 . 2 . Ibid . , P• 207 . 
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spiritual world is known in a different way from the natu-
ral . trl This is made abundantly clear in The Meaning of the 
. 
Creative Act where he frequently contrasts the two ways: 
science , whose ways are exterior and concern objective, 
phenomenal data; and philosophy, whose ways are interior 
and involve non-objective, noumenal reality . "Philosophy 
~ 
is the inner perception of the world through man, while 
science is the external knowledge of the world outside man. 
In man is revealed absolute being: outside him, only the 
relative."2 Berdyaev's term "objectification" refers to the 
~ ~ 
attempt to apply the method of science to all of life. His 
meaning for "philosophy" in this book definitely involves 
' 
religious knowledge, as can be seen when he develops this 
contrast with the method of science: 11 But philosophy and 
religion set up quite other realities . "3 It is as a philos-
~ 
opher, so understood, that man comes to understand the mean-
ing of human creativity: "Philosophy is man ' s self-conscious-
ness of his imperial and ~reative role in the cosmos . 114 
Berdyaev used various terms to denote this philosophical 
approach to truth--"a spiritually integral reason , "5 "spir-
itual experience,n6 ~ na creative act of the spirit,ii7 
1. Destiny, PP • 16-17 . 2. Creative Act, P • 6o. 
3· Thid . , P• 27 . 4· Ibid . , P• 52. 
5· Realm of SJ2irit, P • 29 · 6. Thid . , P• 29; Destiny, P• 4· 
7· Realm of SJ2irit, p . 19 . 
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"spiritual knowing, 111 "revelation , "2 and "intuition. n3 He 
.. ... .... ... .... ~ 
looked upon this as an orientation by means of existential 
philosophy whereby 11 the human subject does not apprehend 
the object, but the revelation of human existence and, 
through it , that of the divine world . 114 This revelation o:r 
human existence, by which man is introduced to true being , 
is conceived as a divine-human process to be distinguished 
from the monistic interpretation of knowledge which makes 
knowledge either a divine process exclusively as in Fichte 
and Hegel , or an exclusively human process as in posit1vism.5 
This divine-human nature of revelation is implied when Ber-
dyaev speaks of its "spiritual" quality, for "spirit" has 
been shown to indicate a divine-human relationship . 
In his emphasis upon the divine- human nature of reli-
gious knowledge, Berdyaev is conscious of steering a course 
between the two extreme views of religious revelation. He 
observes that 11 estern European thought struggles in the 
contrast between rationalism and irrationalism, both o:r 
which are the result of the fractionalization of the spir-
itual world . "6 In other words , he feels that to emphasize 
' 
either the divine or the human aspect of the spiritual world, 
1 . Ibid., P • 30 . 2 . Freedom, P• 114. 
3 · Beginning, p . 38. 4. Solitude, P • 53 · 
5· See Beginning , P • 36 ; Realm of Spirit, PP • 29- 30 . 
6. Realm of Spirit , pp . 29-30 . 
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and thus o£ religious knowledge,is to become shipwrecked 
upon the rock of Scylla or in the whirlpool o£ Charybdis. 
The emphasis upon the human aspect is seen to lead to the 
rationalism which bas no need of revelation while the empha-
sis upon the divine aspect makes man's role meaningless and 
thus leads to irrationalism. 
Man's creative nature, it may thus be observed, has no 
scriptures o£ its own, no external authority. The revela-
tion does not come £rom "above" but £rom 11below, 11 i.e., 
- - -from the depths o£ man's own existence. 11 In creativeness, 
-
man is, as it were, le£t to himsel£, alone, and bas no 
direct aid from on high. 111 It is to be remembered that for 
~ 
Berdyaev God does not exist in a manner exterior to man, 
and neither does God act so much upon man as in and through 
man and his freedom. It is this truth about God which comes 
very close to the heart o£ Berdyaev's doctrine of human 
creativity. In a statement which could be the most signif-
icant sentence that be ever wrote,so far as the problem of 
his doctrine o£ man's creativeness is concerned, he has 
said: 
Times are coming in the life of humanity when it must 
help itself, conscious that the absence of transcend-
ent aid is not helplessness, because man can dis-
cover limitless and immanent within himself if he 
dares to reveal in himself , by the creative act, all 
1 . Creative Act, p. 97• See also P• 98; Beginning, P• 193; 
Freedom, PP• 237-238. 
the power of God and the world! the true world, 
freed from the illusory world . 
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Man's discovery of this power of God and of the spiritual 
world, which is revealed within himself, and which is the 
knowledge of his own creativity, is in itself a creative 
act.2 Man, in thus revealing his creative nature, does so 
by virtue of his creative freedom which allows him to take 
the initiative . This is a freedom like unto God's freedom, 
and its presence in man is involved in the meaning of man's 
being created in the image and likeness of God.3 
b . The Development of Man 
The divine-human nature of revelation means that man 
plays more than just a passive role as the receiver of 
revelation . It means that what is revealed to man depends 
upon the quality of his own self-consciousness . Since Ber-
dyaev holds that the human consciousness ever develops, his 
conclusion is that there will be new revelations correspond-
ing to these changes in the human consciousness which are 
changes in man's receptive capacity for truth about the 
spirit . 
(1) The Development of Human Consciousness 
There is no such thing as a fixed, static, completed 
human nature and human cons c iousness . Man as a creative 
1 . Creative Act, P• 14• 2 . ~·, P • 141. 
3• 1!?.!£•, P • 99 • 
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being experiences change. 11He undergoes new experiences, 
. 
he becomes more complex, he unfolds and develops. There is 
human development, but it does not take place along a 
straight ascending line. 111 Though this development is not 
automatic nor impersonal, and may express regress as well 
as progress, in its true form it is a working-out of God's 
eternal idea of what man should be. "Man is only what God 
is planning, a projected design."2 The positive development 
of man's spiritual nature is itself the work of Christian-
ity wnich has transformed and purified the human soul by 
its mysterious action.3 
(2) Revelation as Progressive 
Corresponding to man's changing structure of conscious-
ness is a change in man's capacity to understand more fully 
the actual nature of reality. 
Revelation is adapted to the structure of con-
sciousness and is proportioned to the degree of 
development which it has reached . It follows there-
fore that there are degrees also in revelation. The 
pouring forth of the divine illumination corresponds 
to the changes to which consciousness is subject and 
to the various tendencies and manifestations of the 
spirit. In the different stages of revelation not 
only man but the world changes, and whole periods 
come into existence in the original universal life 
of the spirit.~ 
1. Beginn~, p. 211. See also Divine, PP• 19, 126; Dream, 
p. 18 ; Freedom, P• 234· 
2. Freedom, p. vii. 3· Ibid., pp. ix, 319. 
4. Freedom, P• 111. See also P• 114; New ~och, p. 13; Realm 
of Spirit, pp. 127 128; Dream, p. 18 • 
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There are various stages or levels of revelation which 
reflect changes in the development of man. Because of this 
decisive human element in revelation, two conclusions 
follow. Firstly, revelation has been subjected to a process 
of distortion and accommodation from the human side. 
The purity of revelation has often been sullied by 
the human element, the human consciousness through 
which it has been filtered •••• Too often the 
human has been passed off for the divine •••• 
there have1been pathological elements, elements of decadence. 
The implication is clear that the progress of revelation 
means a process of purification. 
Secondly, new periods of revelation may be expected 
when man will see realities to which he had been previously 
blinded. "Whole worlds remain outside our experience because 
our consciousness acts as a barrier to them, and because 
our attention has been focused elsewhere and we have chosen 
another and more limited world.n2 More specifically, Ber-
dyaev writes of a climactic revelation of the Holy Spirit, 
referred to as the era or epoch of the Spirit or the ere-
ative epoch. 
The coming of a new era of the Spirit into which the 
highest attainments of spirituality will enter, pre-
supposes a change in human consciousness and that it 
is given a new orientation. It is a revolutionary 
change in consciousness, which has been hitherto con-
ceived in a static way •••• The religion of the 
1. Fate of 1fun, p. 108. See also Freedom, pp. xiii-xiv. 
2. Freedom, p. 102. 
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Spirit will be the religion of man when he has come 
of age; it will1constitute his emergence from child-hood and youth. 
This progressive revelation not only reflects changes 
in the human consciousness but it also corresponds to a 
11 theogonic process" or "moments of the divine life. 112 To 
-
say that this is a revelation of the Spirit is to indicate, 
for Berdyaev, that it will be the result of man's proper 
orientation of himself to God, for the Holy Spirit is the 
principle of union between God and man. This will mean the 
fulfilled expression of the Godhead or Trinity (for the Holy 
Spirit is the third Person of the Trinity) and will mean 
that the Kingdom of God has come. 11 The anthropological 
revelation of the creative epoch will be the finished reve-
lation of God-manhood, the complete disclosure of Christ in 
the life of the world, of Christ uniting Himself with hu-
manity,n3 and thereby uniting humanity and divinity. 
iii. Human Creativity as God-Manhood 
Berdyaev holds that a true understanding of man is to 
be sought in spiritual experience with its divine-human 
1. Divine, PP• 184-185. 
2. Freedom, p. 114. Just as Berdyaev understands the cre-
ation of the world to pass through the three Persons 
of the Trinity, so he also thinks of revelation as 
passing through three stages of the Trinity and cul-
minating in the revelation of the Spirit. 
3· Creative Act, P• 331. 
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quality. Therefore, upon the basis of man's own experience, 
one cannot affirm either God or man apart from the other 
because the bond between the two cannot be broken.l To 
affirm God without man or man without God is to violate the 
"Chalcedonian definition, which has remained a dead letter, 
a fate indeed which has befallen all abstract dogmas which 
have sought to rationalize a mystery.n2 The basic problem 
-
of man's creativity is not man alone nor God alone, but 
God-man and divine-humanity, of two natures which may be 
united in the human person but which are not identical nor 
fused.; "Creativity for me is implied in the fundamental 
Christian truth of God-manhood.n4 God-manhood is Berdyaev's 
-
theological term which describes the spiritual state where-
in man possesses and exercises creative capacities. 
a. The Meaning of Christ for Berdyaev 
The idea of God-manhood, as indicating man's spiritual 
relationship to God, is directly related to the two-nature 
doctrine of Christ,which has already been mentioned as a 
presupposition for the Christian doctrine of man. What must 
be made clear now, however, is Berdyaev's interpretation of 
1. Divine, P• 184. 2. Truth, p. 12;. 
3· Realm of Spirit, pp. 37-;8. As the language implies, 
this is the problem of the extension of the Chaleedon-
1an Creed to apply to all mankind. 
4· Dream, p. 208. 
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the meaning o£ Christ the God-Man for his doctrine of God-
manhood (and thereby also his doctrine of human creativity), 
for it is at this point that he chooses to make the most 
intimate identification of his doctrine of man with the 
Christian tradition. 
(l) Christ as a Historical Figure 
Berdyaev does not show serious interest in the histor-
ical figure o£ Jesus as portrayed in the Gospels. One rea-
son for this is coupled with his oft-repeated admission 
that he cannot give his doctrine of human creativity a 
biblical basis. 
The New Testament truth of the Gospels is only a 
part of Christological truth, oriented towards re-
demption and salvation; in it we cannot seek the 
direct justification of man's creative purposes. 
The Gospels reveal only one aspect of Christ, t~e 
Absolute Man redeeming and saving human nature. 
This indicates that the New Testament gives an incomplete 
picture of Christ, and that a fuller understanding of 
Christ is somewhere available which will transcend and com-
plete the New Testament portrait.2 
Another reason for his lack o£ interest in the histor 
leal person of Jesus is his contention that what appears in 
history is not so important as what exists in eternity. He 
manifests a desire to free himself £rom all reliance upon 
1. Creative Act, P• 96. 
2. For further on this, see below, pp. 210-211. 
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what is historical in nature. 
For my part, I cannot pin down my faith to precar-
ious, uncertain and ambiguous facts of historic 
time. Many a soul has lost its faith on the shifting 
sand of these historical facts of the Bible • Di-
vine revelation intervenes in and shines through 
history, but it is not strictly speaking a histori-
cal revelation: on the contrary it marks a victory 
over all historical revelations and all historical judgments. 
Berdyaev surrenders the historical Jesus for the 
Christ of religious experience. 11 The figure of Christ ought 
-to present itself to a free man as that of an ultimate and 
.final .freedom that he finds within himself. 112 In this way, 
"Christ ceases to be the only one in an objective series, 
among others. He, the all-Man, becomes man's Way, the mys-
tery of man's spirit. 113 
(2) The Cosmic Nature of Christ 
The primary meaning of Christ for Berdyaev must be 
seen against the background of his understanding of the 
1. Dream, P• 299· 2. Dostoevsky, p. 75· 
3· Creative Act, p. 112. This illustrates what can be the 
ultimate result of an emphasis upon the subjective, 
upon religious experience alone. Though it provides a 
valuable insight into the meaning of man's existence, 
it may nevertheless eventuate in the sweeping aside of 
all history as meaningless. If Berdyaev chooses to 
know nothing about the historical figure called Jesus 
and chooses rather a Christ severed .from historical 
detail, this seriously weakens the meaning of Christ 
for man who must find his way as an historically-
existing being. A further problem here is the extent 
to which Berdyaev identifies the 11Humanity" of the 
Christ with the humanity of men. For a critical con-
sideration of Berdyaev's Christology, see chap. 7, 
PP• 363-371. 
creative world process, in its deepest meaning, as the 
manif'estation of' the trinitarian nature of' God. "Apart 
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~ 
f'rom Christ and the Trinitary principle the creation of' the 
world cannot be understood. 111 The incarnation of' Christ the 
Logos reveals a new aspect of' God's continuing work of' cre-
ation.2 The Platonic nature of' Berdyaev's thought (that 
what does not already exist f'rom eternity cannot come into 
existence in time) is suggested in his understanding of' 
Christ as the eternal Idea of' creation: "The ideal relation 
between the human and the divine is shown in Jesus Christ."? 
It is also suggested in his notion that an individual man 
f'ulf'ills his calling by participating !a the nature of 
Christ the God-Man.4 Man, in achieving the divine-human 
existence, is said to "participate" in the God-Manhood o:f 
. -
Christ and thereby also, through Christ, to have his part 
in the Trinity (the Trinity understood as the deeper mean-
ing o:f the world creative process). 
The philosophical value of the two natures of' Christ 
and o:f man's participation in the Trinity through Him is 
evident: "In the Son, in the divine Man, in the God-Man is 
-
comprised the whole human race, mankind in all its multi-
plicity and in every shape and f'orm. In Him the antithesis 
1. Destiny, p. ??· 
?• Truth, p. 153· 
2. Creative Act, p. 137· 
4. Freedom, pp. 137-138. 
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between the one and the many is mysteriously resolved."1 
~ 
And this is very similar to an observation made in Chapter 
4 where personality, considered as an attribute of spirit, 
was seen for Berdyaev to be not only a particular existence 
but also to have a universal content or to be microcosmic 
in nature. 
The importance of Christ is not so much centered in 
the historical person as such but in the Christ of the 
Chalcedonian Creed. The creed is seen to enunciate the 
eternal truth of the commensurability between God and man 
rather than merely to seek to define the meaning of an 
historical person called Jesus. The extent of interest by 
Berdyaev in the historical person seems to be that here in 
this person the creative processes of the real world of 
spirit give indication of having advanced to the stage where 
the eternal truth of God-manhood could be revealed, signal-
ing a new era in the life of the world. From this point a 
spiritual process begins which should embrace all men . 11 The 
-divine-human process not only occurred individually in the 
God-man, it ought also to take place in mankind, in human 
society. u2 This would be a "collective incarnation of God 11 3 
1. Ibid., P• 198. 
2. Beginning, P• 36. See also Nicolas Berdyaev, The Russian 
Ideal trans. R.M. French (Ne York: The Macmillan Co., 
1948}, p. 91. 
3· The Origin of Russian Communism, p. 180. 
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in humanity. The line of development is from God-Man to 
God-humanity; Christ is the eternal symbol and promise of 
mankind's deification and therefore of its collective par-
ticipation in the Divine society of the Trinity, the King-
dom of God. 
Berdyaev speaks of Christ as "the Liberator,"! as the 
one who "redeems and restores human nature to its likeness 
unto God,"2--but not as Christianity has traditionally 
viewed the work of Christ. In fact, the person of Christ 
seems to be also his work. The significance of the Incarna-
tion is overwhelmingly revelatory. The idea is not that God 
was in Christ actively reconciling the world unto Himself 
through the atoning self-sacrifice of Christ,but that Christ 
in his eternal nature has revealed to man his own true 
estate. "With the appearance of Christ in the world, man's 
sonship with God, his likeness to God and his participation 
in the divine nature are all revealed."3 "The appearance in 
-
the world of the God-man marks a new moment in the creativi-
ty of the orld, a moment of cosmic significance. The reve-
lation of the God-man begins the revelation of the creative 
mystery of man. tr4 
1. Creative Act, p. 151. 2. Ibid., P• 111. 
3• 1£!£•, P• 321. 4. Ibid., P• 137• 
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( 3) The Revelation of Christ Completed in Human Creativeness 
The historical appearance of Christ was that of "Christ 
the Redeemer . 111 But a clear distinction is made between this 
aspect of Christ and his 11kingly" aspect, especially in so 
far as the revelation of man's creativity is concerned. 
If redemption concerns only one aspect of Christ, 
the suffering and sacrificing Son of God, creative-
ness concerns another , that of Christ the glorified 
and mighty Son of God . • • • The final mystery of 
man is revealed not only in the Christ who took the 
form of a servant but in His kingly aspect; not only 
in the image of Christ the Sacrifice but in the image 
of Christ the Victor . The creative mystery of human 
nature is related to the Coming Christ, to the power 
and glory of the Absolute Man . This creative mystery 
could not be revealed in the Gospel image of Christ, 
since man still had to pass with Christ through the 
mystery of redemption , through the sacrifice on Gol-
gotha . But can man, oriented as he is solely and co~ 
pletely towards the redemption , and seeing the 
Absolute Man only under the aspect of the sacrificing 
Redeemer , glimpse the Absolute Man in the creative 
image of the mighty King of Glory?2 
Man's creativity is related to Christ ' s 11kingly , " "glori-
fied , " 11 mighty 11 role which is yet to be revealed (with the 
obvious impli cation that the "Gospel image of Christ 11 pic -
tures an historical figure predominantly passive in char-
acter, who submitted to the sufferi ng of the Cross) . On the 
one hand, the appearance of the God- an in the world marks 
a new moment in the world ' s creation and begins the revela-
tion of man ' s creative nature; on the other hand , man's 
1 . Ibid ., P • 321 . 2 . Ibid ., PP • 106-107 . 
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creativity completes the revelation o~ the God- Man . This 
involves an organic relation between Christ ' s person and 
man's person . 1mn's creativity, as an expression o~ God-
manhood, points ~orward to the "complete disclosure o~ 
Christ in the life o~ the world, of Christ uniting Himself 
with humanity . 111 
The idea o~ Christ ' s completed revelation in man's 
creativity has ~or its background Berdyaev's teachings con-
cerning the cosmic nature o~ Christ and the trinitarian 
nature of the creative world process . As already noted, he 
holds that the creative world process passes through all the 
hypostases o~ the Trinity . The creation of the world is the 
eternal generation o~ the Son, ~ully human and fully divine, 
who in his cosmic significance is a prefigurement o~ the 
divine destiny o~ all creation . The final revelation of 
Christ, understood as the Abs olute Man or the Coming Christ , 
will mean that "humanity is deepened to the point of divin-
ity and divinity is made visible to the point of humanity.u2 
Then will Christ the God-Man be fully revealed in the Christ-
like nature of all creation when universal God-manhood is 
achieved and the spiritual (or divine-human) nature o~ 
existence is confirmed . 
1. Ibid., P• 331 . 2 . Ibid., P• 321. 
212 
b. God-Manhood and the Spiritual ~fe 
Human creativity involves a certain relationship be-
tween God and man (expressed in the term God-manhood) and 
the achievement of this relationship is a matter of spirit-
uality (the Spirit understood in trinitarian terms as the 
bond bet een God the Father and God the Son). "Spirituality 
is a divine-human condition. Man in his spiritual depths 
comes into touch with the divine, and from the divine source 
he receives support.rrl Man's knowledge of himself as a 
spiritual being is e~idence of the divine element in h1m,2 
and is thereby a revelation of his own Christological na-
ture. 
Berdyaev portrays the spiritual life of man in dynamic 
terms. 11 The relationship between God and man may be under-
stood only dramatically, i . e . dynamically . "' The relation 
between God and man is one of paradox ,4 1n~olving numerous 
conflicts and encounters . 5 In other words, Berdyaev under-
stands the relationship between God and man to be a dialec-
tical relationsh1p, 6 one in which God and man are mutually 
necessary to each other . 7 
Furthermore, the spiritual life with its God-man drama 
1 . Divine, P• 130 . 2 . s;eirit, p . 33 · 
3 · Realm of SJ2irit, P • 37 • 4 · Destiny, P• 35· 
5· Freedom, p . 21 . 6. Divine, p. 22. 
7 Realm of SJ21rit, p . 37 . 
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is inwardly trinitarian. "Not only is God in man but man 
-is the image of God: in him divine development is realized. 
Man is a participant in the Divine Trinity.u1 Man partici-
-pates in the Trinity through Christ who is experienced as 
an 
inward aid which reveals his [1.e., man's] own 
natural likeness to God, his own participation in 
divine life, man's inward upward-striving. Christ 
is not outside us but within us. He is the Absolute 
Man i~ us. He is our communion with the Holy Trin-
ity." 
-The dynamics of the Trinity, then, understood as the deeper 
meaning of the world process, is understood in dialectical 
terms. 
Berdyaev finds that the basic insights of depth psy-
chology or psycho-analysis provide a good occasion for 
understanding the empirical aspect of the God-man drama of 
the spiritual life. He observes that these new insights 
have initiated a new era in the study of man.3 
The great discovery was that of the unconscious or 
the subconscious. "The new psychology •••• discovers a 
deep irrational layer in the human soul, hidden from con-
sciousness."4 This is accepted as a well-established, 
-
scientific fact. For his own thought Berdyaev takes the 
subconscious to mean that 
1. Creative Act, P• 321. 
2. Ibid., PP• 260-261. See also Freedom, PP• 138, 206. 
3· Destiny, P• 73• 4• ~., P• 70. 
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there is in man a deep-lying stratum which is ante-
rior to objectification. It precedes his ejection 
into the external, it is there before the division 
into subject and object. In virtue of this dLmension 
of depth, ••• man is not determ1ned1by nature and society, there is freedom within him. 
This is the fathomless, meonic freedom of the Ungrund, that 
symbol of the vital force which is at the root of all being. 
The nature of man cannot be defined apart from this notion. 
Without it there is no human creativeness. 
But depth psychology went on to show a conflict be-
tween this subconscious and the consciousness. Berdyaev 
calls this "the greatest discovery of the school of Freud."2 
"Freud's chief merit is his discovery of the evil part 
played by consciousness."; Berdyaev speaks of consciousness 
as that "superficial layer of my ego 114 which is rationalized 
. -
and illuminated by the mind and which involves itself in 
the antithesis between subject and object. It builds up 
many illusions5 and by a selective process it constitutes 
an obstacle to the awareness of many aspects of realit7.6 
The consciousness, by its very nature limited, oan never 
embrace the whole of a person's being, especially the dyna-
mic realm of the subconscious. The unenlightened and unre-
. -
generated subconscious breaks up and distorts the 
1. Truth, P• 15. 2. Destini, P• 73· 
3· Ibid., P• 74· 4- Beginning, p. 42. 
5· ~-, P• 82. 6. Freedom, p. 101. 
215 
consciousness.1 As a result, consciousness involves 
dividedness and loss of wholeness, which Berdyaev links 
with the Fall of man. 2 "Man is a sick being, with a strong 
unconscious life •••• The discoveries of psycho-pathology 
are wholly in keeping with the Christian doctrine of orig-
inal sin. u3 It is seen, then, that the unconscious plays 
a doUble role in the human person--it is the source of 
creative freedom while at the same time it is the source of 
neuroses and of conflicts with consciousness. 
Berdyaev would say, then, that depth psychology has 
clearly shown the human predicament. Man has an unhappy 
consciousness which must somehow be resolved; and this is 
possible only because, with the subconscious and conscious-
ness, there is a third distinguishable realm revealed in 
human nature, that of the superconscious. As Berdyaev puts 
it, 11 I have known the depth and power of the sub-conscious 
and the subterranean, but I have also known that other 
and greater deep which is transcendence.n4 The shortcoming 
of depth psychology is that, though it has discovered 
the unconscious, it has not distinguished between the un-
conscious (or subconscious) and the superconscious.5 This 
superconscious, otherwise referred to as the superhuman 
l. Destin:l, P• 270. 2. Ibid., P• ,a. 
3· Ibid., P• 68. 4· Dream, P• 44· 
5· Destin:l, P• 72. 
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principle or the transcendental aspect of man, as a con-
stituent element of man ' s nature forever invalidates 
attempts by such thinkers as Marx, Freud, Heidegger and 
Sartre to explain man solely "from below" without refer-
1 . ~ 
ence to 11 a higher world . " The human consciousness is seen 
-
as existing between two abysses, 11 the instinctive, subcon-
scious, primeval nature and • • • grace, superconscions-
ness and the divine . 112 Theologically, this means the iden-
tification of the role of the divine in human life with 
the superconscious . "In superconsciousness man is no longer 
alone, but is united to God . "~ The salvation of man, weak 
and divided from the conflict of the consciousness with 
the unconsciousness, comes through the unifying function 
of the spiritual principle of the superconscious . The his-
tory of a man's salvation is that in which a "man passes 
from the subconscious through consciousness to the super-
conscious. Wholeness and fullness are at t ained only in 
superconscious life . u4 It is in the superconscious that 
-the sUbconscious is enlightened and transformed , that the 
conflict between the subconscious and the consciousness is 
resolved. 
Berdyaev, in his employment of psychological terms to 
1. Truth, p . 16. 
~ · ~. , p. 79 · 
2 . Destiny, p . 77 • 
4• ~., P• 270 . 
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describe the God-man drama, gives a description of the 
spiritual world-process itself . The unconscious or subcon-
scious realm of personality constitiutes the significance 
of the Ungrund in human life as the irrational, fathomless, 
meonic freedom which is the sine qua B2a of human creativ-
ity. This is the dynamic principle, the forward thrust both 
in the human person and in the world process. In the same 
general dimension of depth a second principle or realm is 
to be distinguished, the superconscious or the divine, in 
some sense immanent in the Ungrund or the unconscious 
{hence the failure of depth psychology to distinguish it 
from the unconscious), and yet being born out of the Ungrund 
so as to constitute the Goal or Meaning both of the person's 
own development and of the world-process. 1 This is the 
essential nature of both the personal and the world-process--
a development from initial potency and chaos to a fully-
integrated, enlightened and meaningful existence in God . 
But between the initial abyss of the unconscious and its 
projected fulfillment in the superconscious is the 
1. See John Trinick, "Nicolas Berdyaev and Human Creativity," 
The Eastern Churches uarterl , 11 (Winter, 1955), 
-153• Trinick maintains that Berdyaev's creativity 
bears a strong resemblance in many ays to Jung's con-
cept of ''psychical energy" (and even back further to 
the Freudian "libido") which has its origin in the 
mysterious abyss of being (p . 149> · This present study 
acknowledges the influence of the early "depth psy-
chology" movement in providing Berdyaev with concepts 
ith which to present his idea of human creativity. 
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consciousness,wbich functions for the most part as a check 
to this development . Berdyaev speaks of the consciousness 
as an "intermediate state , "l as tha t which formulates laws 
and norma , 2 as corresponding to the phenomenal world . ? The 
consciousness is the realm of "objectification" which, as 
~ 
has been previously shown, is the process of investing 
phenomena with metaphysical reality so as to make reality 
an "object" from which the subject is separated, thus lead-
ing to the alienation and disunion of the person. The drama 
of the spiritual life is seen as the breakthrough of the 
superconscious (corresponding to the noumenal world) into 
the consciousness,4 destroying its rigid forms and rational 
concepts , 5 re-establishing the creative work of the person 
in which both the subconscious and the superconscious oper-
ate,6 and thereby carrying forward the creative world pro-
cess which is a development fr om the meaninglessness of the 
Ungrund to the complete transformat i on in the divine crea-
tive activity. 
1 . Beginning, p. 81 . 
3• Beginning, p 81 . 
5 • Freedom, p . 107 . 
2 . Destinz , P• 77 • 
4• ~., P• 81 . 
6 . Beginning, P• 180 . 
CHAPTER VI 
H~NCR~Tni~ 
It has been established that, for Berdyaev, human cre-
ativity involves a certain interpretation of the divine-
human relationship. The last chapter treated the two terms 
of this relationship, God and man, as they appear in his 
thought and as they relate to the problem of human creativ-
ity. 
This chapter deals directly with the question of human 
creativity in its two aspects: (1) as a re-interpretation 
of the human experience of God; and (2) as the basis for 
communion among persons, such communion to be understood 
theologically as the Kingdom of God. 
1. Human Creativity: A Re-interpretation 
of Religious Experience 
Berdyaev's thoughts upon human creativity are integral 
to his idea of God-manhood, but this must be seen as in-
volving more than just the theological doctrine of two na-
tures, divine and human, in one personality. For him this 
doctrine must itself rest upon the firm rock of concrete 
spiritual experience, the experience of God in human life. 
His idea of human creativity is basically an interpretation 
of religious experience. 
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The religious problem of creativeness is a problem 
of the ways of another kind of religious experience, 
of building up another kind of being. Creativeness 
is neither permitted B££ justified ~ religion--
creativeness ~ religion itself. Creative exper-
ience is a special kind of experience and a special 
kind of way •••• The creative experience is unique 
and self-sufficient--it is not something derivative; 
its roots go into the deepest depths. 
Again he writes: 11 But there is another religious experience, 
which knows of the inscrutable divine-human mystery of God 
expecting from man a daring, creative response to his call-
ing.112 It is at this primary level of religious experience, 
where the human experience of God transpires, that human 
creativity is to be found and verified. 
A. A Critique of the Traditional View of Religious Experience 
It is again against the background of Berdyaev's crit-
icism of traditional religious thought that his interpreta-
tion of religious experience is to be understood. His use 
of the word "another" in the two preceding quotations indi-
. 
cates that his view of the creative religious experience is 
formulated in contrast to other views with which he does 
not agree. 
His key criticism of the traditional understanding of 
the spiritual life is that it has a strong monophysite 
tendency. The traditional view is understood as demanding 
1. Creative Act, PP• 109-110. See also pp. 161-162. 
2. Dream, p. 206. 
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not only that man empty himself of what is bad but that he 
empty himself of everything human as well, that the status 
of man be debased in order that a proper place for God 
might be provided . 1 
Particularly does Berdyaev speak of the ay that 
Christian humility (together with the elements of submis-
sion and obedience) is usually understood . Rightfully under-
stood , humility means 11 the abandonment of self-centredness 
for God- centredness . 112 It is "a manifestation of spiritual 
power in the conquest of selfhood. 11 3 It is, in other words, 
the openness of one's spirit to God . But Berdyaev accuses 
traditional Christian thought of distorting the meaning of 
humility to the injury of man ' s spiritual health . "One of 
the most awful perversions of Christianity was the slavish 
and external interpretation of humility . "4 The key factor 
in this "perversion " is the false idea that God ' s first 
~ 
requirement of man is his submission and obedience . This 
brings man to a fear of God , thus separating his life from 
the divine and producing the heteronomic consciousness in 
which the religious life assumes the form of servility. 5 
When man possesses such a consciousness he is not able to 
1 . Truth, P• 124. See also Creative Act , p . 111 . 
2. Freedom , P • 151 . 3· Destiny , p . 116 . 
4· Ibid . 
5· See Creative Act , PP • 12, 333-334; Destiny, PP • 135, 174• 
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participate creatively in the primary life of the world, 
and hence Berdyaev's call to "another plane of being"1 
where the true nature of the experience of God is known. 
Berdyaev understood this to mean a profound, radical change 
in the human consciousness. Speaking of this change he says: 
The change for me comprises above all a modification 
in man's experience and understanding of the rela-
tion between God and man. I do not doubt the exist-
ence of Godj but I have known moments when my heart 
and mind were overwhelmed by the terrible thought 
that the current notion of this relationship may be 
right--the notion, namely, of God as master and man 
as serf, of ruler and sUbject. If this be so, then 
all is lost, and I am lost too. If this be so, then 
nothing remains for me but the gaping abyss of noth-
ingness. The most monstrous religious nightmare is 
that of an evil God whom men, blinded by their slav-
ishness, regard as good. But there is another reli-
gious experience, which knows of the inscrutable 
divine-human mystery of God expecting fro~ man a 
daring, creative response to his calling. 
This study of Berdyaev's doctrine of human creativity now 
comes to its climax in the attempt to state his interpreta-
tion of "another religious experience." 
B. Berdyaev's Re-interpretation of Religious Experience 
Berdyaev does not give us a careful analysis of reli-
gious experience as does Rudolph Otto in his The Idea of 
the Holy, nor is his interest simply in an objective, de-
scriptive study such as William James gives in The Varie-
ties of Religious Experien~e . He gives hat amounts to a 
description of his own religious experience; but what is 
1. Destiny, P• 131. 2. Dream, PP• 205-206. 
223 
more, he proceeds along the general lines of his re-inter-
pretation of religious experience to offer what amounts to 
a norm or criterion of the experience of God for contempo-
rary man. 
i. Determining Factors in the Re-interpretation 
Several cardinal doctrines in Berdyaev 1s thought, al-
ready referred to in the study, must be briefly noted now 
because of their specific relevance to his understanding o£ 
religious experience. 
a. The Spiritual Nature of Man 
Berdyaev, in his stress on the spiritual nature of man, 
holds that behind the natural, empirical, social man there 
is that aspect of man's being which defies objective study. 
This is the real source of man's life. He bears testimony 
to this depth in man in his ideas of man's being created in 
the image of God and of the Christological nature of man. 
It is only by virtue of this mysterious dimension of man's 
being that he is free. Because it transcends the objective 
existence of man, Berdyaev sometimes speaks of the spiritual 
nature of man as "transcendental man" and says that the 
- -
existence of this spiritual depth in man 11 is the condition 
-
upon which the possibility of religious and spiritual exper-
ience depends, it is, as it were, an~ priori of that 
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experience. 111 
b. God as Non-objective 
With his emphasis upon the subjective nature of the 
spiritual element in man comes Berdyaev's further conten-
tion that God always reveals himself as non-objective. His 
doctrine of God is of the God revealed in one's subjectiv-
ity . "There can be revealed to us only that which is re-
vealed in us, for only that which happens within can have 
any meaning for us . 112 The meeting with God is not a meeting 
-
with someone or something exterior to the person who exper-
iences, and thus Berdyaev's thought about God's non-objec-
tive nature constitutes a rejection of traditional super-
naturalism hich posited a remote dwelling place for God . 
God is known as Subject, for "creativeness as a religious 
experience does not know any dualistic division into sub-
ject and object . 11 3 
This lack of a given objectivity in religious exper-
ience touches the problem of God ' s transcendence and tmma-
nence . Berdyaev feels that both truths about God are pre-
served in his interpretat ion of religious experience--God 
is both transcendent and immanent, for what is merely tran-
scendent has no meaning for human existence . 
1 . Truth, p . 18. 2 . Freedom, P• 93 · 
3• Creative Act , P • 113 . 
1 
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about man is the firm conviction that there exists a common 
bond, an inner relationship between God and man. The anthro-
pocentric nature of his methodology depends upon this start-
ing-point. The fullness of human life is divine-human (as 
it was in Christ), and there can be no clear distinction 
between what is divine and what is human. Thus Berdyaev can 
speak of the divinity of man and of the Humanity of God. So 
organically related are God and man that he can say that 
man is God's "other self"1 and that God is man's "Other 
Self. 112 
This commensurability between God and man means that 
the divine presence in human life is not an alien presence 
or a presence that would do violence to the basic nature of 
the person. Rather, as previously indicated, Berdyaev iden-
tifies the divine presence in the human self with the "su-
perconscious," which is not an intrusion upon the subcon-
scious and t he consciousness but an integral, organic spect 
of the total persun,which resolves the subconscious-con-
sciousness impasse and works for the holeness or unity of 
the person. 
1. See Freedom, PP• 21, 138, 190, 213; Destiny, p 25; 
Beginning, P• 102. 
2. See Freedom, P• 197; Solitude, PP• 86, 89, 90 
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ii . The Creative Human Experience of God 
The nature of religious experience ~or Berdyaev cen-
ters around two words, ecstasy and freedom. They are the 
keys to his re-interpretation . 
a . Ecstasy 
The creative act in which man experiences God is by 
its very nature ecstatic . "The creative act signi~ies an 
ek-stasis, a breaking thro~gh to eternity . "1 This ecstasy 
is variously described as an upward ~light, primary intui-
tion, discovery , a marvelous evocation of images, a great 
love , an attraction upward to the heights , an ascent, a 
standing race to ~ace be~ore God or Mystery or the primor-
dial source of all life . 2 
This ecstasy is the transcending o~ one ' s own finite 
limitations . It means that man is united with that which 
is beyond him-- he transcends himself . Man feels that he has 
gone beyond his own human strength. 3 It is a mark o~ spiri-
tual ecstasy that "in it personality is not destroyed but 
strengthened. In ecstasy personality must issue from itself, 
but in issuing from itself , remain itself ."4 Berdyaev can 
speak of the goal o~ ecstasy as "the transcendent , the 
1. Dream, p . 209 . 2 . Beginning , p . 182 . 
3 · Ibid ., P• 178 . 4 · S1averz, p . 253 · 
5· Dream, p . 37 · 
·----~.~--------------------------------------------------------------
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Other,111 but this does not imply an object as such; rather, 
ecstasy as the act of transcending one's self is diametri-
cally opposed to objectification,for it leads to the 
noumenal world of true existence.2 
A consideration of several words used by Berdyaev will 
help fill-out the meaning of man's ecstasy or transcendence. 
( 1) Eros 
Berdyaev uses ~ in its Greek sense as the power 
which leads men toward fulfillment through union with the 
object of desire. It involves aspiration for the good and 
fulfillment for the self . 
The involvement of ~ in human sexual life is recog-
nized, but a careful distinction is made. 
I have always insisted on the distinction between 
~and sex, for, however much they may be inter-
related, they remain radically different . The life 
of sex is impersonal, generic ; it reduces man to a 
play-thing of biological and physiological processes. 
The sexual act contains nothing that could be recog-
nized as even remotely individual, unique , singular 
and personal; on the contrary, it is the mark of his 
identification with the animal world . Sexual attrac-
tion does not by itself reveal the personal image of 
the object of attraction, rather it blurs that 
image • •• • True love is always concerned with the 
particular and not with the general, with something, 
or rather somebody , not with anything or anybody . 
Admittedly, erotic love is grounded in and is sig-
nificant of sex ; but, at the same time, it marks a 
victory over and redemption of sex . ~ is a wholly 
new experience and reveals a dimension which is 
1 . Dream, P• 37 • 2 . Beginning, P• 59· 
1 transcendent in character . 
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Berdyaev rejects sex life as the way for eros to seek 
its fulfillment . As the hidden force or power behind sex, 
eros strives for the completeness of personality,but it 
cannot accomplish this purpose when it is channeled into 
mere physiological expressions . This is to distort, debase 
and profane ~ love , 2 and to submit personality to the 
race . 3 As a result, man ' s deep desire for wholeness remains 
unsatisfied .4 
Eros goes deeper than the mere distinction of sex and 
is involved in the very being of personality itself . 5 Its 
positive meaning and purpose is to be found 11 in personality, 
-in its striving for the completeness and fullness of life 
and its longing for eternity . 116 The task of creativeness is 
. 
not to destroy ~but to give it its proper goal and 
direction . ? This goal is God . Berdyaev finds in ~ the 
source of man ' s ecstatic thirst f or the divine and for 
wholeness . "Eros is in anguish , f or it is c oncerned with, 
1 . Dream, p . 70. Berdyaev considers ~-love , as ell as 
Christian ~ and philia , as an energy or the nou-
menal world (Beginning , p . 245> · 
2 . Beginning , P• 244• 
4 • Dream, PP • 42-43 • 
3 • Creative Act, P• 194· 
5 · Creative Act, p . 224 . See also p . 181 . 
6. Destinx, p . 240 . 
7• See Destiny, PP • 65, 138 ; Creative Act, pp . 181-182 . 
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and deeply rooted in , the mystery of time and eternity: it 
concerns time athirst for eternal fulfillment , and yet 
never attaining it . 111 El:'os is 11 the source of an upward move-
ment of personality, the creative upsurge •••• In true 
love there is a creative upsurge into another world, a con-
quest of necessity . 112 Speaking of man ' s dignity in the 
world, Berdyaev says that this dignity is determined by 
11 the Eros which turns him Godwards towards the life in 
truth, goodness , and beauty, that is, towards the spiritual 
life . "3 
Eros, then, for Berdyaev becomes expressive of a posi-
tive goodness in man's nature which receives its fulfill-
ment only in God . It is his most important exposition of 
the meaning of tne ecstatic in religious experience . Ho -
ever, mention must be made of other terms which he uses, 
not that they are so important in themselves , but that they 
help to complete the picture of what he means by ecstasy . 
(2) Contemplation 
God is not won by the same kind of struggle which man 
wages to assert his place in the universe , but by contem-
plation in hich man creatively directs his spirit upwards . 
"The contemplation of God Who is love is man ' s creative 
1 . Dream, P• 42 . 
3 · Freedom, P• 46 . 
2 . Creative Act, p . 221 . 
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answer to God's call . Contemplation can only be interpreted 
as love, as the ecstasy of love--and love always is crea-
tive . 111 This contemplation is closely associated with man's 
attai~ing wholeness or inner integrity . 2 
(3} Anguish as Yearning and Terror 
These three terms, as used by Berdyaev, should be con-
sidered together because of their inter- relationship . 
Anguish is a religious experience which involves both yearn-
ing and terror . "Anguish bears w~tness to the transcendent 
and, at the same time, to the distance, the yawning gulf 
that exists between man and the transcendent."3 Anguished 
yearning, which has no object, involves an upward striving 
and a turning from a lower world to a higher world . 4 But 
as man ' a spirit rises to God there is also the experience 
of "sacred terror" which is 11 a pure experience o:f the gulf 
. 
which separates our sinful world f r om the d i vine , celestial 
world and the infinite mystery of being . "5 Berdyaev s~ 
-
up the significance of these terms by saying that the 
yearning and terror of anguish "prove that he [i . e . ma~ 
1 . Destiny , P• 152. 2 . Dream, p . 221 . 
3• .!e.!!!•, P• 40 . 
4. Destiny , P• 175 · See also P• 177 ; Dream, P• 44· 
5· Destiny, p . 177 • This 11 terror , 11 it will be noted, is not 
inspired by the object of religious devotion but by 
the gulf which separates the finite from the infinite . 
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has a lofty, godlike nature and is destined for a higher 
life."1 
<4> Faith and Imagination 
It is by faith that man turns himself to God. It is 
to Berdyaev a voluntary re-direction of a person's power 
of choice in freedom which destroys previously existing 
forms of consciousness and creates fresh possibilities of 
knowing the divine world. 2 Faith, then, is not a condition 
of man's passivity in which God alone is active; rather, 
the state of faith "presupposes tremendous action, and an 
intense and infinite creativity •••• the inner spiritual 
man maintains his activity and his primitive freedom at a 
maximum degree of intensity. n3 Faith is "synonymous with 
. 
the consciousness of other worlds, of the significance of 
Being •••• a primary phenomenon, ••• a relationship 
with God."4 Faith reveals the world to which man aspires 
and for this reason it is a significant element in ecstasy 
uite similar to his use of the word 11faith 11 is the 
way he uses the word "imagination." Without imagination 
1. Ibid., p. 175· These elements of "yearning" and "terror" 
---can be seen to correspond to Rudolph Otto's 11fascina- _ 
tion" and 11mysterium tremendum." 
. -
2. Freedom, P• 107. 3· ~-, p 106. 
4• Solitude, p. 10. The term "faith" in itself does not 
occur often in Berdyaev's writings;but that which it 
signifies, the openness of man's spirit to the divine 
world, is a constant theme. 
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there can be no creative activity because "creativeness 
~ 
means in the rirst instance imagining something dirrerent, 
better and higher . Imagination calls up berore us something 
better than the reality around us . "1 A creative, productive 
imagination is a metaphysical rorce which opposes the objec-
tive world . 2 This function of the imagination is not just 
the imitation or the reproduction of timelessly existent 
patterns (as in Platonism) but it is the creation of images 
that had not previously existed . 3 The imagination, then, 
may enrich reality and thereby the Divine life . 
There is a close relationship between the "image of 
-God" in man and man's "imagination . " Man ' s imaginative 
capacity to envision a better existence than he has actu-
ally experienced testiries to a depth in him where he has 
not completely fallen away from God but has preserved a 
relationship with the Divine world . 4 This , the image of 
God, the suprahuman element in human life , can never be 
effaced, so that an integral part of haman life is always 
the tension between what is , and what could and ought to 
be . It is between these two points that the ecstasy of 
religious experience functions . 
1 . Destiny, p 142 . See also Dream, p . 218 . 
2 . Beginning, P• 175 · 
4• ~., PP • 167-168. 
3 · DestiPl, P • 76 . 
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( 5 ) A Summary 
Berdyaev is not particularly precise ~n his use of 
words, nor does he draw clear distinctions between words 
he uses which are of similar meaning or use a consistent 
vocabulary . However, the important truth to be lifted-up 
out of the foregoing discussion of the meaning of ecstasy 
in his interpretation of religious experience as human 
creativity is t~s--that human nature itself has a positive 
content and purpose . In religious experience man commits to 
God all the energies of his person,which are not destroyed 
nor suppressed but received by God . Religious experience 
is both a movement from God to man (agape) and a movement 
from man to God (~) . It is not the subduing of human 
nature but the fulfillment in God of all that is highest 
and best in man . 
b . Freedom 
Berdyaev took great delight in attacking two particu-
lar views of the relationship between God and man . One view 
was an ontological dualism, with a transcendent God, which 
tended to subject the human will to the divine will since 
God and man were mutually estranged and externally opposed 
to each other Because they were mutually exclusive , the 
presence and reality of God served always to negate any hu-
man freedom or self-expression . The other vie 
logical monism, with an immanent view of God , 
was an onto-
hich saw in 
man only a moment in the development of the divine life . 
Such a pantheistic view, identifying the human and the 
divine wills, rejected the independent existence of man 
with the same thoroughness as the view which completely 
separated the human and divine wills . 1 
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But a third way of understanding the divine-human 
relationship was seen by Berdyaev . This is the theme or God-
manhood, which he in one place calls "theandric anthropo-
morphism. "2 This view means 11 the mutu~l penetration and the 
-
union of two natures, the Divine and the human, while the 
distinction between them and their independence is pre-
served . 113 Such a view is thought to transcend both onto-
logical dualism (for it sees a commensurability between God 
and man, a divine principle in man permitting the most inti-
mate and complex interpenetration between God and man) and 
ontological monism (ror , though i t sees the union of the 
divine and human natures , t hese are not fused nor made 
identical) . 
(1) The Place of Freedom in Religious Experience 
The fact that in religious experience, in man ' s relat -
. 
ing of himself to God , the primary integrity of human nature 
1. On this, see Freedom, PP • 208- 209; Dream, PP• 182, 288; 
Beginning, p . 101 ; Realm of Spirit, PP • 37 38 . 
2. Freedom , P• 209 . 
3• Begi nni ng , p . 36 . The Christology of the Chalcedonian 
Creed is very much in evidence here . 
remains inviolate is at the core of Berdyaev's re-interpre-
tation of man's experience of God . Dualism and monism are 
not able to provide for this . Berdyaev's doctrine of uncre-
ated freedom is basic to his understanding that in religious 
experience man offers to God that which he did not receive 
from God in the first place . "The antithesis between God and 
uncreated freedom, ••• is alone descriptive of the rela-
tionship between God and man as experienced in this world .111 
But when this freedom, which is able to reply to God in 
terms not dictated by God, is offered up to God, this anti-
thesis is transcended;and the freedom is not violated but 
transformed into a meaningful, creative freedom . This is 
freedom of the spirit, a freedom which is not natural to 
man but which is his by a new spiritual birth in God . 2 The 
experience of God does not depress man but gives him free-
dom. 
I experience freedom as divine : God is freedom; he 
is not Lord, but Liberator ; he is the Saviour and 
~berator from the slavery of the world . God never 
operates through necessity, but al ways through free -
dom; and he never forces recognition of himself . 
Herein lies the mystery £!religious experience , 
!E£ f~ B£ evidence~ it except~ possibility 
and ~ reality of freedom:3 
Thus it is clearly maintained that man ' s true freedom, 
which is in the spirit and which results from the acquiring 
1 . Dream, p . 288 . 2 . Freedom, p . 121 . 
3· Dream, p . 177 • Italics mine . 
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o~ spiritual life, is the hall- mark of man ' s experience of 
God; and without this freedom both as a possibility and as 
a reality it is meaningless to speak of religious exper-
ience . So clearly is an identification made between man's 
experience of ~reedom and man ' s experience of God that Ber-
dyaev writes: "God is present and God acts only in ~reedom."l 
-And this ~reedom in which God acts is man ' s proper subjec-
tivity,2 man's spirituality (understood in the Hegelian 
sense) as he is united to God, his other self,3 the trans-
~ormation from a heteronomy to an autonomy which is actu-
ally a theonomy. 4 God is the guarantor of man's freedom. 
Man is thus a ~ree participant in the divine process~ 
not an obedient slave . The Schleiermacherian de~inition of 
religion as the sense of absolute dependence is rejected, 
and religion becomes .for Berdyaev na sense of independence't5 
since the whole of the relationship between God and man is 
defined in terms o.f freedom . 
(2) Man's Freedom and God ' s Grace 
In his stress upon a genuine movement o.f the human 
spirit to ard God as well as the movement of God toward 
the human spirit, Berdyaev speaks of religious experience 
1. Beginning , p . 152 . 
3 • Freedom, PP • 196-197 · 
5· Dream, P• 179 • 
2 . Slavery, p . 200 
4• Ibid . , P• 147 • 
in terms of freedom and grace . In the interaction between 
God and man, grace signifies the forces going from God to 
man while freedom signifies the forces going from man to 
God . 1 
Because Berdyaev holds that man and the world are not 
only created by God but also rooted in God, he rejects the 
notion that divine power does not function directly in man 
but must operate through official channels . 2 The grace of 
God is not to be placed alongside human freedom, nor is it 
to be placed in antithesis to freedom . ? Grace is God's 
in ard spiritual action upon human freedom . 4 It is not 
irresistibly imposed but is rather a helping and sustain-
ing grace . 5 
Berdyaev speaks of three freedoms . 6 There is the ini-
tial and unfathomable human freedom which is not created 
by God and which is the symbol for human ini t i ative in re-
ligious experience; and there is the divine freedom which 
is grace , the divine initiative in rel igious experience . 
Each freedom is completed only i n the other. These two 
movements , of human freedom and divine grace, constitute 
1. Destiny, p . 128. 2 . Fr eedom, P• 50 
3• Realm of Spirit , P • 41; Beginning , P• 152. 
4. Truth, P • 94; Slavery , P• 45 · 
5 · Dostoevsky , P • 73 • 6. See Freedom, pp . 125-141 . 
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"the basic phenomenon of the religious life . "1 
-The third freedom, which is spiritual or creative 
freedom, is a reconciliation of the other two freedoms. 
The very fact that divine grace and human freedom can unite, 
that grace can operate within freedom means that man and 
God are not "wholly other" to each other . It is, in fact, 
"the disclosure of the divine in man . "2 The union of grace 
and freedom in a new and higher freedom means the union of 
God and man, not only without violence to one another but 
with definite mutual advantage . This corresponds to God-
manhood, for Christ is the perfect union of freedom and 
grace . 
Only the Christian revelation , the religion of the 
God-man , can reconcile the two kinds of freedom . It 
is precisely Redemption which frees human liberty 
from the evil which destroys it , and that, not by 
means of constraint and necessity, but by grace, 
which is a force acting from within freedom itself . 
That is why the ChristianAdoc trine of grace is the 
true doctrine of freedom. / 
It is a question of the two natures of Christ , and 
therefore also of the two natures of man . Monophysitism is 
only banished by Christological thought because "Christ is 
man in the absolute sense and not merely God, • • • in Him 
also human freedom is a fact or to be considered . rr4 The hu-
-
man experience of God, then, in which freedom and grace are 
1 . Ibi d ., P• 102. 
3• Freedom, p . 135 · 
2 . Truth, P• 94· 
4• ~. , P• 137 • 
united in creative .freedom which is the .freedom of man "in 
an active and illumined state,"1 is a Christological exper-
ience . 
iii. De-emphasized Elements in the Experience of God 
Some mention must be made of several factors which, 
though they have usually been considered a significant or 
essential part of human religious experience, do not occupy 
a place o.f primary importance in Berdyaev's understanding 
o.f man's experience of God. These are a consciousness of 
sin, repentance and redemption. What mention does Berdyaev 
make of these? 
a. A Consciousness of Sin 
Berdyaev's whole idea of human creativity involves the 
rejection o.f the idea that man is only a sinful being . The 
very reason that traditional Christian thinking about man 
did not see man ' s creative nature is that it was "over-
whelmed by the depressing consciousness o.f sin . "2 -Particu-
-larly depressing is its interpretation o.f sin as 11disobedi-
-
ence," as a ".formal violation o.f the will of God , " as a 
~ 
"crime which infringes the will of God and calls .for legal 
proceedings on the part o.f God . 11 3 Such a notion tends to 
-separate man from God by an absolute gulf so as to preclude 
1. Ibid . , P• 139• 
3• Ibid., P• 90 . 
2. Divine, P• 110. 
any discussion of man's experience of God or union with God 
in God-manhood.1 Berdyaev's rejection of such thinking about 
man forms the background against which his remark about 
11 the fallacy of an exclusively soteriological religion 11 2 is 
to be understood. 
Berdyaev's understanding of sin is primarily in terms 
of 11dividedness, a state of deficiency, incompleteness, 
dissociation, enslavement, h~tred. 11 ; Man is a fallen and 
. 
sinful creature in the sense that he is "split into two and 
longing for wholeness and salvation."4 The discovery of 
psycho-pathology, that man is a sick being with a strong 
unconscious life, is "wholly in keeping" with the Christian 
doctrine of original sin . 5 However, the 11sin 11 of which the 
1 . Spirit, pp. l~-135 . 
2. Dream, P• 210. Berdyaev has the tendency to think of 11soteriological religion" or of man's "salvation" ex-
clusively in terms of man's being obsessed with the 
desire to be saved from his sins . See Creative Act. 
p . 130: "A creator forgets about salvation." For a 
further consideration of this point , see below, 
chap. 7• 
; . Divine, p. 90. See also Solitude, p. 45 · In line with 
this understanding of sin as the loss of inner unity. 
not much of a distinction in meaning exists between 
11sin 11 and 11 evil 11 as these words are used by Berdyaev 
(see, e.g . , Divine , p . 93; Freedom, p . 162). He tends 
to understand man's spiritual problem primarily in 
terms of "evil. " as indicated in his remark: "I have 
• • • always been more aware of human unhappiness than 
of human sin" (Dream, p . 58) . 
4· Destinz, pp. 49-50 . 5· ~., p. 68 
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Church Fathers spoke was more obvious and simple than the 
sickness of soul from which modern man suffers . 1 
The source of man's sin {or his dividedness) is not 
to be found in his physical existence; it is, rather, in 
his spirit which expresses itself wrongly and produces a 
heteronomic existence {this is the proces s which Berdyaev 
calls "objectification") that the source of sin is to be 
2 found . The heteronomic life, being the absence of spiri-
tual life in man, means that man loses the support of the 
divine world. Such a life, therefore, is 11 a state of sin 
and a debasement of the divine image . 113 
How is man ' s sin related to his creativeness? Here 
Berdyaev resorts to somewhat paradoxical language . On the 
one hand , he asserts the antithetical nature of man's sin-
fulness and man ' s creativeness . The result of man ' s sinful 
dividedness is his submission to necessity with resultant 
loss of creative freedom . 4 Furthermore , man ' s primary con-
sciousness of himself is not that of a sinful being but 
that of a creative being . 5 Creativeness means that a per-
son's mind passes from the level of humility and a sense of 
6 
sin to another level of being . In fact , 11man at the moment 
1 . Dostoevsky, p . 62 . 2 . Freedom, p . 218. 
3 • 1£!£., P • 29 . 4 . Creative Act , p . 101. 
5 · Ibid . , p . 113; Destiny, p . 53 · 6. Destiny, p . 131 . 
of creation ~.e . , at the moment of his creative experience 
of God] does not think of victory over sin for he already 
feels free from its weight. 111 
-But on the other hand, Berdyaev also indicates that it 
is man as sinner who is also a creative being. 
Man is both a fallen and sinful creature, split into 
two and longing for wholeness and salvation, and a 
creative being called to continue the work of build-
ing the world and endowed for the purpose with gifts 
from above.2 
Furthermore, man's consciousness of his sin and fall is 
essential to his creativeness. "If modern man has lost the 
sense of sin and of the Fall, it is a sign that he has also 
lost his spirituality and is leading a superficial exis-
tence at the mercy of the world. 11 3 
These two apparently divergent emphases, that sin means 
the loss of creative freedom and that a consciousness of 
sin is necessary for creativity, need to be seen against 
the background of Berdyaev ' s basic understanding of sin as 
deficiency or incompleteness . Man ' s fall,with the resultant 
state of sin,does not mean the complete loss of freedom or 
of the image of God; rather, it means a diminishment of 
man's powers. Hence, though man ' s incompleteness is in 
direct proportion to his loss of creative power, he never 
suffers the complete loss of his freedom. It is man's 
1 . Freedom, P• 231. 2 . Destinz, pp . 49-50 . 
3• Spirit , P • 69 . 
incompleteness which makes human creativity necessary , and 
it is the real though diminished freedom which he possesses 
which makes creativity possible . 
Sin, understood thus as incompleteness, is not a char-
acteristic of the creative experience of God . Man, as he re-
lates himself properly to God, experiences unity , complete-
ness, God-manhood . Man then ceases to face the problem of 
sin; sin no longer is a matter of concern for him. The whole 
scheme of the three levels of ethics which Berdyaev put 
forth in The Destiny of Man--the ethics of law, the ethics 
of redemption, the ethics of creativeness--is built upon 
the idea that once man has put the problem of sin behind 
himself , he can then give himself completely to the crea-
tive life . 
b . Repentance 
The act of man in which he turns from his sin to God 
is generally recognized to be the meaning of repentance . 
Berdyaev says that man ' s struggle with sin begins ith 
repentance, but he also implies that man ' s struggle with 
sin also ends with repentance . 11Sin must be not only rec-
ognized but it must be consumed in the fire of repentance."1 
The thing to be guarded against in repentance is despair . 
Its whole value is that it points forward to a birth into 
new life; it is not this rebirth itself , for the new life 
1 . Creative Act, P• 165 . 
comes when repentance is taken up into and transformed by 
1 creative ecstasy,which is another way of the spirit . Re-
pentance is a preliminary matter. "Repentance or purifica-
tion is only one of the moments of religious experience, one 
of the acts of the mystery of Christ . We must not stop at 
this moment; we must go on to positive spiritual living.u2 
c . Forgiveness or Redemption 
The act of God which meets man's act of repentance and 
brings him into a right relationship to Himself is generally 
recognized as God's forgiveness . It is in this sense that 
Berdyaev most characteristically uses the word "redemption" 
in preference to the word 11forgiveness . 11 Redemption is de-
liverance from sin and evil,3 in its negative aspect; and 
positively it is "first and foremost the reconciliation of 
man to God the Creator . 114 Redemption is decisive so far as 
man's sin is concerned: "Redemption destroys the roots of 
~ 
sin and evil, and thereby frees man from the absolute power 
of the law. u5 
But redemption is not creativity . Creativity "continues 
and completes the spiritual work of redemption . "6 Redemp-
tion relates to the New Testament revelation of Christ as 
1 . See ill£., PP• 165-167 . 2 . Ibid . , p . 111 . 
3 · See Ibid . ' P • 96; Destiny, P• 103 . 4- Destiny , p. 10.3. 
5 · Ibid . , P • 104. 6 . Ibid. , P• 79 · 
Redeemer,whereas creativity relates to the kingly, victori-
ous aspect of Christ which is yet to be revealed . 1 Berdyaev 
cautions that creativity and redemption must not be opposed, 
while at the same time contrasting the two in these words: 
"Redemption comes from God, from the fact of the Crucified 
and Sacrificed God, whereas creative activity derives from 
man. 11 2 
2. Human Creativity and the Kingdom of God 
The creative human experience of God is the primary 
aspect or movement of human creativeness . This is 11ascent"3 
when man's spirit reaches upward as man ecstatically tran-
scends himself to confront the Divine . But there is also 
the 11descent 114 in which the creative activity of man turns 
toward other men and the world . The positive, creative role 
which man plays in divine-human encounter also has , by that 
very fact, a significance for the whole world and indicates 
a new level of cosmic life . 5 
These two dimensions of ascent and descent signify the 
two basic needs of man . The attempt by religion to meet 
these t o needs reveals the essence of religion itself . 
1 . See Creative Act, pp . 96 , 106 , 321 . 
2 . Beginning, P• 193 · 
3 · Dream, p . 63; Spirit, P • 57; Beginning , p . 180. 
4. Ibid . See also Beginning, P • 182 . 5· Destiny, P• 46 . 
Solitude and communion, in their polarity and co-
inherence, are fundamental to life. Withdrawal and 
communication are acts of human existence, round 
which revolves the whole religious life of men. How 
are the distance and the estrangement bred in with-
drawal to be overcome? Religion provides an ans er 
to this question, for it is concerned with creating 
a bridge between two worlds and1thus with the reali-zation of kinship and intimacy. 
It is not only the need of personality to achieve its 
own proper subjectivity or spiritual life but it is in 
accordance with the very nature of personality for it also 
to be social or cosmic. "Personality presupposes a going 
out from self to an other and to others, it lacks air and 
is suffocated when left shut up in itself. Personalism can-
not but have some sort of community in view."2 Society is 
but the social side of personality and the cosmos is but 
the cosmic side.3 This community or society or cosmos is 
what Berdyaev means by the Kingdom of God. 
A. Human Creativity and Eschatology 
i. The Incompleteness of the Present World 
The creative impulse involves a basic dissatisfaction 
with the world as presently experienced and the desire for 
a different world. Divine order and harmony do not prevail 
in the present world, and the higher world for which man 
hungers only sh ines through into this world in "that which 
1. Dream, P• 33· 
3• Ibid., P• 26. 
2. Slavery, p. 42. 
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really exists, in living beings and in their existence . 111 
The only pos sible way of thinking of the world as com-
plete , expressing full harmony and order, is to think of it 
within an eschatological reference as the coming of the 
Kingdom of God . 2 
ii . Man as the Bearer of Meaning 
The incomplete world is called the "natural world" by 
Berdyaev because it is the world which man constructs upon 
the evidences of his physical senses . 11 The 'natural' order 
to which only a relative and temporary stability belongs is 
simply a concatenation of phenomena which are open to scien-
tific explanation . It is always an empi rical , not a meta-
physical order . 11 3 
The "natural" world, then, rests upon something deeper, 
the reality of spirit or existence . The world of "things" 
-
is meaningless in itself but receives its meaning and ful-
filment in the spirit . Man is the being wno bridges the two 
orlds, and as man lives out his destiny in history he 
brings transcendent meaning and light into history and into 
the world because he is the bearer of meaning .4 The world 
and history have meaning only as they move towards the realm 
1. Beginning , p . 155 · This dualistic interpretation is ex-
plored in chap . 3 of the present study . 
2 . Ibid., P • J..48 . 3• Ibid ., P • 154• 
4. Truth , p . 88 ; Destiny , p . 11 ; Beginning , p . 115 . 
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of God-Manhood,1 or the Kingdom of God which is "Meaning" 
itself.2 
iii. An Active Eschatology 
a. Berdyaev's Eschatological Emphasis 
Berdyaev acknowledges the eschatological nature of his 
interpretation of the Christian religion. "The eschatologi-
cal interpretation of Christianity is alone its deep and 
true interpretation. The preaching of Jesus about the coming 
of the Kingdom of God, which after all forms the principal 
part of the contents of the synoptic Gospels, is eschatol-
ogical preaching. 113 
This eschatological aspect in Berdyaev's thought is a 
logical expression of its basic dualistic character. He 
opposes eschatological Christianity and the coming of the 
Kingdom of God to historical Christianity and the histori-
cal Church.4 Only in the eschaton, the end of the world 
and of history, will the Kingdom of God come and meaning 
triumph over meaninglessness.5 
In characteristic fashion, Berdyaev insists that the 
real basis for his eschatological views is not the Bible 
nor theology, but a metaphysical or spiritually-empirical 
1. Beginning, p. 115. 2. Fate of Man, P• 17. 
3• Beginni~, pp. 202-203. See also The Russian Idea, pp. 
195,3· In support of his eschatological understand-
ing of the .Kingdom of God, Berdyaev mentions such 
names as Weiss, Loisy and Schweitzer (Dream, p. 205.). 
4· The Russian Idea, PP• 192, 243· 5· Divine, P• 197• 
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source. 11 The impetus came from a vivid experience of the 
transitoriness of human life and of the complete lack of 
solid ground under men's feet . 111 The demand for the end of 
the world is 11the resultant and consistent demand of per-
sonalism, when thought out to the end.u2 It is not only a 
truth of religious revelation but a moral necessity so far 
as existential philosophy is concerned.? 
b. ESchatology and Objectification 
Eschatology, then, is more a philosophical than a 
theological idea with Berdyaev. And its philosophical mean-
ing is involved in Berdyaev's idea of objectification, to 
him the fundamental problem of philosophy, which involves 
"alienation, the loss of freedom and personality, and sub-
jection to the general and the necessary.u4 ESchatology 
means the end of the process of objectification and the end 
of objective being9 to which the human consciousness had 
transferred the metaphysical center of gravity with a re-
sultant slavery or loss of autonomy. 5 The present "objective" 
-
world is not destroyed or entirely unrelated to the spiri-
tual realm,but it is transformed or transfigured when man 
in his spiritual rebirth comes to his own proper subjectiv-
ity or full existence . 
1 . Dream, p . 290 . 2 . Slaverz, p . 267 . 
3· Beginning, P• l48. 4 - The Russian Idea, p . 243 · 
5· Slavery, P • 72 . 
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The end of objectification will mean the removal of 
the antithetical subject-object relationship, and this re-
moval alone can prepare the way for a spiritual society. 
The triumph of spirit in society would be a triumph 
of personalism, of personal communion, of the rela-
tion of one personality to another in a human and 
humane We, the recognition of the supreme value of 
every personality. This is the creation of a subjec-
tive rather than an objective society •••• A soci-
ety without objects, in which no man or thing will 
be treated as an object, such a society will, indee~ 
be the kingdom of spirit and freedom; and in a sense 
it will be the coming of the Kingdom of God. This is 
not1 the objectification but the incarnation of spir-it. 
c . The Eschatological Nature of Man's Creativity 
Berdyaev observes that there are two ways of under-
standing eschatology--the passive way and the active way.2 
The passive way, conservative and reactionary, has domin-
ated the history of Christian thought . "There has been a 
passive foreboding of and a passive waiting for the end of 
the world; it is determined exclusively by God . "' This pas-
sive interpretation , which assigns t o man the mere role of 
waiting and enduring, is an expression of man ' s slavery.4 
True Christian thought has never held the vie that the 
Kingdom of God ould be achieved upon the earth by the in-
tervention of some overwhelming power . 5 
I . SEirit, p . 6o . 2 . Slaverz, p . 264 . 
,. Ibid . 4 · Beginning, P• 251 . 
5 · Freedom, p . 172 . 
252 
The active way of interpreting eschatology , espoused 
by Berdyaev, holds that "the end of the world is actively, 
creatively prepared by man; it depends upon the activity 
of man also, that is to say it will be the result of di-
vine-human work . nl It is not held that man alone, by his 
own strength and knowledge , will establish the Kingdom of 
God; rather, the Kingdom of God will not and cannot be 
established without man's creative participation. As Ber-
dyaev puts it, "the 'end of the world' ••• is accomplished 
not only 'on the other side ' but also 'on this side'."2 
This necessity for man's participation is rooted in the 
very nature of God who is infinite love . 3 
B. The Religious Meaning of the Kingdom of God 
The religious meaning of the Kingdom of God in Ber-
dyaev's thought can be shown by a treatment of three ways 
in which he thinks of it : (1 ) the Christological meaning; 
(2) the Trinitarian meaning; and (3) the cosmic Church . 
i . The Christological Meaning of the Kingdom of God 
One ay in which Berdyaev thinks of the coming of the 
Kingdom of God is that it is the "second coming of Chr1st.n4 
As distinguished from the Gospel account of a suffering 
1 . Slaver:;r , P • 264 2 . Ibid., P• 72 . 
3 · Freedom, P • 197 . 
4 · Creative Act, p . 108 . See also The Russian Idea, p . 207; 
Beginning, P • 252 . 
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Saviour, the "second coming of Christ" is the revelation of 
- ~ 
Christ's 11kingly aspect," of "Christ the glorified and 
. 1 - . 
mighty Son of God . " The coming of Christ as related in the 
Gospels revealed man's likeness to God and his participa-
tion in the divine life . The coming of the Kingdom of God 
completes and fulfills this revelation of Christ in its 
cosmic dimensions because it means that "humanity is deep-
ened to the point of divinity and divinity is made visible 
to the point of humanity . "2 The first coming of Christ re-
vealed the God-Man; the second coming of Christ will reveal 
the cosmic Christ, divine-humanity , the full union of God 
and mankind . The end of this present world or the coming of 
the Kingdom of God 11 is the union of the divine and human , 
and the eschatological consummation of the existential 
dialectic of the divine and the human . 11 3 
ii . The Trinitarian Meaning of the Kingdom of God 
It has already been observed that Ber dyaev viewed the 
creative world process as a t r initarian process . This is 
the very nature of being or existence . Had existence been 
single in character, it would have remained in an undevel-
oped state of indifference . Had existence been a duality it 
would have been hopelessly divided . Existence can only 
1 . Creative Act , p . 106 . 2 . Ibid . , P • 321 . 
3• Di vine , p . 197 · 
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reveal its content and unique differences (so important 
in Berdyaev's personalist thought) and still remain a unity 
(so important when a community , such as the Kingdom of God, 
is considered) if existence is triune in nature . Therefore 
Berdyaev asserts that "the life of man and of the world is 
an interior moment of the mystery of the Trinity . n1 
Berdyaev holds that the human personality, if it is to 
find its fullest expression and realization, must escape 
from its seclusion and achieve community . This community 
can only be achieved in and through God . "Community • •• 
means the immediate relation of man to man through God, the 
inner source of all life."2 This relation of "man to man 
through God," in its complete expression, is the Kingdom of 
God . 
iii. The Cosmic. Church 
One must not look to Berdyaev for any words of praise 
for the church as a social institution . He does not think 
of the true Church as existing outside of human beings or 
as being a hole of which a person is a part . Rather , the 
Church is "a reality which exists within human beings , "3 
which is to say that the Church is a manifestation of the 
1 . Freedom, p . 200 . 
2 . Realm of Spirit, p . 120 . God, then, not only is the solu-
tion to the problem of the one and the many but also 
to the problem of interaction . 
3· Beginning, P• 132 . 
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life of the spirit . 
The New Testament teaching of the Church as being the 
Body of Christ is expanded by Berdyaev to include the whole 
of the world and society as it realizes its divine- human 
state . "In religious creativeness the divine-human body of 
the world is created , 111 and this body is the cosmic Church . 
In its deepest sense , then, 11 the Church is universality, a 
cosmic organism, a universal, cosmic hierarchy with Christ 
at the heart of being . 112 For Berdyaev, this is the Kingdom 
of God . 
In the true Church, which in its fullest expression 
is the cosmic union of God and man, the experience of the 
individual is not only personal but also of a quality ex-
pressed by the Russian word which is usually left untrans -
lated--sobornost . Berdyaev refers to this particular aspect 
of the life of the Church when he says : 
It is a miraculous life which is not subject to 
social laws ; i t is a community , a brotherhood of 
men in Christ . It is the mysterious life of Christ 
within a human communion, it is a mysterious enter-
ing into communion with Christ . In this sense the 
Church is freedom and love , and there is no external 
authority in it , there is no necessity and no coer-
cive f~rce . What is in it is freedom enlightened by 
grace . 
It is in this personal mutuality, this fullness of 
inter- personal life that personality finds its 11final 
1. Creative Act , p . 331 . 2 . Ibid., P• 157 · 
3· Beginning, P • 131 . 
realization and integration111 because in this divine-human 
life, the r.elations of one person with another are fulfilled 
in the divine . The Holy Spirit alone explains or is the 
principle of interaction between persons . 
Caught-up in the cosmic aspect of the true Church is 
the idea of universal salvation . Man's destiny is linked 
with that of the whole world , and this is not just the 
world of other men but the world also of "animals, plants, 
minerals, of every blade of grass--all must be transfigured 
and brought into the Kingdom of God . "2 
3· The Basic Concern in the Idea of Human Creativity: 
A Christian Doctrine of Salvation 
In the various details of Berdyaev ' s world-vie such 
as his dualism and the concept of objectification, in his 
thinking about God and Christ , in his re - interpretation of 
religious experience in terms of human creativity , in the 
meaning of the Kingdom of God--in all of this there is one 
recurring theme which gives unity to his thought . This theme 
is that of personality, and in particular personality in its 
struggle to realize its full potentialities . 
His dualism speaks of a realm revealed by man's exper-
ience which does not provide nurture for the growth of per-
sonality (indeed, it cannot so provide) , and of a realm 
which provides the very support which personality needs . 
1 . Freedom, p . 200 . 2. Destiny , p . 294· 
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The concept of objectification refers to a certain way in 
which man interprets the experience of his senses whereby 
he acknowledges empirical objects as ultimate reality. As 
a result, personality is also defined as an object or at 
least in terms of its relationship to that which is exter-
nal to it, and is thereby denied its own unique and proper 
subjectivity. God is that principle or aspect of the world 
process which supports the integrity of personality; every 
human being is an idea of God and has as his supreme task 
the full realization of that idea. Christ stands as an 
expression of human personality in its complete fulfillment, 
full humanity in union with the divine. In the re-interpre-
tation of religious experience in terms of human creativity, 
the emphasis is upon the need of the personality for ful-
fillment in God and the preservation of the freedom or 
integrity of personality in the experience of God. The 
Kingdom of God is that achieved communion between persons 
in God and that ordering of the universe hich permits all 
the true values of personality to be both preserved and 
increased. 
In each of the above instances, the thing which is at 
issue and which centrally involves Berdyaev 1 s idea of human 
creativity is that of the fulfillment of human personality. 
The present chapter has sought to demonstrate that this 
fulfillment, in terms of human creativity, is primarily the 
question o£ a certain kind o£ human experience o£ God and 
then secondarily the question of a certain kind of inter-
personal relationship which both results from and gives 
support to this experience of God in all persons . 
It is this attempt to speak of human £ulfillment with-
in the framework of an openly-declared Christian concern 
whitih invites and justifies an identification o£ Berdyaev's 
doctrine of human creativity as an interpretation of Chris-
tian salvation . 
CHAPTER VII 
A THEOLOGICAL EVALUATION OF BERDYAEV'S CONCEPT 
OF HUMAN CREATIVITY 
1 . Introduction 
In his major theme of human creativity Berdyaev claimed 
to have stated the Christian solution to the problem of man's 
exis tence and destiny . But more than this, it is evident that 
in this theme he was setting forth what he felt must be the 
substance of a Christian doctrine of salvation . 
The doctrine of salvation is a cardinal and decisive 
concern of the Christian faith . It is here that the Christian 
doctrines of God , Christ , man and the world intersect . Thus , 
Berdyaev's doctrine of human creativity is a good vantage 
point from which to view the theological adequacy of his 
thought . 
A. Creativity and ,alvation 
The very basis for any identification of Berdyaev's 
doctrine of human creativity as a Christian doctrine ot 
salvation may seem to be denied by the sharp distinction 
which he himself makes between the two . 
Does the mystery of salvation take in the hole of 
life? Is life's final purpose only salvation from 
sin? Redemption from sin, salvation from evil, are 
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in themselves negative, and the final aims of being 
lie far beyond, in a positive creative purpose • 
• • • Man's life could not be created by God for the 
purpose that, having sinned, he should atone for his 
sin, and should put into the work of his redemption 
all his powers 1 throughout the whole extent of the world-process . 
He makes the contrast very clear when he says that "salva-
tion from sin, from perdition, is not the final purpose of 
religious life: salvation is always from something and life 
should be for something . u2 
It is apparent that Berdyaev builds his contrast upon 
a rather narrow and inadequate understanding of the Chris-
tian term "salvation'' (as this term is defined in the Intro-
duction, Chapter I, p . 3). If "salvation" is predominantly a 
negative term, if it means primarily a self-centered preoccu-
pation with deliverance from one ' s sins, then he is correct 
in declaring that it is not the final purpose of the Chris-
tian life . 
But this is not an acceptable contemporary meaning of 
Christian salvation . The New Testament often speaks of salva-
tion as being from something ( its negative aspect) to some-
thing (its positive aspect )--from darkness to light , 3 from 
alienation to a share in divine citizenship , 4 from guilt to 
pardon , 5 from slavery to freedom. 6 
1 . Creative Act, pp . 95-96 . 2 . Ibid , P • 105 . 
3· I Pet . 2 : 9 · 4 · I Pet . 2 :10; Eph. 2 :12-13 . 
5 · Eph. 1 :7; Col . 1 :14. 6 . Gal . 5:1; II Cor . 3:17 . 
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In present-day theology, salvation carries a predomi-
nantly positive emphasis, although the negative aspect is 
never absent from the picture. Roger Hazelton writes that 
the Christian understanding of salvation has stressed its 
positive aspects, that the word means "health or wholeness 
of human being; more than safety alone, it has in mind 
essential soundness or completeness--the fullest and truest 
realization of man's own powers and values.nl David E. 
-Roberts writes that salvation is 11 that condition of whole-
ness which comes about when human life is based in openness 
• • • upon the creative and redemptive power of God. n2 For 
Paul Tillich, salvation means "reclaiming from the old and 
transferring into the New Being," and this process includes, 
above all, 11the fulfilment of the ultimate meaning of one's 
existence. 11 3 For L. Harold DeWolf , salvation involves not 
. 
only the new birth but 11 the entire process of change and 
growth from sin to righteous perfection . 114 These references 
suggest that contemporary Christian theology understands 
salvation to be both from sin and to man ' s fullest self-
realization in God . 
1 . "Salvation, 11 A Handbook of Christian Theology, p . 337. 
2 . (New York: 
3• Systematic Theology, I, 166 . 
4• A Theology of the Living Church (2nd ed . rev . ; New York: 
Harper and Bros . , 1960) , P• 295 • 
It is possible to suggest several factors, reflecting 
his Eastern Orthodox background, which may have entered into 
Berdyaev's understanding of Christian salvation. (1) His 
identification of salvation with deliverance from sin, thus 
making it an initial phase of the Christian life, reflects 
an Orthodox tendency. An Eastern Orthodox theologian has 
stated that the work of Christ is seen by fallen humanity 
primarily as the work of salvation, which is the redemption 
of the world from sin and death, and 11we often forget that 
in breaking the tyranny of sin, our Saviour opens to us 
anew the way of deification, which is the final end of 
man. 111 The basic Orthodox conception of sin is not that of 
a violation of the Divine Will but rather the "diminution 
of essence, a loss of substance, a wound or infection of 
the original image of God, that which man is and ought to 
be. 112 This moderate view on sin in the Orthodox Church lies 
back of Berdyaev's thought that sin is only an initial 
hurdle in the Christian life. 
(2) It may also be that, in the contrast which Ber-
dyaev makes between salvation and his teaching on creativ-
ity, he is registering a protest against the inadequacy of 
1. Vladimir Lossky, The stical Theolo of the Eastern 
Church, trans . anonymous London: James Clarke and 
Co., Ltd., 1957), P• 134· 
2. Ernst Benz, The Eastern Orthodox Church, p. 51. 
the popular ideal of the Christian life in the Orthodox 
Church . R. M. French points out that monastic life is the 
highest expression of Christian discipleship in the Ortho-
dox world , the Christian life par excellence . 1 Partly as a 
result of political pressures, the Orthodox Christian has 
shown a "tendency to excessive otherworldliness that keeps 
him from engaging in the Christian ' s specific task of being 
a ' co-worker of God . ' 112 This type of religious life often 
draws the censure of Berdyaev . 
(3) The Orthodox Church has emphasized the resurrection 
of Christ , and from this emphasis has come a prominent fea-
ture of Orthodoxy-- its thought concerning the transfigura-
tion of the cosmos . 11 Its goal is the rescue of all creation 
from corruption , the transfiguration of the Cosmos, the 
restoration of its original beauty , as well as of its pris-
tine goodness . 11 3 This theme of the transfigured cosmos runs 
throughout the thought of Berdyaev. He thus accepted this 
vision of Orthodoxy, while at the same time he found its 
typical expression of the Christian life to be inadequate . 
1 . The Eastern Orthodox Church (London : Hutchinson's Uni-
versity Library, 1951 ), p . 136 . 
2. Benz , P • 214. 
3• French , p . 168 . A helpful exposition of this feature of· 
Orthodoxy can be found in Jon Gregerson's little book, 
The Transfigured Cosmos : Four Essays in Eastern Ortho-
dox· Christianity (New York : Frederick Ungar Publishing 
Co ., l960 J. 
It may well be that an experience of tension between the 
goal of Orthodoxy, on the one hand, and its negative life , 
on the other hand , was a contributing factor in Berdyaev's 
development of the doctrine of human creativity, which is an 
attempt to bring fullness to a basically negative conception 
of Christian salvation through a new interpretation of the 
religious life,which gives man a central role in the trans-
figuration of the cosmos. 
Berdyaev's doctrine of human creativity is thus best 
understood as an attempt to develop a more adequate doctrine 
of Christian salvation . 
B. Procedure 
This chapter is structured upon four specific proce-
dures . They are: (1) the identification of those major the-
ological doctrines and emphasas which support and tend to 
give coherence to Berdyaev 1 s teaching on human creativity; 
(2) a comparison of Berdyaev 1s thought at these points with 
the thought of two contemporary theologians, Paul Tillich 
and L. Harold DeWolf , for the purpose of understanding more 
clearly Berdyaev's position ; (3) a test of the inner con-
sistency of Berdyaev 1s theological thought , particularly as 
this thought is expressed in the major theological emphases 
identified in (1) above ; and (4) a test of the adequacy of 
Berdyaev ' s views to interpret and support Christian experi-
ence . 
There are specific reasons for the choice of Tillich 
and DeWolf . Of the two , Tillich 's thought lies closer to 
Berdyaev's--he shares with him a wide area of philosophical 
background (especially German idealism) and has also been 
deeply influenced by existential thought. Yet Tillich also 
differs with Berdyaev at significant points, and sometimes 
these differences are subtle and need to be f i nely drawn. 
The presentation of Tillich's thought i s based upon the two 
volumes of his Systematic Theology which have been publ~hed 
prior to this study . DeWolf, on the other hand, has been 
chosen because his theology has influenced this writer's 
theological training and i s close to his thinking on many 
points, while at the same time he differs significantly with 
both Tillich and Berdyaev at many points . The presentation 
of his thought ill be based upon his widely used one-volume 
work, A Theology of the Living Church. 
2 . Berdyaev's 1~jor Theological Emphases: Their 
Identification and a Comparison 
In the light of the foregoing study of Berdyaev's car-
dinal concepts, 1hat are the fundamental theological pil-
lars which support or even make imperat ive his all-pervasive 
notion of man's creative role? 
A. Dualism 
i . Berdyaev's View 
Out of the expos ition of Berdyaev's thought has arisen 
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one prominent notion determinative ~or his teaching o~ hu-
man creativity, a notion which is both theological and ex-
pressive o~ his Weltanschauung . The notion i s this: the 
objective world, the world 11 out there" which is revealed 
through the ordinary empirical senses as existing independ-
ently o~ the knowing subject, is for Berdyaev a God-for-
saken world, a world basically evil, a world which does not 
support basic values nor the struggle of the human person 
for sel~-realization. 
The following terminology is used in speaking of this 
world: it is a "prison," a 11 given world of necessity," a 
"problem," that which "threatens 11 and "destroys 11 man, a 
world which is "unauthentic, untrue, devoid alike of pri-
macy and ultimacy,'' a 11 fallen 11 world, a world of "evil and 
corruption," a world which 11 is without God and not created 
by Him. ul The world in which man lives is just such as this 
because it is experienced primarily as necessity and deter-
mination, as a threat to man ' s ~reedom, ~or Berdyaev's 
dualism is above all the dualism o~ freedom and necessity. 
And because he so closely associates ~reedom and God, the 
corollary to the necessity o~ the world is the godlessness 
o~ the world. Experientially, the ~orld is necessity; the-
ologically, it is void o~ the presence o~ God 
1. These quotations are all documented above, chap. 3, 
passim. 
Here, then, is a basic imperative for Berdyaev's 
emphasis on the activity of man, on man's creative role in 
the world--the conviction that man lives in a hostile world 
which threatens his very existence as a person; and there 
is no superhuman power for good outside him, existing ob-
jectively in the world, upon which he can depend for aid. 
1Aan is driven to his subjective resources. 
ii . Comparison with Tillich and DeWolf 
In contrast to Berdyaev, whose philosophical orienta-
tion remains idealism (despite the harsh strictures he 
makes against traditional idealism), and particularly in 
contrast to his subjectivism, Tillich's philosophical 
orientation is basically that of realism. While Berdyaev 
rejected the concept of "being" because it represented a 
reality transcendent to man ' s existence, Tillich has adcpted 
the concept of "being" wholeheartedly and has elaborated 
his own ontology which "presupposes the subject - object 
1 
structure of being" , for 11 the interdependence of ego-self 
and orld is the basic ontological structure and implies 
all the others . 112 This reveals a trend to ard objectivist 
thinking on the part of Tillich as contrasted with the sub-
jectivist thinking of Berdyaev . The self is seen as having 
a world to rwhich it belongs, spoken of as the "self-world 
1 . Systematic Theology, I, 164 . 2 . Ibid . , P• 171 . 
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correlation,"1 and though this correlation constitutes a 
dialectical structure or polarity, 2 there is no hint in 
Tillich's theology that there is any basic opposition or 
incompatibility between the two . Wherever this correlation 
is sundered , so that the beginning point of a thought-sys-
tem is either the self or the world , no reunion is possi-
ble . 3 
The underlying principle which makes possible this 
correlation (for correlation implies something in common) 
is the universal logos of being or the ontological reason 
in which a distinction is made between objective and sub-
jective reason, between the meaningful structure of reality 
and the structure of the mind that enables it to grasp and 
to transform reality . 4 This pattern of rationality, present 
in all of the finite created world (which includes both the 
self and its environment , both nature and history) is it-
self possible because everything finite participates in 
"being-its elf , " which is Tillich ' s theological name for God. 
God , being-itself , is the "ground" of everything that ex-
ists . As the immanent cause or power of being , God is in a 
sense the substance of everything , and yet God transcends 
every finite being and also the totality of beings (the 
world) . 
1 . Ibid . 2 . Ibid . , p . _l64. 
3 Ibid ., P • 171. 4 - Ibid., pp . 71-79· 
This much of Tillich's thought is sufficient to show 
that he could never describe the objective, empirical world 
as God-forsaken , basically evil and meaningless, and cate-
gorically contrary to personal values . But at the same time 
it should be pointed out that Tillich would not go so far 
as to assert that the world is the direct expression of God 
or points directly and unparadoxically to God . This is what 
he means by "dialectical realism111 (called in his earlier 
writings "belief-ful realism" or "self-transcending real-
ism") . Such a realism "tries to unite the structural one-
ness of everything within the absolute with the undecided 
and unfinished manifoldness of the real . It tries to show 
that the concrete is present in the depth of the ultimate.112 
As dialectical, this view of the world gives both a "yes" 
and a 11 no 11 to the being of God-- 11 yes 11 because God is the 
ground of all being , and "no " because God as ground o:f 
being is ultimate or unconditional, so that no unbroken line 
or way exists from self or the world to God (both Berdyaev 
and Tillich reject natural theology and the traditional 
arguments for God) . So Tillich finds God both revealed and 
concealed throughout the realms of nature, spirit and his-
tory . Everything is capable of revealing God if it is seen 
in the ndepth of the ultimate " and of becoming demonic if 
directly associated with ultimacy . 
1 . Ibid . , pp . 234-235 · 2. ~- , p . 235 · 
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Such a view seems to present a world which is basical-
ly ambiguous in nature, capable of either a revelatory or 
a demonic function, depending upon the one who interprets 
it. The Divine is not experienced within the normal sub-
ject-object structure of this world, 1 and hence cannot be 
said to inhabit a transcendent world above nature, but is 
found in a special spiritual, non-sensory type of experience, 
called ecstasy, as the transcendent depth and ground of this 
world . Apparently only in this revelatory experience is 
the neutral or amb;guous character of the finite world po-
tentially overcome . 
The natural world is ambiguous because it is finite, 
and finitude expresses a double relation to being and to 
nonbeing . Finitude in itself is not evil . The categories of 
finitude (time , space , causality , substance) , by which man 
experiences his existence in the world , illustrate the am-
biguity of man ' s world in that they unite an affirmative 
2 and a negative element . Time , for example , in its negative 
aspect of carrying all things toward disintegration,leads 
to anxiety concerning one ' s transitoriness , hile in its 
positive aspect of creativity, directness and irreversibil-
ity it leads to a corresponding courage to affirm the mean-
ingfulness of temporality . And space, to take one more ex-
ample , is also subject to such contradictory valuations . 
1 . Ibid., P• 112 . 2 . Ibid . , pp . 192ff . 
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Positively, it means having a physical location (a home , a 
country , one's world), a social position (a vocation, a 
group and sphere of influence); and these needs are aspects 
of created goodness, necessary to finite existence. Yet, 
negatively, finitude means having no definite place as 
one's own, the final loss of every place together with the 
loss of being itself . 1 These two categories illustrate the 
ultimate insecurity of man in his finitude. Yet, despite 
the resulting anxiety, man can find in God the courage to 
affirm the finite, to live through his anxiety and to 
achieve a degree of self-realization or self-fulfillment.2 
The picture is not clear with regard to T1llich's faith in 
man's ultimate fulfillment. Although he holds that the 
question of individual fulfillment is at the same time a 
question of universal fulfillment,3 the existential stance 
leads Tillich to the subjective position that the matter 
of ultimate fulfillment is properly only the matter of "mT' 
ultimate fulfillment and must not be separated from the 
existential correlation or dependence upon personal faith 
by making it a matter open to a general judgment 4 
It might be possible, then, to say that Tillich leaves 
the matter an open one, except for the fact that Tillich's 
monistic thought is a thorough rejection of supernaturalism, 
1. Ibid., p . 195. 
3 · Ibid ., p . 270 . 
2 . Ibid , p. 198. 
4· Ibid . 
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of existence beyond death. And though he holds that a man 
may find resources in this world for a "courage to be," 
the lack of a forthright statement of a person' s ultimate 
self-fulfillment in God after death (certainly a central 
affirmation of the main Christian tradition) seems incon-
gruous since Tillich holds , on the one hand, to the am-
biguous nature of existence, and, on the other hand, to a 
pattern of rationality and meaning in the created world in 
his logos doctrine . It is true that a finite being may not 
demand eternal life from God, but it needs to be shown how, 
from the personal point of view, creation can avoid being 
ultimately meaningless if eternal life is not an actual 
possibility . 
In Berdyaev we have the existential absolutizing of 
freedom ~ith the consequent cutting-off of man from nature; 
in Tillich, man, as finite freedom, exists only in the self-
world correlation with the dual implication that being a 
self means that man is over against the natural orld but 
at the same time is very much continuous with nature . In 
Berdyaev is found the view that the objective, natural 
world is unreal, that it is not created by God but is the 
result of man's alienation from God, and that it shall come 
to an end to be replaced by the realm of existence or spir-
it which is revealed in subjectivity . In Tillich is found 
the affirmation of only the finite, natural world as real 
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with no higher transcendent realm, the assertion that this 
world is a manifestation of the originating, sustaining 
and directing creativity of God as the ground of being, 
and the conviction that God intends to save a person within 
the dimensions of this ambiguous world and time, not in a 
realm antithetical to this world. Berdyaev asserts that 
God as the dynamic force behind the world process, the 
Ungrund, has no proper logos nature, is complete mystery, 
impersonal; and that out of this primal factor in a dialec-
tical process the logos (i.e., God the Creator) is distin-
guished. This logos moment is not transcendent to personal-
ity but is rather its immanent support, whereas the Ungrund 
is the transcendent Absolute with whom no relations are 
possible. This is a view of the process of reality in whiCh 
reality is basically chaotic and meaningless, and divine 
Providence (the term "providence" is used to describe the 
ordering of the universe ao as to support personal values) 
is to be understood as a force working within this chaotic 
~hole. Berdyaev's emphasis upon human creativity or activ-
ity is logically related to his view of the immanence of 
the logos-God the Creator in personality. Tillich, in his 
vie of the ambiguous nature of the finite self and its 
world, asserts neither that the world is fundamentally 
meaningless nor that it is fundamentally meaningful. Fini-
tude is a mixture of being and nonbeing, and these exist 
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in tension with one another . Ultimately, however, though 
it is nowhere stated as such, the scales seem tipped in 
favor of logos and meaning, for God as being-itself is the 
ground of both being and nonbeing. A major cause for un-
certainty at this point is Tillich's failure to assert the 
personal nature of God . 
In turning further to the consideration of DeWolf's 
view of the world in which man lives and the part that his 
interpretation plays in his understanding of Christian sal-
vation, it is to be noted that DeWolf's position is part-
and-parcel of his theistic position which holds that God 
is a purposive cosmic Person who is both creator and sus-
tainer of the world . It is mainly in his attempt to estab-
lish the ~ational plausibility of theism that his under-
standing of the universe , a crucial point for theism, is 
to be found . 
It is DeWolf ' s contention that the world in which man 
lives can be understood as the proper expression of a per-
sonal creator God who cares for man . This is expressed in 
the several theistic evidences which specifically involve 
the natural orld . Causal law in correlation with the 
events of the physical universe is not impersonal and irra-
tional but is suggestive of a "Supreme Intelligence . 111 Ful'-
thermore , the natural world offers evidences to suggest 
1. A Theology of the Living Church, P • 50 . 
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that it is the "creation by a mind deliberately devising 
means for the accomplishment of specific purposes. 111 The 
various levels of interaction between man and the natural 
world (biological, cognitive, aesthetic, ethical, religious) 
indicate that man not only is created with these various 
needs but is able also to find them answered in this world.2 
Such correlation between various levels of need and their 
satisfaction is interpreted as further evidence that a 
purposive Creator governs the course of nature. 
In this view, then, God directs the whole order of 
nature . The processes of the material world are willed and 
ordered by God. Whereas Berdyaev tends to see man alone in 
his ideal strivings, facing a world which is not just neu-
tral but actually a threat and a drag to his best interests, 
De olf maintains that man does have adequate cosmic support 
in a universe created and sustained by a personal God,whose 
supreme purpose is the fulfillment of all potentialities 
of the human person 
1 . Ibid . De olf conveniently draws the contrast bet een his 
--view and Berdyaev's view at this point (although he 
does not specifically mention Berdyaev) when he de-
clares: "The appearance is that there is a purpose 
operative in nature quite apart from the purposive 
efforts of human beings or any other creatures . How 
else shall this be explained excepting by reference to 
a purposive cos:rnic Person?" (Ibid ., p . 51) . Berdyaev 
recognizes no "purposive cosmic Person" active in t he 
natural world and no meaning or purpose at all apart 
from the creative acts of the person . Man is the 
bearer of meaning in the world . 
2 . Ibid., PP • 52-56 . 
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It is because of such a conviction on DeWolf's part that 
he argues for the reasonableness of both "special provi-
dence" and the related word "miracle . 111 Again, while Ber-
dyaev holds that the objective world of nature is devoid 
of the presence and activity of God,whose only realm of 
activity is in one's subjectivity, De olf holds that God 
is active ever~vhere and at all times in the world. 
Though the whole order of nature is considered to be 
under the direction of God, yet DeWolf asserts that "only 
partially and intermittently do the reason and loving pur-
pose of God appear to us in the natural order."2 He makes 
a distinction between the final purpose of God and the 
provisional purpose of God, and concludes that the present 
orld is not the best possible world that God can give his 
creatures, but is rather "the best He can give to His child-
ren while they are moving from innocence through sin into 
the early stages of redemption and while most of them re-
main thoroughly preoccupied with their own sinful pur-
poses.n3 Both De\lolf and Berdyaev, therefore hold to some 
concept of a fallen world but with radically different 
interpretations of what the word "fallen" means (neither 
man assumes an original, actual perfection of the world) . 
For Berdyaev the world as "fallen" has essential 
1 ~. , PP • 124-127 . 2 . Ibid ., p . 121. 
3 · Ibid.' pp . l42- J..43 . 
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connotations--it is a world essentially evil, alienated 
from God , and exhibiting no spiritual qualities . For 
DeWolf the world is fallen in the sense that it is not a 
pure expression of God's perfect and ultimate purpose. The 
primary reason for this imperfect expression of God's ra-
tional and loving purpose in the world is man's sin.l Man's 
sin as the frustration of God's perfect purpose is made 
the primary point in DeWolf's approach to an explanation 
of natural evil . 2 
In conclusion, for DeWolf the world is the creation of 
a rational and loving God and is therefore a positive fac-
tor in man's salvation . It is the best possible world 
which God can now give man at his present point of progress 
from sin to righteousness . Salvation does not involve a 
denial of this world and a turning away from it, but it 
does involve salvation from sin to an earnest commitment 
to do God ' s will as it is primarily expressed in the uni-
versal and objective system of moral law . The strong moral 
tone in DeWolf's understanding of man ' s relation to God is 
clearly evident . 
Berdyaev's view of the evil of the natural, objective 
world leads him to deny that it is the creation of a good 
God . Through the alienation of man from God {a rather 
necessary ontological moment), the hole orld stands in 
1 . Ibid . , P• 120 . 2 . Ibid . , P • 139 • 
alienation from the divine and in no way expresses the 
will of God . While DeWolf speaks of God ' s "rational con-
trol of the material order described by the natural sci-
ences , 111 and asserts that 11 through that same order God 
gives us the conditions necessary to any meaningful free-
dom which could be possessed by finite , dependent creatures 
like ourselves , "2 thus maintaining that such a mechanical 
causal order is the most effective environment for the de-
velopment of persons, Berdyaev on the other hand assumes 
practically an opposite interpretation in maintaining that 
the material world , rigidly determined by a system of 
causal law, is indifferent to human values and actually 
threatens to destroy man . Salvation , in its negative aspect, 
is largely a matter of escaping enslavement to this fallen 
world while , in its positive aspect , it is the achievement 
of one ' s own proper subjectivity or freedom . Therefore , 
salvation for Berdyaev is predominantly an ontological pro-
cess hereas for DeWolf it is a distinctly personal pro -
cess . 
Salvation is likewise a predominantly ontological pro-
cess for Tillich. Though he emphatical~y denies that fini -
tude or creaturehood is in itself evil, yet he relates th~ 
1 . Ibid., p . 100 . Since it is a "rational" control, it is 
--c8rtainly also a moral control, for Dewolf holds that 
both reason and goodness are grounded in the mind of 
God . 
2 . Ibid., p . 176 . 
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most intimately. Alienation from the divine life, which is 
the fall, is simply the actualization of finite human free-
dom which is, seen from one side, the end or goal of crea-
tion while, seen from the other side, it is the beginning 
of the fall . 1 The state of man's existence is thus a fallen 
state and again, as in Berdyaev, this fall is a necessary 
ontological moment . But there is a difference in emphasis 
between the two . Berdyaev speaks mostly of the fallen ob-
jective world which is alienated from the life of the self, 
while Tillich speaks of the finite self as being alienated 
from its ground of being or its essence. 
Salvation for Tillich is not an escape from finitude 
and the created world since finitude is not in itself evil. 
Framed in terms of self-realization, of a fruitful tension 
between existence and essence (which is ontological lan-
guage), man is here pictured as being alone in the world 
without a transcendent, personal God ~ho cares and exer-
cises rational and moral control over a significant area 
of man's environment . There is here no clear expression of 
man's ult~ate self-realization , as there is in Berdyaev's 
non-theistic thought and in DeWolf's theistic thought . 
Again, in contrast to Berdyaev for whom human creation is 
the hope for man and creation, Tillich vie s all human 
1. Systematic Theologz, I, 255· 
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1 
creativity as thoroughly ambiguous. Perhaps there is no 
justification in going any further than just to say that, 
for Tillich, the world in which man lives is neutral to 
man's salvation-needs, and man's salvation depends upon the 
open recognition of this and the exercise of the paradoxi-
cal faith which still has the "courage to be." 
The three positions being presented on this particular 
point represent a movement of thought from one position to 
almost its antithesis. Berdyaev holds that man lives in a 
world which is basically meaningless and that within this 
basic meaninglessness man's role is that of the bearer of 
meaning. Moving away from this particular position, Tillich 
asserts that the world is neither basically meaningless 
nor basically meaningful, but rather it is ambiguous at 
this point. Because the world is not basically meaningless 
man need not look to some other realm (such a realm does 
not exist any ay) for his salvation, but because the world 
is not basically meaningful the question of man's salvation 
remains somewhat unclear. Finally DeWolf, in a position 
which is virtually a reversal of Berdyaev's position, 
asserts the basic meaningfulness of the world in which man 
lives and then attempts to find a place for evil and mean-
inglessness within this fundamental interpretation. 
1. Paul Tillich, Systematic Theologx, Vol. II (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1957), p. 256. 
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B. The Doctrine of God 
There are at least three emphases in Berdyaev's thought 
about God which are particularly relevant to the theme of 
human creativity as he has stated it. These three emphases 
center in the questions concerning God's transcendence, h~ 
personality, and his goodness and power. 
i. The Divine Transcendence 
a. Berdyaev's View 
God for Berdyaev is, practically by definition, that 
which transcends the natural world of everyday experience. 
But this is only a provisional dualism, and the divine 
transcendence in this respect is of the order of that of 
truth over illusion, of good over evil . In Berdyaev's 
thought, the natural world is the creation of man, who ~ 
turn is the creation of God . 
The question of God's transcendence over his creation, 
therefore, is the question of whether God transcends the 
person, his creation. And here it seems necessary to con-
clude that the creator God does not transcend his creation. 
This study has earlier observed Berdyaev's position that in 
spiritual experience he does not experience anything which 
has an existence apart from himself, 1 that "the assertion of 
God outside divine-humanity , that is , abstract monotheism, 
1. See above, chap. 6, p. 224. 
is a form of idolatry. 111 Whereas there is a strong deistic 
tendency in Berdyaev's conception of God's relationship to 
the natural world, in the matter of God's relationship to 
his own creation, the person, there is a practical panthe-
ism of a pluralistic kind.2 This seems the necessary con-
elusion from Berdyaev's reluctance to assert any existence 
of God apart from divine-humanity, a term which means man 
in his proper existence, his self-realization. Though Ber-
dyaev refuses to assert an existence of God which is any-
thing but immanent and subjectiv~ for a particular person, 
yet he will hold that all persons share this experience of 
God.' He apparently assumes, in order to avoid a basic 
irrationalism at this point, that the experiences of God 
which different people have are all characterized by an 
essential, common nature. 
In Berdyaev's thought the idea of transcendence seems 
better to apply to the Ungrund , but here it is a 
1. ~· P • 225. 
2 . Berdyaev's realistic understanding of the "image of 
God" in man is an expression of this thorough 
immanentism. See below, PP • 331- 333· 
3· Thus, in terminology used by Berdyaev, God is not 
"objective" but by a subtle distinction God could be 
said to be "trans-subjective" (see Beginning , p . 67; 
his use of the term "trans-personal" else here con-
veys the same meaning) which is interpreted to mean 
that the term 11God" represents a reality whose exist-
ence is not restricted to one per on's experience but 
who at the same time does not exist apart from the 
divine experience common to all men . 
transcendence as understood by mysticism and negative the-
ology, a transcendence in the sense that the divine is in-
comprehensible . There is still here little room for any 
sense of 11 otherness . 11 And furthermore, Berdyaev' s Ungrund 
is not the Creator . 
The conclusion seems justified that Berdyaev does not 
recognize any existence of God the Creator apart from his 
creation . His contention, which assumes a mechanistically 
determined universe , is that a transcendent God must neces-
sarily mean the violation of man ' s true nature and his free-
dom. l The absence of transcendent aid is a basic presuppo-
sition of Berdyaev's doctrine of human creativity . 2 
b . Comparison with Tillich and DeWolf 
The question of God's trans c endence was broached in 
this chapter in dealing with Berdyaev' s dualism. ? There 
Tillich was shown to build his case upon the categorical 
denial of the Divine inhabiting a trans cendent world above 
nature . In his monistic realism, Tillich manifests an 
attempt to overcome the alternat i ve between naturalism and 
supernaturalism with what he calls "self-transcendent" or 
11 ecstatic 11 naturalism, 4 which is ba~ically an attempt to 
1 . See above , chap . 6, pp. 234-235 · 
2. Creative Act , P• 14. 3· See above, pp. 265 ff . 
4 · Systematic Theology , II, 7• 
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give a mystical dimension ("depth") to a system of thought 
which is essentially naturalism. The Divine is to be found 
in the ecstatic character of this world, for, "within it-
self, the finite world points beyond itself" and is thus 
11self-transcendent. 111 Thus , to say that "God as the ground 
of being infinitely transcends that of which he is the 
ground 112 is not so much to make a statement about God as 
it is to say something about the whole world of finite 
things . 3 The world as "self-transcendent" is a world which 
is not self-sufficient and is therefore a denial of any 
closed system of nature . The dependency of the finite world 
suggests a depth or ground of being which is its immanent 
cause and which gives the world its total natural structure 
of things . 
Not only is the finite world dependent; it is also 
totally unable to give unambiguous expression to God as its 
ground of being . To say that God "infinitely transcends 
that of' which he is the ground" seems to be equivalent to 
saying that the finite world is infinitely incapable of 
functioning as a direct expression of the Divine . This 
1 . 1£l4· 2 . ~-
3 · See Tillich ' s statement that 11 to call God transcendent 
••• does not mean that "one must establish a 'super-
world' · of divine objects . It does mean that within 
itself' , the ' finite world points beyond itself . In 
other words , it is self- trans·cendent 11 (Systematic 
Theology , II, 7) . God is transcendent , then, by virtue 
of forfeiture on the part of the finite world . 
interpretation is further supported by the statement that 
11 the divine transcendence is identical with the freedom of 
the created to turn away from the essential unity with the 
creative ground of its being. 111 Freedom so defined is 
simply the freedom of the created world to be a finite 
world, to be a world which partakes of both being and non-
being, to be a world which is 11 s ubs tantially independent of 
the divine ground" but which at the same time "remains in 
substantial unity with it. 112 Such a world, turned away 
from essential unity with its ground of being, cannot give 
a direct expression to the Divine; and it is in this fact, 
once again, that the divine transcendence is seen to reside. 
The word used to symbolize this divine transcendence 
is 11 abyss, u3 which points to the inexhaustible, ineffable 
and only ultimately mysterious aspect of reality . This is 
essentially a deepening of naturalism, against which 
Tillich's main criticism is that it makes the term 11God 11 
interchangeable with the word "universe" and therefore 
semantically superfluous . 4 This is also seen to preserve 
the meaning of 11 the holy" as the distance between finite 
man and the holy in its manifestations . 5 Between being-it-
self and every finite being there is no proportion nor 
1 . ~- , P• 8. 2. Ibid . 
3· Systematic Theology, I, 79 , 237 . 
4· Systematic Theology, II, 7· 5· Thid. 
-
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gradation but rather an absolute break or infinite rr jump. n1 
In rejecting supernaturalism, Tillich points the 
seeker for God to an enriched and deeper interpretation of 
the world of nature. As with Berdyaev 1s Ungrund, the tran-
scendence of Tillich's God as being-itself is transcendence 
as understood by mysticism and negative theology, a tran-
scendence in the sense that no finite thing can fully ex-
press the divine and in the sense that the divine is incom-
prehensible to the finite intelligence. The symbolic use of 
language in speaking of the Divine, as found in both Ber-
dyaev and Tillich, presupposes this kind of transcendence. 
Due to contrasting views in the two systems of thought 
with regard to the world of nature, there is no place in 
Tillich for Berdyaev ' s strong Manichaean tendency with its 
accompanying deistic removal of God from the world of na-
ture . For Berdyaev , God the Creator is immanent in that 
which he creates, is immanent in the subjectivity of per -
sons; whereas Tillich holds that the creative God is imma-
nent in both the sUbjective self and its objective corre-
late, the world . 
In theistic thought where the personal aspect of God's 
being is seriously held, as it is in the theology of DeWolf, 
the divine transcendence needs somehow also to be seriousl 
1 . Systematic Theology , I , 237 · Tillich maintains 
Kierkegaard's 11 infinite qualitative distinction." 
held . De olf conceives of the transcendence of God in three 
explicit ways . 1 (1) God is more than his creation. This 
general point states that creation has not and does not 
now express the full creative power of God . The created 
world is an expression of divine creative power but is 
not to be equated with it in the sense of exhausting it. 
Nowhere does DeWolf spatially locate God above or outside 
the creation , as Tillich likes to picture transcendent 
vie of God . 
(2) God is other than created persons . 
God is one who has created us and redeemed us, who 
confronts and addresses us and to hom we give 
thanks and pray . In all these relations He is shown 
as the divine Other . Indeed , so far as identity is 
concerned He is the Wholly Other •••• In the di-
vine-human encounter a human being does not con-
front and address himself . 2 
For the sake of truth and sound religion, DeWolf is opposed 
to any obscuring of the line of distinction between man 
and God . God po sesses his own self - hood ; and such personal 
categories as purpose , wil l , activity , and understanding 
may appropriately be used as analogies indicative of his 
own proper being . 3 
(3) God is other than the material world . This is 
simply a denial that the physical world as experienced in 
sense perception and interpreted in the natural sciences 
1 . A Theology of the Living Church , pp . 117- 121 . 
2 . Ibid., P• 118 . 3• Ibid ., P• 278 . 
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can be understood, i~ a crudely pantheistic manner, to be 
God or a part of God . Such a view would not harmonize with 
the conception of God as spiritual and personal,which is 
essential to theism. But as shown in his treatment of the-
istic evidences, DeWolf does hold that there are various 
non-material considerations which indicate that the created 
world, at its deepest level of existence, can be thought to 
be in God and expressive of the mind of God. 
It is not possible to say ~hat Berdyaev holds a tran-
scendent view of God as Creator. He does not see God as 
unilaterally active in the world, and hence as more than 
his creation so far as activity or power is concerned, but 
active only through divine-humanity. This assertion of the 
complete immanence of the Creator in the religious experi-
ence or spiritual life of man means that man's confronta-
tion with his world is actually the confrontation of the 
Creator God with the evil, ~eaningless world . Human crea-
tion is literally a theurgy . Power is an idea more appro-
priate for the Ungrund, for God the Creator in Berdyaev's 
thought bears more the connotation of for.m or ideal. The 
only way in which God the Creator may be said to transcend 
the creation is in the way that the ideal transcends the 
real. 
Tillich 1ould agree that God as the creative ground of 
being is more than his creation, and on very much the same 
philosophical grounds as found in DeWolf--i . e ., the incom-
pleteness of the world , the continuing divine creative 
activity . But in Tillich God ' s transcendence is only by 
virtue of forfeiture , so to speak . It is actually the cre-
ation's lack of aseity and its resulting self-transcending 
nature which is signified in the symbol of divine tran-
scendence . Whatever positive meaning the term may have, as 
a direct reference to God, is locked in the dark vaults o~ 
negative theology . 
So far as God being other than created persons, there 
is no place in Berdyaev for a Creator God , possessing his 
own self-hood , who is related to man as the divine Other . 
There is here the obscuring of the distinction between man 
and any aspect of deity to which the category of personal-
ity is applicable . In Tillich there is an absolute dis-
tinction between God as the creative ground and man (just 
as there is in Berdyaev between Ungrund and man) . However , 
man does not relate himself to the impersonal ground o~ 
being but rather to the symbolic image of God as Personal , 
which does not literally presume a wholly- other personal 
God in the divine-human encounter . Encounter with a per-
sonal God , for Tillich, could just as well be described as 
man in communion with his h~gher self . _The same thing can 
be said ~or Berdyaev . The only real distinction between 
Berdyaev and Tillich at this point is that Berdyaev , 
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reflecting his strong subjectivis~, reserves the term Cre-
ator for that aspect of deity immanent in human personalit~ 
while Tillich, reflecting the objective aspect of his think-
ing, applies the term Creator primarily to the creative 
ground of all existence. 
DeWolf, Berdyaev and Tillich all agree that God, under-
stood in any aspect, is other than the material world. 
ii. God as Personal 
a. Berdyaev's View 
The God of Berdyaev is Spirit. The word "spirit" has 
. 
the general connotations of fullness, intensity, concrete-
ness of being. In the light of this, then, his statement 
that God is a "concrete 3eing , a Person and not an abstract 
idea111 seems logically to follow. But the apparent face-
value of this statement needs to be balanced by other em-
phases and statements. 
There is the failure of Berdyaev to indicate clearly 
that God as spirit has an objective existence, one which is 
:ndependent of the person who experiences him,so that God 
possesses his own proper subjectivity. This of course, 
involves the matter already considered of the divine tran-
scendence, something which seems to follo from a serious 
acceptance of a truly personal God. 
1. See above, chap. 5, P• 157· 
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Furthermore, Berdyaev has said that when he speaks of 
God as a person he is not s peaking of "person" in the human 
sense of the word but in the "spiritual sense of a concrete 
image, with which personal contact is possible for us."l 
There are other statements by Berdyaev which appear to sup-
port the interpretation of his thought which finds that God 
only becomes personal in the human experience of the di-
vine.2 
It seems justifiable to conclude, so far as Berdyaev's 
thought is concerned, that God can only be spoken of as 
personal when it is the God-as-encountered in religious 
experience. In a sense, this equates God with the experi-
ence of God. God is personal in the sense that the divine 
revelation to man is so intimately involved with and in hu-
man personality . Apart from God-as-experienced, it is mean-
ingless to speak of God as a personal being . He appears as 
a personal being in religious experience, but what he is in 
himsel£ is mystery. 
1. Ibid . Italics mine . 
-
2. In addition to the quotation just above regarding the 
"concrete image" which is necessary for religious ex-
perience, see also Berdyaev's contention that the 
assertion of God outside of divine-humanity is a form 
of idolatry (Realm of Spirit, p . 38) , and, in a fur-
ther variation on the same theme, his statement that 
11 in Christ God becomes a person, and man becomes a 
person" (Creative Act, p. 78) . Also relevant at this 
point is Berdyaev's contention that there is no uni-
versal apart from human personality {see above, 
chap. 4, PP• 75-80) . 
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b. Comparison with Tillich and DeWolf 
Tillich's position on the matter of the personality of 
God, God as a person, can be introduced by first observing 
his use of the adjective "personal" as applied to God. He 
takes the "symbol 'personal God' 11 to be 11 absolutely fund a-
' 
mental because an existential relation is a person-to-per-
son relation," and adds that 11man cannot be ultimately con-
cerned about anything that is less than personal. 111 But it 
is nevertheless a "symbol," a medium through hich the 
material of ordinary experience is used in speaking about 
God . It is not a word to be taken literally, for every 
symbolic statement about God is at the same time both 
affirmed and negated.2 
The positive aspect of the symbol consists in the fact 
that it enters into or participates in the reality which it 
represents . Thus the adjective - symbol 11 personal 11 is taken 
to indicate something meaningful about God and is supported 
(even required) by the nature of religious experience 3 
But Tillich will not take the step from the adjective 
"personal" to the noun 11person . 11 "'Personal God' does not 
mean that God is ~ person . It means that God is the ground 
of everything personal and that he carries within himself 
the ontological power of personality . u4 Tillich 's reluctance 
1 . Systematic Theology, I, 244· 2 . Ibid . , P • 239 · 
3 · Ibid . , pp . 223, 244· 4• Ibid . , P • 245 • 
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to speak of God as a Person (or without the indefinite 
article , for that matter) , seems to be connected with his 
identification of personality with individuality,1 together 
with the further related observations that to be an indi-
vidual 11self 11 implies separation from a "not-self,11 2 and 
that the ontological elements of individualization and p~ 
ticipation exist in polarity . 3 God as ~ person, then, could 
not have universal participation as the ground of allfinite 
things and therefore could not be God according to T.Ulich's 
definition of God . 4 A concept of a personal God expresses 
the concreteness of man ' s ultimate concern (as it does in 
Berdyaev) , but cannot in itself support the ultimate nature 
of the ultimate concern . 5 Individualization and participa-
tion, as polar elements , are to be thought of as rooted in 
being- itself, and God transcends them both . "Personal God" 
does not refer to what God is , his nature as such, but is 
rather the objective expression of what God does --he creates 
and supports personal life , and is the power of personality 
to resist dissolution in the face of despair . 6 
Tillich and Berdyaev appear to hold similar positions 
1 . Ibid . ' pp . 243 ' 244· 2 . Ibid ., p . 244· 
3 . Ibid . 
4 . Ibid . , p . 245 · This is why he calls "personal God" a 
--confusing symbol (Ibid . ) . 
5 • Ibid., P• 223 . 6 . Ibid., P• 245 · 
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so far as the matter of referring to God as person or per-
sonal is concerned . When Tillich asserts that the symbol 
"personal God" is necessary because an existential relation 
is a 11pers on-to-pers on relation, 11 and yet further asserts 
that "personal God 11 does not mean that God is a person, it 
seems necessary to conclude that he is using the word "per-
son" in the expression "person-to-person relation" with two 
different meanings . When the word is used to describe the 
Divine participant in religious experience it apparently is 
so used in accordance with Tillich's assertion that 11divine 
images" are projected against the "realm of ultimate con-
cern" much like the projection of a picture upon a screen. 1 
This is a notion very similar to Berdyaev's contention that 
God only becomes personal in the human experience of the 
divine, that the word 11 person 11 is to be understood in the 
"spiritual sense of a concrete image, with which personal 
contact is possible for us . 11 
It is strange, in view of the fact that both thinkers 
accept the necessity and the adequacy of the concept of 
"person" as applied to the Divine within the realm of ~­
ligious experience, that they should proceed to deny any 
validity of the concept 11person 11 in its application to the 
Divine considered in and of itself . This lends support to 
the suspicion that in both systems of thought religious 
1. Ibid ., P • 212 . 
experience is a lonely experience, an experience with an 
11 I" but whose "Thou 11 gives way to the 11 ideal I" or the 
"higher s elf • 111 
In contrast with both Berdyaev and Tillich, DeWolf 
asserts God's transcendence as the personal Other. But 
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this assertion does not mean that God is a person just as 
a human being is a person . To say 11 God is personal" is 
still to use the language of analogy, and it means that 
"His nature must be far more closely analogous to our own 
than to that of material objects . n2 The affirmation that 
God is personal is not accompanied by a psychology of God, 
but springs rather from DeWolf's concern for a proper 
concept of the God who is adequate both as the creator and 
sus tainer of the universe and as the "Thou" of religious 
experience . Various statements are made about God in his 
relationship to the world which clearly involve his per-
sonal being . God is the "Supreme Mind , " 3 or 11 upreme In-
telligence"4 am "Will . u5 He is con cious of others and 
loves them. 6 
1 . Tillich in a class at Harvard University defined prayer 
as communion with one ' s higher or ideal self . 
2 . A Theology of the Living Church , p . 100 . 
3 • Ibid • , p . 4 9 • 
5· Ibid ., p . 57 · 
4 • Ibid ., P • 50 . 
6 . Ibid ., PP • 46 , 115 . De olf ' s faith in "special provi-
dence" means that God has the deepest interests of 
individuals in mind (~. , pp . 124-126) . 
God has voluntarily self-limited himself in his exercis e of 
power . 1 He is the source of all good2 and the creator of 
meaning and value . 3 His creation is the expression of pur-
pose .4 Such ideas have no meaning and such realities have 
no existence apart from a personal being . For DeWolf the 
concept of 11 person 11 provides a valid and significant insight 
into the nature of God . 
The contrast between Berdyaev and Tillich, on the one 
hand ~ and DeWolf on the other hand can be succinctly ex-
pressed in this way--for Berdyaev and Tillich the 11God-
idea11 is personal , whereas for DeWolf the living God him-
self is personal in his independent existence . Both Ber-
dyaev and Tillich seem to suggest that a human person can 
be conscious of God but that God cannot be conscious of 
that human person. 
iii . The Divine Power and Goodness 
a . Berdyaev's View 
The distinction which Berdyaev makes between the Abso-
lute God of the Ungrund and the Creator God is basically a 
separation of the divine power and divine goodness . 
The Ungrund represents a voluntaristic notion that the 
primary stuff of the universe is will or freedom. It is 
1 . Ibid . , p . 106 . 
3· Ibid . , P • 55 • 
2 . Ibid . , pp . 113-114. 
4. Ibid ., PP • 50-51 . 
blind , dynamic, impulsive , non- purposive . It is the source 
of all particular things . It is the source of both good and 
evil , but it is itself neither good nor evil because such a 
distinction is not inherent in the primary life of the uni-
verse . Ungrund represents divine power - of-being without di-
vine goodness . 
On the other hand , the Creator God can be said to be 
divine goodness without divine power . It was observed1 that 
the birth of the Creator God out of the Ungrund is conceived 
by Berdyaev in terms of the dialectic . God is the light 
issuing from the dark Ungrund as its illumination , the for-
mal principle which seeks to give form to the primal chaos , 
the meaning which seeks to give order to the blind , meaning-
less ground of all existence . God the Creator is the formal 
principle which arises out of the totally dynamic Ungrund 
and exists in tension with it . The final and absolute result 
of this tension is the synthesis of dynamics and form in 
the fully- realized potentialities of the cosmic process . 
Together with this form-bestowing function of the divine 
creativity, which means the highest good for the created 
world, is to be considered Berdyaev ' s oft-repeated asser-
tion that such ideas as power or force are not to be asso-
ciat ed ith God the Creator . "God is freedom; he is not 
Lord , but Liberator •••• God never operates through 
1 . See above, chap . 5, p . 166 . 
necessity, but always through freedom . 111 The word "freedom" 
here means man's freedom. It is difficult to see any place 
in Berdyaev's thought for the idea that God acts or ex-
presses his power independently, in and of himself, in a 
manner similar to the claim which Berdyaev makes for man. 
The separation between the divine power and the divine 
goodness has direct relevance to Berdyaev's treatment of 
the problem of theodicy . In answer to the question of how 
an all- good and all- powerful God can be justified in the 
light of the existence of evil, Berdyaev would say that God 
is both the source of all dynamic expression (as the Un-
grund) and the source of all good (as the Creator) . But 
these two aspects of the divine nature are clearly distin-
guished from one another so as to exist in an antithetical 
relationship in which the dynamic nature is emphasized and 
is primary . In this respect, Berdyaev's thought goes back 
to Duns Scotus who elevated the will of God over the intel-
lect . 
Berdyaev finds in the primal life of the universe a 
divine power ~hich is , in and of itself meaningless , with-
out form or direction , indifferent to moral values . He also 
finds a divine goodness which is , in and of itself, unable 
to assert itself effec t ively , lacking its o n proper dyna-
mism. These two aspec ts of divinity exist in a radical 
1. See above, chap . 6, p . 236 . 
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tension, and this tension centers in the existence of man 
where it alone can be resolved . 
b. Comparison with Tillich and DeWolf 
In Tillich's thought there is a recognition of a polar-
ity in God between the divine power and the divine goodness, 
expressed most clearly in terms of the polarity of the on-
tological elements of dynamics and form (to be accurate, it 
must be pointed out that Tillich holds that the ontological 
elements point symbolically to qualities of the divine life 
which are analogous to them1 ) . 
Tillich's doctrine of God, in so far as the recogni-
tion of polarities is concerned, is an attempt to transcend 
both the notion in classical Christian theology of God as 
actus purus in which form is victorious and becoming is de-
nied, and the contrasting notion (influenced by Luther's 
vitalistic conception of God and also by considerations of 
the problem of evil) in which the dynamic element takes 
prominence over the form element . "If' we say that God is 
being-itself, this includes both rest and becoming , both 
the static and the dynamic elements . 112 To speak of God as 
the living God requires the separation of or the distinc-
tion between "dynamics " (potentiality) and "form" 
1 . Systematic Theology , I , 246 . 
2 . Ibid ., p . 247 . Dynamics means "becoming" and form means 
---nrest . 11 
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(actuality) 1 , but to this must be added Tillich's conten-
tion that the polarities in the divine life are "in bal-
ance," that neither side "threatens" the other nor is there 
"a threat of disruption . "2 It is finitude which transforms 
. 
this polarity of dynamics and form into a tension in which 
the balance is destroyed and either dynamics or form 
threatens to overcome the other.3 
The dynamic element in God is the "~ on, the potenti-
ality of being, which is nonbeing in contrast to things 
that have a form, and the power of being in contrast to 
pure non-being. 114 Tillich acknowledges that the same idea 
of a dynamic element polar to form is also expressed in 
Berdyaev's meonic freedom.5 He apparently has this same 
dynamic element in mind when, in mentioning what he calls 
the trinitarian elements or principles in the divine life , 
he speaks of the "Abyss" which is "the depth of the divine 
life , its inexhaustible and ineffable character. 116 In the 
abyss "every form disappears"? and it "cannot be -exhausted 
1 . Ibid. , p . 246 • 
2 . Ibid ., p . 247 • "Within the divine life, every ontologi-
--cal element includes its polar element completely, 
without tension and without the threat of dissolution" 
(Ibid., P • 243) . 
3 · Ibid ., pp . 198-200. See also Vol . II, pp . 64- 65 . 
4· Ibid ., Vol . I, p . 179· 5 · Ibid ., p. 246 . 
-
6. Ibid .' p . 156. 7 · Ibid ., pp . 157-158. 
-
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by any creation or by any totality of them. 11 1 11 Abyss 11 is 
-
the element of power within the process of the divine 
life . 2 
The second trinitarian element is the 11 Logos 11 which is 
defined as 11 the form , the meaning and structure element in 
the divine iife . 11 3 The Logos represents the element of 
meaning , the fulness of the content of the divine life . 4 
This element exists in polar relationship to the Abyss , and 
the dynamic unity of these two elements in the divine life 
is 11Spirit , 11 the third of the trinitarian principles . "Spii'-
it is the power through which meaning lives , and it is 
meaning which gives direction to power . God as Spirit is the 
ultimate unity of both power and meaning . u5 
The polarity of power and meaning , or of abyss and 
logos , which Tillich asserts to be true of the divine life , 
corresponds to the distinc tion which Berdyaev makes between 
the Absolute God of the Ungrund and God the Creator . The 
difference between the thought of the two theologians at 
this point is the manner in which the relationship between 
these two elements is c onc eived . Ti llich asserts that the 
"dynamics 11 pole and the "form ll pole exist in balance and 
-
- -
are united within the unity of the divine li.fe without 
1. Ibid ., P • 79 · 2 . Ibid., pp . 250- 251 . 
3· Ibid.' P • 156 . 4 Ibid.' P• 250 . 
5 · Ibid . 
-
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either pole having a primacy and without a tension in which 
one would threaten the other. 
Berdyaev's thought represents a radical assertion o£ 
the primacy o£ the dynamic principles from which all else 
is derived in dialectical fashion. In conscious revolt 
against the notion of God as actus purus, as pure form in 
which all potentiality is actualized and dynamics is ex-
hausted, Berdyaev would apparently be classified by Tillich 
as one member of the group of thinkers who have been in-
duced "to emphasize the dynamics in God and to depreciate 
the st~bilization of dynamics in pure actuality. 111 The 
manner in which the polar relationship is understood (i.e., 
balanced in Tillich and unbalanced in favor of dynamics £or 
Berdyaev) is a reflection of the respective interpretations 
which the two thinkers make of the world in which man lives. 
For Tillich the objective world is ambiguous, neither mean-
ingful nor meaningless, while for Berdyaev the world in 
which man lives is basically meaningless and a threat to 
meaning as such, and man's life is a desperate struggle to 
bring meaning into his existence . 
One more significant observation should be made con-
cerning the relationship of the two polar elements as con-
ceived in these two systems of thought . Tillich seems to 
assert that in God as being-itself the balanced relationship 
1 . Ibid ., P • 246 • 
of the polar elements is an objective fact c onstituting the 
very nature of God himself . It would be meaningless to sug-
gest that there is any movement within the divine life to 
achieve this balance or that there is any struggle within 
the divine life on the part of the 11 form 1' pole to enlighten 
and transform completely the 11dynamics 11 pole. The balance is 
. 
a given aspect of the divine life, an integral part of the 
definition of God,which cannot be otherwise,since, as 
Tillich says, 11God cannot cease to be God. 111 
~ . 
On the other hand, Berdyaev in his subjectivist think-
ing seems to suggest that the dialectical relationship be-
tween the dynamics-pole and the form- pole of the divine 
life (called , respectively, the Ungrund and the Creator 
God) is accomplished and developed in and through man ' s 
creativity . There is no given kind of relationship within 
the divine life independent of man ' s spiritual condition . 
Tillich can speak of God as Spirit to indicate symbolically 
the ultimate unity of dynamics and form in the divine 
life , 2 but in the thought of Berdyaev, "Spirit " means pri-
marily the union of God and man, God-manhood , the fullness 
of ex.istence, which is the synthesis of the divine grace 
(i . e ., meaning) and fathomless human freedom (i . e ., dynam-
ics) . 
Since Tillich ' s God as being- itself includes both the 
1 . Ibid ., P• 247 • 2. Ibid ., pp . 156 , 250. 
~orm and the dynamic elements in balance , it seems neces -
sary to assert of the divine life (though it is but a sym-
bolic assertion) that it has its own structure within which 
the balance of the two polar elements is possible. The 
creative relationship between form and dynamics does not 
exhaust the meaning of the word 11 God . 11 The world-process is 
a process within the divine life but not equivalent to it . 
Berdyaev ' s radical assertion o~ dynamics in his Ungrund 
doctrine certainly means that the basic life o~ the universe 
is without structure of any kind . His dialectical interpre-
tation of the world- process envisions the movement or evolu-
tion of the dynamic universe as it strives toward ever more 
adequate meaning-structures which will actually bring the 
dynamic life of the universe to ~ulfillment without violat-
ing its dynamic nature . And this process , for Berdyaev, is 
not only a world process but a theogonic process . The world 
process is the divine life for Berdyaev, whereas for Tillich 
it is within the divine life . And that which is asserted as 
a ~act by Tillich, namely the balance between the ~orm and 
the dynamic poles in the divine life, for Berdyaev is a 
goal to be achieved within the divine li~e . Berdyaev ' s con-
ception o~ the imbalance between form and dynamic in God 
means that his God is a 11becoming 11 God ho is subject to a 
-process which has the character of a divine fate . 
DeWolf's position on the question o~ God's power and 
goodness involves both a crit i que of the general position 
which Tillich and Berdyaev seem to embrace, and a clearly-
differentiated, alternative interpretation of the being of 
God . 
If , according to DeWolf , the basic premise of finitis-
tic theism is that "some or all natural evil is contrary to 
God's will and its existence is due to some uncreated force, 
being or aspect of being which opposes , limits or partiall 
obstructs that will , 111 then both Berdyaev and Tillich can 
-be so classified . Both recognize some kind of tension be-
tween the divine abyss and the divine logos . 
The main philosophical objection raised against such 
finitistic thought is that it does not clearly escape an 
ultimate dualism. This objection is based upon the obser va-
tion that no meaningful relation between the abyss and the 
logos is shown, so completely does mystery prevail ; nor may 
it even be possible to conceive of such a relationship . 
If all meaningful relationships in the world are 
attributed finally to a rational will , rational 
Given or logos in God , and one speaks of some abyss , 
nonrational Given or other nonrational source of the 
"irregular," then any meaningful relation of this 
source to rationality , will or anything else has 
been made ~hypothesi impossible . Not only is be-
lief in such an extrarational kind of ultimate being 
a barren hypothesis from which nothing can be in-
ferred, but it postulates gratuitously a new self-
contradictory relationship at the very source of 
being . 2 
1 . A Theology of the Living Church, p . 132 . 
2 . Ibid., P • 132 . 3ee also P• 95 · 
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DeVolf further finds such a concept of a God who 
lacks unity or completeness to be religiously inadequate 
because it fails to support the kind of absolute depend-
once upon a holy God which is characteristic of creative 
religious experience. 1 
The way in which the power and goodness (both moral 
and rational goodness, for the two are inseparable) of God 
are positively related finds its basis in DeWolf's insis-
tence upon the complete self-unity of God . All existence 
is grounded in the rational, creative will of God so that 
there is nothing independent of that will which would limit 
the power of God. 2 The objectivity of moral ideals is 
traced to the grounding of all moral la~ in the rational 
judgment of God himself . 3 God , then, is both the first 
cause (expressive of the divine creative power) and the 
final cause (expressive of the div1ne goodness giving pur-
pose and meaning to existence) . God ' s power and goodness 
are regarded here as harmonious, inseparable aspects of 
God's being,which is a being of complete self-unity . Actu-
ally, for DeWolf it comes down to a matter of commitment 
1. Ibid., P • 135 · 
2 . Ibid . , p . 105 God ' s power is limited only by the divine 
nature itself , or by the divine purpose, or by other 
free beings who are still dependent upon God ' s crea-
tive will . 
3· Ibid ., PP • 56-58 . 
to a monotheistic faith, for (and this could apply both to 
Tillich and to Berdyaev) 11 a belief in conflicting elements 
or in aspects so utterly different in kind as to constitute 
a real division within God would be opposed to such con-
~iderations as have been urged in support of belief that 
God is one . 111 
All three theologians clearly recognize the presence 
of mystery when they think about God . Berdyaev and Tillich 
posit the mystery as an aspect of God's being and then pro-
ceed to contrast this mysterious aspect of God's being with 
the known, rational, revealed aspect of God's being . 
DeWolf restricts mystery to the limitations of man's under-
vtanding about God . Berdyaev and Tillich begin their the-
ological quest with mystery , whereas De olf ackno ledges a 
vast area of mystery at the end of the quest . For Berdyaev 
and Tillich, if God can be assumed to have self-conscious-
ness in some respect (and it is far from certain that this 
is the case), then God must be incomprehensible to himself . 
For DeWolf, God is only incomprehensible to his human 
creatures , and that to the extent that his being , power 
and knowledge tran3cend the understanding of finite minds . 
1 . Ibid • , p • 9 5 • 
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c. Christology 
i . Berdyaev's View 
The study has shown that Berdyaev has little interest 
in the historical person Jesus . In the distinction which 
has come to be made between the "Jesus of history" and the 
11Christ of faith , " he is definitely to be associated with 
the latter emphasis . 1 The particular meaning of "Christ" 
for Berdyaev within this context is revealed in the 
following expressions which he uses: 11 the Abs clute Man," 2 
the "ultimate and final freedom that he [i . e . , ma~ finds 
within himself , n3 "the all-Man , • • • man's Way, the mys-
tery of man's spirit, 114 "the ideal relation between the 
human and the divine, 11 5 "man in the absolute and spiritual 
sense of the word , that is the Eternal Man . 116 Such state-
-
ments suggest that the word "Christ" as used by Berdyaev 
means predominantly the personal ideal image of man's own 
self-realization . 
Furthermore, and reminiscent of the Hegelian inter-
pretation of the Trinity, the Second Person 1s understood 
to be the cosmic ideal of the corporate self- realization 
of the world as expressed in terms of community or the 
Kingdom of God . Berdyaev ' s thought moves quickly and with 
1. See above, chap. 5 , pp. 205-206. 
3· Ibid ., p . 206. 
2. Ibid ., P • 205. 
4· ~· 
5· ~., p . 207. 6. See above, chap. 4, p. 119 . 
ease from Christ the God-Man (which is primarily a theo-
logical dogma or truth with a universal validity) to the 
concept of God-manhood as it is related to the divine-
human nature of both man's spiritual existence (which is 
expressed in human creativity) and the cosmic process 
{which, when it has achieved its full divine-human ful-
fillment, is said to have entered into the era of the King-
dom of God). 
Berdyaev's Christology is equivalent to the ne an-
thropology which he sought to set forth in his teaching on 
human creativity. He was concerned with a 11Christology of 
man,"l for he held that 11 the Christological revelation is 
also an anthropological revelation . 112 But the problem here, 
which is also to be pointed out later in connection with 
Berdyaev's view of man, is this : does Berdyaev actually 
acknowledge the full humanity of Christ? He makes it clear 
that Christ is Man, but little attention is given to the 
fact that Christ was also ~ man. The distinction here is 
between Man as the transcendent ideal of true humanity and 
man as the empirical, existent being . "Christ , 11 as the term 
is used here, seems to have something in common ith any 
particular man only to the extent that that particular man 
embodies the Ideal Man , which means that Christ never 
shares completely his ideal humanity with any particular 
1 . See above , chap . 5, p . 186 . 
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human being in this life . The humanity of Christ is not the 
humanity of the creature which has been traditionally con-
trasted with the divinity of the Creator. The Humanity of 
Christ is at the same time his Divinity, so that it is Di-
vine-Humanity . The paradox of the two natures of Christ 
tends to be resolved in favor of his divinity. 
The significance of Christ, understood as the Christ-
nature of religious experience, for Berdyaev's idea of hu-
man creativity is this--Christ is expressed in man's ex-
perience of God, which is human creativity . Berdyaev's tend-
ency to universalize the particular is seen in this tend-
ency to see a theological significance in the God-man Jesus 
Christ almost exclusively as a proto-type of the creative 
human experience of God . What interest there is in the his-
torical Jesus tends to see in him the first particulariza-
tion of the eternal Christ- ideal of the divine- human rela-
tionship 
It is doubtful that Berdyaev has made any identifica-
tion of the historical Jesus with the eternal Christ . His 
reluctance to identify any eternal reality ith a particu-
lar historical entity would seem to preclude this . Hence 
his hope for a final revelation of God in the Spirit , a 
subjective revelation , which will be final and absolute as 
the historical revelation in Christ cannot be . 1 
1. See above , chap . 5, np . 210-211 . 
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ii. Comparison with Tillich and DeWolf 
The same freedom from the significance of the histori-
cal Jesus for Christian salvation which characterizes Ber-
dyaev's thought is also a feature of Tillich's Christolog~, 
although Tillich's position is better documented and more 
complex. 
In keeping with his general method of approach to the-
ological questions, which moves from the universal to the 
particular (e.g., from the ground of being to the Christian 
God) , Tillich's orientation in Christology begins with the 
universal predicament and need of existential man who is 
alienated from God, his world and from his own essence . 
Hence, "Christology is a function of soteriology. The prob-
lem of soteriology creates the cbristological question and 
gives direction to the christological answer . n1 And this 
-
"problem of soteriology" is the problem of a new state of 
being which, for Tillich, issues in the quest for the New 
Being which started "when men became aware of their exis-
tential predicament and asked whether their predicament 
could be overcome through a new state of reality . "2 The Ne 
Being is defined as "essential being under the conditions 
of existence , conquering the gap between essence and exis -
tence . n3 
1 . Systematic Theology, II , 150 . 
3• Ibid . , PP • 118-119 . 
2. Ibid . , pp . 138-139· 
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In this view of salvation, man's existential predica-
ment is an unresolvable discrepancy between his actual self 
and his ideal self, between his existence and his essence; 
and man's salvation lies in narrowing this gap between 
essence and existence through the power of the New Being. 
To conquer the gap between essence and existence means to 
conquer the gap between God and man. But this is accom-
plished through the New Being which is "the eternal God-man 
unity. 111 In other words, the estrangeme~t between God and 
man is overcome through the unity of God and man. This may 
seem to be a most unprofound statement, but it must be re-
called that in Tillich's thought it is not either estrange-
ment ~ unity, but both--and . "In some degree all men par-
ticipate in the healing power of the New Being."2 Tillich 
. 
would probably say that the very fact that a person feels 
a disquieting gap between his 11 essence 11 and his "existence" 
is in itself testimony that there also exists some kind of 
unity bet een "essence" and "existence . " 
. 
For Tillich the New Being is the name for that partic-
ular tendency or power in a monistic world vhich works to-
ard the fulfillment of the ultimate meaning of a person's 
existence. The New Being is the "healing and saving power 
••• in all h1story . n3 
1. Ibid . , P• 159 · 
3 · Ibid . 
2 . Ibid., p . 167 . 
The New Being has universal significance, 1 and individual 
men are said to 11participate 11 in it . 2 All o:f this suggests 
a key notion in Tillich's existentially-oriented doctrine 
of salvation--namely, that salvation is primarily a matter 
of a present new reality, the New Being, which is immedi-
ately experienced and graciously bestowed. The immediacy of 
the New Being :frees it from dependency upon the results o:f 
historical research . And the New Being is independent of 
any theology, :for :faith is itself the immediate expression 
of the presence of the New Being . 3 
The manner in which Tillich relates soteriology and 
Ohristology is expressed in the frequently-occurring 
phrase, 11 the New Being in Jesus as the Christ . 11 The mean-
~ ~ 
ing of the soteriological expres sion "the New Being" has 
been considered above . The New Being is "in" Jesus 11 as 11 the 
Christ . 
By the expres sion "Jesus as the Christ" Tillich does 
not mean to have reference to a historical person named Je-
sus who actually was in his own being the Christ . It is his 
contention that the man Jesus is not the Christ . 4 The his-
torical person Jesus, in and of himself, could not have 
universal significance,but gains universal significance 
only as he is interpreted in symbols and myths by those who 
1 . Ibid., p . 151 . 2 . Ibid . , P • 110 . 
3 · Ibid . ' pp. 113- 114 . 4 · Ibid . , P • 143• 
receive him as the Christ . 1 The idea that the person of 
Christ is a reality in itself apart from a correlation with 
those who accepted him as the Christ is considered "a rather 
unsatisfactory and theologically dangerous scheme . 11 2 Accept -
ing the conclusions of form criticism, Tillich holds that it 
is impossible to find the real Jesus behind the symbols of 
his reception as the Christ . 3 
All of this means that Jesus (of whom it can be 
asserted that he was , not what he was in himself) became 
the Christ when he was accepted as the Christ by the early 
Christian Church . And, according to Tillich, this accept-
ance occurred after the death of Jesus and arose out of the 
tension which developed in the minds of the di9ciples be-
tween the po~itive impression which Jesus had made upon 
them, as one whose being was the New Being , and the negativ-
ity of his disappearance from the present experience of the 
disciples . This tension was resolved by a unique happening . 
"In an ecstatic experience the concrete picture of Je us of 
Nazareth became indissolubly united with the reality of the 
New Being . He is present wherever the New Being is pres-
ent u4 This is the event upon which Christianity is based , 
the linking of the picture of Jesus with the reality of the 
New Being , interpreted through the symbol of the 
1 . Ibid ., pp . 151- 152 . 
3 • Ibid ., P • 102 . 
2 . Ibid . , P• 168 . 
4. Ibid ., P• 157 • 
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Resurrection, asserted in the confession of Jesus ~ the 
Christ, i.e., ~the bearer of the New Being.1 
The expression "the New Being in Jesus as the Christ," 
it may be concluded, says nothing directly nor significantly 
of the actual person Jesus. Rather, it see~ to be a state-
ment about the apostolic confession, about the biblical 
picture which the faith of the early church created. Tillich 
sees no necessity nor possibility of going behind the prim-
itive Christian faith to the object of that faith; rather, 
the primitive faith has itself become the object. Though no 
explanation nor reason may be given for the effective rela-
tionship, the Christian today still continues to find in the 
biblical, confessional picture of Jesus as the Christ an 
adequate expression of the power of the New Being; and it is 
this experience of transforming power which verifies the 
biblical picture of the Christ, which is itself based on the 
actual experience of the New Being by the disciples.2 
There is, then, for contemporary theological thought, 
no relationship between the actual Jesus and the New Being, 
and no universal and exclusive relationship between the 
biblical picture of Jesus as the Christ and the New Being. 
1. Ibid. Tillich firmly maintains, in his precise wording 
'*Jesus as the Christ , u that "Christ 11 is not to be 
thought of as a proper name but rather as the symbolic 
designation of a function, i.e., he who bears or actu-
alizes the New Being. 
2. ~., PP• 114-115, 127. 
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Tillich labels as "absurd and demonic" the idea that salve.-
-tion to eternal life depends upon an encounter with Jesus 
as the Christ and the acceptance of his saving power.1 The 
healing power of the New Being is the concomitant, in same 
degree, of being itself, and one of the ways it appears is 
in Jesus as the Christ.2 Tillich speaks of "Jesus as the 
Christ" as Savior, not because the actual person Jesus was 
. 
involved in any decisive acts for the salvation of the 
world, but because the biblical picture of Jesus as the 
Christ is the "ultimate criterion of every healing and sav-
ing process.u3 -
Several basic observations need to be made on Tillich's 
Christology. First of all, he makes a clear distinction be-
tween "Jesus" and "Christ." There is no essential relation-
ship between what the two names signify. He speaks of the 
''revelatory content" (the Christ, that which has universal 
saving power) and the "historical form" (the historical 
~ 
Jesus, about whom little can be said other than that the 
apostles brought together in their minds the picture which 
they had of Jesus and their experience of the New Being 
which they had come to associate with Jesus). But Jesus in 
h~elf is not the Christ; he was received ~ the Christ by 
the apostles for whom he had the value or function of one 
1. Ibid., P• 167. 
-
2. ~· 
3• Ibid., P• 168. 
through whom the revelation of the New Being came. And this 
faith-picture of Jesus ~ the Christ who brings the New 
Being is all that the church today possesses. This picture 
is based on the actual experience of the New Being by the 
disciples; and, for those who recognize the authority of 
the apostolic picture, it continues to be the means through 
which the New Being has power to transform life. Instead of 
the traditional Christian belief that it is Jesus in his 
resurrected existence as Christ who brings the transformed 
life, Tillich holds that in an ecstatic moment the disci-
ples linked their picture of Jesus with the reality of the 
New Being which they continued to experience. Therefore 
Tillich's view of Jesus as the Christ obviates a ~aith in 
the resurrection of Jesus as either a physical or spiritual 
event.1 
Furthermore, Christology for Tillich is largely a mat-
ter of projection, the attempt to give concrete expression 
to the experience of the New Being. This seem3 to be the 
meaning which lies back of Tillich's statement that "the 
christological paradox and the paradox of the justi£ication 
of the sinner are one and the same paradox."2 This paradox 
-in which Christology and salvation are united, and even 
identified, is the paradox of the ~te of unity between God 
and man, hich is the essential meaning of the New Being. 
1. Ibid., P• 157• 2. Ibid., P• 150. 
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The great christological decisions of the early church 
(Nicaea, Chalcedon) are not interpretations or Jesus Christ 
but of "Jesus as the Christ." So Tillich rejects ideas of 
-"div~ne nature" and 11human nature" in favor o:f dynamic re-
lational concepts such as "eternal God-man-unity" or "Eter-
nal God-Manhood, 111 which are just other names for the New 
Being. It is meaningless to speak about a man Jesus who was 
both human and divine. 2 What Tillich seems to mean, in set-
ting his Christology in the statement that "in Jesus as the 
Christ the eternal unity of God and man has become histori-
cal reality,"3 is that in the experience which is the basis 
for the confess ion "Jesus as the Christ," the experience of 
the New Being, the christological (and also soteriological) 
paradox of the union of God and man is affirmed. And this 
says nothing about the historical person Jesus. It is only 
of the picture of Jesus as the Christ, in so :far as it 
:functions as an adequate expression of the power o:f the New 
Being, that both 'humanity" and "divinity" can be asserted. 
All this seems to lead to the conclusion that Christo~ 
ogy is primarily a matter of self-interpretation. When 
Tillich declares that Christology is a function of soteri-
ology and that christological statements are symbolic, he 
means that christological symbols are a medium through 
1. ~·, P• J.48. 
3• Ibid., P• J.48. 
2. M£•, PP• 143, 147-J.48. 
which the attempt is made to give non-literal expression to 
the experience of the transforming, saving power of the New 
Being. After confining religious faith to symbols, he then 
proceeds to reinterpret the christological symbols in the 
light of his interpretation of the contemporary experience 
of the New Being. The participation of the New Being in the 
conditions of existence is its humanity-pole. The victory 
of the New Being over the conditions of existence is its 
divinity-pole.1 The Resurrection of Christ is but the ncer-
tainty of one's own victory over the death of existential 
estrangement."2 The doctrine of the atonement becomes "the 
description of the effect of the New Being in Jesus as the 
Christ on those who are grasped by it in their state of 
estrangement . "' The Second Coming is a symbol of the ambi-
guities in the realization of the New Being within history , 
of the tensions inherent in the finite Christian experi-
ence . 4 
In the Christologies of both Berdyaev and Tillich the 
same freedom from the significance of the historical Jesus 
for Christian salvation is to be found . Whether it be Ber-
dyaev and his "Christology of man" or Tillich and his con-
tention that Christology is primarily soter1ology, the same 
anthropocentric orientation is evident . For both , 
1 . Ib i d . , P • 1,6 . 
, . Ibid., P• 170 . 
2 Ibid . , p . 155 · 
4• Ibid . , P • 120. 
--------------------------------
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Christology,with its traditional concern for the relation 
of the divine and human natures in the historical person 
Jesus Christ, becomes primarily a matter of man's self-
1 
realization. Berdyaev and Tillich agree that man's salva-
tion depends upon some kind of a proper relationship of man 
to God, and it is their understanding of this union of hu-
man nature with divine nature in the process of salvation 
which constitutes their Christology. 
But within this basic similarity of their christologi-
cal orientation some clear differences are to be observed, 
differences which result mainly from the contrast of Ber-
dyaev's more idealistic and strongly sUbject-oriented 
thinking with Tillich's thinking which is decidedly more 
object-oriented and consequently more realistic. 
For Berdyae~ God-manhood (the christological term 
which he most frequently uses, the achievement of which is 
synonymous with human creativity) is understood in terms of 
a reality which is related to human personality in terms of 
immanence. In fact, God-manhood in its fullest expression 
seems to mean human personality in its highest state of 
self-realization and self-fulfillment through factors and 
forces inherent in personality itself. In his understanding 
of God-manhood there is no reference to a divine nature or 
1 . It is for this reason that the present study has treated 
Berdyaev's Christology in the section dealing with man. 
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power existing apart from human personality and to which 
human personality must be properly related . Rather, he has 
spoken at times of a proper relationship within human per-
sonality between what he has called the unconscious, the 
consciousness, and the superconscious . 1 God-manhood points 
to the "psychosynthesis" (a term used by Berdyaev) of human 
personality . God-manhood, then, is really Man, the symbolic 
representation of human possibilities . 
On the other hand, Tillich, in the use of his christo-
logical term "New Being, 11 seems to point to a reality which 
i n some respect has an independent existence . The New Being 
possesses a universal quality , and in thought can be distin-
guished from Jesus as a man or from any particular man . Men 
are said to "participate" (always incompletely) in the New 
Being , which in turn is conveyed to men through the biblical 
picture of Jesus as the Christ , the ''bearer" of the New 
Being . Tillich speaks of the "actualization" of the New 
Being within history and human existence . Men in their state 
of estrangement are said to be "grasped" by the New Being . 
In one instance Tillich appears to define New Being as the 
sum total of all healing and saving processes in the world . 2 
The New Being i not thought of as being exclusively imma-
nent in human personality but in ome ense as given to 
1. See above , chap . 5, pp . 213-218 . 
2 . Systematic Theology, II, 167-168 . 
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1 personality, thereby re-establishing the meaning of grace. 
This does not mean that the New Being exists as a 
"thing" or "object" but more as a power or as an aspect of 
process, which has its own reality apart from any particu-
lar participant in it. This view of the New Being is con-
sistent with the realist trend of Tillich's thought, where-
as the stress upon immanence within personality is consis-
tent with Berdyaev 1 s strong sUbjectivist tendency. 
This aspect of Tillich's Christology suggests that 
man's hope of salvation does not rest in the direct per-
sonal relationship of himself to God, but in his relation-
ship to the New Being, of which alone christologioal asse~ 
tiona can be made. There is involved here Tillich's conten-
tion that no finite person, including Jesus himself, could 
actually be the personal unity of a divine and a human na-
ture because God's nature or essence is beyond essence and 
existence.2 Thus Christology is not a matter of the person 
of Jesus Christ, nor the matter of a personal relationship 
between Jesus and the Father, nor a matter of any man's 
personal relationship with the Father God. Rather it seems 
to concern a univers 1 structure of reality called the New 
Being, which transcends the realm of finitude, evidences 
the tendency to support human fulfillment, and is most 
fully experienced in connection with the biblical picture 
1. Ibid., P• 125. 2. Ibid., PP• l47-l48. 
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of Jesus as the Christ. Its definition as "Eternal God-Man-
1 hood" could just as well be spelled 11 Man," in the light of 
. -
Tillich's definition of the New Being as "essential being 
under the conditions of existence, conquering the gap be-
tween essence and existence.n2 
-But this assertion of divine-human unity only apart 
from human finitude seems to undercut hope in man's ulti-
mate fulfillment. Tillich describes the threefold character 
of the state of salvation as "participation" in the New 
Being, "acceptingu it, and "being transformed" by it,:? but 
he does not typically speak of the state of salvation as 
itself a "new being," and this despite his attempt to show 
that New Being is just what the Apostle Paul was speaking 
about when he said, "If any man be in Christ, he is a new 
creature." The state of salvation does not mean to be in a 
state of fellowship with God, as this has been traditional-
ly interpreted, but may mean simply to exist in a fruitful 
tension with one's Ideal Self (i.e., the New Being), re-
gardless of the many traditional theological te~ employed 
by Tillich. This aspect of Tillich's Christology seems to 
give a basis for the uncertainty which surrounds the ques-
tion of man's final destiny as he sees it. 
By contrast, Berdyaev's "Christology of man" breathes 
1. Ibid., P• J.48. 
3• Ibid., P• 176. 
2. Ibid., PP• 118-119. 
a strong note of optimism and hope for man's fulfillment 
and ultimate destiny which, in a way, even exceeds the ex-
pectation found in traditional western Christian thought. 
Such ideas in Berdyaev's thought as the divine nature in 
man,or the deification of man,find no place in the thought 
of Tillich who seems determined to stress that humanity is 
humanity, divinity is divinity, and that it is meaningless 
to speak of their unity in a historical person so as to 
create a "half-god."l 
Berdyaev not only speaks of the unity of divine nature 
and human nature but finds this unity to be of the essence 
of personality itself, immanent in personality without any 
reference to a reality outside the subject . In contrast to 
Tillich, who is reluctant to admit that divinity is acces-
sible to the finite human person , Berdyaev makes the divine 
so accessible to the human person as to be immanent in per-
sonal1ty, thereby blurring the traditional distinction be-
tween divinity and humanity . It is the presence of the 
divine nature in man which is the basis for his optimism 
regarding man. The proper consequence of the immanence of 
the divine nature in personality is a radical transformation 
of man,resulting in the christological man, God-man, man in 
his fulfillment,whose humanity is at the same time his di-
vinity . This is Berdyaev ' s deification of man . 
1 . Ibid., PP • 142 ff . 
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But this seems to suggest that Berdyaev's faith in 
man's destiny rests upon the creation of a third reality, 
a new Man , into whose being are merged both the finite, 
empirical man and the transcendent, personal God of tra-
ditional thought. Berdyaev's hope, then, is not directed 
toward human existence as such, but to the new Man , whose 
coming will usher in the new era of the Spirit . 
Thus, in neither the christological thought of Ber-
dyaev nor Tillich is there to be found a clearly expressed 
hope for the self-fulfillment of man in his finite, human 
existence. Tillich holds that man's very essence is fini-
tude, that he must accept his finitude, that man is saved 
in his finitude; but he fails to assert man's ultimate sal-
vation (in the chronological sense of ultimate). Berdyaev 
has a tendency to devaluate man's finitude, to relate fini-
tude to evil in a manner reminiscent of Indian philosophy; 
and to see salvation as salvation from finitude, as the 
deliverance from one level of being to another in which 
man's finite human existence has become a divine-human 
existence. In neither system of thought is hope expressed 
for man's ultimate destiny ~ a finite, human being. 
In setting forth Delolf's Christology, only those 
aspects ~ill be presented which are relevant to a compari-
son with the particular emphases in Berdyaev's Christology 
which give support and coherence to his teaching on human 
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creativity. 
One matter worthy of notice at the outset is the strong 
biblical grounding which DeWolf gives to his Cbristology. 
Such biblical orientation is characteristic of his theology 
as a whole, but in no part of it is this more apparent than 
in the christological sections. On the other hand, though 
Berdyaev's writings contain many chr1stological references, 
there is very little biblical reference. Tillich's christo-
logical thought is likewise marked by little biblical inter-
est as such; he will be found to use many biblical terms~ 
but he has energized these terms with the characteristic 
content of his own thought. 
Along with DeWolf's strong biblical emphasis is the 
accompanying assumption that the Gospel records are not 
only "faith" pictures but~ even after being subjected to 
historical criticism, still stand as a significant statement 
of historical truth about the life and influence of Jesus.1 
Jesus was not only a real historical character, but he was 
a complete human being, physiologically and psychologica1-
ly.2 The Gospel records show one who possessed his own 
filial God-consciousness, one whose teachings and healings 
speak of his wisdom and power of personality, one in whom 
man found the supreme revelation of God . 3 DeWolf finds the 
1. A Theology of the Living Church, p. 247• 
2 . Ibid., PP• 226-230. 3• ~·, PP• 246-247 • 
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heart o~ christological doctrine, and the basis upon which 
the historical person Jesus can properly be called the Son 
o~ God and his divinity can be asserted, in the ~act that 
Jesus so ~reely identified himself with the purpose o~ God 
that his teaching, action and thought were actually expres-
sions of God's own activity. "As activity and expression of 
God's own purposive will, the~, Jesus was truly divine."1 
In support of this explanation of the relation between 
Jesus and God, which combines both incarnational and adop-
tionist christological thought, DeWol~ traces the story of 
Jesus, beginning with his preparation and calling by God, 
through a continuing ~aithfulness to God while growing in 
an understanding of the divine will, and finally to Jesus' 
response to God's call in his maturity. 
Subjecting his will to the now clearly revealed will 
of his Father, he valued what God valued, rejected 
the evils against which God warned and loved even 
the least and most unlikely persons as God loved 
them. His moral judgments were in accord with the 
judgments of God and his 2sp1r1t co~ormed to his Father's righteous love . 
This represents the adoptionist aspect o~ DeWolf's Christ-
ology. The incarnational aspect is represented in his inter-
pretation of the biblical phrase, "And the ord became 
~lesh and dwelt among us . "3 The "Logos" element of Christ-
-
ology is interpreted to symbolize the initiative o~ God in 
1 . Ibid., p. 255· 
3• John l:J.4. 
2. ~., PP• 250-251. 
the purpose, illumination, power and achievement of Jesus.1 
As Jesus freely surrendered himself to the Father's will, 
he came to express "all of the outgoing, self-giving atti-
tude and purpose of God that can shine through one human 
life."2 This attitude and purpose of God is most vividly 
and effectively revealed in the death and resurrection of 
Jesus. The Cross is a revelation primarily of God's love, 
of His willingness to share the guilt of the sinner; and 
this, together with the revelation of God's power over 
death in the Resurrection, gives the sinner hope. But God 
in the Cross has also revealed the true nature of sin and 
leads the sinner to condemn his own sin. Thus is man moved 
to repent and to enter into a transforming fellowship with 
God.3 
It will be noted that DeWolf's interpretation of the 
relation of Jesus to God departs from the category of' "sub-
stance" which has characterized Christological thought un-
til rather recent times. In moving away from a concept of 
ontological oneness, he views the oneness of Jesus with God 
primarily as an ethical oneness manifested in a personal 
relationship which, at its core, is a oneness in purpose.4 
Tillich likewise intentionally has sought to replace static 
1. A Theology of the Living Church, P• 251. 
2. ~., P• 253· 
4• Ibid., P• 255· 
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essences by a dynamic relation in formulating his Christ-
ology.1 In view of the dynamic, evolutionary features of 
Berdyaev's thought, it seems almost out of place for him to 
be speaking of "natures" and "substances" in connection with 
- . ~ 
Christology. This may reflect not only some undigested in-
fluence of the Greek church fathers, but also his tendency 
to conceive the divine-human relationship in terms more 
ontological than ethical. 
Moving on from his basic contention that there is a 
dependable knowledge of the historical Jesus,which is ade-
quate for religious needs (something that neither Tillich 
nor Berdyaev would admit), DeWolf further asserts that Jesus 
thus known was a revelation primarily of what God is and of 
2 
what God has done, is doing and will do for men. Tillich, 
whose christological statements refer to the Gospel portrait 
of Christ, the "Christ of faith," finds in Christ not a 
revelation of God as such but a revelation of the New Being. 
"Christ" thus understood has no essential relationship to 
-
the man Jesus and, as the demythologized Christ of the Ne 
Testament, is interpreted in terms of the achievement of 
authentic selfhood, of which the term 11 New Being" is the 
-
symbol. While DeWolf holds that there is a genuine, person-
al continuity between Jesus and Christ~ the 11Chr1sttt of 
1. Systematic Theology, II, 148. 
2. A Theology of the Living Church, p. 234· 
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Tillich does not point to a particular achievement by God 
in space-time;and any continuity between "Christ" and a 
certain man named Jesus is to be found only in the religi-
ous experience of the early Christian church. "Christ," in 
so far as it is an assertion about God, seems to mean little 
more than that the resources of God are available to man. 
Very much the same can be said about Berdyaev's Christ-
ology as has just been said of Tillich's. "Christ" does not 
refer to an individual historical man but to Man in the 
generic, ideal sense . No attempt is made to show the pre-
cise relationship between this Man and a man named Jesus, 
which leads to the suspicion that Berdyaev here reflects 
the influence of the Christology of the early Greek church 
fathers, for whom Christ was a divine being inhabiting an 
impersonal humanity . In contrast to DeWolf's basic approach 
to Christology, which is ethical and therefore insists that 
Christ possessed a genuine human personality (and not mere-
ly human nature or human nature personalized by the divine 
Logos), Berdyaev 1 s basic approach is mystical, realistic, 
redemptive in nature and c onceives of the union of divine 
and human elements in one person in such a way that the 
1 divine element transforms or deifies the human element . 
1 . See A. C. cGiggert, A Histor of Christian Tho t, Vol . 
I (Ne York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1932 , chap. 15, 
"The Doctrine of the Pers oo of Christ , " where this dis-
tinction is made betweeo the ethical and the redemptive 
approach to Christology in the early Eastern Church. 
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D. The Doctrine of Man 
i. Berdyaev's View 
The main theological content of Berdyaev's doctrine 
of man may be found in the meaning which he gives to the 
theological term 11 1mage of God." Much of what he means by 
personality, man as a spiritual being,and man as a crea-
tor, converges at this theological point. 
The important observation has already been made that 
the term "image of God 11 signifies for Berdyaev a divine ele-
ment which is not merely imaged or reflected in man but 
1 
which is really and actually present in man. The same mean-
ing is expressed in variations on this theme,which make it 
clear that Berdyaev considers man to be a spiritual being 
only by virtue of this constituent divine element in man. 
For example, the personality is 11 the bearer of the divine 
principle in life,"2 such divine principle apparently to be 
equated with 11 the existence of suprapersonal values," an 
"existence • • • higher than human personality , " a "higher 
~orld 11 immanent in human personality; which is distinSuiahed 
from the actual state of a human personality as the ideal 
is to be distinguished from the real. Again, in terminology 
suggested by depth psychology, Berdyaev sees in human nature 
1. See above, chap. 5, p . 144. 
2 . Ibid., chap. 4, P• 95· 
3• Ibid., P• 87. 
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not only the realm of the human consciousness but also the 
realm of the "superconsciousness" which he further identi-
1 fies as the divine. Again, using terms which have been 
hallowed by centuries of philosophical controversy, Berdyaev 
says that the "universal" only exists in a particular per-
sonality.2 The close association of "universal" with 11di-
. 
vine" is suggested by statements that in personality the 
universal means fullness of existential content, or pleni-
tude;3 and that the universal is expressed in the qualita-
tive character of personality and is indeed that hich 
gives actual existence its qualitative value and fulfill-
ment.4 Again, it is said that man is a synthesis of the 
finite and the inf1nite, 5 and man's stature and signifi-
cance is in direct proportion to his realization of the in-
finite nature of his being. 6 This theme of the divine imma-
nence is further sustained in the contention that man's 
true freedom is divine-human, i.e., man's initial freedom 
is transfigured by divine grace which is a "force acting 
from within freedom itself n7 
. 
On the basis of these illustrations of the meaning of 
the 11 image of God" for Berdyaev, the conclusion of this 
1. Ibid., 
-
3· Ibid , 
5· ~-, 
6. ~., 
chap. 5, P. 
p. 79. 
chap. 5, p. 
chap. 4, P• 
216. 
144. 
87. 
2. Ibid., chap. 4, pp. 78-79· 
4· Ibid. 
7· Ibid., p. 118 . 
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study is that God is related to man as the suprapersonal 
to the personal, as the superconsciousness to the con-
sciousness, as the universal to the particular, as the in-
finite to the finite, as grace to freedom. In each case, 
Berdyaev is speaking of something that is really present in 
the person, and in fact does not exis t apart from the per-
son (just as the person does not exist apart from it). 
ii. Comparison with Tillich and DeWolf 
Tillich's thought on the meaning of the "image of God" 
in man also points to the heart of his doctrine of man. His 
reference to the 11 image 11 in the first volume of his theol-
-
ogy occurs within a cosmologico-theological context--the 
1 
consideration of God as creating. Here the emphasis is on 
the fact that it is man as creature who is called the 
"image of God." "Man is the image of God in that in which 
. -
he differs from all other creatures, namely, his rational 
structure. 112 This "rational structure'' is not what Tillich 
~ 
calls technical reason but, rather, it is that which par-
ticipates in the ontological reason which embraces both a 
meaningful structure of reality (objective reason) and 
1. Systematic Theology, I, 258-259· 
2. Ibid., p. 259· In thus defining the image as rationality, 
~llich takes his place in a long line of tradition 
which goes back to Aquinas, Augustine, and even beyond. 
On this tradition see David Cairns, The Image of God 
in Man (Ne York: Philosophical Library, 1953), chap. 8, 
"The Image as Rationality." 
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individual minds with the structured ability to grasp and 
to transform this meaningful structure of reality (sUbjec-
tive reason) . Thus man i s able to grasp structures, Gestalt 
processes, values and meanings in the universe . 
Man is the image of God because in him the ontolog-
ical elements are complete and united on a creature-
ly basis, just as they are complete and united in 
God as the creative ground . Man is the image of God 
because his logos is analogous to the divine logos, 
so that the divine logos can ap£ear as man without 
destroying the humanity of man . 
But this "rational structure" in man which constitutes 
the image of God is primarily the structure of man's crea-
turely, finite freedom. Only in man is to be found actual-
ized finite freedom, that is, 11the power of transcending 
the chain of stimulus and response by deliberation and de-
cision. u2 In the second volume of his theology , where the 
contextual concern is primarily soteriological , Tillich 
identifies the "image of God " as "all the qualities of hu-
man freedom taken in their unity . u3 But within this soteri-
ological context , Tillich seems to interpret finite freedom, 
of which the "image of Godu is a symbol , primarily and al-
most exclusively in terms of that which makes the Fall pos -
sible . "Only he who is the image of God has the power of 
1. Systematic Theology , I , 259 · Is it possible to detect 
here a Stoic understanding of reason? 
2. ~. , P• 258 . 3· Systematic Theology, II, 33· 
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separating himself from God. 111 And the particular aspect of 
this structured finite freedom which makes it possible for 
man to become estranged, to leave his essential center and 
to become the center of himself and of his world, is man's 
uniquely fully-centered being. He alone has self-conscious-
ness or complete centeredness, and "this structural centered-
De gives man his greatness, dignity, and being, the 
2 
'image of God'·" So, not only does Tillich refuse to define 
the "image" in terms of communion with God, but he seems 
. 
to emphasize that the "image of God" in man means man's 
separation from God. The image is not lost in the Fall but 
manifested. More emphasis is given to the notion that the 
11 image of God" in man is that which separates him from God 
rather than that which binds him to God. 
The striking feature of Tillich's exposition of his 
doctrine of the "image of Godu is the lack of any positive 
reference to God whose image it is supposed to be. He is 
primarily interested in pointing out that, in comparison 
with the rest of creation, man possesses special advantages 
and resources symbolized in the "image of God. 11 The concept, 
-
then, is based upon a comparison of man with the world in 
which he lives rather than upon any comparison of man with 
God. It is a concept which points to what makes man truly 
human,and for this reason could just as well be called "the 
1. Ibid. 2. ~., p. 49· 
image of man in man." While Tillich does assert that 
"certainly man can have communion with God only because 
he is made in his 1mage,"1 yet, apart from the question of 
what being related to God or having "communion with God" 
can mean for Tillich in view of his denial of a personal 
God, this statement does not point to any specific way in 
which man is like God. And again, when he asserts that 
"man is the image of God because his logos is analogous to 
the divine logos," this need not indicate anything more 
than the already-mentioned comparison of man with the world 
which confronts him, of the subjective and objective as-
pects of ontological reason. By "divine logos" Tillich does 
not mean God as such--his thought at this point seems to 
combine features of Stoicism and Platonism. "Divine logos" 
-points to the structures of meaning in reality, just as the 
Stoics used the term "logos" for the divine forces immanent 
' 
in the worla. and constitutive of all life. And "divine 
logos" also has somewhat the force of an intermediary agent 
which bridges the gap bet een God and the world (or man) 
and makes it possible to communicate with the world and act 
upon it, as it has meant in Platonism. 
This understanding of Tillich's interpretation of the 
"image of God" in man, if correct, clearly supports an ob-
servation made earlier on Tillich's Christology--that man's 
1. Systematic Theology, I, 259· 
hope of salvation does not appear to rest upon a direct, 
personal relationship of himself to God. 
337 
A considerable gap appears to separate Berdyaev and 
Tillich on the matter of a theological formulation of man's 
essential nature. Berdyaev, in his realistic interpretation 
of the "image" as the divine element in man, expresses the 
notion of divinization and ultimate union with God which is 
generally held in Eastern Orthodox theology. 1 In a real 
sense, Berdyaev's idea of human creativity is his restate-
ment of the Eastern notion of deification or apotheosis. 
His interpretation of the "image" is the basis for his 
optimism about man's resources and destiny in a world which 
is hostile to man. But such an interpretation places every-
thing on a razor's edge. In one sense, the notion of the 
divine element in man can be seen as ennobling man, as pro-
viding a ground for human value, dignity, fulfillment. But 
in another sense, since the divine element in man seems to 
be clearly identifiable and in some sense to be distin-
guished from the rest of what constitutes man's humanity, 
and is the basis for Berdyaev's optimistic valuation of man, 
1. The line of thought regard~ng the divinization of man 
goes back to such Eastern theologians as Irenaeus, 
Athanasius and Clement; and in Greek philosophy it 
goes even further back through Stoicism to Heraclitus 
ith his notion that the soul of man is a part of the 
universal Logos. In Berdyaev there is also a line of 
influence going back to the German mystics Jacob 
Boehme and Meister Eckhart. 
the question of Berdyaev's estimate of man,apart from the 
divine element and deification,produces the strong suspicion 
that it might be quite low and disdainful. Berdyaev's hope 
is in neither man as such nor in God as such, nor in the Gei-
man coD!rontation as it is generally understood in Christian 
thought, but in God-manhood . In the light of his view of 
God's immanence in the human person, the deified person 
seems to assume aspects of the 11 superman11 whose own creative 
self-expressions will be adequate to secure his ultimate 
salvation. 
Tillich clearly rejects any realistic interpretation 
of the 11 1mage of God" in man . In his Christology it was 
observed that he holds it to be a meaningless use of lan-
guage to speak of a finite person as being in any way a 
unity of a divine element and a human element . 1 It is char-
acteristic of him to assert that man is the image of God 
rather than that the image of God is in man . There is no 
special feature or level of man's being which is to be iden-
tified ith the image of God; rather , it is the total ~uc­
ture of a finite human person and in particular the personal 
structure of self-conscious or self-centered finite freedom . 
And the emphasis given in interpreting this freedom as the 
power of a man to separate himself from God seems to lead 
to the paradox that man's dignity is at the same time his 
1. See above, p. 318. 
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sin and undoing. Tillich clearly removes from man's being 
the divine element which Berdyaev sees there, but in so 
doing he seems to erect a formidable gulf between man and 
God. In his interpretation there exists the problem of any 
positive relationship between the "image of God" and the 
' 
God whose image it is . Contrasted with Berdyaev's view of 
man as the bearer of light and meaning in a dark world, man 
for Tillich remains an ambiguous being in an ambiguous 
world . 
DeWolf finds the meaning of the "divine image in man" 
in four persistent qualities of human 11fe.1 (1) Man is 
distinguished from the rest of creation and is like God by 
virtue of the fact that he is a spiritual being. His spirit-
ual nature is understood primarily in the personal cate-
gories of thinking, feeling , willing--elements involved in 
the analogy which DeWolf sees between the human person and 
God as Person . To say that man is a spiritual being is to 
say that he is a true self . DeWolf elsewhere makes the 
observation, relevant at this point , that the freedom of 
self-determination is one aspect of the divine image in man. 2 
1 . A Theology of the Living Church , PP • 205-207 . 
2 . Ibid ., p . 176 . It is in this regard that De olf speaks 
qualifiedly of human creativity: " e do possess, as 
stewards, a derived and dependent power to direct, in 
some measure, the onflowing development of our o n 
lives and of the continuing creative process of hich 
we are a part •••• We thus stand at the yet unfin-
ished edge of His creation where we are given a 
(L) Man possesses a deep sense of moral discrimination 
and obligation, so that the ethical category of righteous -
ness may be applied both to him and to God . 
(3) Man longs for union with God to gain his own self -
completion . This particular human quality depends upon 
DeWolf's first point, for a meaningful relationship is pos-
sible only if both man and God are spiritual beings. 
(4) Man's life is persistently marked by an aspiration 
to goodness . This particular expression is directly involved 
in DeWolf ' s second point regarding man's sense of moral 
obligation, for only as man recognizes the good can he de-
sire it and relate other values to the pursuit of goodness. 
Such an interpretation of the divine image in man is 
strongly personal and ethical in its emphasis . Because man 
is a person, he is a conscious rational being and therefore 
subject to categories of moral dis t inction; and because man 
is a person, he has divinely- endowed freedom to reject evil 
and to commit himself to the good . 
Both DeWolf and Tillich make some reference to man's 
rational nature in their interpretations of the divine 
image , although this rat ional structure is primarily onto-
logical for Tillich while it is strongly ethical for DeWolf. 
Both rel ate the image to man ' s finite freedom, but Tillich 
significant part in determining what it is to be" 
(Ibid. , p . 177) . 
seems preoccupied with finding in this freedom an explana-
tion of man's alienation from God, while DeWolf emphasizes 
man ' s freedom as the basis for cooperation with God and 
commitment to the good. Both relate the divine image to 
man 's nature as a self-centered being or person. 
DeWolf and Berdyaev , in their interpretations of the 
divine image, both intend to assert the inherent dignity of 
man. In fact, for DeWolf the notion of the image serves as 
a counter-balance to the notion of man as a sinner. For 
this reason, both men reject the idea that the image repre-
sents an orig~nal perfection or superaddition lost in the 
Fall , or that it represents only a reflection in man of the 
divine nature and so is a relationship of divine grace to 
man rather than a statement about man as such. Both relate 
the image to man as a spiritual being, to human freedom, and 
to man's hope for ultimate self-fulfillment . 
But in stating just what the image is, the two theolo-
gians assume irreconcilable positions . Berdyaev sees the 
image as a divine element really and actually present in 
man, apparently constituting the highest aspect of person-
ality. Deriolf, however, rejects the idea which would "regard 
God as literally putting Himself or some aspect of Himself 
into the experience of a man, in special revelation, so that 
the 'I' and 'Thou 1 become blurred in a single consciousness. ul 
1 . Ibid., P• 65 • 
Though he has appreciative words for the desire of the mys-
tics for the most intimate relationship with the Divine, he 
rejects any mystical tendency to affirm an identity with 
God. 
In all • • • relations He is shown as the divine 
Other. Indeed , so far as identity is concerned He 
is the Wholly Other, though this must not be taken 
to imply an absolute unlikeness •••• In the 
divine-human encounter a human being does not con-
front and address himself. It is not to ourselves 
that we give thanks and pray. To say that any of 
these transactions occurred simply in a man ' s re-
lation to himself would be to deny the gospel in its 
entirety ind reduce the Christian religion to a 
delusion. 
In a further word of warning on this matter, DeWolf 
finds that "wherever the line of distinction bet een man 
and God has been blurred, truth and sound religion have been 
brought into peril. tt2 
3• Evaluation of Berdyaev 1s Theological Position 
This evaluation of Berdyaev's thought involves a two-
fold approach: (1) it shall test the internal consistency 
of his thought; and (2) it shall seek to determine the ade-
quacy of his thought to interpret the meaning of Christian 
experience. In both instances the inquiry will center in 
1. Ibid., p. 118. This may account for a lack of reference 
to prayer in Berdyaev 1s writings. And Tillich, in a 
Harvard class in which the writer was present, once 
def'ined prayer as 11communion with one's higher self." 
2. Ibid., p. 119. A good illustration of the point which 
-:Dewolf makes here is the religion of India with its 
idea of Brahman-Atman. 
what have earlier been identified as Berdyaev's major theo-
logical emphases--his dualism, his doctrine of God (as it 
relates to the questions of God's transcendence, his person-
al nature, and his power and goodness), his Christology, and 
his doctrine of man. 
A. Internal Consistency 
Early in this study the decision was made to approach 
the exposition of Berdyaev's thought by beginning with his 
basic intuition regarding the place of man in the universe. 
The following consideration of the internal consistency of 
Berdyaev's theological thought will likewise begin with this 
basic intuition. 
Berdyaev's emphasis on man's creative role in the world 
involves his conviction that man is confronted by a hostile 
worl~wbich threatens his personal existence because it does 
not support basic values and the struggle of the human per-
son for self-realization. The objective world in Berdyaev's 
dualism is a world which is not created by God and is devoid 
of the presence of God. Man 's hope somehow lies in his sub-
jective resources. 
Actually, this view of man vis-a-vis his objective 
world environment is more than just a cosmological construc-
tion. It is a theological statement and implies a particular 
doctrine of God. Berdyaev, as well as religious thought in 
general , is not concerned with the world as it is in itsel~ 
but only with the world as it is related to God . 
Berdyaev's negative evaluation of man's objective envi-
ronment leaves only two actual alternatives for philosoph-
ical thought about God- -either God's existence is virtually 
denied as a result of the failure to assign to God a deter-
minative role in man ' s environment , or God is disengaged 
from the objective order of things and is confined to the 
realm of subjectivity. 
Three emphases in Berdyaev's thought about God have 
been identified as particularly relevant to his theme of 
human creativity . He was first seen to hold, with regard to 
the question of the transcendence of God, that God tran-
scends the objective world which he himself does not create . 
Transcendence thus understood is simply the disengagement 
of God from the objective world environment of man . The 
creative activity of God is confined to the creation of sub-
jects or persons (i . e ., to the realm of human subjectivity) 
so that God can be said to exist only as he exists imman-
ently in the human person. Thus God is fully immanent in 
his creation. Berdyaev has thus chosen the second of the 
two alternatives for thought about God which were mentioned 
above , and at this point he appears to be consistent with 
his basic intuition of man's position in the world . 
The second emphasis in Berdyaev ' s thought about God, 
which has to do with the question of the personal nature of 
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God, is that the God to whom man is related does not possess 
his own proper subjectivity, but rather is conceived in the 
image of a personal being within the context of religious 
experience. God thus becomes personal in the true experience 
of him which is symbolized by such words as "Spirit" and 
"Christ, 11 but apart from this religious experience Berdyaev 
does not say that God is personal or a true self. In view 
of his assertion of the complete immanence of God in the 
human person, his particular understanding of the way in 
which God may be said to be personal seems consistently to 
follow. If God were in any sense a truly personal being, his 
transcendence of his creation would seem to follo • There 
appears to be a necessary relationship between divine per-
sonality and divine transcendence of the created torld. 
Berdyaev at this point is also consistent ith his interpre-
tation of man's position in the world, for a God who is not 
personal and who is immanent in the human person could not 
be expected to be purposefully active in man's objective 
environment. 
The third and final assertion about God which this 
study has determined to be fundamental in Berdyaev's doc-
trine of human creativity is the distinction which he makes 
between God the Absolute and God the Creator, or bet een the 
divine power and the divine goodness. These two aspects of 
reality exist in a dialectical relationship, hich is actually 
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an existential dialectic,since they describe the process of 
man's subjective existence as it centers in two basic human 
capacities--self-expression and meaning. Man's power for 
self-expression suggests the Ungrund, a primal reality of 
freedom, will or dynamic force which is inherent in man as 
man. This is the fundamental aspect of the process of man's 
life, more basic than meaning itself. Indeed, even before 
he achieves self-consciousness or is aware of the question 
of meaning, man gives expression to his unformed freedom. 
The development of personality in man involves the synthesis 
of this primal freedom and meaning into a meaningful free-
dom. And this is the story not only of man's individual 
subjective existence but also of the whole of reality 
itself. The cosmic process is the enlightenment of radical 
freedom (the Ungrund) by God the Creato~who is understood 
to be an immanent aspect or moment or principle of the 
process -and this process is (or at least centers in) the 
process of man's subjective existence. 
This particular understanding of a tension between 
divine power and divine goodness appears to be consistent 
with Berdyaev's other two teachings about God. Since it is 
a theogonic process immanent in man's subjectivity, it pre-
serves the idea of the immanence of God in his creation. 
Also, both this immanence and the fact of a clear distinc-
tion between divine power and divine goodness serve to 
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maintain Berdyaev's view that God the Creator is not truly 
a personal being possessing his own proper subjectivity. 
In the thought of Berdyaev, personality is al ays the syn-
thesis of freedom and meaning. 1 And the fact that this rela-
tionship between the divine power and the divine goodness, 
representing the progressive enlightenment of the cosmic 
life, is conceived in terms of subjectivit~makes it consis-
tent with Berdyaev's negative evaluation of man's position 
in the orld because it maintains that any growth of meaning 
is tied to man's subjective resources and has no objective 
source . 
The last two emphases in Berdyaev's theological thought 
which have been identified as supporting his teaching on 
creativity, namely his teachings concerning Christ and the 
image of God in man, can best be understood,not as advances 
in thought beyond what has already been observed in his 
thinkiQS about God, but rather as explications of this basic 
thinking by the use of key ideas found in the realm of 
Christian theology which touch upon the doctrine of man. 
"Christ" in Berdyaev's vocabulary represents the id a, 
abstracted from the Chalcedonian Creed, of the divine nature 
and the human nature in one person . The term is used primarily 
to refer to the divine-human process within man himself, 
1 . Thus it can be maintained that the Absolute God and God 
the Creator are terms which function as symbols of the 
ra material from hich human personality is produced 
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and especially to the goal of man's self-realization in 
this process . Since this idea continues to carry the subjec-
tive emphasis in Berdyaev's thought, there is no problem of 
its accommodation to Berdyaev's negative evaluation of man's 
objective environment . The concept of "Christ" also serves 
Berdyaev as a vehicle for expressing divine immanence; it 
symbolizes the true nature of religious experience in which 
alone God can be said to be personal; and it represents in 
man the positive relationship between man's primal freedom 
(Ungrund, the Absolute God, divine power) and the divine 
logos (God the Creator, divine grace, divine goodness) which 
is a process of synthesis and enlightenment within the Divine 
life itself . Thus far Berdyaev's understanding of Christ 
seems to be consistent with other theological aspects of his 
thought . 
But Christ for Berdyaev also symbolizes the corporate 
self-realization of the world , i . e ., universal salvation. 
This is the expression of an underlying optimism in his 
thought . Ho ever , is such an optimism with regard to the 
cosmic process consistent with his general theological posi-
tion? According to Berdyaev, man ' s objective world environ-
ment supports neither a uni versal salvation nor the salvation 
of the individual . In his view of God , which leaves no room 
for the transcendenc e of the Creator over his creation and 
no allowance for a Creator who i s in himself a personal 
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being who envisions goals or purposes and the means for their 
achievement , and which asserts that the divine goodness and 
the divine power do not fully inform one another, there is 
no room for the assertion of a comprehensive providence such 
as seems required as a basic framework within which a belief 
in universal salvation can reasonably be held. Furthermore, 
if the primal human freedom,whose transformation by divine 
grace is symbolized in Christ, is as radical and as irrational 
a freedom as Berdyaev seems to indicate, then there is no 
real reason why it should choose for God rather than against 
God . In the matter of consistency , then , there does appear 
to be a problem in relating Berdyaev ' s cosmic optimism to 
the rest of his thought . To a great extent this is a problem 
inherent in any system of thought which takes a strongly 
subjective position as its starting point and then seeks to 
conclude by embracing all of reality . Just as Berdyaev saw 
the difficulty of moving from the object to the subject , so 
his thought exhibits the difficulty of moving from the sub-
ject to the object . 
Finally, in the matter of Ber dyaev ' s interpretation of 
the image of God in man , his subjective emphasis is resumed . 
His realist interpretation of the i mage represents his 
assertion of the Divine immanence , which is conceived in 
personal imager y , in the human person. This personal image 
of the Divine immanence is God the Creato~ ho works to 
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transform the freedom of man's depths. The effective pres-
ence of the image of God in man is conceived in Christolog-
ical terms and is the basis for Berdyaev's position that 
human personality is divine-human. 
It seems possible to conclude that the basic theolog-
ical beliefs of Berdyaev, which undergird his doctrine of 
human creativity, do possess a relationship to one another 
which is generally consistent. The only problem appears to 
be in relating his cosmic optimism, as expressed in his idea 
of the cosmic Christ or universal salvation, to the rest 
of his thought • 
B. The Adequacy of Berdyaev's Theological Thought to 
Interpret the Meaning of Christian Experience 
i. Berdyaev's Dualism 
There is an indissoluble bond between Christian expe-
rience and the Christian interpretation of man's natural 
world (the word 11world 11 here means the environment which 
all men have in common). This is not to suggest that Chris-
tian faith and experience arise out of or start at the 
point of an impartial, empirical study of nature. Rather, 
the Christian interpretation of the world environment of man 
is itself the expression of a prior faith and experience. 
To be more specific, the Christian view of the created world 
is determined by the Christian knowledge of God as Creator, 
who is known as Creator on the basis of a prior encounter 
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with him as Lord and Savior. 
(A) Three observations can be made concerning the in-
adequacy of Berdyaev's thought to interpret the meaning of 
Christian experience on the basis of the following assump-
tions about this experience . First, Christian experience at 
its best has been informed with a sense of appreciation for 
the natural world as God's good creation, having in some 
sense its own existence over against the Creator, while at 
the same time remaining continuously and completely dependent 
upon God's sovereign creative power . Second, Christian ex-
perience has been characterized by the awareness of a conti-
nuity between the subjective human experience of God and the 
wider environment of man's life, so that the world, vie ed 
as the proper setting for the life which God wills, is seen 
as a complement of the Christian experience . 
(1) The most serious inadequacy of Berdyaev ' s thought 
at this point is his failure to identify the Savior God with 
the Creator of the natural world . According to him, asser-
tions about God as Savior and Creator are applicable only to 
the content of one ' s subjective experience . 1 The external 
world of nature is held to be not God's creation but man's 
1 . The terms "Savior" and "Creator," in referring to Ber-
dyaev's thought .about God , have to be used with quali-
fication . There is no Savior God in the sense of a 
personal deity actively engaged in seeking man ' s good . 
There is no creation in the sense that something came 
into being which absolutely was not . 
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creation, the result of the Fall which took place in the 
spiritual world and which preceded rather than follo ed the 
creation of the natural world. Berayaev seems to come close 
to embracing the Manichaean view that the natural world is 
evil in itself,when he describes this world as a strange, 
hostile, evil world. 
In this aspect of Berdyaev's thought it is possible to 
see a variation of the view of early Christian Gnostic sects 
which claimed that the Creator God and the Savior God were 
not the same God, that there was a difference bet een the 
God of the Old Testament,who had created matter (and thus 
was a low-level deity), and the God of the New Testament, who 
is concerned with the salvation of men. In Berdyaev's 
thought the functions of the Old Testament Creator God are 
in part assumed by man through his process of "objectifi-
cation," and the God involved in man ' s salvation is only 
present in one's subjectivity . 
This radical exclusion of God from the objective uni-
verse actually amounts to a forfeiture of the attempt, so 
characteristic of liberal theology, to show a basic harmony 
between religion and science . In a form of dichotomy which 
seems to be particularly tempting to theology in recent 
times, Berdyaev has conceded to natural science complete 
autonomy in the physical realm, has discharged God from the 
role of cosmic providence, and has retained God to deal 
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exclusively with the soul. 
Berdyaev's conception of the relationship of man's 
objective environment to the divine world is therefore a 
basically negative one. The natural world i s not the crea-
tion of God, it is void of the presence and activity of God, 
and it does not permit man to find God. One scholar has ob-
served that it is the Christian consensus that the created 
world exhibits "real existence, dependence, and adaptation 
to the Christian end, 111 but Berdyaev would say that this 
world has no real existence, is not dependent upon God, and 
is not adapted to the Christian end. Such a view of man's 
world environment does little to reflect the meaning of 
Christian experience as this meaning may be expressed in a 
sense of positive appreciation for the natural world as the 
creation of God the Creator, poss essing its own existence, 
totally dependent upon God ' s creative power, and complemen-
tary to the subjective experience of God . 
(2) Another inadequacy of such a dualism, suggested in 
the primary criticism stated just above , is that it endan~s 
the unity and coherence of the Christian experience of God 
1 . Walter Marshall Horton , Christian Theology : An Ecumenical 
Approach (New York : Harper and Bros , 1958), P• 118, 
quoting illiam Adams Brown , Christian Theology in 
Outli ne, pp . 198 ff . Horton states that Christian 
thinkers throughout the his tory of Christian thought 
have preserved a common vie of the relationship of 
the world to God which can be briefly stated in these 
three assertions about the created world . 
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and Christian thought about God's activity in the world. 
This unity and coherence are preserved if salvation is close-
ly associated with the creation of man's total world environ-
ment, rather than understood as an emergency measure or an 
escapism because no effective basis has been established for 
relating man to the world about him. In Berdyaev's thought 
it can even be said that salvation is, in some sense, the 
antithesis of the creation of the world . The close associa-
tion of salvation with the creation of the world ould mean 
that salvation , understood as the bringing of the world to 
fulfillment , though distinct from creation,which is the 
bringing of the world into being , is nevertheless to be 
viewed as the fulfillment of the divine purpose which was 
first expressed in creation . Thus the God of creation and 
the God of salvation are identified , and the nature of his 
relation to the world , whether as Creator or Savior , is best 
expressed in the word 11 love . 11 
(3) There is also the additional necessity for the 
unity of Christian experience itself for purposes of veri 
fication . Berdyaev seems to say that the subjective experi-
ence of God is self-authenticating and must not be subordin-
ated to something less than itself (which means any objective 
criterion) . Such a position would appear to leave no basis 
for distinguishing what is actually the Word of God from 
what is but the projection of one's own wishes and fears . 
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The demand for the unity of experience would insist that 
the subjective experience of God be authenticated by the 
objective activity of God in history and in nature (this 
involves a coherence theory of truth). Here subjective ex-
perience and exper~ence of what is objective substantiate 
one another; and while each does not determine the other, 
together they form a single complex which demands for both 
a common origin--God. 
(B) But hidden behind what may be considered an over-
statement of the discrepancy between man's nature and destiny 
and the inadequacy of man's environment to guarantee that 
destiny lies an important positive value in Berdyaev's 
thought. At least part of the motivation back of his nega-
tive evaluation of man's objective world may be found in his 
concern to show that there is a clear distinction to be 
made between man and the rest of creation, that man is not 
a being whose life can be exhausted in the orld-pictures 
of positivism and naturalism as he knew them. And he has 
rightly seen that man's very self-consciousness is the best 
denial of any system of thought which would see man as just 
a phase of the objective social and natural orld. If it be 
granted that Christian experience is characterized by a 
sense of human need which cannot be satisfied by the phys1cal 
universe and by the awareness of a realm transcending the 
physical world in which man's spirit is sustained, then 
in this respect Berdyaev's dualistic thought touches upon 
something which is basic to the very existence of religion 
itself. 
ii. Berdyaev's Doctrine of God 
Christian experience, by its very nature, seems to re-
quire certain assumptions regarding the Object of Christian 
experience which will best account for that experience. 
(1) The very essence of Christian experience is abso-
lute trust in God and commitment to God. The God who would 
most adequately justify such a trust is a God who has a liv-
ing interest in the human person and is actively seeking 
that person's well-being. This would require that God pos-
sess the ability to know, the freedom to direct himself in 
response to human need, and the capacity for fellowship 
(i.e., the capacity to receive personal trust). In other 
words, Christian experience seems to presuppose that God 
possesses the attributes of personality and is indeed per-
s onal, the "Thou" of religious experience. 
~ (2) Christian experience, by virtue of its sense of 
direct confrontation with God and its positive evaluation 
of the world as God's creation, testifies to the immanence 
of God. But Christian experience is also most frequently 
informed with a sense of God's otherness, God's freedom to 
act in the world, God's judgment upon the failure to conform 
to his will, God's quality of mysterium tremendum. Christian 
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experience seems to imply God's transcendence along with his 
immanence. 
(3) The wholeness and absoluteness of the self's com-
mitment to God, which earlier was thought to be best sup-
ported by a belief in a personal God, also seems to imply 
the unity of God's being . Anything which would cast a shadow 
over the adequacy of God to meet human need, such as the 
presence of conflicting elements in God or a disparity be-
t 1een the revealed nature and the mysterious nature of God, 
would not seem to justify and support the kind of self-aban-
donment 1hich is required in Christian experience. 
(A) If Christian experience has been expressed by a 
sense of the personal nature of God , the transcendence as 
well as the immanence of God, and the unity of the being of 
God, then Berdyaev's concept of God inadequately interprets 
the meaning of Christian experience in three respects . 
(1) A key problem appear s in Berdyaev's thought regard-
ing the personal nature of God . For him there is no personal 
God existing in and for himself, to whom a person is related 
in religious experience . The per onal image of God is a 
feature of the religious experience of God, but apart from 
this image (a feature of man's subjective experience) there 
is only the mysterious, hidden God . This understanding of 
God as personal does not appear to express adequately what 
Christian experience seems to imply with regard to the 
personal nature of its Object. Although the term 11 I-Thou 11 is 
of recent coinage, it expresses well the nature of the God-
~~n relationship in Christian experience as one marked by 
mutuality, directness and intensity. Although Berdyaev makes 
use of the 11 I-Thou 11 idea, he does so primarily in an att erupt 
to redirect theology from an objective approach which is 
concerned with God's existence and nature (which, he cen-
t ends , makes God an 11 It 11 ) to a more sub j ec ti ve approach. 
But in doing this he seems to have lost the dialogical 
nature of the 11 I-Thou11 relationship, the notion that it is 
a relation between God and man. If God is only personal in 
the human experience of the divine, then apparently the 
11 Thou 11 of religious experience is not at the same time an 
11 I," the Object of Christian experience is not a ubject. 
This seems to make the Christian experience a relation to a 
11 God-idea 11 rather than to the living God of biblical faith. 
This involves one of the great theological questions of the 
day--can Christian experience be sustained (or even enriched) 
if it is based exclusively upon a subjective symbolism and 
imagery of the Divine? Such an emphasis would seem to weaken 
the agape aspect of the 11 I-Thou 11 relationship (the strong 
biblical notion of God's initiative and concern for man) 
and to make more prominent the ~aspect (the Greek idea 
that man must strive to reach God, that God is not an effi-
cient participant in religious experience but functions as 
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the goal of human progress) . It is significant that Berdyaev 
does recognize the essential person- to- person , existential 
nature of Christian experience ; and his assertion of the 
personal image of the Divine aspect of the experience is an 
attempt to meet this need . But what is at issue here is 
much more than the mere use of the word 11 pers onal"; what is 
at issue is the crucial matter of the adequacy of the Other 
in Christian experience . It is here that Berdyaev's state-
ment on the personal aspect of God seems inadequate to in-
spire the kind of personal trust and vital encounter which 
have characterized the Christian experience of God . 
(2) The problem of the adequacy of Berdyaev 1s thought 
to interpret the meaning of Christian experience which has 
been noted above in his position on the personal nature of 
God has its carry-over into the questions of the divine 
transcendence and the unit y of God ' s being . 
Berdyaev takes the position that God the Creator , to 
whom personal imagery is applicable , only exists as immanent 
in the human person, and that any transcendence of the Crea-
tor can only be of the nature of a value- dimension within 
the immanenc e . God the Creator only exists as a dimension 
(the highest) of one ' s subjective being , and he does not 
exist independent of his creation . It seems logically to 
follow , then , since God has no s elfhood of his o m, that 
the existence of the Creator i3 dependent upon the existence 
of finite personalities . In fact , the theogonic drama of 
which Berdyaev writes, i . e ., the birth of God the Creator 
from the Ungrund, seems best interpreted as the symbolic 
representation of the evolutionary emergence of personality 
from the prior subconscious stage of the universal process . 
Such a view, which leaves little room for the transcendence 
of the Creator , seems inadequate to express the meaning of 
Christian experience which is informed with the sense of 
God ' s otherness, God ' s freedom to act , God's judgment, God's 
mysterium tremendum. Christian experience has characteris-
tically included the strong biblical emphasis on the God 
who stands above the world as the sovereign Lord of individ-
uals and nations . The human person has sensed a creaturely 
dependence upon the Creator rather than a sense of independ-
ence from the Creator or of dependence of the Creator upon 
the creation . The salvation associated with Christian expe-
rience , which is generally understood as the free and gra-
cious act of God who wills to deliver man from sin to new-
ness of life, seems best understood as the gift of a God who 
is not only personal but transcendent . Such an idea of God 
also best supports that aspec t of Christian experience in 
which God is experienced as Judge , as One who requires fi-
delity and obedience to himself , as One who dispenses due 
recompense to the sinner and to the faithful person . 
(3) Berdyaev has described a tension in the divine 
life between the divine power and the divine goodness which 
actually amounts to a division. Neither aspect of the divine 
life directly supports the other, and this tension is re-
solved in the human creative experience, which alone can give 
meaning to the dynamic thrust of the universe and can give 
goodness an effective expression. The divine power is asso-
ciated with the Ungrund, a concept which represents the 
indeterminate, chaotic, amoral power in all things; and the 
divine goodness is symbolized in God the Creator, who is him-
elf generated from the Ungrund. vVhile it is true that, in a 
sense, this means that divine power and divine goodness are 
not ultimately irreconcilable, since they have a common or~n 
in the Ungrund, yet it does posit a dualism in the very 
ground of all things and gives a primacy to the indeterminate 
power of the Ungrund. ~uch a lack of positive unity in God 
would seem to detract from the adequacy of God to meet human 
need, and this in turn makes it questionable whether such a 
God can inspire a complete and absolute commitment of the 
self. In fact, such a dualism in the divine life appears to 
threaten God's ability to overcome it, and this is no doubt 
a prime reason for Berdyaev's emphasis on human creativity, 
which offers the only ground for hope that the dualistic 
conflict can be resolved. 
(B) In the light of Christian experience there are at 
least three positive things which can be said about Berdyaev~ 
concept of God. 
(1) His concept of God includes the suggestion of the 
ultimate unity of being. The Ungrund, the primal source of 
every particular thing, is also the symbol of the ultimate 
enlightened unity of all things in God. If Christian experi-
ence suggests the unity of God's being, then it would also 
seem to suggest the ultimate synthesis of all of creation 
as the unified expression of the divine creative will. In 
Berdyaev's thought, however, this vision of the ultimate 
unity of being is not accompanied by the assertion of the 
unity of God's being, and thus it lacks a support hich it 
seems to require. 
(2) Berdyaev's position makes allowance for diversity 
of being. His stress on the inviolability of personality 
and freedom, and his rejection of any idea of God or concep-
tion of salvation which imposes an obligatory pattern upon 
the individual without regard for his specific needs and 
capacities, represent a vision of the universe enriched 
through diversity . If the God of Christian experience is 
agape love, and if he justifies personal trust by his living 
interest in the person and his action to secure the person's 
well-being, then he will accept each person as a unique 
entity. A diversity of being would seem to be involved in 
such a conception of the God-man relationship . 
(3) Berdyaev's position presents a religiously 
available God, at least in the sense that it is possible 
for the person to participate in Reality, to adjust himself 
to It by powers which are inherent in It and available to 
him. The limited nature of the strength of Berdyaev's 
thought at this point is evident in the fact that the God 
of his thought never literally acts in behalf of a person, 
never answers prayers. But in so far as his thought does 
give a religiously available God, a positive appreciation 
can be expressed for what certainly is a sine qua non of 
Christian experience. 
iii. Berdyaev's Cbristology 
Christian experience differs from religious experience 
in general by virtue of the fact that it centers in Christ. 
It has been observed that the very essence of the Christian 
experience is absolute trust in God . But one must be con-
vinced that the Other of this relationship is worthy of 
such trust. 
One aspect of the Christian's faith-relationship with 
God, then, would seem to be summed up in the words of the 
Apostle Paul: "God was in Christ reconciling the world unto 
himself" (2 Cor. 5:19). Jesus Christ, whose actions cannot 
be separated from the purpose of God, has brought assurance 
of God's love and forgiveness. The one in whom Christian 
faith is centered has revealed the depth of God's concern. 
So it is that the Christian's relationship to God i s at the 
same time a relationship to Christ, based upon the recog-
nition that in and thr.ough Christ (his life, death, and 
resurrection) God has revealed himself for the salvation 
of men. This is the basis in experience for the belief in 
the divinity of Christ.l 
Arising out of the experience of God in the earliest 
Christian community, the apostolic message centered in the 
facts of .Jesus' life in relation to God's ongoing purpose. 
The Christian experience of God is to be seen as a call to 
orient one's self about a new center, and this new center 
is not a mere ideal or an abstraction,but it is a fact. The 
identification of the Christ of religious experience with 
the historical .Jesus has tended to give Christian faith the 
distinctive features of definiteness and purpose, and to make 
faith a profoundly ethical experience because the identifi-
cation gives direction and structure to the new powers of 
the Spirit. The concreteness of the experience thus centered 
in Christ awakens man to the depth of his own sin,but also 
more hopefully to his true status before God. Thus Christian 
experience seems to reveal the necessity for a faith in the 
full humanity of .Jesus Christ, the "second Adam." 
1. The reality of the Christian experience indicates only 
that God does redeem men through Christ (or, it is just 
as proper to say that Christ redeems men when Christ 
is understood to express the purpose and act of God). 
It is the difficult task of theology proper to attempt 
to state with precision and comprehensiveness how God 
does this. -
(A) There are three ways in which Berdyaev's Christo-
logy seems to be inadequate in interpreting the meaning or 
Christian experience . 
(1) If Christian experience, in its highest and most 
characteristic expression, has centered in an experience of 
Christ, whose meaning for the person of faith is based upon 
the facts of the objective, historical existence of Jesus 
Christ (his life, death, and resurrection); and if all 
subjective, spiritual experiences of the living Christ are 
viewed as having to do with an extension or the historical 
person beyond the usual limitations of space and time--
then Berdyaev 1s strongly subjective approach to Christology, 
with little real concern for the historical person, seems 
to fall short of adequately interpreting the meaning of the 
Christian experience of Christ . Berdyaev's sUbjective ap-
proach to the understanding of Christ may be due, in part, 
to an historical skepticism, but it is ultimately the ex-
pression of Berdyaev's basic mystical approach in which 
time is but the moving shadow of eternity. He does not find 
God in history but in "meta-history"; God is not continuous 
with history but does break in upon it in the creative act. 
This involves the undervaluation of historical time in favor 
of existential time and eternity. But Christianity has 
always been an historical religion, both in the sense of 
believing in the importance of the historical character of 
Jesus Christ and in affirming an intimate connection between 
the activity of God and the course of human history (as 
reflected in the doctrine of providence , a doctrine which 
Berdyaev rejects) . Though Berdyaev's thought is christolog-
ically-centered, the nature of Christian experience seems 
to require that his subjective Christology be balanced by a 
corresponding appreciation for the impact of the concrete 
facts relating to the life of the historical Jesus . It is 
perhaps due t o the lack of such an impact upon religious 
experience as he understands it that his thought seems to 
lie more in the direction of saying that the Christian expe-
rience is Christ rather than saying that it is an experience 
of Christ . Christology then becomes a statement about the 
experience rather than about what is experienced . 
(2) Again , if Christian experience has been so centered 
in Christ as to suggest that it is through the mediation or 
Christ that the salvation of God has appeared and is expe-
rienced by men, then Berdyaev ' s thought reveals a further 
inadequacy. In the light of his emphasis upon the immanence 
of God in human personality with no divine transcendence, 
the very problem of mediation, to which Christ is the answer 
in Christian faith, does not exist for Berdyaev . Since God 
is not transcendent to human personality, there can be no 
gap to be bridged and no real need for a mediator . Thus 
there is missing in Berdyaev the strong christological 
emphasis on Christ as the expression of the divine initia-
tive in man's salvation, and the primary emphasis on Christ 
as the revelation of God's love, will and purpose for man. 
While Christian exper ence does find in Christ the revela-
tion of the divine purpose for man, this element seems to 
constitute the whole of the revelation of Christ for Ber-
dyaev . Christ is not viewed as a revelation of the heart and 
mind of God but as a revelation of man's true humanity . This 
is the basic idea in Berdyaev's assertion that his Christo-
logy is a Christology of man which is concerned with a ne 
anthropology . 
The absence of the insight of Christian experience that 
God mediates his salvation through Christ, coupled with 
Berdyaev's disinterest in the historical Jesus, makes his 
thought appear to lead in the direction of reducing the 
"Christ" of the New Testament to a symbol of the achievement 
of authentic selfhood . In fact , since God in no way tran-
scends man's being but is totally immanent, there seems to 
be a danger of the humanist tendency to demythologize God 
himself, so that God becomes equivalent to 11man at his best," 
the "ideal man . " 
Because of this tendency in his thought, it seems pos-
sible to observe in Berdyaev the tendency to substitute 
Christology for the Christ . This is the tendency to regard 
Christ as an historical exemplar of a universal and eternal 
truth, as the supreme manifestation of the Idea of the unity 
of man with God. Salvation then becomes the development and 
realization of man's innate divinity as revealed in Jesus 
Christ the God-Man. There is no recognition here of Kierke-
gaard 's 11 absolute paradox. 11 The s ubstit uti on of Christ ology 
for the Christ means that it is possible to be fascinated by 
the idea of "Christ, 11 to be overwhelmed by the speculative 
grandeur of Christology, and yet ignore what Christ himself 
was, said or did. This is to be concerned with Christ as a 
dogma but not with Christ as the Word of God. Consequently, 
the meaning of Christ which Christian experience seems to 
presuppose is not adequately stated in Berdyaev's thought. 
(3) If the absolute commitment which characterizes the 
Christian experience is made to God as he is revealed in 
Christ, then the absolute nature of the commitment ould seem 
to require that the historical revelation of God in Christ 
possess a corresponding ultimacy and finality (in the sense 
of being definitive), so that in a real sense the history 
of salvation is henceforth ~post facto. But the historical 
revelation of God in Jesus Christ is not accepted by Ber-
dyaev as the final and fullest revelation of God. His posi-
tion, which anticipates a revelation of God hich ill 
supersede the historical revelation in Jesus Christ, is 
based upon a speculative trinitarian idea that revelation 
must pass through all three Persons in chronological order--
Father , Son and Holy Spirit . The idea of a revelation of the 
Spirit agrees with other aspects of his thought such as the 
immanental view of God in persons, and the sUbjective nature 
of Berdyaev's approach with the resulting tendency to depre-
ciate events in historical time and to feel that an histor-
ical event cannot be final , absolute and ultimate. Such a 
view would seem to undercut the very basis in Christian ex-
perience for an absolute commitment to God as revealed in 
Jesus Christ . In making Christian experience center in the 
vague concept of Spirit, Berdyaev's thought tends to weaken 
the profound ethical impact of the Christian experience of 
God. 
(B) There are two features of Berdyaev's thought which 
possess positive value in making clear the meaning of Christ 
for Christian experience . 
(1) One positive characteristic of his thought is the 
ay in which it is centered in Christ (this is apart from 
any consideration of his interpretation of the meaning of 
Christ). He has made a conscious attempt to speak of both 
God and man only within the basic framework of the God-
manhood manifested in Christ . He thus has attempted, in an 
essential manner, to center his thought in that which is 
also the center of Christian experience, and this gives his 
thought its basic Christian perspective . 
(2) If the concreteness of Christian experience, as it 
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centers in Christ, awakens man to his true status before 
God, and if the Christ is not a psychological abnormality 
nor the great Exception but rather the great Example, then 
it seems that Berdyaev's insistence upon a Christology of 
man has some merit to it. 
It cannot be said that there is now a clear consensus 
in the formulation of a Christian anthropology. Strong re-
cent influences in theology have been against the acceptance 
of anthropology as a proper concern for theology. But if a 
Christian understanding of man begins by regarding the God-
man relationship as the concrete datum, and sees clearly 
that man's concrete and positive nature lies in his rela-
tionship to God, then the formulation of a Chris tian anthro-
pology need not fall into the grips of either humanism or 
anthropocentr1sm. Unfortunately , due to Berdyaev's under-
standing of what is involved in the God- man relationship, 
it is not certain that he has avoided this pitfall . 
The Apostle Paul speaks of "mature manhood" as 11 the 
. 
measure of the stature of the fullness of Christ" (Eph. 4:13). 
-The Chalcedonian Creed states that Christ is "complete in 
-
manhood," "truly man," "like us in all respects, apart from 
-
sin. " If Christ is true personality and true manhood, then 
it should be possible to make use of Christology in the 
statement of the meaning of Christian personality . 
One particular factor which gives urgency to a concern 
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for a Christology of personality is the influence of psycho-
therapy upon Christian thought . Psychotherapy has shown that 
human beings cannot fulfill their own natures unless their 
capacities gain free expression . Berdyaev seemed to be well 
aware of this . Translated into terms of Christian salvation, 
this means that unless what Christ signifies can be related 
in a positive manner to resources discoverable in man, Christ 
cannot be identified with the aims and standards which man 
feels are his own . In that case , Christ becomes an alien, 
powerless figure . 
iv . Berdyaev's Doctrine of b~n 
Though the idea of the 11 image of God" has always been 
present in Christian thought concerning the nature of man 
(and this is a clear indication that it expresses some vital 
aspect of the Christian experience) , it i s impossible to 
point to a particular interpretation of the image which 
represents the unanimous or even traditional Christian point 
of view. But the general direction which Christian thought 
has taken in dealing with thi3 idea is also the direction 
which it has taken in its doctrine of man . 
The nature of the Chris t ian experience of God not only 
points to certain assumptions about God hich seem to explain 
the experience most adequately , but it points also to a de-
finite understanding about man . The Christian view of man i 
based on the analysis of man ' s own experience of God . 
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The fact that man does have the experience of God and, 
so far as is known, only man of all created beings is capable 
of a conscious relationship with God, suggests the broader 
aspects of what the "image of God" may mean . It is the symbol 
of that which differentiates man from the rest of creation 
although he is continuous with creation, and the symbol of 
man's likeness to God although he is transcended by God. 
The first chapter of Genesis pictures God as saying, "Let us 
make man in our image, after our likeness; and let them have 
dominion over" the living creatures of the earth. This points 
to the aspect of human experience which suggests that man 
is not wholly immersed in nature and one with nature over 
against the divine otherness of the Creator, but was created 
for a place of dignity which transcends the rest of creation. 
But, even more than this, in the experience of God God speaks 
to man and man can respond . There is something about the 
nature of man which is the bas is for dialogue . The 11 image of 
. 
God" symbolizes man's capacity to receive and to reflect the 
grace of God, and is the very basis for any saving relation-
ship bet een man and God . Thus the "image of God 11 testifies 
-to man's likeness to God , and it has served as the basis for 
knowledge about God from analogy with the human person. The 
image means that man is essentially a spiritual being . 
But if man as a spiritual being is understood as making 
an absolute commitment to the holy will of God in Christian 
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experience , if the Christian experience as it centers in 
Christ does awaken man to both the depth of his own sin and 
his true status before God,so that he is constantly faced 
with the necessity of making ethical decisions--then a 
further distinctive human quality to which the 11 image of 
God" points can be mentioned . This is that man possesses a 
sense of moral responsibility to correspond to the call to 
decision which is characteristic of Christian experience. 
And this sense of moral responsibility, in turn, means that 
man can determine his life in a way that the rest of creation 
cannot because he possesses human freedom. 
(A) If the 11 1mage of God 11 in man points to certain qual-
ities of the human participant in the Divine-human encounte~ 
such as man's ability to transcend his own creatureliness, 
his likeness to God as the basis for religious experience, 
his freedom as a responsible being , then Berdyaev's thought 
about the image is inadequate in two respects . 
(1) It can be observed that the image for Berdyaev is 
also that which differentiates man from the rest of creation, 
is the basis for human dignity and value , and is the symbol 
of man's lordly calling in the world . Ho ever, he over-
emphasizes this aspect to the point where he does not give 
proper recognition to man ' s finitude and creaturehood, man's 
deep involvement in temporality , and the impingement of the 
rest of creation upon man's being . It is as creature that 
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man is said to be in the image o~ God. 
(2) But it is in Berdyaev's understanding o~ the image 
as it concerns man's relationship to God that the most 
serious inadequacy is to be ~ound. In contrast to an inter-
pretation which has seriously taken the word "image" to mean 
a likeness or resemblance to God, which is a quality or as-
pect of man's own proper and deepest nature, Berdyaev iden-
ti~ies the image realistically as a divine constituent 
element in man which completes his proper being. It is upon 
such an understanding that Berdyaev's optimistic view o~ 
man is based, as it is embodied in his teaching of human 
creativity. But such a view of the image introduces a clear 
distinction between the human and the dlvine elements in man, 
making it less than certain that Berdyaev's doctrine of 
human creativity actually is the ~firmation of man's being 
per ~ be~ore God the Creator . In such a doctrine of the 
11 image o~ God 11 is the goodness o~ the creation preserved? 
Is the integrity o~ man preserved? If it is possible to say 
that the divine element, the image , is man's being, then the 
words 11 God 11 or 11divine 11 seem to have no distinct meanings 
reserved unto themselves . The fluid relationship between 
"human" and 11divine 11 makes ~or an ambiguity at the very 
point where Christian experience seems to require the pre-
servation of a clear distinction . 
Berdyaev's interpretation o~ the image goes to the very 
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heart of his anthropology , which for him is also his Christo-
logy. Here he shares a perspective similar to the ancient 
Apollinarian doctrine which taught that while Christ had a 
human body and a human soul , his spirit as the highest aspect 
of his being was not human but divine. The term "impersonal 
humanity" could apply to the humanity of his anthropology 
since the real essence of the persona is not human but 
divine. As an anthropology this is reminiscent of Gnostic 
anthropology, in which man's body and soul are considered to 
be part of this world and subject to its destiny, but en-
closed in the soul is the spirit or pneuma which is a portion 
of the divine substance existing in a fallen world. 
When Berdyaev ' s interpretation of the "image of God" 
. 
is viewed together with his positions on the other points 
discussed in this chapter, the implications for the problem 
of salvation begin inescapably to assert themselves. vVhen 
he holds that God is only present and active and real in 
one's subjectivity, that God is not a personal 11 1 11 but is 
personal in the sense that he is experienced by persons, 
that the really important thing about Christ is not his his-
torical life but that he has revealed the true nature of 
man 's relation to the immanent God--then the crucial nature 
of his realistic interpretation of the image seems to suggest 
a particular way of salvation which is at variance ith the 
experience of the Christian community. This is the inward 
way to God , the way of the mystic , the way of mystical re-
flection or introspection so far as one ' s subjective being 
is concerned, and the way of asceticism and non- attachment 
so far as the objective world is concerned . With logical 
consistency this notion is reflected in the drastic reduction 
of the role of Christ as Savior , the underestimation of the 
seriousness and persistence of human sin together with the 
optimistic estimate of human capabilities, the assertion of 
the essential meaninglessness of the objective world, the 
devaluation of historical Christianity as a saving force in 
the world . 
(B) Berdyaev's teaching on the 11 image of God" seems to 
convey something of the meaning of Christian experience in 
the three following ways . 
( 1} A limited appreciation of his thought on the "image 
of God 11 in man may be f ound in interpreting his language as 
an endeavor to give expression to the actual transformation 
effected in human nature by union with God through Christ . 
If the Christian experienc e of God involves a dynamic re-
orientation of the self , with a result ing wholeness of being 
and a heightening of personal freedom and spiritual sensi-
tivities , then Berdyaev has given expression to this aspect 
of its meaning with his emphasis upon personal experience in 
religion. But Christian thought has usually understood the 
union of the person with God to be a faith union, a genuine 
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11 I-Thou11 relationship and not an ontological fusion of the 
believer with God. If divine grace is experienced as a 
bestowal upon the human person, then the distinction between 
Creator and creature mus t not be blurred. 
(2) If, in the Christian experience of God, God is not 
on the periphery but at the very center, then it can be said 
that Berdyaev, in his thought about the image, gives expres-
sion to an insight which is essential to an understanding 
of the meaning of Christian experience. Berdyaev rejects 
the notion that personality can be fully defined and deooribed 
apart from the reality of God, so as to make God an intrusion 
and a superfluous element in the being of personality. It 
is a Christian insight that man's concrete nature lies in 
his relationship to God, that a purely autonomous definition 
of personality is an abstraction and does not correspond to 
the full content of human experience . 
(3) If man , as a free and responsible being, experiences 
God in such a way that the experience has ethical conse-
quences, then Berdyaev's idea of the 11 image of God 11 in man 
may be said to give support to this ethical aspect . This is 
the case because his thought at this point , by perceiving 
in each man the same quality of uniqueness as a manifestation 
of the divine , provides the basis for regarding all men 
with reverence . 
~8 
4· Conclusion 
In the evaluation of the adequacy of Berdyaev's thought 
to interpret the meaning of Christian experience, strong 
negative conclusions have been drawn. The crucial problem 
in his thought, when it is viewed in the light of such a 
test, lies in his idea of God. A God who is not personal 
(at least in the sense that man is personal), who does not 
transcend his creation in some manner which clearly distin-
guishes his being from the being of his creation, who is 
not active in man's objective environment, who is good but 
whose goodness is asserted in such a way that his ability 
to overcome evil is threatened by an inner dualism--such a 
God is something less or other than what the Christian 
experience of God would seem to require. If religion can be 
defined as ultimate concern , then man's ultimate concern for 
his own being must find in the Object of his worship a simi-
lar ultimate concern for man ' s being . Such an ultimate con-
cern on the part of God characterizes the way in which 
Christianity has interpreted the meaning of the Cross . 
The conclusions of this study seem to suggest that 
Berdyaev's lasting contribution to the ongoing task of 
Christian theology will not be in the area of theology pro-
per , and in particular the doctrine of God , but it will 
rather lie in the persistent and urgent manner in which he 
defends the reality and value of man ' s own existence . The 
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positive conclusions which were drawn in the preceding eval-
uation point in this direction. It is here that his thought 
is most virile and suggestive. Perhaps the greatest task of 
Christian theology today is not the defense of God but the 
defense of man; and if this is true, then Berdyaev was right 
in his contention that an anthropodicy is more basic than 
a theodicy--although he went further than this in holding 
that a true anthropodicy would be a theodicy. 
Berdyaev ' s total commitment to the idea of the dignity 
of man--in his case, even to the point of supposing that a 
transcendent God would be a threat to the true image or 
man--is a perennial necessity for Christian thought. It was 
this commitment on his part which led him to embrace the 
Christian faith and to seek support of this commitment to 
human dignity by means of Christological speculation. But 
from a theological point of view, Berdyaev's attempt to 
develop a Christian humanism appears to be more humanistic 
than Christian. This is shown in his contention that man is 
to come to salvation only through resources which he finds 
within his own being (to which resources the name 11 divinity11 
-is given), that man is not to be dependent upon God for 
pardon or salvation 1 
1. At this point, by a curious reversal of ideas, the very 
thing which has characterized the traditional Christian 
understanding of sin, i.e., the desire to be indepen-
dent of God, has become for Berdyaev the mark of man's 
spiritual health. 
A serious assertion of human dignity and value has its 
implications for the Christian doctrine of salvation, as 
Berdyaev so well understood. It means a movement away from 
a viewpoint in which man can only confess, repent and remain 
passive before God, and in which salvation is understood 
primarily as a change of man's status before God which tran-
spires apart from man himself. Such a position understands 
salvation as a completely divine operation to which man may 
bring nothing. Berdyaev's thought is suggestive when it as-
serts that Christology points to positive resources and 
possibilities in man. He sees that salvation muat not be 
understood as the self-emptying by man of his unique human 
powers and qualities, but rather their transformation so 
that they may receive their fullest expression. But whereas 
a Christian doctrine of salvation seems to call only for the 
recognition of a positive relationship between salvation 
and resources immanent in the human person, Berdyaev seems 
to make the more extreme suggestion that salvation and human 
creativity have to do only with resources immanent in the 
human person. 
Berdyaev's doctrine of uncreated freedom, when it is 
made the foundation of a metaphysics (as he does make it), 
is indeed difficult to reconcile with the implications of 
Christian experience. But when this doctrine is seen as a 
symbolic representation of man's role in his encounter with 
God , then it is not so strange . The 11 uncreated freedom" 
aspect of man's being can be seen as a cosmic guarantee that 
man is not reduced to a cipher in the God-man encounter . 
Berdyaev felt that anything which is created by God is, by 
virtue of that very fact , directly and completely control-
lable by God . "Uncreated freedom" can be taken to mean that 
man has a positive role to play in his own salvation. Divine 
grace, consequently, is not some irresistible force which 
suffocates man; rather, divine grace addresses man in his 
freedom, and man responds by offering up his freedom to God 
in order that it may be transformed into a full, constant 
and meaningful human existence . Thus , in a real sense, 
Christian salvation can be understood as the affirmation of 
the self in God . The self accepts the God who accepts the 
self . Such an understanding of the meaning of the divine -
human encounter affirms an inseparable link between the 
creative and the redemptive activity of God . The human self 
which God initially created , being the highest creation by 
virtue of the "image of God , 11 is not despised in salvation 
but rather comes to its intended fulfillment . Salvation is 
therefore the affirmation of God ' s creation . 
The positive content of Berdyaev' s doctrine of man, 
as expressed in his idea of human creativity , is not ne-
gated by the questionable and s peculative aspects of his 
thought . Though this anthropological theme is consistent 
with his particular views of the world , God , Christ , and 
man , it is not inextricable from such a thought system. The 
very fact that Berdyaev's thought can be disentangled at 
this point is reflected in the observation that the appre-
ciation for his thought which is generally expressed by 
Christian theologians centers in his defense of man's dig-
nity , positive value and freedom. 
Man's dignity, positive value and freedom is an emphasis 
~hich is also compatible with a more evangelical interpre-
tation of the Christian faith . (1) Man may be understood to 
be called to a creative role in the world, not because he 
thinks himself to be confronted by a hostile world which 
1 threatens his very being, but because the Creator God has 
given to man the limited freedom of deter~nation, which per-
mits man to be a participant in the ongoing creativity of 
God . The imperative for creativity , then , is not understood 
to be the negative quality of the world in which man lives, 
but the positive quality of God ' s own purpose which embraces 
both man and his objective environment . 
(2) Man may understand his creative role to be his 
response, not to an awareness that there is no transcendent 
personal deity who actively supports personal values in the 
world , but to the awareness that in his gift of freedom and 
1 . Th~s aspect of Berdyaev ' s thought seems to inject an 
element of near-desperation into his notion of human 
creativity . 
an environment in which to exercise this freedom,he has ex-
perienced the grace of a personal, transcendent God who both 
creates persons and wills the development of personality to 
its fullest potential . 
(3) Man may see the necessity for the creative expres-
sion of his own powers, not as the only way in which divine 
goodness may be effected in the world, but as a free and 
grateful response to the divine goodness which he has al-
ready experienced and as an effort to extend the divine 
goodness to all human relationships . 
(4) Man may see the possibility of creativity primarily 
established, not in "Christ" as a dogmatic symbol of the ideal 
relationship between human nature and divine nature, but in 
the life and sacrifice of Jesus Christ , who is the revelation 
of God's willingness to forgive sinners , of God ' s desire 
to restore them to fellowship with himself , and of the 
initiative of divine love to break through human hopeless-
ness and to a aken men to a new existence . 
(5) And lastly, man can give expression to his creative 
role, not because of a literally divine element in his be-
ing which makes his self- expression a kind of theurgy , but 
because of the gift of freedom and selfhood from God which 
is a reflection of God's own freedom and selfhood in a 
finite existence . 
Perhaps the most important thing about Berdyaev was 
what he was trying to say rather than the particular way 
in which he said anything . It is generally the case that a 
creative thinker does not provide for the advancement of 
thought along a broad front, but rather makes his lasting 
contribution to some particular point . These concluding re-
marks have tried to indicate where Berdyaev's significant 
contribution lies . Though the course of Christian theology 
may find it at varying positions between the poles of theo-
centric and anthropocentric thought, the burden of Berdyaev~ 
thought about man--his freedom, dignity, value, creativity--
must not be lost. 
CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLU.S IONS 
A number of conclusions have been drawn in the course 
of this study which can now be listed in a formal manner. 
(1) Berdyaev, in his teaching on human creativity, was 
giving expression to a certain understanding of the rela-
tionship between God and man. He was, in fact, by making 
the self-fulfillment of human personality the central con-
cern of human creativity, and by attempting to speak of 
this 1ithin the framework of an openly-declared Christian 
stance, giving an interpretation of the meaning of Christian 
salvation. 
(2) In this attempt to develop a more adequate doc-
trine of Christian salvation , Berdyaev sho1s the influence 
of the Eastern Orthodox Church in his moderate view of hu-
man sin and in his vision of the transfigured universe, but 
he appears consciously to reject the negative ascetic ideal 
of the Christian life which prevails in the Eastern Ortho-
dox Church. 
(3) Berdyaev's teaching on human creativity rests upon 
six major theological presuppositions . (a) As understood 
from a basic dualistic attitude, man's ~orld environment 
does not support human values and is void of the presence 
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of God . (b) The Creator God is totally immanent in his 
creation, the human person. (c) God is basically imperson-
al mystery, but God appears or is imaged as a personal 
being in religious experience. (d) The concept of Ungrund 
points to a radical tension in the divine life, a tension 
between divine power and divine goodness. This tension 
centers in the existence of man, where it alone can be 
resolved. ( e) "Christ 11 means the personal ideal image of' 
man's self-realization, and also the cosmic ideal of the 
corporate self-realization of the world. (f) The "image of 
God" signifies a divine element which is really present in 
man, constituting him a personal, spiritual, creative 
being . 
(4) The positions of Paul Tillich and L. Harold De lolf' 
stand in contrast to Berdyaev's basic dualistic outlook . 
Berdyaev holds that man lives in a world which is basical-
ly meaningless and that within this basic meaninglessness 
man's role is that of the bearer of meaning . Tillich as-
serts that the world is neither basically meaningless nor 
basically meaningful, but rather ambiguous at this point . 
Because the world is not basically meaningless, man need 
not look to some other realm for his salvation; but because 
the world is not basically meaningful, no assertion of 
man's ultimate salvation is made. Deiolf, in a position 
hich is virtually a reversal of Berdyaev's position, as-
serts the basic meaningfulness of the world in which man 
lives and then attempts to find a place for evil and mean-
inglessness within this fundamental interpretation. 
(5) In contrast to Berdyaev's position that God the 
Creator is tota~ly immanent in the subjectivity of persons, 
Tillich holds that God the Creator is immanent in both the 
subjective self and its objective correlate, the world. 
Though he speaks of the self-transcending nature of crea-
tion, there is no direct indication of the transcendent 
nature of God the Creator, who is primarily the creative 
ground of all existence . DeWolf conceives of the created 
world as being in God at its deepest level of existence, 
but the created world is an expression of the divine mind 
and divine po er thich transcend any particular expression 
in the process of creation. 
(6) Both Berdyaev and Tillich hold that God is basi-
cally impersonal mystery hich is imaged as a peraonal 
being in religious experience . In contrast to this, De olf 
finds in the concept of 11 pers on 11 a valid and significant 
insight into the nature of God as he is in his independent 
existence. 
(7) The distinction which Berdyaev makes bet een the 
Absolute God of the Ungrund and God the Creator is similar 
i n nature to the polarity of power and meaning , or of the 
abyss and logos , which Tillich asserts to be true of the 
divine life . The two theologians differ in their conception 
of the relationship of these two elements . For Berdyaev, 
the polar relationship is unbalanced in favor of dynamics, 
which means that the basic life of the universe is without 
structure , and that God is a "becoming" God subject to a 
process which has the character of a divine fate . For 
Tillich, the polar elements exist in balance and are united 
within the unity of the divine life . This balance is a given 
aspect of the divine life and suggests that the divine life 
has its own tructure within which this balance is possible . 
DeWolf rejects this notion of a tension between the divine 
logos and the divine abyss , as held by both Berdyaev and 
Tillich, because of the spectre of ultimate dualism which 
seems to accompany it . He holds that the divine power and 
the divine goodness are har monious , inseparable aspects of 
God ' s being , hich is a being of complet e self- unity . 
(8) For both Berdyaev and Tillich , Christology is 
primarily a matter of man ' elf- realization and essentially 
non- historical in orientat ion . Berdyaev , in the use of the 
term 11 God-:ma.nhood" (his main christol ogical term) , refers 
to a reality immanent in human subjectivity . Tillich, how-
ever, in the use of the term "Ne Being" (his main christo-
logical term) , seems to indicate a reality hich in ooe 
sense exists independently of the human person . In contrast 
to both Berdyaev and Tillich, DeWol£ holds to a genuine 
personal continuity between Jesus and Christ, and insists 
that the Gospel records are a significant statement of his-
torical truth about the life of Jesus . Jesus, by freely 
surrendering himsel£ to the Divine ill, according to God's 
unique purpose and initiative for him, became the supreme 
expression of God's attitude and purpose in historical time. 
(9) Berdyaev sees the "image of God" as a divine ele-
ment really and actually present in man, constituting the 
highest aspect of man's being . In this idea he gives ex-
pression to the notion of man's divinization held by the 
Ea tern Orthodox Church, and expresses a most intimate rela-
tionship bet een hat is human and what is divine . Tillich 
rejects any realistic interpretation of the 11 1mage of God" 
in man because he rejects a meaningless any language which 
peaks of the finite person a a unity of a divine element 
and a human element . He tends to see the image in the total 
tructure of the finite human per on . De olf also re ects 
Berdyaev's interpretation of the image His o interpret a -
tion is personal and ethical in nature , differing from the 
ontological interpretations of both Berdyaev and Tillich. 
(10) Berdyaev s theological thought , expressed in the 
six ma r presuppositions for his teaching on human crea-
tivity hich were entioned in (3) above , exhibits a general 
~0 
internal consistency . The only problem appears in relating 
his cosmic optimism, as expressed in his idea of the cosmic 
Christ or universal salvation , to the rest of his thought 
~ith its basic subjectivism and failure to assert a mean-
ingful view of divine providence . 
(11) Testing the adequacy of Berdyaev 1s dualism to 
interpret the meaning of Christian experience, the study 
noted three inadequacies in its depreciation of man's world 
environment . (a) It fails to identify the Savior God with 
the Creator of the natural world . (b) It endangers the unity 
of the Chris tian experience of God and Christian thought 
about God's activity in the world . (c) It does not pro-
vide for the unity of Christian experience as a basis for 
the verification of Christian truth. 
A particular strength of Berdyaev 1s thought at this 
point is its insistence that man ' s spir it requires more 
than the natural world for its life . 
(12) ~erdyaev 1 s doctrine of God as found to express 
inadequately the meaning of Christian experience at three 
points . (a) The impersonal nature of God does not ade-
quately support the element of personal trust and vital 
encounter found in Christian experience . (b) The total 
immanence of God in his creation does not adequately ex-
press the sense of God's otherness and the element of 
divine judgment . (c) The ten8ion in the divine life bet~een 
the divine power and the divine goodness does not ade-
quately express the divine ability to meet human need . 
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Berdyaev 1 s doctrine of God seems to express adequately 
the meaning of Christian experience in three ways . (a) In 
it~ idea of the Ungrund it suggests the ultimate unity of 
all being . (b) In the emphasis on freedom , it provide3 for 
diversity of being . (c) It presents a religiously available 
God . 
(13) Berdyaev ' s Christology is inadequate to express 
the meaning of Christian experience for three reasons . 
(a) This Christology has no concern for the historical ex-
istence of Jesus Christ and thus endangers the concrete 
nature of Christian experience . (b) There is no necessity 
for an understanding of Christ as mediator , since the im-
manence of God in the human person eliminates the need for 
mediation . (c) This Christ ology does not acknowledge the 
ultimacy and finality of the histor i cal revelation of God 
in Christ and hence it doe not upport the absolute nature 
of the Christian commitment to the God revealed in Jesus 
Christ . 
There are two ways in which Berdyaev 1s Christology 
may be said to express adequately the meaning of Christian 
experience . (a) His Christology lies at the very center of 
his thought , i . e . , his thought is christocentric just as 
Christian experience is christocentric . (b) Berdyaev 1 s 
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Christology is suggestive in its contention that Christol-
ogy can be useful in stating the meaning of Christian 
personality. 
( J.4) Berdyaev's thought on the "image of God" in man 
is inadequate to express the meaning of Christian experi-
ence for two reasons. (a) It does not give proper recogni-
tion to man's finitude and creaturehood. (b) It is ques-
tionable whether Berdyaev, in this particular aspect of his 
thought, is really affirming man's whole being before the 
Great or God . 
The strengths of Berdyaev's thought at this point are 
three in number. (a) It represents an endeavor to give ex-
pression to the actual transformation effected in human 
nature by union with God through Christ. (b) It insists 
that personality can only be defined and described in re-
lationship to God . (c) It provides for a basis for regard-
ing all men with reverence . 
(15) The lasting value of Berdyaev's thought is seen 
to lie in the persistent and urgent manner in which he 
defends the reality and value of man's own existence . The 
adequate and sugge tive features of Berdyaev's theological 
thought, which have been mentioned above in the test of the 
ability of his thought to interpret the meaning of Chriatian 
experience, point in thia direction . 
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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this study is (1) to explore the theo-
logical significance of Berdyaev's idea of human creativity 
and to determine its relation to a Christian doctrine of 
salvation, and (2) to identify the major theological pre-
suppositions which undergird this idea, compare them with 
the thought of Paul Tillich and L. Harold DeWolf, and eval-
uate them. 
The study engages the thought of Berdyaev at its most 
inclusive and determinative point--his dualism of spirit 
and nature . It then narrows to an investigation of the con-
tent and meaning which is given to the idea of "spirit." 
On the basis of theological meanings which appear, the pre-
liminary conclusion i~ drawn that the main theological con-
cern of Berdyaev's teaching on human creativity involves the 
problem of a particular understanding of man's relationship 
to God . ollowing a tudy of Berdyaev's doctrines of God 
and man, and an identification of the marks of the creative 
experience of God and its co~mic consequences, the conclu-
sion is dram that Berdyaev , in his teaching on human crea-
tivity, seeks to give an interpretation of the meaning of 
Christian salvation . 
Berdyaev's concept of human creativity is supported 
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by six major theological presuppositions . (1) Ian's world 
environment does not support human values and is void of 
the presence of God . By comparison , Tillich asserts that 
the world is neither basically meaningless nor basically 
meaningful, and DeWolf asserts the basic meaningfulness of 
the world . 
(2) The Creator God is totally immanent in his crea-
tion, the human person . Tillich asserts the in~nence of 
God in both the self and its objective world as the ground 
of being . DeWolf sees the created world as an expression of 
the Divine mind,which transcends any of its particular ex-
press ions . 
(3) God is basically impersonal mystery , but appears 
as a personal being in religious experience . This is essen-
tially the view of Tillich, but De olf holds that 11 person 11 
-is a valid insight into the very nature of the Divine elf . 
(4) The concept of Ungrund points to a radical tension 
in the divine life between divine power and divine goodness, 
a tension hich centers in the existence of man here it 
alone can be resolved . For Berdyaev , this tension is unbal-
anced in favor of the dynamic pole . Tillich, with a similar 
notion of tension , holds that the polar elements exist in 
balance in the divine life . DeWolf rejects this notion of 
tensicn in God in favor of a vie of God's complete self-
unity . 
(5) 11 Christ 11 means the personal ideal image of man's 
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self- realization , and also the cosmic ideal of the corpor-
ate self- realization of the world . Tillich's Christology 
is also without an essential historical content, 1ihile 
DeWolf insists upon the personal continuity between Jesus 
and Christ . 
(6) The 11 image of God" signifies a divine element 
which is really present in man, constituting him a person-
al , spiritual, creative being . Tillich rejects the idea of 
a finite person being the unity of a divine element and a 
human element, and associates the image with the total 
structure of the finite person . DeWolf associates the image 
with the personal and ethical qualities of the human person. 
These presuppositions were submitted to a test of 
internal consistency and to a test of their ability to in-
terpret and support the meaning of Christian experience . 
Berdyaev's thought exhibits a general internal consis-
tency . The only pr·oblem appears in relating his co mic 
optimism to the rest of his thought with its basic subjec-
tivism and its failure to assert a meaningful vie of divine 
providence . 
Both eaknesses and strengths were noted in the test 
of the adequacy of Berdyaev ' s theological thought to inter-
pret and support the meaning of Christian experience . 
(1) Hi duali m, ith its depreciation of man's orld 
environment, is inadequate because (a) it fails to identify 
the uavior God ~ith the Creator of the natural world; (b) 
it endangers the unity of the Christian experience of God 
and Christian thought about God ' s activity in the world; 
and (c) it doe not provide for the unity of Christian ex-
perience as a basis for verification of Christian truth. 
But a strength of Berdyaev ' s thought at this point is its 
contention that man's spirit requires more than the natural 
world for its life . 
(2) Berdyaev 1 s doctrine of God is inadequate because 
(a) the impersonal nature of God does not support personal 
trust and vital encounter; (b) the total immanence of God 
does not express the sense of God's otherness and divine 
judgment; and (c) the tension in the divine life bet ~een 
divine power and divine goodness detracts from the ability 
of God to meet hwnan need . Three otrengths in Berdyaev's 
doctrine of God are (a) the suggestion of the ultlmate 
unity of being ; (b) the provision for diversity of being; 
and (c) a religiou ly available God . 
(3) Berdyaev's Christology is inadequate because (a) 
it has no es ential relati nship to the historical person 
Jesus Christ; (b) there is no sense of Christ as mediator, 
since the immanence of God in the human person eliminates 
the need for mediation; and (c) the historical revelati n 
of God in Christ i not seen to possess ultimacy and final-
ity . The strengths of Berdyaev's Christology are (a) the 
chri tocentric nature of his thought , and (o) hi suggestion 
that Christology can be useful in stating the meaning of 
Chr1stian personality . 
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(4) Berdyaev's thought on the 11 image of God" is in-
adequate because (a) it does not give proper recognition 
to man's finitude and creaturehood; and {b) it is question-
able whether Berdyaev is affirming man's whole being before 
the Creator God. The s trengths of Berdyaev 's thought at 
thi point are (a) its endeavor to give expression to the 
actual transformation effected in human nature by union 
with God through Christ; (b) its insistence that personal-
ity can only be defined and described in its relationship 
to God ; and (c) the provision of a basis for regarding 
all men with reverence. 
The lasting value of Berdyaev 's thought is seen to lie 
in the persistent and urgent manner in which he defends the 
reality and value of man ' s own existence . The positive 
aspects of his theological thought , as noted above, point 
in this direction . 
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